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![]() The legislative power of
the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Parliament, which shall
consist
of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of Representatives, and which is
hereinafter
called "The Parliament", or "The Parliament of the Commonwealth."
A Governor-General appointed by the Queen shall be Her Majesty's representative in the Commonwealth, and shall have and may exercise in the Commonwealth during the Queen's pleasure, but subject to this Constitution, such powers and functions of the Queen as Her Majesty may be pleased to assign to him. There shall be payable to the Queen out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Commonwealth, for the salary of the Governor-General, an annual sum which, until the Parliament otherwise provides, shall be ten thousand pounds. The salary of a Governor-General shall not be altered during his continuance in office. The provisions of this Constitution relating to the Governor-General extend and apply to the Governor-General for the time being, or such person as the Queen may appoint to administer the Government of the Commonwealth; but no such person shall be entitled to receive any salary from the Commonwealth in respect of any other office during his administration of the Government of the Commonwealth. (1) The Governor-General may appoint such times for holding the sessions of the Parliament as he thinks fit, and may also from time to time, by Proclamation or otherwise, prorogue the Parliament, and may in like manner dissolve the House of Representatives. (2) After any general election the Parliament shall be summoned to meet not later than thirty days after the day appointed for the return of the writs. (3) The Parliament shall
be summoned to meet not later than six months after the establishment
of
the Commonwealth.
There shall be a session of the Parliament once at least in every year, so that twelve months shall not intervene between the last sitting of the Parliament in one session and its first sitting in the next session. (1) The Senate shall be composed of senators for each State, directly chosen by the people of the State, voting, until the Parliament otherwise provides, as one electorate. (2) But until the Parliament of the Commonwealth otherwise provides, the Parliament of the State of Queensland, if that State be an Original State, may make laws dividing the State into divisions and determining the number of senators to be chosen for each division, and in the absence of such provision the State shall be one electorate. (3) Until the Parliament otherwise provides there shall be six senators for each Original State. The Parliament may make laws increasing or diminishing the number of senators for each State, but so that equal representation of the several Original States shall be maintained and that no Original State shall have less than six senators. (4) The senators shall be
chosen for a term of six years, and the names of the senators chosen
for
each State shall be certified by the Governor to the Governor-General.
The qualification of electors of senators shall be in each State that which is prescribed by this Constitution, or by the Parliament, as the qualification for electors of members of the House of Representatives; but in the choosing of senators each elector shall vote only once. (1) The Parliament of the Commonwealth may make laws prescribing the method of choosing senators, but so that the method shall be uniform for all the States. Subject to any such law, the Parliament of each State may make laws prescribing the method of choosing the senators for that State. (2) The Parliament of a State
may make laws for determining the times and places of elections of
senators
for the State.
Until the Parliament otherwise provides, but subject to this Constitution, the laws in force in each State, for the time being, relating to elections for the more numerous House of the Parliament of the State shall, as nearly as practicable, apply to elections of senators for the State. The Senate may proceed to the despatch of business, notwithstanding the failure of any State to provide for its representation in the Senate. The Governor of any State may cause writs to be issued for elections of senators for the State. In case of the dissolution of the Senate the writs shall be issued within ten days from the proclamation of such dissolution. (1) As soon as may be after the Senate first meets, and after each first meeting of the Senate following a dissolution thereof, the Senate shall divide the senators chosen for each State into two classes, as nearly equal in number as practicable; and the places of the senators of the first class shall become vacant at the expiration of three yearst and the places of those of the second class at the expiration of six yearst, from the beginning of their term of service; and afterwards the places of senators shall become vacant at the expiration of six years from the beginning of their term of service. (2) The election to fill vacant places shall be made within one year before the places are to become vacant. (3) For the purposes of this
section the term of service of a senator shall be taken to begin on the
first day of July following the day of his election, except in the
cases
of the first election and of the election next after any dissolution of
the Senate, when it shall be taken to begin on the first day of July
preceding
the day of his election.
Whenever the number of senators for a State is increased or diminished, the Parliament of the Commonwealth may make such provision for the vacating of the places of senators for the State as it deems necessary to maintain regularity in the rotation. (1) If the place of a senator becomes vacant before the expiration of his term of service, the Houses of Parliament of the State for which he was chosen, sitting and voting together or, if there is only one House of that Parliament, that House, shall choose a person to hold the place until the expiration of the term, or until the election of a successor as hereinafter provided whichever first happens. But if the Parliament of the State is not in session when the vacancy is notified, the Governor of the State, with the advice of the Executive Council thereof, may appoint a person to hold the place until the expiration of fourteen days from the beginning of the next session of the Parliament of the State, or the expiration of the term, whichever first happens. (2) Where a vacancy has at any time occurred in the place of a senator chosen by the people of a State and at the time when he was so chosen, he was publicly recognized by a particular political party as being an endorsed candidate of that party and publicly represented himself to be such a candidate, a person chosen or appointed under this section in consequence of that vacancy, or in consequence of that vacancy and a subsequent vacancy or vacancies, shall, unless there is no member of that party available to be chosen or appointed, be a member of that party. (3) Where:
(b) before taking his seat he ceases to be a member of that party (otherwise than by reason of the party having ceased to exist), he shall he deemed not to have been so chosen or appointed and the vacancy shall be again notified in accordance with Section 21 of this Constitution. (4) The name of any senator
chosen or appointed under this section shall be certified by the
Governor
of the State to the Governor-General.
