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Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan's The Labor Code of the Philippines, Annotated Labor Standards & Social Legislation Volume I of a 3-Volume Series 2019 Edition (3rd Revised Edition)
 

 
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
 

 
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
 

   
September-1939 Jurisprudence                 

  • G.R. No. 46562 September 13, 1939 - BARDWIL BROS. v. PHIL. LABOR UNION

    068 Phil 436

  • G.R. No. 46673 September 13, 1939 - ANDRES P. GOSECO v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

    068 Phil 444

  • G.R. No. 45596 September 18, 1939 - MARCOS LIPANA v. DOMlNGO LAO Y OTROS

    068 Phil 451

  • G.R. No. 46412 September 18, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MANOJI

    068 Phil 471

  • G.R. No. 46497 September 18, 1939 - ANTONIO S. SANAGUSTIN v. CONRADO BARRIOS

    068 Phil 475

  • G.R. No. 46170 September 20, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. FERMIN PUNTO

    068 Phil 481

  • G.R. No. 46780 September 20, 1939 - FISCAL OF CAMARINES NORTE v. JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES NORTE

    068 Phil 483

  • G.R. No. 46108 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. DATU GALANTU MEDTED

    068 Phil 485

  • G.R. No. 46109 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. NICOLAS CARPIO

    068 Phil 490

  • G.R. No. 46197 September 22, 1939 - KINKWA MERIYASU CO. v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

    068 Phil 501

  • G.R. No. 46302 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. TORIBIO C. COSTES

    068 Phil 503

  • G.R. No. 46578 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ANICETO MARQUEZ

    068 Phil 506

  • G.R. No. 46580 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. PEDRO DE GUZMAN

    068 Phil 508

  • G.R. No. 46602 September 22, 1939 - YAP TAK WING & CO. v. MUNICIPAL BOARD

    068 Phil 511

  • G.R. No. 46686 September 22, 1939 - TRANQUILINO RUBIS v. PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES

    068 Phil 515

  • G.R. No. 46715 September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. EMILIO DE JESUS

    068 Phil 517

  • G.R. No. 46068 September 23, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. EUSTAQUIO CAROZ

    068 Phil 521

  • G.R. No. 46650 September 23, 1939 - MARIO BENGZON v. AUDITOR GENERAL

    068 Phil 527

  • G.R. No. 46652 September 23, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. CASIMIRO CONCEPCION

    068 Phil 530

  • G.R. Nos. 46802-46812 September 23, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. RESURRECCION B. PEÑAS

    068 Phil 533

  • G.R. No. 46739 September 23, 1939 - PAMPANGA BUS CO., INC. v. PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES UNION

    068 Phil 541

  • G.R. No. 46668 September 26, 1939 - GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. v. PAMPANGA SUGAR MILLS

    068 Phil 547

  • G.R. No. 46729 September 25, 1939 - KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGAGAWA SA PANTRANCO v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

    068 Phil 552

  • Adm. Case No. 879 September 27, 1939 - PEDRO DE GUZMAN v. TOMAS B. TADEO

    068 Phil 554

  • G.R. No. 46080 September 27, 1939 - GUILLERMO A. CU UNJIENG v. HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORP.

    068 Phil 559

  • G.R. No. 46094 September 27, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. FERNANDO C. QUEBRAL

    068 Phil 564

  • G.R. No. 46237 September 27, 1939 - ROSALIO MARQUEZ v. BERNARDO CASTILLO

    068 Phil 568

  • G.R. No. 46350 September 27, 1939 - TAN CHAY v. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL.

    068 Phil 572

  • G.R. No. 46470 September 27, 1939 - JUAN CASTILLO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

    068 Phil 577

  • G.R. No. 46539 September 27, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. VALENTIN DOQUEÑA

    068 Phil 580

  • G.R. Nos. 46553-46555 September 27, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. LEON FABILLAR

    068 Phil 584

  • G.R. No. 46615 September 27, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ALBERTO AQUINO

    068 Phil 588

  • G.R. No. 46727 September 27, 1939 - PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES’ UNION v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

    068 Phil 591

  • G.R. No. 46168 September 29, 1939 - INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER CO. OF THE PHIL. v. DELFIN MAHINAY

    068 Phil 597

  • G.R. No. 46336 September 29, 1939 - REVEREND ULRIC ARCAND v. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.

