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Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan's The Labor Code of the Philippines, Annotated Labor Standards & Social Legislation Volume I of a 3-Volume Series 2019 Edition (3rd Revised Edition)
 

 
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
 

 
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
 

   
May-1939 Jurisprudence                 

  • G.R. No. 45383 May 2, 1939 - MARIA V. SERAPIO v. MARIANO SERAPIO, ET AL.

    067 Phil 701

  • G.R. No. 45502 May 2, 1939 - SAPOLIN CO., INC. v. CORNELIO BALMACEDA

    067 Phil 705

  • G.R. No. 45915 May 2, 1939 - ESCOLASTICO BUENAVENTURA v. GERINO Z. LAYLAY

    067 Phil 717

  • G.R. No. 45486 May 3, 1939 - TIBURCIO SUMERA v. EUGENIO VALENCIA

    067 Phil 721

  • G.R. No. 45322 May 4, 1939 - WALTER BULL v. REDO L. YATCO

    067 Phil 728

  • G.R. No. 45524 May 4, 1939 - MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS v. VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC.

    067 Phil 733

  • G.R. No. 45969 May 4, 1939 - TAN TIAH v. Yu JOSE

    067 Phil 739

  • G.R. No. 45122 May 5, 1939 - VISAYAN SURETY & INSURANCE CORPORATION v. FRUCTUOSA TABARES

    067 Phil 743

  • G.R. No. 45496 May 5, 1939 - ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORROS DE MANILA

    068 Phil 1

  • G.R. No. 45662 May 5, 1939 - JUAN GOROSTIAGA v. MANUELA SARTE

    068 Phil 4

  • G.R. No. 45889 May 5, 1939 - CRISPINO ENRIQUEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.

    068 Phil 8

  • G.R. No. 45987 May 5, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. CAYAT

    068 Phil 12

  • G.R. No. 46405 May 6, 1939 - RAYMUNDO TRANS. CO., INC. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

    068 Phil 22

  • G.R. No. 45667 May 9, 1939 - HARRY IVES SHOEMAKER v. TONDEÑA

    068 Phil 24

  • G.R. No. 45696 May 9, 1939 - GIL BUENDIA v. VICENTE SOTTO

    068 Phil 31

  • G.R. No. 45865 May 10, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. TI YEK JUAT

    068 Phil 37

  • G.R. No. 45993 May 11, 1939 - GERONIMO SANTIAGO v. FABIAN R. MILLAR

    068 Phil 39

  • G.R. No. 45318 May 12, 1939 - JACINTO MESINA v. PETRA DELINO

    068 Phil 43

  • G.R. No. 45427 May 12, 1939 - PHIL. NATIONAL BANK v. PHIL. TRUST CO.

    068 Phil 48

  • G.R. No. 45433 May 12, 1939 - ROSARIO GONZALEZ CASTRO VIUDA DE AZAOLA v. GASTON O’FARRELL

    068 Phil 74

  • G.R. No. 45648 May 12, 1939 - DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. ANICETO ABA

    068 Phil 85

  • G.R. Nos. 46119-46121 May 12, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. IGNACIO BELTRAN

    068 Phil 90

  • G.R. No. 46584 May 13, 1939 - MARIANO MARCOS v. ROMAN A. CRUZ

    068 Phil 96

  • G.R. No. 45616 May 16, 1939 - FELICIANO SANCHEZ v. FRANCISCO ZULUETA

    068 Phil 110

  • G.R. No. 45543 May 17, 1939 - SURIGAO MINE EXPLORATION CO. v. C. HARRIS

    068 Phil 113

  • G.R. No. 46432 May 17, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. TEODORICO MARTIN

    068 Phil 122

  • G.R. No. 45924 May 18, 1939 - CELESTINO RODRIGUEZ v. EUGENIO YAP

    068 Phil 126

  • G.R. No. 45160 May 23, 1939 - JOSE GREY v. SERAFIN FABIE

    068 Phil 128

  • G.R. Nos. 45705-45707 May 23, 1939 - TEODORA DOMINGO v. MARGARITA DAVID

    068 Phil 134

  • G.R. No. 45842 May 23, 1939 - MARCARET STEWART MITCHELL MCMASTER v. HENRY REISSMANN & CO.

