OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR.,
HON. ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Administrator
of the Land Registration Authority and the REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF MARIKINA CITY,
E C I S I O N
is a Petition for Review to reverse the Decision dated 29
November 2000 of the Court of Appeals (“appellate court”) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 55993. The appellate court affirmed the Resolution dated
21 May 1999 issued by the Land Registration Authority (“LRA”) in
Consulta No. 2879. The LRA ruled that a notice of lis pendens
based on a motion is not registrable.
Sandoval (“Sandoval”) and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. (“Ozaeta”) filed an
application for registration of title before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 152 (“land registration court”), docketed as Case
No. 2858, Land Registration Case No. N-18887 (“LRC No. N-18887”).
The land registration court issued an order of general default and
hearings on the application followed. On 31 May 1966, the land
registration court granted the application. The decision became
final and executory, and the land registration court issued a
certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991.
National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA) issued on 20
October 1977 Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 in the names of Sandoval
and his wife Rosa Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome Lao.
July 1997, petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo Lopez, Oscar Lopez,
and Presentacion L. Psinakis (“petitioners”), heirs of Eugenio Lopez,
Sr., filed a motion in LRC No. N-18887. The motion alleged
that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the application to
the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23 September 1970. Petitioners
prayed that the court consider in the land registration case the Deed
of Absolute Sale over the lots executed by Sandoval and Ozaeta and
their respective spouses in favor of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. Invoking
Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (“PD 1529”), petitioners
also prayed that the court issue the decree of registration in their
names as the successors-in-interest of Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
land registration court gave due course to the motion and conducted
Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT Nos.
O-1603 and O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta and their spouses
only on 18 August 1998. The pertinent entries in the Decrees
This Decree is
issued pursuant to the Decision dated 31st day of May, 1966 of the Hon.
Pedro C. Navarro, Judge of [Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
II, Pasig, Rizal], and the Honorable Briccio C. Ygaña, this 3rd
day of July, 1998.
at the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration,
Quezon City, this 20th day of October, in the year of Our Lord nineteen
hundred and ninety-seven at 8:01 a.m.
Land Titles and Deeds
Entered in the
“Registration Book” for Marikina, pursuant to the provisions of section
39 of PD No. 1529, on the 18th day of August nineteen hundred and
ninety-eight, at 1:16 p.m.
Register of Deeds (Emphasis added)
filed another motion on 25 November 1998 to declare void Decree Nos.
N-217643 and N-217644 and Original Certificate of Title (“OCT”) Nos.
O-1603 and O-1604. Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs show
that incumbent Administrator Alfredo R. Enriquez signed the Decrees on
20 October 1997, before he assumed office on 8 July 1998 and even
before Hon. Briccio C. Ygaña issued the Order of 3 July 1998.
questioned the inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA to
recall the decrees. The LRA Administrator denied the request and
explained the inconsistencies in the dates in a letter dated 1
December 1998. The entire letter states:
Republic of the
Crisostomo A. Quizon
Makalintal Barot Torres & Ibarra Law Offices
Floor Benpres Building
Road corner Meralco Ave.
Center, Pasig City
concerns your letter requesting the recall of Decree Nos. N-217643 and
N-217644 issued in Land Registration Case No. N-2858, LRC Record No.
N-18887, both in the names of Alfonso Sandoval and his wife, Rosa Ruiz,
and Roman Ozaeta, Jr., and his wife, Ma. Salome Lao.
of this Authority show that aforesaid decrees of registration were
prepared on October 20, 1977 pursuant to the decision of the court
dated May 31, 1966 and the order for issuance of decree dated August
24, 1993. Said decrees were forwarded to the Office of the
Administrator on August 8, 1998 and was [sic] released therefrom on
August 13, 1998. Consequently, said decrees were signed sometime
between August 8 and 13 1998 and definitely not on October 20, 1997 as
what is reflected thereon because the undersigned Administrator assumed
office only on July 8, 1998. Apparently, at the time the decrees
were signed it was not noticed, through oversight, that they were dated
October 20, 1977. It is therefore hereby clarified that Decree
Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 were actually issued sometime between August
8 and 13 1998 and not on October 20, 1997.
the claim that these decrees were prematurely issued as the motion for
the issuance of the decrees in favor of the Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, the
properties involved having been sold to him by the applicants, is still
pending with the court, it is informed that no copy of said motion nor
of the order directing this Office to comment thereon appears on file
in the records of the case. Hence, these matters could not have
been taken into consideration in the issuance of the decrees. Had
the Administration been apprised of these incidents, perhaps the
issuance of the decrees could have been held in abeyance until the
court has resolved the same.
