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ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
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ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 62 -
IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF SUSPENSION OF THREE (3) MONTHS FROM THE SERVICE
AGAINST RODOR S. GAYAO, PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF ABRA
This refers to the administrative complaint
filed by Apolonia vda. de Carino against Provincial Prosecutor Rodor S.
Gayao of Bangued, Abra for grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
neglect of duty.
Records disclose that the murders case was filed by the complainant
with the Provincial Prosecution Office of Bangued, Abra on account of
the killing of her husband last November 11, 1990, in Gaddani, Tayum,
Abra. After preliminary investigation respondent Gayao filed on
February 4, 1991, the following cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 996 for
murder against Alejandro Alagao and Agibis Tugcay, (2) Crim. Case No.
1027, PP vs. Felix Dimaandal and Junie Bides for Murder, (3) Crim. Case
No. 1028, PP vs. Felix Dimaandal for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
(4) Crim. Case No. 653, PP vs. Fernando Tadeo, et al. for Multiple
Murder with Attempted Murder.
On February 20, 1991, the accused filed a motion for admission to and
reduction of bail. Respondent Gayao offered no opposition to the motion
and summarily wrote "No objection". On the basis of which the court, on
the same day and without notice and hearing, granted the motion and the
bail was reduced to only P20,000,00. Consequently, the court ordered
the release of the accused upon posting of bail. The complainant,
however, filed an appeal with the court and prosecutor's office
alleging that the granting and reduction of bail without notice and
hearing is null and avoid. During the hearing on the motion of 17 April
1991, the court ordered Gayao to submit his comment within the period,
prompting the court to issue an order on May 6, 1991, sustaining its
earlier approval of the motion of the accused but increased the amount
of bail from P20,000.00 to P50.000,00. On May 21, 1991, the complainant
filed a motion for reconsideration. This time, respondent Gayao
reverted to his former position that no bail should be granted, and if
there is any grant of bail a preliminary hearing should be conducted as
mandated under Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Complainant also claimed
that respondent Gayao did not file a complaint for illegal possession
of firearm against the accused even after the lapse of three (3) months
since Criminal Case No. 996 was filed, although the gun had already
been surrendered. This saved the accused from posting bail of
P200,000.00 each. Complainant also points out that in a later case
(Criminal Case No. 1027, PP vs. Felix Dimaandal and Junie Bides ),
respondent Gayao simultaneously filed with the criminal action a
complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms against the accused
although the firearms has not yet been recovered.
Complainant further alleges that in an earlier case, Crim. Case No.
653, PP vs. Fernando Tadeo, et al. for Multiple murder and Attempted
Murder, respondent Gayao gravely abuse his discretion. In this case,
Gayao recommend "No Bail". On August 22, 1980, the accused Tadeo filed
a motion to dismiss but Gayao opposed the motion alleging that there
were four eyewitnesses who positively identified the accused. On August
24, 1988, Gayao filed an amended complaint to include three (3) more
accused. A new motion to dismiss was again filed by Tadeo, this time
Gayao surprisingly manifested his conformity. On the basis of which the
court issued in order dated October 14, 1988, dismissing the case and
ordering Tadeo's release. Complainant points out that Gayao wrote the
word. "Conformity" on the order of the court to confirm his earlier
manifestation.
Asked to comment, respondent Gayao alleges that when accused Alejandro
Alagao and Agibis Tugcay in Crim. Case No. 996 were arrested, they
immediately filed with his office a motion for admission to a reduction
of bail. That after he noted "No Objection" to the motion, the case was
immediately brought to Hon. Benjamin Bongolan, Executive Judge, who
inscribed thereon the word "Granted". Consequently, Judge Bongolan
ordered the release of the accused upon posting a bond of P20,000.00
each. He avers that he did not object to the motion because the
question of granting bail is a matter of judicial discretion, citing
the Mogul doctrine (G. R. No. 53373, June 30, 1987) that once a
complaint or information is filed in court any disposition of the case
rests in the sound discretion of the court. He stated that the court
failed to calendar the motion for admission to bail, thus prompting the
complainant to file an appeal with the Provincial Prosecutor and the
Court, alleging the nullity of the granting of bail. According to him,
the court resolve the issue by increasing the bail to P50,000.00 again
without a hearing for which complainant filed a motion for
reconsideration. On June 16, 1991, the court ordered, among others,
that respondent is not in full accord with the arguments of the movant,
thus reverting to his original stand that the evidence of guilt is
strong and, therefore, the accused should not be granted bail.
As to the charge that he failed to file that complaint for illegal
possession of firearm against the accused simultaneously with the
criminal action, he explains that it was only on April 19, 1991 or
three (3) months later that the corresponding complaint for illegal
possession of firearms was filed. Thus, the investigation, resolution
and filing of information for murder were made ahead of the illegal
possession of firearm. He states that in the Dimaandal Case (Crim. Case
No. 1027 and 1028 ) the action for illegal possession of firearm was
filed together with the criminal action on the basis of the
certification of Mayor Reynaldo Sarte, Chief of Investigation, dated
April 19, 1991 that the accused in not a licensee of any firearm. As
regards the dropping of Fernando Tadeo from the criminal complaint,
respondent avers that the same is the subject of a petition for review,
and he would refrain from commenting thereon. Also, the case is still
pending in court.
