ESTOLAS and RICARDO SALVADOR,
E C I S I O N
this Petition for Review on
petitioners Josefina Estolas and Ricardo Salvador seek the reversal of
the Court of Appeals Decision dated 30 May 2002 and the
Resolution dated 22 January 2003 denying their motion for
reconsideration. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig,
Branch 168, adjudging petitioners herein (who were the defendants
thereat) jointly and severally liable for damages in the amount of
P75,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as exemplary damages.
pertinent facts, as appreciated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
18 October 1982 -
Plaintiff-appellee (now respondent) Raymundo Acena is appointed
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER WITH PERMANENT STATUS, of the Rizal
Technological College (RTC) by Dr. Lydia Profeta, President of said
college. Such appointment is approved by the Civil Service
earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of
the trial court. Aggrieved therefrom, petitioners, as represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition
contending that the Court of Appeals erred:
December 1985 - (1) Respondent Acena is extended a promotional
appointment as ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR effective 01 November 1985;
Effective 30 October 1985, and in view of his promotion to Associate
Professor, respondent Acena is designated ACTING ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
by President Profeta in an undated letter;
November 1985 - Respondent Acena assumes his position as Associate
Professor and receives the salary for such position per certification
of the personnel officer of RTC dated 04 November 1985;
January 1986 - Respondent Acena, thru a letter addressed to President
Profeta, rejects his appointment as Associate Professor because of the
provisions of Memorandum Circular No. 4 of the CSC which requires a
masteral degree to qualify for permanent appointment as Associate
January 1986 - President Profeta accepts the “rejection”;
March 1986 - Appellant-defendant Dr. Josefina Estolas (now petitioner)
is designated as Officer-in-charge of RTC in place of Dr. Profeta;
April 1986 - (a) Petitioner Estolas issues Memorandum Order No. 30,
Series of 1986, revoking the designation of respondent Acena as Acting
Administrative Officer effective on even date and designating
appellant-defendant (now petitioner) Ricardo Salvador in his stead;
The CSC receives a copy of the 09 January 1986 letter of respondent
Acena rejecting his appointment as Associate Professor;
Respondent Acena institutes Civil Case No. 53327 for Injunction and
Damages enjoining petitioner Estolas from implementing and enforcing
Memorandum Order No. 30 claiming that the same violated his rights to
security of tenure;
April 1986 - Respondent Acena amends his complaint;
April 1986 - Respondent Acena likewise files a letter-complaint with
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) for alleged illegal
termination of his services as Acting Administrative Officer;
1986 - Appointment of respondent Acena as Associate Professor is
approved by the CSC as temporary on the ground that respondent Acena
does not meet the educational requirement pursuant to CSC-Memorandum
Circular Series of 1985;
July 1986 - Respondent Acena also seeks the opinion of the CSC
regarding his appointment and status as Administrative Officer of the
March 1987 - Chairperson of the CSC, Celerina Gotladera, issues an
opinion in favor of respondent Acena holding that the latter is still
the administrative officer as he was appointed thereto under permanent
status and as his appointment as Associate Professor had been withdrawn;
1987 - The trial court issues an Order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner Estolas from
implementing Memorandum Order No. 30. The basis for said Order is
the 23 March 1987 opinion of CSC Chairperson Gotladera;
February 1988 - The MSPB dismisses respondent Acena’s complaint for
February 1988 - Respondent Acena demands for the withdrawal of the MSPB
order considering that Commissioner Gotladera had already ruled on the
March 1988 - The MSPB sets aside its 03 February 1988 order;
June 1988 - Aggrieved by the 23 March 1988 MSPB Order, petitioner
Estolas goes to the Office of the President on Petition for Review and
the same is indorsed for disposition to the CSC;
October 1989 - CSC issues Resolution No. 89-748 declaring that the
action of petitioner Estolas in revoking the designation of respondent
Acena as Acting Administrative Officer is in order, thus setting aside
the 23 March 1987 opinion of Commissioner Gotladera and the 23 March
1988 Order of the MSPB;
February 1993 - The trial court renders the assailed Decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:
considered, defendants are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay
plaintiff the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages with costs against defendants.”
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER ESTOLAS ACTED IN BAD FAITH WHEN SHE ISSUED
MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 30
preliminary matter, it is vital to note that we are not at all
unfamiliar with the factual milieu of this case. In Acena vs.