the recall of the decrees of registration, we regret to inform you that
since the certificates of title transcribed pursuant to said decrees
have already been issued and released by the Registrar of Deeds
concerned, it is now beyond our authority to recall them unless duly
authorized by the court.
hope that we have satisfactorily disposed of the concerns raised in
November 1998, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina
City an application to annotate the notice of lis pendens at the back
of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 on the ground that petitioners have filed
with the land registration court a motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603
and O-1604 void. Petitioners attached to the application a
copy of the 25 November 1998 motion and the pertinent OCTs.
letter dated 15 December 1998, the Register of Deeds of Marikina
City denied the application to annotate the notice of lis
pendens. The entire letter states:
Republic of the
of Deeds, Marikina City
Crisostomo A. Quizon
Floor, Benpres Bldg.
Road cor. Meralco Avenue
is in connection to [sic] your application to have a Notice of Lis
Pendens [annotated] at the back of OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 issued in
the name of ALFONSO SANDOVAL AND SPOUSE.
to Sec. 76, PD No. 1529[,] the contents of the notice are the name[s]
of the parties, the court where the action is pending, the date the
action was instituted and a copy of the compalint [sic] in order to
determine if the person named in the title is impleaded.
regret to inform you that the application, bereft of the original
petition or compaint [sic] upon which this office will base its action,
do not agree with our findings, you can, without withdrawing the
documents you submitted, elevate the matter en consulta five (5) days
from receipt hereof to the Office of the Administrator, Land
Registration Authority, East Avenue cor. NIA Road, Quezon City.
January 1999, three days after receipt of the letter, petitioners
elevated the denial in consulta to the LRA. The case was docketed
as Consulta No. 2879.
Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
resolution dated 21 May 1999, the LRA stated that the sole question
for resolution is whether a notice of lis pendens is registrable based
on a motion to declare void the decrees and titles. The LRA
agreed with the Register of Deeds that a notice of lis pendens based on
a motion is not registrable. Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, the LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the
legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens relative to the
LRA focused on petitioners’ standing in LRC No. N-18887. The LRA
declared that petitioners are not parties in LRC No. N-18887.
Since a land registration case is a proceeding in rem, an order of
general default binds the whole world as a party in the case.
Petitioners are mere movants whose personality the court has not
admitted. Based on Section 26 of PD 1529, the LRA ruled that
petitioners should have filed a motion to lift the order of general
default. Pertinent portions of the LRA decision read:
Until and after
the Order of General Default in LRC Case No. 18887 is lifted,
petitioners cannot be clothed with personality as oppositors in said
land registration case by merely filing a motion after a judgement has
been rendered. Such being the case, a notice of lis pendens on
the basis of the motion filed by petitioners cannot be admitted for
registration. To rule otherwise would preempt the judgment of the
Court in so far as the personalities of the movants as oppositors in
the land registration case is concerned.
premises considered, this Authority is of the opinion and so holds that
the notice of lis pendens is not registrable.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
petitioners filed before the appellate court a petition for review of
the LRA’s decision. Petitioners filed the petition on the ground
of manifest error and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the LRA
Administrator when he ruled in Consulta No. 2879 that the notice of lis
pendens is not registrable.
appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The
appellate court reiterated the LRA’s ruling that only a party to a case
has the legal personality to file a notice of lis pendens.
Petitioners have no legal personality because they failed to file a
motion to lift the order of general default in the land registration
present the following issues for resolution of this Court:
PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES ISSUED BY THE LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS A PROPER BASIS FOR FILING THE NOTICE OF LIS
WHETHER PETITIONERS CAN FILE THE MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES
ISSUED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT IN LRC CASE NO. N-18887 DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE COURT HAS NOT LIFTED THE GENERAL ORDER OF DEFAULT.
Ruling of the Court
petition has no merit.
agree with the observation of the appellate court that the pleadings
filed by petitioners, public respondents and the Office of the
Solicitor General cite “more or less the same provisions of the laws as
applicable in support of their respective contentions but differ x x x
only with respect to their interpretation thereof.” With this
observation in mind, we quote the pertinent provisions of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and of PD 1529.