    068 Phil 601

  • G.R. No. 46458 September 29, 1939 - ERLANGER & GALINGER v. HERMENEGILDO G. ALAGAR

    068 Phil 610

  • G.R. No. 46725 September 29, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MAXIMINO AQUINO

    068 Phil 615

  • G.R. No. 46023 September 30, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JESUS FLORENDO

    068 Phil 619

  • G.R. No. 46252 September 30, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. LEONOR DE MOLL

    068 Phil 626

  • G.R. No. 46298 September 30, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. DATU AMBIS

    068 Phil 635

  • G.R. No. 46390 September 30, 1939 - CASIMIRO TIANGCO v. PROCESO FRANCISCO

    068 Phil 639

  • G.R. No. 46396 September 30, 1939 - ALEJANDRO DE GUZMAN v. VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT CO.

    068 Phil 643

  • G.R. No. 46451 September 30, 1939 - PAZ CHUA v. SECRETARY OF LABOR

    068 Phil 649

  • G.R. No. 46484 September 30, 1939 - SANTIAGO SAMBRANO v. RED LINE TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.

    068 Phil 652

  • G.R. No. 46724 September 30, 1939 - CRESCENCIO REYNES v. ROSALINA BARRERA

    068 Phil 656

  • G.R. No. 46728 September 30, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. EDUARDO MONTENEGRO

    068 Phil 659

  •  





     
     

    G.R. No. 46108   September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. DATU GALANTU MEDTED<br /><br />068 Phil 485

     
    PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

    FIRST DIVISION

    [G.R. No. 46108. September 22, 1939.]

    THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DATU GALANTU MEDTED ET AL., Defendants. DATU GALANTU MEDTED, KANAKAN MEDTED, and MAUTI DUMAURONG, Appellants.

    Carmelo Basa for Appellants.

    Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Zulueta for Appellee.

    SYLLABUS


    1. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; MURDER; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; PURPOSE OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. — The appellant base their defense of double jeopardy on the fact that the first complaint filed against them in the justice of the peace court was dismissed upon petition of the fiscal himself, for lack of evidence, as soon as it had been received in the Court of First Instance, and on the fact that, notwithstanding said dismissal, the fiscal again charged them with the same acts and offense in another case. This defense is unfounded. The result of a preliminary investigation can neither constitute nor give rise to the defense of double jeopardy in any case, because such preliminary investigation is not and does not in itself constitute a trial or even any part thereof. The only purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine, before the presentation of evidence by the prosecution and by the defense, if the latter party should wish to present any, whether or’ not there are reasonable grounds for proceeding formally and resolutely against the accused (People v. Peji Bautista, G. R. No. 45739, April 25,1939; U. S. v. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil., 209). In order that the defense of jeopardy may lie, there must be a former judgment, either of acquittal or of conviction, rendered by a court competent to render the same, not only by reason of the offense committed, which must be the same or at least comprised within it, but also by reason of the place where it was committed. Under the established facts it cannot be stated that the same circumstances exist in the case under consideration. Consequently, the defense of double jeopardy is untenable.

    2. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY. — The lower court held as proven the existence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and of dwelling, and the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction of the appellant, in the commission of the crime. However, it gave no importance to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime because it correctly declared the same to be absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery (People v. Piring, 63 Phil., 546). There is no doubt about the existence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance because the appellants committed the aggression by taking the deceased by surprise without any risk whatsoever to themselves, the deceased not having been, as he was not, warned in order to defend himself or even to avoid said aggression. The act, or rather the aggression, was treacherous and was the result of a conspiracy among the appellant.


    D E C I S I O N


    DIAZ, J.:


    At about 7 o’clock in the night of September 25, 1937, Moro Manankian, married to Sumeriñgan, received a spear wound in his breast above his right nipple, piercing his right lung and producing a hemorrhage which caused his death a few moments later. This took place in his own house situated in the place called Makamalig in the barrio of Marang, district of Parang, Province of Cotabato. The crime was attributed to the accused Datu Galantu Medted, Kanakan Medted, Mauti Dumaurong, and Makagaan, all Moros, against whom a complaint was first presented in the justice of the peace court of the municipal district of Parang, followed later by an information filed in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. After due trial in the latter court, the three appellants — the accused Makagaan having been released from the charge upon motion of the fiscal, for lack of evidence — were convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally to the heirs of the deceased an indemnity of P1,000 plus the costs. They appealed from said sentence and in this instance they now argue that the court erred: (1) In not sustaining the defense of double jeopardy in their favor, and (2) in finding them guilty of the crime with which they had been charged, notwithstanding the fact that the same had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