(5) If the place of a senator chosen by the people of a State at the election of senators last held before the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual] Vacancies) 1977 became vacant before that commencement and, at the commencement, no person chosen by the House or Houses of Parliament of the State, or appointed by the Governor of the State, in consequence of that vacancy or in consequence of that vacancy and a subsequent vacancy or vacancies, held office, this section applies as if the place of the senator chosen by the people of the State had become vacant after that commencement. (6) A senator holding office at the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies) 1977, being a senator appointed by the Governor of a State in consequence of a vacancy that had at any time occurred in the place of a senator chosen by the people of the State, shall be deemed to have been appointed to hold the place until the expiration of fourteen days after the beginning of the next session of the Parliament of the State that commenced or commences after he was appointed and further action under this section shall be taken as if the vacancy in the place of the senator chosen by the people of the State had occurred after that commencement. (7) Subject to the next succeeding paragraph, a senator holding office at the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies) 1977 who was chosen by the House or Houses of Parliament of a State in consequence of vacancy that had at any time occurred in the place of a senator chosen by the people of the State shall he deemed to have been chosen to hold office until the expiration of the term of service of the senator elected by the people of the State. (8) If, at or before the commencement of the Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies) 1977, a law to alter the Constitution entitled "Constitution Alteration (Simultaneous Elections) 1977" came into operation, a senator holding office at the commencement of that law who was chosen by the House or Houses of Parliament of a State in consequence of a vacancy that had at any time occurred in the place of a Senator chosen by the people of the State shall be deemed to have been chosen to hold office:
(b) if the senator elected by the people of the State had a term of service expiring on the thirtieth day of June, One thousand nine hundred and eighty-one - until the expiration or dissolution of the second House of Representatives to expire or be dissolved after that law came into operation or, if there is an earlier dissolution of the Senate, until that dissolution. The qualifications of a senator shall be the same as those of a member of the House of Representatives. (1) The Senate shall, before proceeding to the dispatch of any other business, choose a senator to be the President of the Senate; and as often as the office of President becomes vacant the Senate shall again choose a senator to be the President. (2) The President shall cease
to hold his office if he ceases to be a senator. He may be removed from
office by a vote of the Senate, or he may resign his office or his seat
by writing addressed to the Governor-General.
Before or during any absence of the President, the Senate may choose a senator to perform his duties in his absence. A senator may, by writing addressed to the President or to the Governor-General if there is no President or if the President is absent from the Commonwealth, resign his place, which thereupon shall become vacant. The place of a senator shall become vacant if for two consecutive months of any session of the Parliament he, without the permission of the Senate, fails to attend the Senate. Whenever a vacancy happens in the Senate, the President, or if there is no President or if the President is absent from the Commonwealth the Governor-General, shall notify the same to the Governor of the State in the representation of which the vacancy has happened. Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the presence of at least one-third of the whole number of the senators shall be necessary to constitute a meeting of the Senate for the exercise of its powers. Questions arising in the Senate shall be determined by a majority of votes, and each senator shall have one vote. The President shall in all cases be entitled to a vote; and when the votes are equal the question shall pass in the negative. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of members directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth, and the number of such members shall be, as nearly as practicable, twice the number of the senators. (2) The number of members chosen in the several States shall be in proportion to the respective numbers of their people, and shall, until the Parliament otherwise provides, be determined, whenever necessary, in the following manner:
(ii) The number of members to be chosen in each State shall be determined by dividing the number of the people of the State, as shown by the latest statistics of the Commonwealth, by the quota; and if on such division there is a remainder greater than one-half of the quota, one more member shall be chosen in the State. (3) But notwithstanding anything
in this section, five members at least shall be chosen in each Original
State.
For the purposes of the last section, if by the law of any State all persons of any race are disqualified from voting at elections for the more numerous House of the Parliament of the State, then, in reckoning the number of the people of the State or of the Commonwealth, persons of that race resident in that State shall not be counted. (1) Notwithstanding anything in Section 24, the number of members to be chosen in each State at the first election shall be as follows:
Victoria: 20 Queensland: 9 South Australia: 6 Tasmania: 5. (2) Provided, that if Western
Australia is an Original State, the numbers shall be as follows:
Victoria: 23 Queensland: 9 South Australia: 7 Western Australia: 5 Tasmania: 5.