Civil Service Commission, a case anchored on the very same facts
that gave rise to the present petition, petitioner thereat (respondent
Acena herein) challenged the jurisdiction of the CSC in issuing
Resolution No. 89-748 dated 09 October 1989 setting aside the 23 March
1988 Order of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). We
pronounced in Acena that the CSC did not have jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for review filed therewith as it was filed out of
time. Thus –
IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO RESPONDENT ACENA
Here, it is
admitted by public respondent Commission and not disputed by private
respondent Estolas that the petition for review which can be considered
as an appeal from the decision of the MSPB dated March 23, 1988 was
filed outside the reglementary period. This being so, the public
respondent exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the petition
that was erroneously filed with the Office of the President.
Having exceeded its jurisdiction public respondent committed reversible
error when it set aside the order dated March 23, 1988 of the MSPB
which had long become final and executory. Final decision or orders of
the MSPB is an adjudication on the merits conclusive on the parties,
hence, it can no longer be subject to review (San Luis, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 80160, June 26,1989).
the case at bar. Petitioners insist that Memorandum Order
No. 30, relieving respondent Acena of his position as Acting
Administrative Officer, was validly issued as respondent Acena was
holding such position in an acting capacity only, as he had previously
accepted an appointment as Associate Professor. Moreover,
Memorandum Order No. 30 was issued only after the RTC Board of
Trustees, upon the recommendation of an Ad Hoc Committee on
Reorganization composed of representatives of management, faculty and
employees of the College, recommended the designation of petitioner
Salvador vice respondent Acena. Finally, as petitioner Estolas
acted rightfully in her official capacity in designating petitioner
Salvador, neither she nor petitioner Salvador can be made liable for
damages as damages can only be recovered if the acts complained of are
Acena, on the other hand, maintains that his promotion to Associate
Professor never took effect as he rejected said appointment, which
rejection was accepted by the then President of the RTC, before the
said appointment could be approved by the CSC. In his letter of
rejection, respondent Acena specifically stated his preference to stay
as Administrative Officer under permanent status as opposed to the
temporary position of Associate Professor. Thus, as his promotion
to Associate Professor never took effect, respondent Acena concluded
that he never abandoned his position as Administrative Officer.
law on damages prescribes that in order that one can have redress for
an act which caused him damage, the act must not only be hurtful, it
must also be wrongful. There must be damnum et enjuria. All in
all, in order to recover moral damages, the claimant must prove the
following: (1) there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there must be a
culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated
on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. In
herein case, the factual issue of whether or not the issuance by
petitioner Estolas of Memorandum Order No. 30 was wrongful has been
passed upon with finality by the MSPB way back in 1988 following our
ruling in Acena vs. Civil Service Commission. It should be recalled
that the MSPB Order set aside its earlier order dismissing respondent
Acena’s complaint for illegal dismissal because the CSC “through the
Chairman has already rendered its final determination on the
matter.” The relevant portions of the CSC resolution being
adverted to by the MSPB are quoted hereunder:
Records show that
then RTC President Lydia N. Profeta issued on December 9, 1985 an
appointment to Mr. Acena as Associate Professor and the same was
received in the Commission National Capital Region Office on January 6,
1986. Thereafter, on January 9, 1986, Mr. Acena wrote RTC
President Profeta that he prefers to remain as Administrative Officer
because this Commission might approve his appointment as temporary
because he does not possess a masteral degree. He asked that his
appointment as Associate Professor be withdrawn and that he will refund
whatever he received as salary of Associate Professor in excess of his
salary as Administrative Officer. In a letter dated January 13,
1986, RTC President Profeta wrote Mr. Acena that his appointment as
Associate Professor was withdrawn. The letter of Mr. Acena and
the letter of President Profeta were received on April 8, 1986 by the
National Capital Region. On April 10, 1986 by way of a 1st
indorsement, the said appointment of Mr. Acena as Associate Professor,
together with other appointments, were returned without action by the
National Capital Region to the RTC.
unaware of the withdrawal of the said appointment of Mr. Acena as
Associate Professor by then President Profeta, as the new
Officer-In-Charge of RTC, you resubmitted the said appointment to the
National Capital Region on May 20, 1986 and the NCR approved the same
as temporary because Mr. Acena does not meet the education requirements.
basis of the foregoing facts, this Commission holds that Mr. Raymundo
T. Acena is still Administrative Officer of that College having been
appointed thereto under permanent status and because his appointment as
Associate Professor had been withdrawn. The Supreme Court, in the
case of Mitra vs. Subido, G.R. No. L-21691, September 15, 1967, has
ruled that the appointing authority is empowered in the exercise of his
executive prerogative to withdraw an appointment he issued provided
that the same has not been irrevocably approved by the Commission.