14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Notice of lis pendens. – In an action affecting the title or the right
of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when
affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office
of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is
situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice
shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or
defense, and a description of the property in that province affected
thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record
shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be
deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and
only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.
notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon
order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the
purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
76 of PD 1529 states:
Notice of lis pendens. – No action to recover possession of real
estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title
thereof, or for partition or other proceedings of any kind in court
directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof
or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to vacate
or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as
against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or
notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the
court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the
institution thereof, together with a reference to the number of the
certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land affected
and the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered.
of Lis Pendens
pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis
pendens refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court
acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of
the action, and until final judgment.
purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party
causing the registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to advise third
persons who purchase or contract on the subject property that they do
so at their peril and subject to the result of the pending
filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it
keeps the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the
court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of
the final judgment by successive alienations. Second, it binds a
purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to
the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate
subsequently. However, the filing of a notice of lis pendens does
not create a right or lien that previously did not exist.
a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after
relying only on the certificate of title is a purchaser in good
faith. Against such third party, the supposed rights of a
litigant cannot prevail, because the former is not bound by the
property owner’s undertakings not annotated in the transfer certificate
of title. Thus, we have consistently held that —
The notice of lis
pendens x x x is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the
court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident
in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not
affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to
constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property
that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they
may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to
the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to
those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The
cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere
incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having
jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or
removal x x x is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in
the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.
notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not only with title
or possession of a property, but also with the use or occupation of a
property. The litigation must directly involve a specific
property which is necessarily affected by the judgment. Magdalena
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals enumerated the
cases where a notice of lis pendens is appropriate:
[A] notice of lis
pendens is proper in the following cases, viz:
other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no application in the
a) An action to
recover possession of real estate;
action to quiet title thereto;
action to remove clouds thereon;
action for partition; and
other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to
the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.
decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should
contain a statement of the institution of an action or proceeding, the
court where the same is pending, and the date of its institution.
A notice of lis pendens should also contain a reference to the number
of the certificate of title of the land, an adequate description of the
land affected and its registered owner.
Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis pendens
because “the application was bereft of the original petition or
complaint upon which this office will base its action.” In consulta
to the LRA, petitioners pointed out that they have complied with the
requirements for the registration of the notice of lis pendens, as
Proceedings for the probate of wills;
Levies on execution;
Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased persons; and
Proceedings in which the only object is the recovery of a money
7.2.1 The Notice
of Lis Pendens contains a statement of the filing by the Heirs of
Eugenio Lopez of a motion to declare Original Certificates of Title
Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 null and void;
enumeration readily reveals that they have not complied with the
requisites. Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application
for a notice of lis pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and
not original parties, in LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not
parties to an action as contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they
failed to present the requisite pleading to the Register of Deeds of
Marikina City. We hold that the Register of Deeds correctly denied the
application for a notice of lis pendens.
It contains the name of the court wherein the motion is pending which
is “the registration court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 152, Pasig
City.” The date of the filing of the motion is shown on the
motion itself wherein the receipt of said motion by the land
registration court on November 25, 1998 is duly stamped;
The numbers of the Original Certificates of Title Nos. O-1603 and
O-1604 are clearly indicated in the notice;
There is adequate description of the land affected in the Notice of Lis
The names of the registered owners are indicated in Paragraph 4 of the
Motion attached to the Notice;
A copy of the motion to declare OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 null and
void, dated November 25, 1998 upon which the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal will base its action is attached as Annex “A” of the
Notice of Lis Pendens. (Emphasis in the original)
committed a fatal procedural error when they filed a motion in LRC No.
N-18887 on 16 July 1997. The remedy of petitioners is an action
for reconveyance against Sandoval, Ozaeta and their spouses.
Reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act
No. 3322, which states that “xxx in all cases of registration procured
by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies
against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the
rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title xxx.”
action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person
whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system
in another’s name. Although the decree is recognized as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is
not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for
reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of
justice and not with the land registration court. Reconveyance is
always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent
third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be
annotated on the certificate of title immediately upon the institution
of the action in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid
transfer to an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim
of the real owner.
of a Motion to Lift the Order of General Default
comment, the LRA states that under Section 26 of PD 1529 the order
of default includes petitioners. Therefore, petitioners’ failure
to move to lift the default order did not give them standing in the
case. As long as the court does not lift the order of general
default, petitioners have no legal standing to file the motion to
declare void the decrees of registration issued to the
applicant. Section 26 of PD 1529 provides thus:
Order of default; effect. – If no person appears and answers within the
time allowed, the court shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason
to the contrary appearing, order a default to be recorded and require
the applicant to present evidence. By the description in the
notice “To All Whom It May Concern”, all the world are made parties
defendant and shall be concluded by the default order.
an appearance has been entered and an answer filed, a default order
shall be entered against persons who did not appear and answer.
justification for filing a motion to annul the decrees and titles, as
opposed to filing a motion to lift the order of general default, rests
on two related assumptions. First, with the filing of the 16 July
1997 motion and giving of due course to the motion by the land
registration court, petitioners assert that they acquired legal
standing in the registration proceedings. Second, buyer Eugenio
Lopez, Sr. stepped into the shoes of the sellers-applicants Sandoval
and Ozaeta when applicants sold the property to him. As
successors-in-interest of the buyer, petitioners contend that they are
not strangers to the proceedings.
justify their two assumptions, petitioners traced the antecedent of
Section 22 of PD 1529 to Section 29 of Act 496 and its judicial
interpretation in Mendoza v. Court of Appeals.
