November 1930 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 32813 November 5, 1930 - CORPORACION DE PP. AGUSTINOS v. LEON DEL REY
055 Phil 163:
055 Phil 163:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 32813. November 5, 1930.]
PROVINCIA DEL SANTISIMO NOMBRE DE JESUS DE FILIPINAS, DE LA ORDEN DE ERMITANOS DE NUESTRO PADRE SAN AGUSTIN, VULGARMENTE CONOCIDA POR "CORPORACION DE PP. AGUSTINOS," plaintiff-appellee, v. LEON DEL REY, Defendant-Appellant.
Tomas Besa for Appellant.
Eusebio Orense and Nicolas Belmonte for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE; CONTINUANCE OF TRIALS. — The power to grant or deny motions for continuance is vested in the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge, and his rulings in this regard will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of some substantial rights of the applicant. In the present case, this court finds no indication that the judge presiding over the court below abused his discretion.
D E C I S I O N
OSTRAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment foreclosing a mortgage executed by the defendant in favor of the Compañia Agricola de Ultramar. The mortgage was afterwards transferred to the herein plaintiff, and the defendant failing to fulfill the terms of the mortgage, the present action was brought. The mortgaged property is a tract of land situated in the barrio of Ermitano, municipality of San Juan del Monte, Province of Rizal, and contains an area of 19,959 square meters.
Upon appeal, the mortgagor’s contention is that the court below exceeded its jurisdiction and discretion in denying a motion for the continuance of the trial of the case in order to give him an opportunity to prepare his evidence. That contention cannot be sustained. The continuance of trials lays largely in the discretion of the court, and we can find no indication that the judge presiding over the court below abused his discretion. The action was brought on August 19, 1928, and the trial did not take place until a year afterwards. It would seem that the defendant had ample time to prepare his evidence, if any he had.
The appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Upon appeal, the mortgagor’s contention is that the court below exceeded its jurisdiction and discretion in denying a motion for the continuance of the trial of the case in order to give him an opportunity to prepare his evidence. That contention cannot be sustained. The continuance of trials lays largely in the discretion of the court, and we can find no indication that the judge presiding over the court below abused his discretion. The action was brought on August 19, 1928, and the trial did not take place until a year afterwards. It would seem that the defendant had ample time to prepare his evidence, if any he had.
The appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