The then Acting Secretary of Justice found the respondent liable for
serious irregularity, lacking in zeal and dedication to his work and
reckless in the exercises of discretion and recommended that the
respondent be suspended for three (3) months. The pertinent portion of
the explanation of the Secretary reads:
"By
filing on June 16, 1991, a separate complaint for Illegal Possession of
Firearms (CC No. 1041) against the accused charged with Murder in
Criminal Case No. 996, and a similar complaint (CC No. 1028) against
Felix Dimaandal charged with Multiple Murder and Attempted Murder in
Crim. Case No. 1027, respondent can be faulted for serious irregularity
in the performance of duties.
"Sec. 1 of PD 1866 provides
that "if homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed
firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed". The use of an
unlicensed firearm for killing is a qualifying circumstance or an
essential ingredient of the offense of qualified possession of firearm,
the presence of which requires the imposition of the mandatory death
penalty (now life imprisonment) (Lazaro vs. People 112 SCRA p. 483). It
is not a separate felony.
"In accordance with the
aforestated law, respondent, upon receipt of the report of the PNP Abra
Command, should have amended the information in Criminal Case No. 996
alleging such fact, and not file a separate complaint for illegal
possession of firearms against the accused.
"Respondent received the report
of the PNP Abra Command on April 19, 1991, yet he acted on the report
only on June 18, 1991, or a delay of two months. We find this
reflective of his lack of zeal and dedication in the discharged of his
duties and responsibilities.
"In Criminal Case No. 996, the
accused are charged with murder qualified with the used of unlicensed
firearm. Under the law, the imposable penalty for such crime is death
which is now life imprisonment and therefore, non-bailable, yet
respondent in no justifiable circumstances did not object to the motion
of the accused for admission to and reduction of bail. Respondent
ignored the mandatory requirements laid down under Sec. 5, Rule 114,
of the Rules of Court. Said Rule provides that at the hearing of an
application for admission to bail filed by any person who is in custody
for the commission of an offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or
death, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt is strong. From the wordings of this provision, and as
established by jurisprudence, the requirement of notice and hearing on
the application for bail is mandatory. In accordance with this rule,
respondent was duty bound to oppose the motion, considering that the
accused are charge with a capital offense. There is nothing in the
records that would justify respondent's reversal of his original
recommendation that no bail should be granted. Had he opposed the
motion, as was his duty, the Court would have conducted a hearing as
mandated under the aforestated rule. This he failed to do, however,
prompting the court, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, not
only to dispense with the hearing, but to grant the motion as well. In
its order dated May 6, 1991, the court stated that the hearing was
considered unnecessary in view of respondent's notation of "No
Objection" to the motion.
"In his comment , respondents
explains that noted "No Objection" to the motion because ultimately the
issue rested on judicial discretion. Apparently, not only did
respondent ignore the mandatory requirements under Rule 114, but also
deliberately disregarded the fact that judicial discretion can be
abused as it can be influenced by arguments and manifestation of
counsel in their assiduous pursuance of what is just and proper for
their clients. By committing a grave error, respondent not only accused
damage to the service, but prejudiced to the complainant, whose
interest he was sworn to protect, since the granting of bail to the
accused without notice and hearing has deprive her of her
constitutional right to due process. (Rodil vs. Garcia, et al. 191
Phil. 671, May 31, 1981).
"In Criminal Case No. 653, the
accused are charged with Multiple Murder and Attempted Murder qualified
with the use of an unlicensed firearm punishable by death. With no
basis in law, respondent conformed to the motion for dismissal filed by
the accused Fernando Tadeo. Records show that he even wrote the word
"Conformity" on the order of the Court, dated October 11, 1998. In his
comment, respondent did not offer any explanation or justification of
his conformity to the dropping of Tadeo from the criminal complaint.
Based on the records, and in the absence of any explanation or
justification from him, we find respondent's act highly questionable
and irregular. Nothing in the records show that respondent conducted a
reinvestigation and found that the evidence against the accused was
insufficient as to warrant the dismissal of the complaint against him.
I concur.
The respondent prosecutor apparently erred in filing an information of illegal possession of firearm separate from murder . Such act is seriously irregular for a prosecutor is duty bound to determine the proper or appropriate charge/charges to be filed against the accused. This manifest his lack of seriousness and dedication in the performance of his duties. On the other hand, the respondent prosecutor in noting "No Objection" to the motion to bail has really ignored the mandatory requirements under Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. He failed to protect the interest of the state and the complainant by disregarding the fact that judicial discretion may be abused. This has actually deprived the complainant of her right to due process. Furthermore, his act in conforming to the motion to dismiss filed by the accused Fernando Tadeo in Criminal Case No. 653 is indeed highly questionable and irregular. These things should not be countenanced.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Provincial Prosecutor Rodor S. Gayao of Abra is hereby found liable for serious irregularity and abuse of discretion and deserves the penalty of three (3) months suspension from the service.
Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety three.
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