22 of PD 1529 provides:
Dealings with land pending original registration.—After the filing of
the application and before the issuance of the decree of registration,
the land therein described may still be the subject of dealings in
whole or in part, in which case the interested party shall present to
the court the pertinent instruments together with the subdivision plan
approved by the Director of Lands in case of transfer of portions
thereof, and the court, after notice to the parties, shall order such
land registered subject to the conveyance or encumbrance created by
said instruments, or order that the decree of registration be issued in
the name of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said
pertinent portion of Section 29 of Act 496 provides:
After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the
decree of title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,
the land therein described may be dealt with and instruments relating
thereto shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds at any
time before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner as if
no application had been made. The interested party may, however,
present such instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of
presenting them to the office of the Register of Deeds, together with a
motion that the same be considered in relation with the application,
and the court, after notice to the parties shall order such land
registered subject to the encumbrance created by said instruments, or
order the decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of
the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments.
x x x
v. Court of Appeals explains the procedure in cases of conveyance
of the land subject of a registration proceeding by an instrument
executed between the time of filing of the application for registration
and the issuance of the decree of title.
The law does not
require that the application for registration be amended by
substituting the “buyer” or the “person to whom the property has been
conveyed” for the applicant. Neither does it require that the
“buyer” or the “person to whom the property has been conveyed” be a
party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to the land
registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are:
(1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested
party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation
with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties
to the case xxx.
also assert that they do not dispute the judgment of the land
registration court. However, this position is in conflict with
their 25 November 1998 motion to have the decree and the titles
declared void. Petitioners now assume the roles of both
successors-in-interest and oppositors. This confusion of roles
brought about petitioners’ grave error in procedure.
land registration court granted the application in LRC No. N-18887 on
31 May 1966 and issued a certificate of finality dated 8 March
1991. Petitioners filed their motion to consider the deed of sale
in the registration on 16 July 1997. Petitioners filed their
motion to have the decrees and the corresponding certificates of title
declared void on 25 November 1998. Petitioners filed both motions
long after the decision in LRC No. N-18887 became final and
executory. Neither petitioners nor even the applicants from whom
they base their claim presented the Deed of Sale before the land
registration court while the action was pending.
the facts and arguments as presented above, we hold that the motion
filed by petitioners is insufficient to give them standing in the land
registration proceedings for purposes of filing an application of a
notice of lis pendens. However, we disagree with the LRA and the
appellate court’s observation that petitioners need to file a motion to
lift the order of general default. A motion to lift the order of
general default should be filed before entry of final judgment.
The land registration court granted the application for registration of
title on 31 May 1966 and issued a certificate of finality on 8 March
1991. Petitioners filed their motion on 16 July 1997. Thus,
even if petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of general
default, the order of default could not be set aside because the motion
was filed out of time.
Toco v. Go Fay, this Court explained the effect of an order of
default to the party defaulted. A party declared in default loses
his standing in court. As a result of his loss of standing, a
party in default cannot appear in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or
be entitled to notice. A party in default cannot even appeal from
the judgment rendered by the court, unless he files a motion to set
aside the order of default under the grounds provided in what is now
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
in its comment before this Court, the LRA stated thus:
Under Section 26,
PD 1429, petitioners are deemed to have been included by the default
order. Those who did not file an answer should be considered as
having lost their standing in court from that stage (Republic v. Dela
Rosa, 173 SCRA 12) except when they file a motion to set aside the
order [of] default on the grounds mentioned in Section 3, Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court (Toco v. Fay, 80 Phil. 166).
land registration cases (as in the said LRC No. N-18887), an order of
general default was deemed to have been issued based on the presumption
of regularity in judicial proceedings (Pascual, et al. v. Ortega, et
al., 58 O.G. 12 March 1962 C.A.). Petitioners failed to adduce
any evidence showing that the order of general default was
lifted. Records disclosed that without first filing a motion to
lift the order of general default, petitioners filed a motion to
declare as null and void the decrees and titles. Until the order
of general default is lifted by the court, petitioner could not be
considered as a party to the action. They are deemed movants
whose personality as far as the case is concerned is not yet admitted
by the court considering that the order of default has not been
should be careful, however, to distinguish between movants as mere
interested parties prescribed under Section 22 of PD 1529 and movants
as intervenors-oppositors to the land registration proceedings.
