August 1931 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 34431 August 11, 1931 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. FABIAN MONTERA
055 Phil 933:
055 Phil 933:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 34431. August 11, 1931.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FABIAN MONTERA, Defendant-Appellant.
Eusebio C. Encarnacion for Appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CRIMINAL LAW; VALIDITY OF THE HABITUAL DELINQUENT LAW, ACT NO. 3397; "EX POST FACTO" LAWS. — The Habitual Delinquent Law, Act No. 3397, is not an ex post facto law, and is valid.
D E C I S I O N
MALCOLM, J.:
The trial judge was right in convicting the accused for the theft of twelve phonograph records and one flashlight, valued of P30.30 and in considering the accused as an habitual delinquent. No consent, express or implied, on the part of the offended party for the accused to take the records and flashlight was established. Recidivism was properly taken into account as an aggravating circumstance, independently of the provisions of the Habitual Delinquent Law. (People v. Aguinaldo [1925], 47 Phil., 728.)
The Habitual Delinquent Law, Act No. 3397, is attacked as an ex post facto law in violation of the Organic Act. This court has heretofore held the Habitual Delinquent Law valid as not inflicting cruel or unusual punishment. (People v. Madrano [1928], 53 Phil., 860.) The present contention is equally unsustainable. Statutes which authorize a more severe punishment to be imposed upon one convicted of a second or subsequent offense are not objectionable upon the ground that they are ex post facto laws. Such statutes, the United States Supreme Court has said, do not impose any additional punishment for the former crimes, but simply impose a punishment on future crimes, the penalty therefor being enhanced on account of the criminal propensities of the accused. (McDonald v. Massachusetts [1900], 180 U. S., 311.)
Conforming, therefore, with the pronouncements of the trial court, except that, as recommended by the Attorney-General, there must be a modification of the period of imprisonment, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, it being understood that the defendant and appellant is sentenced to two years, four months, and one day imprisonment, presidio correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P30.30, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with the appropriate accessory penalties, and with the costs of both instances; and to an additional penalty of ten years’ imprisonment as an habitual delinquent. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, Villa-Real and Imperial, JJ., concur.
The Habitual Delinquent Law, Act No. 3397, is attacked as an ex post facto law in violation of the Organic Act. This court has heretofore held the Habitual Delinquent Law valid as not inflicting cruel or unusual punishment. (People v. Madrano [1928], 53 Phil., 860.) The present contention is equally unsustainable. Statutes which authorize a more severe punishment to be imposed upon one convicted of a second or subsequent offense are not objectionable upon the ground that they are ex post facto laws. Such statutes, the United States Supreme Court has said, do not impose any additional punishment for the former crimes, but simply impose a punishment on future crimes, the penalty therefor being enhanced on account of the criminal propensities of the accused. (McDonald v. Massachusetts [1900], 180 U. S., 311.)
Conforming, therefore, with the pronouncements of the trial court, except that, as recommended by the Attorney-General, there must be a modification of the period of imprisonment, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, it being understood that the defendant and appellant is sentenced to two years, four months, and one day imprisonment, presidio correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P30.30, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with the appropriate accessory penalties, and with the costs of both instances; and to an additional penalty of ten years’ imprisonment as an habitual delinquent. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, Villa-Real and Imperial, JJ., concur.