Mr. Acena was paid the salary of Associate Professor, he, however,
refunded the salary differential as evidenced by OR#1609303 and
1608112. Moreover, Mr. Acena had timely expressed his desire to
remain as Administrative Officer under permanent status instead of
accepting the promotional appointment as Associate Professor under
temporary status before this Commission inadvertently approved the same
as temporary after it had been withdrawn. On the same premise,
the approval by this Commission of the appointment of Mr. Ricardo
Salvador as Administrative Officer in that college is withdrawn
inasmuch as Mr. Acena has not validly vacated the same. Pertinent
records of this Commission are hereby modified or corrected
accordingly. (Emphases supplied)
determination by the MSPB, which was based on the CSC opinion to the
effect that respondent Acena still held the position of Administrative
Officer in a permanent capacity at the time of the issuance of
Memorandum Order No. 30 is conclusive upon us.
disposed of this preliminary matter, we now unravel the first of two
issues posed in the instant petition, i.e., whether or not petitioner
Estolas, in conspiracy with petitioner Salvador, issued the said
memorandum in bad faith.
the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that, indeed,
petitioners acted in bad faith. Verily, such conclusion drawn
from facts is a conclusion of law which this Court may review.
as petitioner Salvador is concerned, it is reversible error on the part
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to have concluded that
petitioner Salvador acted in bad faith as such conclusion is completely
bereft of any rational basis. The evidence before us simply does
not support such valuation. Respondent Acena, grasping at straws,
tried to establish during the direct examination of petitioner Salvador
that despite the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court for
the petitioners to refrain from enforcing Memorandum Order No. 30,
petitioner Salvador continued to perform the duties of Acting
Administrative Officer through the signing of “payrolls, vouchers,
requisitions.” Petitioner Salvador denied the allegation which
prompted respondent Acena, through his lawyer, to remark that he will
have these papers subpoenaed. The records, however, do not reveal
if, indeed, respondent Acena followed through with his plan for
subpoena. What is more, no other matters were hurled at
petitioner Salvador that could establish acts of bad faith and
conspiracy with petitioner Estolas to illegally deprive petitioner
Acena of his position as Administrative Officer.
being a civil case, it was incumbent upon respondent Acena, as
complainant in the lower court, to prove that which he alleged.
To this burden, respondent Acena fell short. Thus, the
presumption of good faith holds. It is axiomatic that “to support a
judgment for damages, facts which justify the influence of a lack or
absence of bad faith must be alleged and proven.” In the absence of
contrary evidence, petitioner Salvador cannot be faulted in accepting
the designation of Acting Administrative Officer from his superior and
in exercising the duties and functions of the office.
as petitioner Estolas is concerned, however, we agree in the finding
that she acted in bad faith.
complaint for damages against petitioner Estolas was actually for the
single act of having issued Memorandum Order No. 30, allegedly in bad
faith, on 08 April 1986. This complaint, it should be stressed,
was filed the same day as the issuance of Memorandum Order No.
30. Thus, acts of bad faith on the part of petitioner Estolas
committed after the filing of the complaint necessarily are extraneous
matters that do not form part of respondent’s cause of action.
Respondent Acena, however, went on to introduce acts, purportedly
constituting bad faith, which transpired days, months and even years
after the filing of the complaint. The lawyers for petitioner
Estolas, for reasons this Court can only divine, did not object to the
presentation of additional issues. Consequently, and by operation
of law, such issues are considered as having been raised in the
pleadings. Under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure, issues which are not raised in the pleadings but which are
tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, shall be
treated in all respects as if they have been raised in the pleadings.