Subject to this Constitution,
the Parliament may make laws for increasing or diminishing the number
of
the members of the House of Representatives.
Every House of Representatives
shall continue for three years from the first meeting of the House, and
no longer, but may be sooner dissolved by the Governor-General.
(1) Until the Parliament of the Commonwealth otherwise provides, the Parliament of any State may make laws for determining the divisions in each State for which members of the House of Representatives may be chosen, and the number of members to be chosen for each division. A division shall not be formed out of parts of different States. (2) In the absence of other
provision, each State shall be one electorate.
Until the Parliament otherwise
provides, the qualification of electors of members of the House of
Representatives
shall be in each State that which is prescribed by the law of the State
as the qualification of electors of the more numerous House of
Parliament
of the State; but in the choosing of members each elector shall vote
only
once.
Until the Parliament otherwise
provides, but subject to this Constitution, the laws in force in each
State
for the time being relating to elections for the more numerous House of
the Parliament of the State shall, as nearly as practicable, apply to
elections
in the State of members of the House of Representatives.
(1) The Governor-General in Council may cause writs to be issued for general elections of members of the House of Representatives. (2) After the first general
election, the writs shall be issued within ten days from the expiry of
a House of Representatives or from the proclamation of a dissolution
thereof.
Whenever a vacancy happens
in the House of Representatives, the Speaker shall issue his writ for
the
election of a new member, or if there is no Speaker or if he is absent
from the Commonwealth the Governor-General in Council may issue the
writ.
Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives shall be as follows:
(ii) He must be a subject of the Queen, either natural-born or for at least five years naturalized under a law of the United Kingdom, or of a Colony which has become or becomes a State, or of the Commonwealth, or of a State. (1) The House of Representatives shall, before proceeding to the despatch of any other business, choose a member to be the Speaker of the House, and as often as the office of Speaker becomes vacant the House shall again choose a member to be the Speaker. (2) The Speaker shall cease
to hold his office if he ceases to be a member. He may be removed from
office by a vote of the House, or he may resign his office or his seat
by writing addressed to the Governor-General.
Before or during any absence
of the Speaker, the House of Representatives may choose a member to
perform
his duties in his absence.
A member may by writing addressed
to the Speaker, or to the Governor-General if there is no Speaker or if
the Speaker is absent from the Commonwealth, resign his place, which
thereupon
shall become vacant.
The place of a member shall
become vacant if for two consecutive months of any session of the
Parliament
he, without the permission of the House, fails to attend the House.
Until the Parliament otherwise
provides, the presence of at least one-third of the whole number of the
members of the House of Representatives shall be necessary to
constitute
a meeting of the House for the exercise of its powers.
Questions arising in the
House of Representatives shall be determined by a majority of votes
other
than that of the Speaker. The Speaker shall not vote unless the numbers
are equal; and then he shall have a casting vote.
No adult person who has or
acquires a right to vote at elections for the more numerous House of
the
Parliament of a State shall, while the right continues, be prevented by
any law of the Commonwealth from voting at elections for either House
of
the Parliament of the Commonwealth.
Every senator and every member
of the House of Representatives shall before taking his seat make and
subscribe
before the Governor-General, or some person authorized by him, an oath
or affirmation of allegiance in the form set forth in the schedule to
this
Constitution.
A member of either House
of the Parliament shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a
member of the other House.
(1) Any person who:
(ii) Is attained of treason, or has been convicted and is under sentence, or subject to be sentenced, for any offence punishable under the law of the Commonwealth or of a State by imprisonment for one year or longer; or (iii) Is an undischarged bankrupt or insolvent; or (iv) Holds any office of profit under the Crown, or any pension payable during the pleasure of the Crown out of any of the revenues of the Commonwealth; or (v) Has any
direct or
indirect
pecuniary interest in any agreement with the Public Service of the
Commonwealth
otherwise than as a member and in common with the other members of an
incorporated
company consisting of more than twenty-five persons:
(2) But Sub-section IV does
not apply to the office of any of the Queen's Ministers of State for
the
Commonwealth, or of any of the Queen's Ministers for a State, or to the
receipt of pay, half pay, or a pension, by any person as an officer or
member of the Queen's navy or army, or to the receipt of pay as an
officer
or member of the naval or military forces of the Commonwealth by any
person
whose services are not wholly employed by the Commonwealth.