    068 Phil 142

  • G.R. No. 46177 May 23, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MELCHOR TAGASA

    068 Phil 147

  • G.R. No. 46437 May 23, 1939 - EUFEMIO P. TESORO v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

    068 Phil 154

  • G.R. No. 45213 May 24, 1939 - H. P. L. JOLLYE v. EMETERIO BARCELON

    068 Phil 164

  • G.R. No. 45486 May 24, 1939 - ASIATIC PETROLEUM CO. v. JOSEFA VALENCIA VIUDA DE MOLINA

    068 Phil 172

  • G.R. No. 45218 May 26, 1939 - CONSUELO CEMBRANO v. CARMEN PARDO DE TAVERA DE GONZALEZ

    068 Phil 175

  • G.R. No. 45446 May 25, 1939 - C. N. HODGES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.

    068 Phil 178

  • G.R. No. 45530 May 25, 1939 - CHINA INSURANCE v. Y. CHONG

    068 Phil 189

  • G.R. No. 45615 May 25, 1939 - TEOFILO SINCO v. SILVESTRA TEVES

    068 Phil 200

  • G.R. No. 46000 May 25, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JOSE M. BAES

    068 Phil 203

  • G.R. No. 46024 May 25, 1939 - SOTERA ARAVEJO v. ALFONSO DORONILA

    068 Phil 210

  • G.R. No. 46078 May 25, 1939 - GREGORIA REYNOSO v. JOSE E. TOLENTINO

    068 Phil 213

  • G.R. No. 45189 May 26, 1939 - PHIL. SUGAR ESTATE DEV’T. CO., INC. v. JUAN POSADAS

    068 Phil 216

  • G.R. No. 45264 May 26, 1939 - JOSEFA CASTELLTORT v. BALBINA PASION

    068 Phil 224

  • G.R. No. 45736 May 26, 1939 - CONCEPCION LOPEZ v. ADELA LOPEZ

    068 Phil 227

  • G.R. No. 46100 May 26, 1939 - ALFREDO HIDALGO RIZAL v. JOSEFA RIZAL MERCADO

    068 Phil 231

  • G.R. No. 43585 May 27, 1939 - RIZALINA DE LA ROSA v. MAXIMIANA EDRALIN

    068 Phil 234

  • G.R. No. 45307 May 27, 1939 - COMPAÑIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS v. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE

    068 Phil 238

  • G.R. No. 45324 May 27, 1939 - GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. v. FRANCISCO ABADINAS

    068 Phil 254

  • G.R. No. 45374 May 27, 1939 - MANUEL RODRIGUES v. DANIEL TIRONA

    068 Phil 264

  • G.R. No. 45608 May 27, 1939 - JESUS AZCONA v. PACIFIC COMMERCIAL CO.

    068 Phil 269

  • G.R. No. 46248 May 27, 1939 - TIMOTEO TAROMA v. ROMAN A. CRUZ

    068 Phil 281

  • G.R. No. 45350 May 29, 1939 - BACHBACH MOTOR CO. v. ESTEBAN ICARAÑGAL

    068 Phil 287

  • G.R. No. 45121 May 31, 1939 - DEMETRIO GAMBOA v. SERAFIN GAMBOA

    068 Phil 304

  •  





     
     

    G.R. Nos. 45705-45707   May 23, 1939 - TEODORA DOMINGO v. MARGARITA DAVID<br /><br />068 Phil 134

     
    PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

    FIRST DIVISION

    [G.R. Nos. 45705-45707. May 23, 1939.]

    TEODORA DOMINGO and MARIANO SANTOS, as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased ANTONIO MANUEL, Petitioners, v. MARGARITA DAVID, Respondent.

    Juan R, Liwag, for Petitioners.

    Santos & Solidum and Jose Teodoro for Respondent.