    It appears from the evidence presented during the trial that while the deceased Manankian was cooking coconut oil on the stove inside the kitchen of their house, on the occasion in question, he unexpectedly received a spear wound in his breast, as a consequence of which he was unable to utter any word except to tell his wife Sumeriñgan that he had been speared. His wife, upon peeping through the uncovered opening between the floor of their living room and that of their kitchen, in order to find out who could have been the aggressors of her husband, saw the appellants by the light of a lamp which was in the kitchen and by that of the flames of the fire in the stove beside which her said husband stood cooking the coconut oil. It likewise appears from the evidence that the appellants and their respective families were not in good terms with the deceased and his wife ever since said deceased, about four years before, charged the father of the first two appellants and grandfather of the last one, with having stolen two carabaos belonging to him and his wife. The person whom the deceased had charged with theft of large cattle was named Sulay. The case had been submitted to a Constabulary officer and later to the chieftains of the place where the parties resided. During the sort of trial held before said chieftains, Sulay was required to swear before the Koran to affirm thereby the truth of his allegation that he had not stolen the animals belonging to the deceased. Upon swearing, he invoked death to come upon him if he was not telling the truth. It happened that Sulay died some years later and the deceased and his faction believed that it was due to his having sworn falsely in connection with the question between him and the deceased, relative to the two carabaos belonging to said deceased. Thereafter the resentment of the appellants, who are sons and grandson of Sulay, against the deceased and his family, became more accentuated and aggravated. The lower court declared that the motive of the crime was the grave resentment then existing between the deceased and the appellants.

    The testimony of the widow of the deceased to the effect that she recognized the accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the aggression committed against her husband, is corroborated by that of the witness Mama, who testified that at the cries of said widow, he saw and recognized the three appellants as they fled from said place, each of them carrying spears and creeses.

    While it is true that Sumeriñgan told Bansil, Sangad and Mamarinta, who were the first to go to her house after the crime, that she had not been able to recognize the perpetrators thereof, stating the same thing to Lieutenant Cabrera of the Army, who went to the scene of the crime on the following day for the purpose of conducting the necessary investigation, however, the reason given by said witness for having behaved in that manner is not only satisfactory but convincing as well. The widow being a native of the Province of Lanao, she was a stranger in Makamalig and had no relatives therein who could protect her. Bansil, Sangad and Mamarinta were all very near relatives of the appellants, some by reason of blood ties and others by reason of marriage. Although she knew who the authors of her husband’s death were, she kept silent for fear of being harmed. She likewise kept silent when Lieutenant Cabrera went to said place to conduct an investigation, because the relatives of the appellants were then present and could hear her. On that same occasion, however, amidst sobs and tears, she told Lieutenant Cabrera in a low voice, outside the hearing of others, that she would go to see him at his headquarters in order to make a true revelation and to give him the names of the perpetrators of the crime. She did so, as she had promised, soon after her husband’s body had been buried.

    The appellants base their defense of double jeopardy on the fact that the first complaint filed against them in the justice of the peace court was dismissed upon petition of the fiscal himself, for lack of evidence, as soon as it had been received in the Court of First Instance, and on the fact that, notwithstanding said dismissal, the fiscal again charged them with the same acts and offense in another case. This defense is unfounded. The result of a preliminary investigation can neither constitute nor give rise to the defense of double jeopardy in any case, because such preliminary investigation is not and does not in itself constitute a trial or even any part thereof. The only purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine, before the presentation of evidence by the prosecution and by the defense, if the latter party should wish to present any, whether or not there are reasonable grounds for proceeding formally and resolutely against the accused (People v. Peji Bautista, G. R. No. 45739, April 25, 1939; U. S. v. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil., 209). In order that the defense of jeopardy may lie, there must be a former judgment, either of acquittal or of conviction, rendered by a court competent to render the same, not only by reason of the offense committed, which must be the same or at least comprised within it, but also by reason of the place where it was committed. Under the established facts it cannot be stated that the same circumstances exist in the case under consideration. Consequently, the defense of double jeopardy is untenable.

    The lower court held as proven the existence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and of dwelling, and the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction of the appellants, in the commission of the crime. However, it gave no importance to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime because it correctly declared the same to be absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery (People v. Piring, 63 Phil., 646). There is no doubt about the existence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance because the appellants committed the aggression by taking the deceased by surprise without any risk whatsoever to themselves, the deceased not having been, as he was not, warned in order to defend himself or even to avoid said aggression. The act, or rather the aggression, was treacherous and was the result of a conspiracy among the appellants.

    For all the foregoing, the appealed judgment being in accordance with law, it is hereby affirmed in toto, with the costs to the appellants, who must, however, be credited with one-half of the preventive imprisonment which they have been suffering to date. So ordered

    Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Laurel, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.

    G.R. No. 46108   September 22, 1939 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. DATU GALANTU MEDTED<br /><br />068 Phil 485


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