If a senator or member of the House of Representatives:
(ii) Takes the benefit, whether by assignment, composition, or otherwise, of any law relating to bankrupt or insolvent debtors: or (iii)
Directly or
indirectly
takes or agrees to take any fee or honorarium for services rendered to
the Commonwealth, or for services rendered in the Parliament to any
person
or State: Until the Parliament otherwise
provides, any person declared by this Constitution to be incapable of
sitting
as a senator or as a member of the House of Representatives shall, for
every day on which he so sits, be liable to pay the sum of one hundred
pound to any person who sues for it in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
Until the Parliament otherwise
provides, any question respecting the qualification of a senator or of
a member of the House of Representatives or respecting a vacancy in
either
House of the Parliament, and any question of a disputed election to
either
House, shall be determined by the House in which the question arises.
Until the Parliament otherwise
provides, each senator and each member of the House of Representatives
shall receive an allowance of four hundred pounds a year, to be
reckoned
from the day on which he takes his seat.
The powers, privileges, and
immunities of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, and of
the
members and the committees of each House, shall be such as are declared
by the Parliament, and until declared shall be those of the Commons
House
of Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees,
at the establishment of the Commonwealth.
Each House of the Parliament may make rules and orders with respect to:
(ii) The order and conduct of its business and proceedings either separately or jointly with the other House. The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:
(ii) Taxation but so as not to discriminate between States or parts of States; (iii) Bounties on the production or export of goods, but so that such bounties shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth; (iv) Borrowing money on the public credit of the Commonwealth; (v) Postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services; (vi) The naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth; (vii) Lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys; (viii) Astronomical and meteorological observations; (ix) Quarantine; (x) Fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits; (xi) Census and statistics; (xii) Currency, coinage, and legal tender; (xiii) Banking, other than State banking; also State banking extending beyond the limits of the State concerned, the incorporation of banks, and the issue of paper money; (xiv) Insurance, other than State insurance; also State insurance extending beyond the limits of the State concerned; (xv) Weights and measures; (xvi) Bills of exchange and promissory notes; (xvii) Bankruptcy and insolvency; (xviii) Copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and trade marks; (xiv) Naturalization and aliens; (xx) Foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth; (xxi) Marriage; (xxii) Divorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation thereto, parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants; (xviii) Invalid and old-age pensions; (xxiiiA) The provision of maternity allowances, widows' pensions, child endowment, unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental services (but not so as to authorize any form of civil conscription), benefits to students and family allowances; (xxiv) The service and execution throughout the Commonwealth of the civil and criminal process and the judgments of the courts of the States; (xxv) The recognition throughout the Commonwealth of the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of the States; (xxvi) The people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws; (xxvii) Immigration and emigration; (xxviii) The influx of criminals; (xxix) External affairs; (xxx) The relations of the Commonwealth with the islands of the Pacific; (xxxi) The acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws; (xxxii) The control of railways with respect to transport for the naval and military purposes of the Commonwealth; (xxxiii) The acquisition, with the consent of a State, of any railways of the State on terms arranged between the Commonwealth and the State; (xxxiv) Railway construction and extension in any State with the consent of that State; (xxxv) Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State; (xxxvi) Matters in respect of which this Constitution makes provision until the Parliament otherwise provides; (xxxvii) Matters referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth by the Parliament or Parliaments of any State or States, but so that the law shall extend only to States by whose Parliaments the matter is referred, or which afterwards adopt the law; (xxxviii) The exercise within the Commonwealth, at the request or with the concurrence of the Parliaments of all the States directly concerned, of any power which can at the establishment of this Constitution be exercised only by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by the Federal Council of Australasia; (xxxix) Matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by this Constitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in the Government of the Commonwealth, or in the Federal judicature, or in any department or officer of the Commonwealth. The Parliament shall, subject to this constitution, have exclusive power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:
(ii) Matters relating to any department of the public service the control of which is by this constitution transferred to the Executive Government of the Commonwealth: (iii) Other matters declared by this Constitution to be within the exclusive power of the Parliament. (1) Proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys, or imposing taxation, shall not originate in the Senate. But a proposed law shall not be taken to appropriate revenue or moneys, or to impose taxation, by reason only of its containing provisions for the imposition or appropriation of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or payment or appropriation of fees for licenses, or fees for services under the proposed law. (2) The Senate may not amend proposed laws imposing taxation, or proposed laws appropriating revenue or moneys for the ordinary annual services of the Government. (3) The Senate may not amend any proposed law so as to increase any proposed charge or burden on the people. (4) The Senate may at any stage return to the House of Representatives any proposed law which the Senate may not amend, requesting, by message, the omission or amendment of any items or provisions therein. And the House of Representatives may, if it thinks fit, make any of such omissions or amendments, with or without modifications. (5) Except as provided in
this section, the Senate shall have equal power with the House of
Representatives
in respect of all proposed laws.