    SYLLABUS


    1. COURTS; COURT OF APPEALS; APPLICATION OF RULE 31 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS. — Under Rule 31 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, adopted by the Court of Appeals, the cases submitted to the divisions of which the Court of Appeals is composed for its consideration and adjudication or decision, are deemed submitted for the same purpose to all the members composing the said court, whether or not they have been members thereof on the date when the said cases have been submitted; and only those members present when the cases are submitted on oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if the parties, or either of them, so ask in writing. The rule is squarely applicable to the case because it is undeniable that none of the parties has asked in writing, or otherwise, that only the members of the Court of Appeals who were present during the oral argument should consider and decide the cases.

    2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FORCE OF LAW OF THE RULES OF COURT. — The Rules of the Court of Appeals, when not contrary to any legal provision, have the force of law and are binding upon the parties litigant (Paterno V8. City of Manila, 17 Phil., 26; Ynchausti & CO. v. De Leon, 24 Phil., 224; Shioji v. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333).

    3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HEARING. — Commonwealth Act No. 3 and its amendment, No. 259 contains no provision defining the hearing required to be granted to parties in appealed cases submitted to the Court of Appeals for decision. The hearing required by these laws is the same as that required in cases appealed to the Supreme Court and differs from the trial held in Courts of First Instance where evidence is adduced by the parties. The hearing in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court is held upon the record, the bill of exceptions or record on appeal and the briefs, and a case is deemed heard and submitted after it has been included in the calendar of hearings and this has been read or published on the dates fixed by law, unless during the reading of the calendar the parties or their counsel ask for oral argument, in which event the case will not be deemed submitted until after such oral argument (Serra v. Mortiga, 204 U. S., 470, 11 Phil., 762.)

    4. ID.; APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION UNDER SECTION 113 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. — In the cases of Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca (37 Phil., 921), and Philippine Manufacturing Co. v. Imperial (47 Phil., 810), it has been held that an order denying a motion under section 113 is appealable; but it seems plain that the denial of said motion is not a bar to the institution of the action for nullity of judgment based upon the fact that this has been fraudulently obtained. This is the more obvious considering that fraud is not one of the causes or grounds mentioned by section 113, namely, error, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect on the part of the applicant.

    5. ID.; ANNULMENT OF A JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD; EXTRINSIC FRAUD. — An action to annul a judgment, on the ground of fraud, will not prosper unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts constituting it have not been controverted or decided in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered (Anuran v. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil., 29; Javier v. Paredes and Gregorio, 52 Phil., 910).

    6. ID.; "RES JUDICATA." — Held: That the facts upon which the petitioners base the alleged fraud have already been raised, discussed and decided by the court in the first case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered, the parties therein being the same as those who have intervened in the second, and that the judgment thus rendered is res judicata with respect the second case.


    D E C I S I O N


    IMPERIAL, J.:


    The petitioners ask in their petition for certiorari that we review and reverse the decision rendered in the cases by the Court of Appeals, reversing in turn that of the Court of First Instance of Manila which held valid the judgment rendered by said court in civil case No. 43654, sentenced the petitioners, in civil case No. 46982 of the same court, to pay the respondent, jointly and severally, the sum of P1,000, with interest thereon at 12 per cent per annum, from June 18,1931, plus P200 by way of attorney’s fees, and the costs, and ordered that said amounts be paid within thirty days from the finality of the judgment and, in default thereof that the two rings pledged be sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof applied to the payment of the aforesaid sums of money.

    Civil case No. 43655 (G. R. No. 45705 of this court) was commenced by the respondent in the Court of First In stance of Manila to recover from the petitioners the amount of P1,000, being the amount of a note signed by the spouses Antonino Manuel and Teodora Domingo, plus interest thereon at 12 per cent per annum and the penalty of P200 by way of attorney’s fees and cost of collection. Due to the death of Antonino Manuel, the petitioner Mariano Santos was joined as his judicial administrator appointed by the court. In this case the court rendered judgment absolving the petitioners from the complaint, and this is the judgment which was reversed by the Court of Appeals which sentenced the said petitioners in the manner aboveindicated.

    Civil case No. 46982 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (G. R. No. 45707 of this court) was instituted by the petitioners to annul the judgment which said court rendered the civil case No. 43654, a judgment which foreclosed the mortgages upon which the complaint was based and ordered the petitioners to pay to the respondent the sum of P4,000 and, in default thereof, to sell at public auction the encumbered real property. In the said case the court rendered judgment nullifying that rendered in the said civil case No. 43654 and said judgment is the one reversed by the Court of Appeals.