in addition to the basic issue of whether or not petitioner Estolas, in
conspiracy with petitioner Salvador, issued Memorandum Order No. 30 in
bad faith, several other incidental issues were taken up during the
gestational period of seven (7) years that this case was pending before
the trial court, all of which were duly scrutinized by both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals. The trial court ratiocinated thus:
a careful study of the records of the case and finding that the
allegations of the plaintiff to be meritorious, this Court is inclined
to rule in favor of plaintiff. Records indeed showed that
defendants displayed lack of good faith when they tried to remove
herein plaintiff as Acting Administrative Officer. In fact, despite the
refusal of plaintiff to accept the position of Associate Professor,
defendants ignored the same but instead continued on removing Acena’s
appointment as Associate Professor. Moreover, there has been a
request from two members of the Board of Trustees (Exhibits “F” and
“G”) for a meeting of the Board of Trustees to resolve the issues
surrounding the controversy on Acena’s promotion. However, herein
defendants simply disregarded such request instead proceeded on
implementing the questioned Memorandum and continually placed Acena in
the payroll as Associate Professor.
defendants (sic) demonstration of bad faith remained even during the
pendency of this case. After a restraining order was issued by
this Court, defendants persisted on enforcing Memo. Order No. 30.
Defendants acted similarly when an injunction was issued by this
Court. This contemptuous attitude of the defendants cannot be
viewed with favor.
we find inexcusable and laden with bad faith the actuation of
petitioner Estolas in resubmitting to the CSC for its approval the
appointment papers of respondent Acena as Associate Professor despite
the latter’s vehement rejection of said position and despite the
pendency of the case in the trial court. Worse still, petitioner
Estolas conveniently did not inform the CSC of the real picture of
respondent Acena’s appointment:
GASCON: After the case was filed the papers of Acena was (sic)
returned to the RTC notwithstanding the proceedings of this case, the
pendency of this case you returned the papers of Mr. Acena to the Civil
Service for confirmation of his appointment as Associate Professor, is
final issue on deck is the propriety of the award of moral and
exemplary damages. To resolve said issue, an examination of
factual circumstances would be necessary, a task that is clearly beyond
this Court’s dominium except –
This was already asked before. Yes, it was returned with all the
other papers because that (sic) will be no basis for his salary
inasmuch as this is still a case, no basis for his salary.
You mentioned about others which Mr. Acena is one of them?
Yes, Your Honor.
My question is, was there a restraining order regarding the designation
of the rest of the persons that you mentioned?
There was none, Your Honor.
There was only a restraining order and preliminary injunction as far as
Acena is concerned?
Yes, Your Honor.
GASCON: And that you did not inform the Civil Service when you
returned the papers of Acena for confirmation? You did not make
the proper information to the Civil Service of the pendency of this
case, is it not?
They know it, in Civil Service that there is a case.
GASCON: The question is yes or no, Your Honor.
The question is whether she inform (sic) the Civil Service of the
pendency of this case?
GASCON: Did you make the information?
I did not, Your Honor.
Did it not occur to you that if you have furnished the Civil Service of
the records of this case they could have acted differently? Did
it not occur to your mind that the Civil Service if officially informed
of this case before the Court, could have acted differently?
Yes, but I did not, Your Honor.
Is it not a fact that as President or OIC of the RTC that it is your
duty to inform the proceedings of this case to the Civil Service
considering that the appointment of Acena is being contested, did it
not occur to your mind?
It did not occur to my mind, your Honor.
another clear badge of bad faith on petitioner Estolas’s part was to
indicate respondent Acena as Associate Professor in the payroll despite
the trial court’s order of preliminary mandatory injunction for
petitioner Estolas to refrain from implementing Memorandum Order No. 30
as respondent Acena was still Administrative Officer, occupying said
position in a permanent capacity. Thus:
GASCON: Now, one last question you are defendant here in this
case from the very beginning in the payrolls of the RTC you indicated
that Acena was an Associate Professor, is it true?
I do not prepare payrolls, as President, sir.
GASCON: Are you aware of that fact that payrolls were prepared
despite the decision of the Civil Service despite the Injunction of
this Court and the pendency of this Injunction that payrolls were
prepared indicating that Acena was Associate Professor not
Administrative Officer, are you aware of that?
There was no decision yet, so in order to have the basis for his
salary, and Associate Professor is higher than Administrative Officer.
GASCON: The question is whether or not you are aware that the
payrolls were prepared whereby Acena was indicated there as Associate
Professor and not Administrative Officer.
I am aware that the payroll is prepared, sir.
Despite the preliminary injunction?
Yes, Your Honor.