The proposed law which appropriates
revenue or moneys for the ordinary annual services of the Government
shall
deal only with such appropriation.
(1) Laws imposing taxation shall deal only with the imposition of taxation, and any provision therein dealing with any other matter shall be of no effect. (2) Laws imposing taxation,
except laws imposing duties of customs or of excise, shall deal with
one
subject of taxation only; but laws imposing duties of customs shall
deal
with duties of customs only, and laws imposing duties of excise shall
deal
with duties of excise only.
A vote, resolution, or proposed
law for the appropriation of revenue or moneys shall not be passed
unless
the purpose of the appropriation has in the same session been
recommended
by message of the Governor-General to the House in which the proposal
originated.
(1) If the House of Representatives passes any proposed law, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree, and if after an interval of three months the House of Representatives, in the same or the next session, again passes the proposed law with or without any amendments which have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree, the Governor-General may dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously. But such dissolution shall not take place within six months before the date of the expiry of the House of Representatives by effluxion of time. (2) If after such dissolution the House of Representatives again passes the proposed law, with or without any amendments which have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House of Representatives will not agree, the Governor-General may convene a joint sitting of the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. (3) The members present at
the joint sitting may deliberate and shall vote together upon the
proposed
law as last proposed by the House of Representatives, and upon
amendments,
if any, which have been made therein by one House and not agreed to by
the other, and any such amendments which are affirmed by an absolute
majority
of the total number of the members of the Senate and House of
Representatives
shall be taken to have been carried, and if the proposed law, with the
amendments, if any, so carried is affirmed by an absolute majority of
the
total number of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives,
it shall be taken to have been duly passed by both Houses of the
Parliament,
and shall be presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent.
(1) When a proposed law passed by both Houses of the Parliament is presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent, he shall declare, according to his discretion, but subject to this Constitution, that he assents in the Queen's name or that he withholds assent, or that he reserves the law for the Queen's pleasure. (2) The Governor-General
may return to the house in which it originated any proposed law so
presented
to him, and may transmit therewith any amendments which he may
recommend,
and the Houses may deal with the recommendation.
The Queen may disallow any
law within one year from the Governor-General's assent, and such
disallowance
on being made known by the Governor-General by speech or message to
each
of the Houses of the Parliament, or by Proclamation, shall annul the
law
from the day when the disallowance is so made known.
A proposed law reserved for
the Queen's pleasure shall not have any force unless and until within
two
years from the day on which it was presented to the Governor-General
for
the Queen's assent the Governor-General makes known, by speech or
message
to each of the Houses of the Parliament, or by Proclamation, that it
has
received the Queen's assent.
The executive power of the
Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the
Governor-General
as the Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and
maintenance
of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth.
There shall be a Federal
Executive Council to advise the Governor-General in the government of
the
Commonwealth, and the members of the Council shall be chosen and
summoned
by the Governor-General and sworn as Executive Councillors, and shall
hold
office during his pleasure.
The provisions of this Constitution
referring to the Governor-General in council shall be construed as
referring
to the Governor-General acting with the advice of the Federal Executive
Council.
(1) The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer such departments of State of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may establish. (2) Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General. They shall be members of the Federal Executive Council, and shall be the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth. (3) After the first general
election, no Minister of State shall hold office for a longer period
than
three months unless he is or becomes a senator or a member of the House
of Representatives.
Until the Parliament otherwise
provides, the Ministers of State shall not exceed seven in number, and
shall hold such offices as the Parliament prescribes, or, in the
absence
of provision, as the Governor-General directs.
There shall be payable to
the Queen, out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Commonwealth,
for
the salaries of the Ministers of State, an annual sum which, until the
Parliament otherwise provides, shall not exceed twelve thousand pounds
a year.
Until the Parliament otherwise
provides, the appointment and removal of all other officers of the
Executive
Government of the Commonwealth shall be vested in the Governor-General
in Council, unless the appointment is delegated by the Governor-General
in Council or by a law of the Commonwealth to some other authority.
The command in chief of the
naval and military forces of the Commonwealth is vested in the
Governor-General
as the Queen's representative.
(1) On a date or dates to be proclaimed by the Governor-General after the establishment of the Commonwealth the following departments of the public service in each state shall become transferred to the Commonwealth:
- Naval and military defence: - Lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys: - Quarantine. (2) But the departments of customs
and of excise in each State shall become transferred to the
Commonwealth
on its establishment.
In respect of matters which,
under this Constitution, pass to the Executive Government of the
Commonwealth,
all powers and functions which at the establishment of the Commonwealth
are vested in the Governor of a Colony, or in the Governor of a Colony
with the advice of his Executive Council, or in any authority of a
Colony,
shall vest in the Governor-General, or in the Governor-General in
Council,
or in the authority exercising similar powers under the Commonwealth,
as
the case requires.
