Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1932 > November 1932 Decisions > G.R. No. 36627 November 19, 1932 - EL HOGAR FILIPINO v. A.P. SEVA

057 Phil 573:

This is an appeal taken by A.P. Seva, as judicial administrator of the estate of Leonor G. de Seva, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated August 3, 1931, confirming the sale made by the sheriff of said court, of a parcel of residential property with the improvements thereon situate in the City of Manila, and mortgaged to the plaintiff, El Hogar Filipino, the highest bidder being Victor Buencamino for P12,550, and ordering the issuance of another writ of execution for the rest of the sentence under execution.

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns seven alleged errors as committed by the court a quo in the aforesaid order, which he shall take up in the course of this decision.

The first question to decide in this appeal, and that raised in the first assignment of error, is whether or not the property herein litigated was sold extrajudicially by the sheriff of Manila. The appellant himself answers this question in his brief recital of the facts, wherein he states that by virtue of a writ of execution dated June 29, 1931, issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila in the foreclosure proceedings instituted by El Hogar Filipino against A.P. Seva, as administrator of the estate of the late Leonor G. de Seva, the sheriff of Manila sold the property at public auction. Inasmuch as a competent court has ordered has been carried out, the sale cannot be called extrajudicial.

As for the other assignments of error referring to the insufficiency of the price at which the property was sold at public auction, this court laid down the following doctrine in the case of Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Green (52 Phil., 491):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"MORTGAGE; SALE OF REALTY UNDER EXECUTION. -Inasmuch as the opposition to the confirmation of the sale made by the sheriff pursuant to the execution only alleged as a ground that the price for which the mortgaged property was sold was absolutely inadequate and unreasonable, and whereas it has heretofore been held by this court that a smaller price, for which the same property was sold at the first auction, notwithstanding that it was inadequate, was not sufficient by itself alone to annul the order confirming the sale (which was annulled for a different reason); therefore, the fact that the opponent was not given an opportunity to present evidence in support of the allegations of his opposition does not constitute a prejudicial error which would nullify the order confirming the sale made by the sheriff."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the present case the appellant has not shown, either in the lower court or in this court, that there was anybody who offered, or was willing to offer, a higher price for the property in question, if the sale made by the sheriff to Victor Buencamino would be set aside, and another auction sale held.

With reference to the question whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila that took cognizance of the foreclosure proceedings here mentioned, has jurisdiction to order the public auction sale of the mortgaged property situate in Occidental Negros, this court laid down the following doctrine in the case of Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General (20 Phil., 523):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF SECTION 377, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. — Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that actions affecting real property shall be brought in the province where the land involved in the suit, or some part thereof, is located, does not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over the land itself but relates simply to the personal rights of the parties as to the place of trial.



"7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VENUE NOT CONNECTED WITH JURISDICTION; WAIVER BY PARTIES. — Venue is not connected with jurisdiction over the subject matter; and the defendants’ rights in respect thereto, as they are conferred by section 377 above referred to, may be waived expressly or by implication. Act No. 136 before referred to having conferred the fullest and completest jurisdiction possible upon Courts of First Instance relative to the real estate of the Islands, section 377 referred to will not be held or construed to restrict or limit that jurisdiction, it not containing express provisions to that end." (See also Central Azucarera de Tarlac v. De Leon and Fernandez, 56 Phil., 169; Cerf v. Medel, 33 Phil., 37; Katigbak v. Tai Hing Co., 52 Phil., 622; Marquez Lim Cay v. Del Rosario, 55 Phil., 962.)

In volume 42, page 31, section 1528, of Corpus Juris, there is the following statement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"PROPERTY IN SEVERAL COUNTIES. — Although there is contrary authority, where tracts of land situated in different counties are embraced in one mortgage, the proper court of either county has jurisdiction to foreclose the mortgage and order the sale of all the land. Several mortgages securing an entire debt are in effect one and may be foreclosed in any county in which part of the land lies, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

It has already been held, therefore, that when various parcels of land or real property situate in different provinces, are included in one mortgage contract, the Court of First Instance of the province wherein they are situated or a part thereof is situated, has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an action for the foreclosure of said mortgage, and the judgment therein rendered may be executed in all the other provinces wherever the mortgaged real property may be found.

By virtue whereof, finding no error in the order appealed from, it is hereby affirmed in its entirety, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.