March 1916 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 10202 March 29, 1916 - GOV’T. OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS Ex Rel. MUN. OF CARDONA v. MUN. OF BINANGONAN ET AL.
034 Phil 518:
034 Phil 518:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 10202. March 29, 1916. ]
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS Ex Rel. THE MUNICIPALITY OF CARDONA, Plaintiff, v. THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN ET AL., Defendants.
Modesto Reyes and Eliseo Ymzon for plaintiff.
Solicitor-General Corpus and Roberto Moreno for defendants.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTES; VALIDITY; JUDICIAL AUTHORITY. — Generally speaking, the Supreme Court will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of the Legislature unless that question is raised in an appropriate manner and is relied upon and argued by the parties.
2. ID.; ID.; ARGUMENT BY PARTIES. — The Supreme Court may refuse to pass on the constitutionality of an Act of the legislature, although the question is raised, unless the parties have relied on and argued it and informed the court relative thereto to its satisfaction.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; — Every Act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is contrary is clearly demonstrated; and where a party to an action raises the question, but neglects to argue it or inform the court with respect thereto, the court will proceed to the resolution of the case upon the assumption that such Act is constitutional.
4. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY. — Where, therefore, the constitutionality of an Act of the legislative conferring power on the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands to alter, by an executive order, the boundary lines of the municipalities of the Philippine Islands, whereby a portion of one municipality is included and becomes a part of another, is put in question, but such question is not argued and not authorities relative thereto are cited and the court is not informed thereon to its satisfaction, the Act will be presumed to be constitutional.
5. ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE ORDERS OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL. — The form of an executive order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands made in pursuance of the Act referred to in the last paragraph is within the discretion of the executive authority and the Supreme Court will not take cognizance of any question based thereon.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.;. — The Governor-General having full authority to promulgated such an order the Supreme Court would assume, if the matter could properly to evoke action by the Chief Executive.
2. ID.; ID.; ARGUMENT BY PARTIES. — The Supreme Court may refuse to pass on the constitutionality of an Act of the legislature, although the question is raised, unless the parties have relied on and argued it and informed the court relative thereto to its satisfaction.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; — Every Act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is contrary is clearly demonstrated; and where a party to an action raises the question, but neglects to argue it or inform the court with respect thereto, the court will proceed to the resolution of the case upon the assumption that such Act is constitutional.
4. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY. — Where, therefore, the constitutionality of an Act of the legislative conferring power on the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands to alter, by an executive order, the boundary lines of the municipalities of the Philippine Islands, whereby a portion of one municipality is included and becomes a part of another, is put in question, but such question is not argued and not authorities relative thereto are cited and the court is not informed thereon to its satisfaction, the Act will be presumed to be constitutional.
5. ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE ORDERS OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL. — The form of an executive order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands made in pursuance of the Act referred to in the last paragraph is within the discretion of the executive authority and the Supreme Court will not take cognizance of any question based thereon.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.;. — The Governor-General having full authority to promulgated such an order the Supreme Court would assume, if the matter could properly to evoke action by the Chief Executive.
D E C I S I O N
MORELAND, J. :
This is an action by the municipality of Cardona to prohibit perpetually the municipality of Binangonan from exercising municipal authority over the barrios of Tatala, Balatik, Nambug, Tutulo, Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo, and Bonot.
The complaint alleges that the municipality of Binangonan is now exercising governmental authority over the barrios named, to the exclusion of the municipality of Cardona; that such authority is exercised by the municipality of Binangonan by reason of Executive Order No. 66, series of 1914, issued by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands on the 1st day of July, 1914, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Pursuant to the provisions of section one of Act Numbered seventeen hundreds and forty-eight, the boundary line between the municipalities of Binangonan and Cardona, in the Province of Rizal, is hereby defined and fixed as follows, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On the mainland, beginning on the north at the intersection of Morong River and the existing Binangonan boundary, thence in a southerly and westerly direction to Mapulanglupa (Otherwise called Santol), where a partially destroyed monument now exists; thence in a direct south-easterly line to the summit of Mountain Tutulo; and thence to the Laguna de Bay; thus embracing within the limits of the municipality of Binangonan the barrios or sitios of Tatala, Balatik, Mambug, Tutulo, Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo Sampad, and Bonot.