The judicial power of the
Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called
the
High Court of Australia, and in such other federal courts as the
Parliament
creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal
jurisdictio.
The High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice, and so many other
Justices,
not less than two, as the Parliament prescribes.
(1) The Justices of the High Court and of the other courts created by the Parliament:
(ii) Shall not be removed except by the Governor-General in Council, on an address from both Houses of the Parliament in the same session, praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehavior or incapacity: (iii) Shall receive such remuneration as the Parliament may fix; but the remuneration shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. (2) The appointment of a Justice
of the High Court shall be for a term expiring upon his attaining the
age
of seventy years and a person shall not be appointed as a Justice of
the
High Court if he has attained that age.
(3) The appointment of a Justice of a court created by the Parliament shall be for a term expiring upon his attaining the age that is, at the time of his appointment, the maximum age for Justices of that court and a person shall not be appointed as a Justice of such court if he has attained the age that is for the time being the maximum age for Justices of that Court. (4) Subject to this section, the maximum age for Justices of any court created by the Parliament is seventy years. (5) The Parliament may make a law fixing an age that is less than seventy years as the maximum age for Justices of a court created by the Parliament and may at any time repeal or amend such a law, but any such repeal or amendment does not affect the term of office of a Justice under an appointment made before the repeal or amendment. (6) A Justice of the High Court or of a court created by the Parliament may resign his office by writing under his hand delivered to the Governor-General. (7) Nothing in the provisions added to this section by the Constitution Alteration (Retirement of Judges) 1977 affects the continuance of a person in office as a Justice of a court under an appointment made before the commencement of those provisions. (8) A reverence in this section
to the appointment of a Justice of the High Court or of a court created
by the Parliament shall be read as including a reference to the
appointment
of a person who holds office as a Justice of the High court or of a
court
created by the Parliament to another office of Justice of the same
court
having a different status or designation.
(1) The High Court shall have jurisdiction, with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as the Parliament prescribes, to hear and determine appeals from all judgments, decrees, orders, and sentences:
(ii) of any other federal court, or court exercising federal jurisdiction; or of the Supreme Court of any State, or of any other court of any State from which at the establishment of the Commonwealth an appeal lies to the Queen in Council: (iii) of the Inter-State Commission, but as to questions of law only: and the judgment of the High
Court in all such cases shall be final and conclusive.
(2) But no exception or regulation prescribed by the Parliament shall prevent the High Court from hearing and determining any appeal from the Supreme Court of a State in any matter in which at the establishment of the Commonwealth an appeal lies from such Supreme Court to the Queen in Council. (3) Until the Parliament
otherwise provides, the conditions of and restrictions on appeals to
the
Queen in Council from the Supreme Courts of the several States shall be
applicable to appeals from them to the High Court.
(1) No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council from a decision of the High Court upon any question, howsoever arising, as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and those of any State or States, or as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of any two or more States, unless the High Court shall certify that the question is one which ought to be determined by Her Majesty in Council. (2) The High Court may so certify if satisfied that for any special reason the certificate should be granted, and thereupon an appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council on the question without further leave. (3) Except as provided in
this section, this Constitution shall not impair any right which the
Queen
may be pleased to exercise by virtue of Her Royal prerogative to grant
special leave of appeal from the High Court to Her Majesty in Council.
The Parliament may make laws limiting the matters in which such leave
may
be asked, but proposed laws containing any such limitation shall be
reserved
by the Governor-General for Her Majesty's pleasure.
In all matters:
(ii) Affecting consuls or other representatives of other countries: (iii) In which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, is a party: (iv) Between States, or between residents of different States, or between a State and a resident of another State: (v) In which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth: the High Court shall have original
jurisdiction.
The Parliament may make laws conferring original jurisdiction on the High Court in any matter:
(ii) Arising under any laws made by the Parliament: (iii) Of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction: (iv ) Relating to the same subject-matter claimed under the laws of different States. With respect to any of the matters mentioned in the last two sections the Parliament may make laws:
(ii) Defining the extent to which the jurisdiction of any federal court shall be exclusive of that which belongs to or is invested in the courts of the States: (iii) Investing any court of a State with federal jurisdiction. The Parliament may make laws
conferring rights to proceed against the Commonwealth or a State in
respect
of matters within the limits of the judicial power.
The federal jurisdiction
of any court may be exercised by such number of judges as the
Parliament
prescribes.
The trial on indictment of
any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury, and
every
such trial shall be held in the State where the offence was committed,
and if the offence was not committed within any State the trial shall
be
held at such place or places as the Parliament prescribes.