GASCON: And you allowed this to happen?
GASCON: And it is a fact that Mr. Acena whenever he signs the
payroll always indicates “under protest” and despite the notation of
Mr. Acena that this is under protest you still allowed the payroll to
be prepared indicating Mr. Acena as Associate Professor and not
Administrative Officer contrary to the injunction issued by the Court
and the decision of the civil service, is it not?
Because my officer is the one who prepares the payroll.
Now, Madam Witness, as President of the Rizal Technological Colleges
who has the final say on the preparation of the payrolls?
There were several people who would sign.
Yes, but the last say must be the President, has the last say of that?
Yes, Your Honor.
And when this payroll were (sic) brought to your attention and they
have notice [sic] that the name of Acena indicated as Associate
Professor and not as an Administrative Officer despite the knowledge of
the restraining order you still approved the preparation of the
payroll, you admit that?
Yes, Your Honor.
When the findings are grounded on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
case at bar entails an excursion into the facts as the lower court’s
findings, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, were but
conclusions without citation of specific evidence upon which they were
based (exception no. 7). The lower court simply avowed:
foregoing remorseful acts of the defendants do not only warrant the
award of damages but also exemplary damages to deter others from
committing a similar act in the future (Ramnani vs. CA, 196 SCRA 731;
Diaz[,] et al., vs. Amante, L-9228, Dec. 26, 1958).
considered, defendants are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay
plaintiff the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages with costs against defendants.
lower court, as well as the Court of Appeals, missed out one very
crucial fact, i.e., damages are not presumed; the first requisite for
the recovery of moral damages is that there must be an injury, whether
physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant. There must be proof of physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, etc. The claimant must
satisfactorily prove the factual basis and causal connection thereof
with the defendant’s acts. Thus, the ultimate question that must be
asked is: did respondent Acena suffer damages from petitioner Estolas’s
wrongful act of issuing Memorandum Order No. 30 and from her acts of
bad faith as discussed above? Parenthetically, is petitioner
Salvador liable for damages considering that there is no adequate proof
of conspiracy with petitioner Estolas nor is there evidence of bad
faith on his part?
evidence supports respondent Acena’s claim for moral damages against
petitioner Estolas. The actuations of petitioner Estolas in
booting-out respondent Acena as Administrative Officer, which the
latter held in a permanent capacity, and in forcing the position of
Associate Professor – undisputedly a temporary position – down his
throat, fall squarely within Article 21 of the Civil Code on human
relations. On the witness stand, respondent Acena testified that as
a direct result of petitioner Estolas’s actuations, he felt insulted,
embarrassed and humiliated. He suffered “serious anxiety, moral
shock, sleepness nights” and even had to resort to “minimum
respondent Acena’s high position in the RTC community and the long
drawn out feud between him and the president of the college, we find
his claim of having suffered moral damages credible. The award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000 is likewise justified to set
an example for the public good and as a form of deterrent to the
repetition of the same act by others.
the contrary, petitioner Salvador cannot be made liable for moral
damages as it was not proved that he conspired with petitioner Estolas
in issuing Memorandum Order No. 30. Neither was it proved that he
acted in bad faith during all time material to the case.
Invariably, in order that a plaintiff (respondent Acena herein) may
maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff – a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
that petitioner Salvador cannot be made liable for moral damages,
neither can he answer for exemplary damages, the latter being allowed
only in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
WHEREFORE, premises considered the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 May 2002 and its Resolution
dated 22 January 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that
only petitioner Josefina V. Estolas is ordered to pay respondent
Raymundo Acena the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000) as
moral damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary
damages. With costs.
Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ.,
Sr., J., no part.
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
When the factual findings of the trial court and appellate courts are
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond the
issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee;
When the judgment of the appellate court is premised on a
misapprehension of facts or when it has failed to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered will justify a different
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence upon which they are based; and
When findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate
Justices Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now Supreme Court Associate Justice)
and Danilo B. Pine concurring, Rollo, pp. 31-37.
Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate
Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Danilo B. Pine concurring, Id. at 38.
Penned by Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo.
See Merit Systems Board Order dated 03 February 1988, RTC Records, Vol.
I, p. 451; TSN 12 December 1986, pp. 25, 57.
Per finding of CSC Chairperson Celerina G. Gotladera and per testimony
of CSC Director of Legal Affairs, Ernesto Basa (TSN, 10 October 1986,
See Exh. 16 for Respondent Acena.