    While these cases were on appeal to the Court of Appeals, they were assigned, in accordance with the rules, to the First Division thereof composed of Justices Concepcion, Moran, Sison, Paras and Albert and were set for oral argument on July 24, 1936. After the oral arguments, the cases were submitted for decision. However, the First Division did not consider, vote, or decide the cases, and they were thus left undecided. On January 28, 1937, while these cases were still pending decision, the Court of Appeals adopted a resolution effective on February 1st of the same year, changing the composition of its divisions. Under the said resolution, the Second Division was composed of Justices Moran, Imperial, Bengzon, Padilla and Lopez Vito and to this Division was assigned the consideration and decision of the said cases. After studying and voting them, the Second Division promulgated the joint decision appealed from on July 29, 1937.

    The petitioners contend in their first assigned error that the decision thus promulgated by the Second Division is null and void because it was signed by Justices who, with the exception of Justice Moran, have not heard the oral arguments therein made, and that the cases were decided without affording them the due process of law. This same question was submitted on motion for reconsideration and the Court of Appeals denied it as untenable. We believe and so hold that the contention is indefensible and insupported by law. Rule 31 of the Rules of this Court, adopted by the Court of appeals as a part of their Rules, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

    "31. All matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the justices who are members of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such justices were or were not members of the court and whether they were or were not present at the date of submission: Provided, That only those members present when any matter is submitted on oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if the parties, or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the date of submission."cralaw virtua1aw library

    Under this rule, the cases submitted to the divisions of which the Court of Appeals is composed for its consideration and adjudication or decision, are deemed submitted for the same purpose to all the members composing the said court, whether or not they have been members thereof on the date when the said cases have submitted; and only those members present when the cases are submitted on oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if the parties, or either of them, so ask in writing. The rule is squarely applicable to the case because it is undeniable that none of the parties has asked in writing, or otherwise, that only the members of the Court of Appeals who were present during the oral argument should consider and decide the cases. The rules of the Court of Appeals, when not contrary to any legal provision, have the force of law and are binding upon the parties litigant (Paterno v. City of Manila, 17 Phil., 26, Ynchausti & Co. v. De Leon, 24 Phil., 224; Shioji v. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333).

    The petitioners cite section 145-K of Commonwealth Act No. 3 in their insistence that the Second Division of the Court of Appeals did not afford them due process of law when it decided the cases without giving them the benefit of oral argument, because the former oral argument; took place before the First Division. This contention is likewise without merit. To show this lack of merit, it would suffice to cite the aforequoted Rule 31 which expressly permits the consideration and decision of submitted cases by members of the Court of Appeals who have not been present at the oral argument, unless the contrary is so requested in writing by the parties or by any of them. But there is also another reason justifying Rule 31 and showing the unsoundness of the contention. Commonwealth Act No. 3 and its amendment, No. 259, contains no provision defining the hearing required to be granted to parties in appealed cases submitted to the Court of Appeals for decision. The hearing required by these laws is the same as that required in cases appealed to the Supreme Court and differs from the trial held in Courts of First Instance where evidence is adduced by the parties. The hearing in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court is held upon the record, the bill of exceptions or record on appeal and the briefs, and a case is deemed heard and submitted after it has been included in the calendar of hearings and this has been read or published on the dates fixed by law, unless during the reading of the calendar the parties or their counsel ask for oral argument, in which event the case will not be deemed submitted until after such oral argument (Serra v. Mortiga, 204 U. S., 470, 11 Phil., 762).