All revenues or moneys raised
or received by the Executive Government of the Commonwealth shall form
one Consolidated Revenue Fund, to be appropriated for the purposes of
the
Commonwealth in the manner and subject to the charges and liabilities
imposed
by this Constitution.
The costs, charges, and expenses
incident to the collection, management, and receipt of the Consolidated
Revenue Fund shall form the first charge thereon; and the revenue of
the
Commonwealth shall in the first instance be applied to the payment of
the
expenditure of the Commonwealth.
(1) No money shall be drawn from the Treasury of the Commonwealth except under appropriation made by law. (2) But until the expiration
of one month after the first meeting of the Parliament the
Governor-General
in Council may draw from the Treasury and expend such moneys as may be
necessary for the maintenance of any department transferred to the
Commonwealth
and for the holding of the first elections for the Parliament.
(1) When any department of the public service of a State becomes transferred to the Commonwealth, all officers of the department shall become subject to the control of the Executive Government of the Commonwealth. (2) Any such officer who is not retained in the service of the Commonwealth shall, unless he is appointed to some other office of equal emolument in the public service of the State, be entitled to receive from the State any pension, gratuity, or other compensation, payable under the law of the State on the abolition of his office. (3) Any such officer who is retained in the service of the Commonwealth shall preserve all his existing and accruing rights, and shall be entitled to retire from office at the time, and on the pension or retiring allowance, which would be permitted by the law of the State if his service with the Commonwealth were a continuation of his service with the State. Such pension or retiring allowance shall be paid to him by the Commonwealth; but the State shall pay to the Commonwealth a part thereof, to be calculated on the proportion which his term of service with the State bears to his whole term of service, and for the purpose of the calculation his salary shall be taken to be that paid to him by the State at the time of the transfer. (4) Any officer who is, at
the establishment of the Commonwealth, in the public service of a
State,
and who is, by consent of the Governor of the State with the advice of
the Executive Council thereof, transferred to the public service of the
Commonwealth, shall have the same rights as if he had been an officer
of
a department transferred to the Commonwealth and were retained in the
service
of the Commonwealth.
When any department of the public service of a State is transferred to the Commonwealth:
(ii) The Commonwealth may acquire any property of the State, of any kind used, but not exclusively used in connection with the department; the value thereof shall, if no agreement can be made, be ascertained in, as nearly as may be, the manner in which the value of land, or of an interest in land, taken by the State for public purposes is ascertained under the law of the State in force at the establishment of the Commonwealth: (iii) The Commonwealth shall compensate the State for the value of any property passing to the Commonwealth under this section; if no agreement can be made as to the mode of compensation, it shall be determined under laws to be made by the Parliament: (iv) The Commonwealth shall, at the date of the transfer, assume the current obligations of the State in respect of the department transferred. On the establishment of the
Commonwealth, the collection and control of duties of customs and of
excise,
and the control of the payment of bounties, shall pass to the Executive
Government of the Commonwealth.
(1) During a period of ten years after the establishment of the Commonwealth and thereafter until the Parliament otherwise provides, of the net revenue of the Commonwealth from duties of customs and of excise not more than one-fourth shall be applied annually by the Commonwealth towards its expenditure. (2) The balance shall, in
accordance with this Constitution, be paid to the several States, or
applied
towards the payment of interest on debts of the several States taken
over
by the Commonwealth.
Uniform duties of customs
shall be imposed within two years after the establishment of the
Commonwealth.
Until the imposition of uniform duties of customs:
(ii) The Commonwealth shall debit to each State:
(b) The proportion of the State, according to the number of its people in the other expenditure of the Commonwealth.
(1) On the imposition of uniform duties of customs the power of the Parliament to impose duties of customs and of excise, and to grant bounties on the production or export of goods, shall become exclusive. (2) On the imposition of
uniform duties of customs all laws of the several States imposing
duties
of customs or of excise, or offering bounties on the production or
export
of goods, shall cease to have effect, but any grant of or agreement for
any such bounty lawfully made by or under the authority of the
Government
of any State shall be taken to be good if made before the thirtieth day
of June, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and not otherwise.
Nothing in this Constitution
prohibits a State from granting any aid to or bounty on mining for
gold,
silver, or other metals, nor from granting, with the consent of both
Houses
of the Parliament of the Commonwealth expressed by resolution any aid
to
or bounty on the production or export of goods.
(1) On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the states, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free. (2) But notwithstanding anything
in this Constitution, goods imported before the imposition of uniform
duties
of customs into any State, or into any Colony which, whilst the goods
remain
therein, becomes a State, shall, on thence passing into another State
within
two years after the imposition of such duties, be liable to any duty
chargeable
on the importation of such goods into the Commonwealth, less any duty
paid
in respect of the goods on their importation.