"On the Island of Talim, that portion of the island embraced within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Cardona; and the remainder of the island, including the small off-lying islands of Bunga, Olahipan, and Malake, as being embraced within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Binangonan.
"Action will at once be taken to survey the boundary line herein fixed and to establish monuments demarcating same."cralaw virtua1aw library
The plaintiff further alleges that the executive order referred to and above quoted and the Act under which it was issued are "unconstitutional" in the said Act confers on the Governor-General legislative authority; and that the Governor-General in promulgating said order usurped legislative functions. Plaintiff also claims that the order is void because it does not contain a statement that the change in the division line between the said municipalities was required by the public good; and that it does not appear in said order itself that there was a present urgency requiring the promulgation of such an order.
The defendant municipality demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The question before us is that presented by the demurrer.
We do not think that plaintiff’s objections are well founded. No reason has been given why the Act is unconstitutional and no argument or citation of authorities has been presented on the subject. Every Act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown; and no showing of unconstitutionality having made in this case, the objection to the order of the Governor-General based on that ground must be overruled. The other two objections are frivolous. Although it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that the Governor-General ought to make such an order unless the public good requires it, that fact need not be stated in the order. The same may be said with regard to its urgency. The Governor-General having full authority to promulgate such an order this court will assume, if it should act on and matter at all, that there was public necessity therefor and that the matter was of such urgency as properly to evoke action by the Chief Executive.
The demurrer to the complaint is sustained and unless an amendment thereof is made within five days from the service of a copy of this order eliminating the objections stated in this decision, the action will be dismissed on the merits. So ordered.
Torres, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.
The complaint alleges that the municipality of Binangonan is now exercising governmental authority over the barrios named, to the exclusion of the municipality of Cardona; that such authority is exercised by the municipality of Binangonan by reason of Executive Order No. 66, series of 1914, issued by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands on the 1st day of July, 1914, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Pursuant to the provisions of section one of Act Numbered seventeen hundreds and forty-eight, the boundary line between the municipalities of Binangonan and Cardona, in the Province of Rizal, is hereby defined and fixed as follows, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On the mainland, beginning on the north at the intersection of Morong River and the existing Binangonan boundary, thence in a southerly and westerly direction to Mapulanglupa (Otherwise called Santol), where a partially destroyed monument now exists; thence in a direct south-easterly line to the summit of Mountain Tutulo; and thence to the Laguna de Bay; thus embracing within the limits of the municipality of Binangonan the barrios or sitios of Tatala, Balatik, Mambug, Tutulo, Mahabang Parang, Nagsulo Sampad, and Bonot.
"On the Island of Talim, that portion of the island embraced within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Cardona; and the remainder of the island, including the small off-lying islands of Bunga, Olahipan, and Malake, as being embraced within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Binangonan.
"Action will at once be taken to survey the boundary line herein fixed and to establish monuments demarcating same."cralaw virtua1aw library
The plaintiff further alleges that the executive order referred to and above quoted and the Act under which it was issued are "unconstitutional" in the said Act confers on the Governor-General legislative authority; and that the Governor-General in promulgating said order usurped legislative functions. Plaintiff also claims that the order is void because it does not contain a statement that the change in the division line between the said municipalities was required by the public good; and that it does not appear in said order itself that there was a present urgency requiring the promulgation of such an order.
The defendant municipality demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The question before us is that presented by the demurrer.
We do not think that plaintiff’s objections are well founded. No reason has been given why the Act is unconstitutional and no argument or citation of authorities has been presented on the subject. Every Act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown; and no showing of unconstitutionality having made in this case, the objection to the order of the Governor-General based on that ground must be overruled. The other two objections are frivolous. Although it be admitted, for the sake of argument, that the Governor-General ought to make such an order unless the public good requires it, that fact need not be stated in the order. The same may be said with regard to its urgency. The Governor-General having full authority to promulgate such an order this court will assume, if it should act on and matter at all, that there was public necessity therefor and that the matter was of such urgency as properly to evoke action by the Chief Executive.
The demurrer to the complaint is sustained and unless an amendment thereof is made within five days from the service of a copy of this order eliminating the objections stated in this decision, the action will be dismissed on the merits. So ordered.
Torres, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.