    After the promulgation of the decision of the court in civil case No. 43664 and within the six months following, the petitioners filed a motion under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure and asked that the said decision be set aside on the ground that the same had been obtained by the respondent through fraud. The fraud is made to consist in the same facts alleged in the action subsequently instituted to annul the said decision, that is, that the mortgage deeds on which the decision is based are fictitious and fraudulent. The court denied the motion and the petitioners did not appeal from the order of denial The Court of Appeals held in its appealed decision that the failure to appeal said order is a bar to the action for nullity of the judgment. The petitioners alleged in their second assigned error that this ruling is erroneous because the remedy granted by section 113 is cumulative and could be availed of without thereby losing their right to the action for nullity. In the cases of Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca (37 Phil., 921), and Philippine Manufacturing Co. v. Imperial (47 Phil., 810), we have held that an order denying a motion under section 113 is appealable; but it seems plain that the denial of said motion is not a bar to the institution of the action for nullity of judgment based upon the fact that this has been fraudulently obtained. This is the more obvious, considering that fraud is not one of the causes or grounds mentioned by section 113, namely, error, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect on the part of the applicant. But the assignment of error is of no consequence in view of our ruling on the following assigned errors.

    In their third assigned error, the petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in holding, in turn, that the decision of the court which held null and void that rendered in civil case No. 43664 is erroneous. In the fourteen assigned error it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petitioners’ equitable remedy upon the sole ground that the alleged fraud is not extrinsic. And in the fifth assigned error it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the petitioners are entitled to the equitable remedy on the ground of newly discovered evidence. These three assignments of error which the attorney for the petitioners tries to substantial jointly, raise the sole question of whether or not the action for nullity of the decision rendered in civil case No. 43654, based upon the ground of fraud, lies. The Court of Appeals resolved the question in the negative and adversely to the petitioners because it found that the facts established that the alleged fraud was not extrinsic or collateral inasmuch as it had been controverted and decided in the said civil case. And it was not extrinsic because in that case the petitioners had already alleged the same fraud and had made it to consist in the falsity of the mortgage deeds and in the fact that the loans which they guaranteed were fictitious because the money had never been received by them. and the action subsequently commenced by the petitioners to nullify the judgment was based upon the same facts or grounds, that is, that the judgment sought to be nullified had been obtained fraudulently by the respondent as the mortgage deeds upon which it was based were fraudulent and fictitious. The legal conclusion thus reached by the Court of Appeals is correct and finds support in the jurisprudence uniformly established in this jurisdiction. An action to annul a judgment, on the ground of fraud, will not prosper unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts constituting it have not been controverted or decided in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered (Anuran v. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil., 29; Javier v. Paredes and Gregorio, 52 Phil., 910). The petitioners argue that the questions in the two cases are distinct and separate because the first had to do with the falsity of the mortgage deeds, whereas, the second alleged as a ground for nullity the fraud availed of by the respondent to obtain the judgment. We find no weight in the argument. Under the facts found established by the Court of Appeals, which this court cannot disturb, in the first as well as in the second case the falsity of the mortgage deeds and the fictitious loan were the questions raised and submitted by the petitioners and the court decided said questions in favor of the Respondent. The cause of action of the second case could not be different from that of the first because the fraud attributed to the respondent was made to consist in the falsity of the same mortgage deeds and this falsity is what the petitioners claim to be the fraudulent means availed of by the respondent to secure the judgment sought to be annulled.

    As to the allegation that the judgment should be annulled at least on the strength of the newly discovered evidence, Exhibits 1 to 41 and 44 to 55, we are of the opinion that the alleged newly discovered evidence does not change the result of the cases and the doctrine laid down on the subject. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals held that a consideration of said evidence would not alter the facts found to have been established.

    In the sixth assignment of error it is contended that the defense of res judicata interposed by the respondent and sustained by the Court of Appeals should not have been sustained. We hold that the facts upon which the petitioners base the alleged fraud have already been raised, discussed and decided by the court in the first case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered, the parties therein being the same as those who have intervened in the second, and that the judgment thus rendered is res judicata with respect to the second case.

    In the seventh and last assigned error the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance. In view of what has been said, it is obvious that the Court of Appeals did not commit the alleged error, because the decision which it rendered, as above shown, is in accordance with the facts and the law.

    In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is denied, with the costs to the petitioners. So ordered.

    Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Laurel and Conception, JJ., concur.

    G.R. Nos. 45705-45707   May 23, 1939 - TEODORA DOMINGO v. MARGARITA DAVID<br /><br />068 Phil 134


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