It is only in the latter case that a motion to lift the order of
general default is required. It is only in the latter case that
the doctrine pronounced in Serrano v. Palacio, as repeatedly
invoked by the LRA and OSG, is applicable:
x x x
[P]etitioners committed an error of procedure when they filed a motion
to intervene in the x x x land registration case for the proper
procedure would have been for them to ask first for the lifting of the
order of general default, and then, if lifted, to file an opposition to
the application of the applicants. This is so because proceedings
in land registration are in rem, and not in personam, the sole object
being the registration applied for, and not the determination of any
right not connected with the registration (Estila vs. Alvero, 37 Phil.
are not mere interested parties in this case. By filing their
motion to have the decrees and the corresponding certificates of title
declared void, they took the role of oppositors to the application for
appellate court stated that “in as much as it would want to oblige to
the plea of petitioners to hasten or expedite the proceedings and to
avoid further expenses on the part of the petitioners, however[,] (it)
could not.” Indeed, it requires a delicate balancing act
between the objective of the Rules of Court to secure a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding and the
strict requirements for a notice of lis pendens. The facts in
this case show that petitioners have not complied with the requirements.
we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993 dated 29 November 2000.
J., (Acting Chairman),
Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ.,
Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate
Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Romeo A. Brawner, concurring.
Penned by Hon. Alfredo R. Enriquez, Administrator of the Land
Rollo, p. 28.
Ibid., pp. 35, 50, 54; CA Rollo, pp. 66-67.
Rollo, pp. 42-45.
Ibid., pp. 46-47. See also Rollo, pp. 52, 56, 234-235. The
pertinent portion of the Deed of Absolute Sale states that Sandoval and
Ozaeta warrant the “fil[ing] of the corresponding motion or
manifestation in Land Reg. Case No. N-2858, LRC Rec. No. N-18887, Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Alfonso Sandoval and Roman Ozaeta, Jr.,
Applicants, in order that the original certificates of title over the
said property will issue directly in the name of EUGENIO LOPEZ, his
heirs, administrators, or assigns.” However, Ozaeta later learned that
their counsel, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, never filed the appropriate motion.
Property Registration Decree.
Rollo, p. 58.
Ibid., pp. 50-57.
Ibid., pp. 50, 54. OCT No. O-1604 was issued by the National Land
Titles and Deeds Administration at 8:02 a.m.
Ibid., pp. 58-60. See also CA Rollo, pp. 42-48.
CA Rollo, pp. 66-67.
Rollo, pp. 64-65.
Ibid., p. 66.
Ibid., pp. 73-75.
Ibid., p. 75.
See ibid., p. 14.
Ibid., p. 36.
See 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens §1 (1948).
Viewmaster Construction Corp. v. Hon. Maulit, 383 Phil. 729 (2000)
citing Nataño, et al. v. Esteban, et al., 124 Phil. 1067 (1966),
Bisaya Land Trans. Co., Inc. v. Cuenco, 131 Phil. 627 (1968), and Heirs
of Maria Marasigan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-69303, 23
July 1987, 152 SCRA 253.
See Po Lam v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116220, 6 December 2000, 347
SCRA 86 citing Somes v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 62 Phil.
See Viewmaster Construction Corp. v. Hon. Maulit, supra note 21 citing
Pino v. CA, G.R. No. 94114, 19 June 1991, 198 SCRA 434, Dino v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 95921, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 422.
Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
60323, 17 April 1990, 184 SCRA 325 citing Heirs of Maria Marasigan v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-69303, 23 July 1987, 152 SCRA 253
and Tanchoco v. Aquino, No. L-30670, 15 September 1987, 154 SCRA 1.
Viewmaster Construction Corp. v. Hon. Maulit, supra note 21.
Supra note 24.
Amado D. Aquino, Land Registration and Related Proceedings 301 (1994).
Rollo, p. 66.
Ibid., pp. 69-70.
See Casillan v. Espartero, et al., 95 Phil. 799 (1954).
See Director of Lands, et al. v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al., 92
Phil. 826 (1953); Narciso Peña, Narciso Peña, Jr., and
Nestor N. Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds 132-134
Rollo, pp. 87-91.
The Land Registration Act.
No. L-36637, 14 July 1978, 84 SCRA 67.
80 Phil. 166 (1948).
Rollo, p. 89.
No. 15645-R, 31 August 1955, 52 O.G. 260.
Rollo, p. 40.
6 of Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.