This Court, in Acena vs. Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. 90780, 06
February 1991, 193 SCRA 623, 650), later declared that the CSC exceeded
its jurisdiction when it entertained the petition filed therein.
Please refer to discussion on page 5.
Rollo, pp. 18-45.
G.R. No. 90780, 06 February 1991, 193 SCRA 623, 630.
Custodio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116100, 09 February 1996, 253
Ibid., citing Comstock vs. Wilson, 257 NY 231, 177 NE 421, 76 ALR 676;
Haldeman vs. Bruckhart, 45, 45 Pa 514.
Francisco vs. Ferrer, Jr., G.R. No. 142029, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA
Supra, note 8.
MSPB Order dated 23 March 1988, RTC Records, Vol. I, p. 458.
RTC Records, Vol. I, pp. 407-408.
The rule on conclusiveness of judgment as the lesser known type of res
judicata means that the judgment in the prior action operates as an
estoppel only as to matters actually determined therein or which were
necessarily included therein (Vda. De Cruzo vs. Carriaga, Jr., G.R.
Nos. 75109-10, 28 June 1989, 174 SCRA 330).
Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110015, 11
July 1995, 245 SCRA 715, citing Binalay vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 92161, 18
March 1991, 195 SCRA 374.
TSN, 30 July 1991, p. 10.
Id., p. 12.
Article 527, Civil Code.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. vs. First Farmers Milling Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. L-29041, 24 March 1981, 103 SCRA 436, 442.
An amended complaint was subsequently filed a few days later, or on 14
April 1986, substantially reiterating the allegations in the original
Note that the complaint was filed in 1986 but the trial of the case
dragged on until 1992.
Whether or not petitioner Estolas, in conspiracy with petitioner
Salvador, acted in bad faith and is liable for damages --
When petitioner Estolas issued Memorandum Order No. 37 dated 10 April
1986 (Exh. “J” for Acena; TSN, Sept. 14, 1987, pp. 14-26) instructing
the administrative staff of the RTC to disregard an earlier memorandum
issued by respondent Acena wherein the latter called for the
maintenance of the status quo;
When, on May 20, 1986, petitioner Estolas indorsed to the CSC for
approval respondent Acena’s appointment papers for Associate Professor
despite the latter’s insistence that he had already seasonably rejected
said appointment and despite the pendency of the case; (TSN Sept. 16,
1991, pp. 8-11-15) and
When, despite the trial court’s order of injunction dated 15 May 1987,
petitioner Estolas secured the renewal of respondent Acena’s temporary
appointment as Associate Professor for the years 1987, 1988, 1999 and
1990. (TSN, 16 Sept. 1991, pp. 15-21)
Records, Vol. II, p. 823.
The order for preliminary injunction was actually handed down on 15 May
1987 (Records, pp. 193-194).
TSN, 25 May 1992, pp. 30-32.
The pertinent portion of the Order of preliminary injunction dated 15
May 1987 reads:
consideration of both oral and documentary evidence adduced by the
plaintiff, the Court is convinced that plaintiff has fully established
and proven the facts alleged in the Complaint that defendant Josefina
Estolas illegally and immorally issued Memorandum Order No. 30; and
upon further consideration of the fact that the plaintiff herein is the
duly appointed Administrative Officer of the Rizal Technological
Colleges, his appointment being approved and confirmed by the Civil
Service Commission (Exhibit “A”) which appointment, until the present
date, is permanent in nature, so that said plaintiff must continue to
perform all functions and responsibilities as Administrative Officer of
Rizal Technological Colleges, in order to serve the interest of the
public, which appointment was given strength in the Decision rendered
by Celerina G. Gotladera of the Civil Service Commission (Exhibit
‘S’).” (Records, Vol. I, pp. 193-194)
TSN, 25 May 1992, pp. 32-34.
Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117501, 08 July 1997,
275 SCRA 267, 279.
Records, Vol. II, pp. 823-824.
Article 2217, New Civil Code.
Philippine Veterans Bank vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 130439, 26 October 1999,
317 SCRA 510.
“Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages.”
TSN, 14 September 1987, p. 17.
TSN, 16 September 1991, p. 29.
Supra, note 9 at 490.
Supra, note 11 at 267; Art. 2229, Civil Code.