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ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
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ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 67 -
IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF FINE EQUIVALENT TO SIX MONTHS SALARY ON ATTY.
FIDEL H. BORRES, JR., PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATOR, AGUSAN
DEL NORTE This refers to the letter-complaint dated
August 3, 1995, of Silverio Marabe against Fidel H. Borres, former
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Agusan del Norte, for
Gross Ignorance of the Law Amounting to Inefficiency and Incompetence
in the Performance of Official Duties. "Rule
XII, Sec. 1 of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure which took effect on
22 June 1994 provides: Further, Sec. 2 of the same Rule provides: 'Execution
Pending Appeal. Any motion for execution of the decision of the
Adjudicator pending appeal shall be filed before the Board, and the
same may be granted upon showing good reasons and conditions which the
Board may require.' Unfazed, respondent Borres on August 13, 2002, filed a "MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PRAYER FOR EARLY RESOLUTION", insisting that the complaint against him is now moot and academic, in view of his retirement from the government service effective September 11, 2001. Against the foregoing factual backdrop, then DAR Secretary Hernani A. Braganza in a Memorandum for the President dated January 8, 2003, recommended the suspension of respondent Borres from the service for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay. At this juncture, while we agree with then Secretary Braganza that respondent Borres should be meted the recommended penalty of suspension for openly defying DARAB rules and regulations when he issued an "execution pending appeal" order, an act we consider to be a deliberate and wanton disregard of established rules and procedure, and which as an adjudicator he ought to uphold it at all times, with a cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Be that as it may, the major concern in the case at bar is whether or not this Office can still impose administrative sanction on respondent following his retirement from the service. While it is generally conceded that an administrative proceeding is predicated on the holding of an office or position in the government (Dianalon vs. Quntillan, Adm. Case No. 116, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 347), the rule is qualified and therefore, recognized to admit an exception, as amplified by the Supreme Court, in this wise: "It
was not the intent of the Court in the case of Quintillan to set down a
hard and fast rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent
judge as the case may be renders moot and academic the administrative
case pending against him; nor did the Court mean to divest itself of
jurisdiction to impose certain penalties short of dismissal from the
government service should there be a finding of guilt on the basis of
the evidence. In other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the
time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the
mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in
office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its
jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of
the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be
fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications. For what remedy would the people have against a judge or
against any other public official who resorts to wrongful and illegal
conduct during his last days in office? What would prevent some corrupt
and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other
condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the
pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties? If only for
reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its
jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under
its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are
inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants
and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which
he served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the
situation." People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712, citing Perez vs.
Abiera, Adm. Case No. 223-J, June 11, 1975, 64 SCRA 302) Stated somewhat differently, the severance of official ties with the government of a public official or employee constitutes a bar to the subsequent filing of an administrative case against him for an act or acts committed during his incumbency. A sesu contrario, once an administrative charge is initiated against such respondent, his compulsory or optional retirement, resignation or separation from the service during the pendency thereof does not nullify or moot the proceedings, which should continue to its logical conclusion. And if so closed or terminated for that reason alone, it may be reopened by the Office of the President on its own motion, if respondent is a presidential appointee, or at the instance of the department head concerned, if non-presidential appointee. This is the pith and core of the clarificatory opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Opinion No. 30 dated Feb. 17, 1978) vis-a-vis the query of whether the retirement, resignation or separation from public office of an employee would divest the department head, or the head of any concerned agency of the government, of jurisdiction to act upon an administrative case filed against the employee during his tenure of employment, to wit: 'The
Department of Justice has taken the position, as early as 1962, that
the attainment of the age of compulsory retirement by a respondent does
not ipso facto close the pending administrative proceedings against
him. Although the highest penalty in an administrative case is that of
dismissal or separation from the service, which is already accomplished
by the respondent's compulsory retirement, the proceedings may still
continue for purposes of determining whether or not the respondent is
guilty with the end in view of imposing penalties incident to dismissal
for cause. The Department has even sustained the view, in the case of
Undersecretary Tambokon, that the administrative case, if already
closed or terminated, may be reopened by the Office of the President
motu proprio or at the instance of the Department Secretary.' Assayed upon the foregoing legal considerations, it does not require an extended argument to show that the retirement of respondent Fidel H. Borres, Jr. as Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Agusan del Norte during the pendency of the administrative charge against him for Gross Ignorance of the Law Amounting to Inefficiency and Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties did not render the same moot and academic as to warrant the dismissal of the administrative charge against him. However, since the recommended penalty can no longer be served following his retirement from the service, a penalty of fine equivalent to six (6) months salary, deductible from whatever retirement benefits he may be entitled to is legally tenable. WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Fidel H. Borres, Jr., Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Agusan del Norte is hereby found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and ordered to suffer the penalty of fine equivalent to six (6) months salary, deductible from whatever retirement benefits he may be entitled thereto. Done in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 31st day of March in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand Three. Manila, Philippines, |
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Since 19.07.98.