During the first five years after the imposition of uniform duties of customs, and thereafter until the Parliament otherwise provides:
(ii) Subject to the last subsection, the Commonwealth shall credit revenue, debit expenditure, and pay balances to the several States as prescribed for the period preceding the imposition of uniform duties of customs. After five years from the
imposition of uniform duties of customs, the Parliament may provide, on
such basis as it deems fair, for the monthly payment to the several
States
of all surplus revenue of the Commonwealth.
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the Parliament of the State of Western Australia, if that State be an Original State, may, during the first five years after the imposition of uniform duties of customs, impose duties of customs on goods passing into that State and not originally imported from beyond the limits of the Commonwealth; and such duties shall be collected by the Commonwealth. (2) But any duty so imposed on any goods shall not exceed during the first of such years the duty chargeable on the goods under the law of Western Australia in force at the imposition of uniform duties and shall not exceed during the second, third, fourth, and fifth of such years respectively, four-fifths, three-fifths, two-fifths, and one-fifth of such latter duty, and all duties imposed under this section shall cease at the expiration of the fifth year after the imposition of uniform duties. (3) If at any time during
the five years the duty on any goods under this section is higher than
the duty imposed by the Commonwealth on the importation of the like
goods,
then such higher duty shall be collected on the goods when imported
into
Western Australia from beyond the limits of the Commonwealth.
During a period of ten years
after the establishment of the Commonwealth and thereafter until the
Parliament
otherwise provides, the Parliament may grant financial assistance to
any
State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit.
Until the Parliament otherwise
provides, the laws in force in any colony which has become or becomes a
State with respect to the receipt of revenue and the expenditure of
money
on account of the Government of the Colony, and the review and audit of
such receipt and expenditure, shall apply to the receipt of revenue and
the expenditure of money on account of the Commonwealth in the State in
the same manner as if the Commonwealth, or the Government or an officer
of the Commonwealth, were mentioned whenever the Colony, or the
Government
or an officer of the Colony is mentioned.
The power of the Parliament
to make laws with respect to trade and commerce extends to navigation
and
shipping, and to railways the property of any State.
The Commonwealth shall not,
by any law or regulation of trade, commerce or revenue, give preference
to one State or any part thereof over another State or any part thereof.
The Commonwealth shall not,
by any law or regulation of trade or commerce, abridge the right of a
State
or of the residents therein to the reasonable use of the waters of
rivers
for conservation or irrigation.
There shall be an Inter-State
Commission, with such powers of adjudication and administration as the
Parliament deems necessary for the execution and maintenance, within
the
Commonwealth, of the provisions of this Constitution relating to trade
and commerce, and of all laws made thereunder.
The Parliament may by any
law with respect to trade or commerce forbid, as to railways, any
preference
or discrimination by any State, or by any authority constituted under a
State, if such preference or discrimination is undue and unreasonable,
or unjust to any State; due regard being had to the financial
responsibilities
incurred by any State in connection with the construction and
maintenance
of its railways. But no preference or discrimination shall, within the
meaning of this section, be taken to be undue and unreasonable, or
unjust
to any State, unless so adjudged by the Inter-State Commission.
The members of the Inter-State Commission:
(ii) Shall hold office for seven years, but may be removed within that time by the Governor-General in Council, on an address from both Houses of the Parliament in the same session praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehavior or incapacity: (iii) Shall receive such remuneration as the Parliament may fix; but such remuneration shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Nothing in this Constitution
shall render unlawful any rate for the carriage of goods upon a
railway,
the property of a State, if the rate is deemed by the Inter-State
Commission
to be necessary for the development of the territory of the State, and
if the rate applies equally to goods within the State and to goods
passing
into the State from other States.
The Parliament may take over
from the States their public debts, or a proportion thereof according
to
the respective numbers of their people as shown by the latest
statistics
of the Commonwealth, and may convert, renew, or consolidate such debts,
or any part thereof; and the States shall indemnify the Commonwealth in
respect of the debts taken over, and thereafter the interest payable in
respect of the debts shall be deducted and retained from the portions
of
the surplus revenue of the Commonwealth payable to the several States,
or if such surplus is insufficient, or if there is no surplus, then the
deficiency or the whole amount shall be paid by the several States.
(1) The Commonwealth may make agreements with the States with respect to the public debts of the States including:
(b) the management of such debts; (c) the payment of interest and the provision and management of sinking funds in respect of such debts; (d) the consolidation, renewal, conversion, and redemption of such debts; (e) the indemnification of the Commonwealth by the States in respect of debts taken over by the Commonwealth; and (f) the borrowing of money by the States or by the Commonwealth or by the Commonwealth for the States. |