February 1953 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-5832 February 27, 1953 - PAZ FIRMEZA v. EVO SANTIAGO DAVID
092 Phil 733:
092 Phil 733:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-5832. February 27, 1953.]
PAZ FIRMEZA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EVO SANTIAGO DAVID, Defendant-Appellant.
Enrique F. Mariño for Appellant.
Manuel Y. Coloso for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; "ACCION PUBLICIANA." — The 1948 Judiciary Act did not introduce any modification to the well-established principle that when deprivation of possession of realty has lasted more than one year the action to recover it falls within the jurisdiction of the courts of first instance.
D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
February 15, 1949 Paz Firmesa filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint to recover from Evo Santiago David a parcel of land with improvements in the municipality of Hinigaran, same province. She alleged ownership thru a registered certificate of title, and possession up to January 7, 1948 when defendant by force and intimidation occupied the premises, and harvested the products thereafter.
The answer ascribed fraud to the acquisition of the certificate, and asserted ownership by defendant thru inheritance from his predecessors and ancestors.
When the case was called for hearing, the defendant orally questioned the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that, as the allegations of the complaint had made out a case of forcible entry and detainer, the matter should be referred to the corresponding justice of the peace. The Honorable Francisco Arellano, Judge, overruled the objection, observing that the seizure of the land had taken place more than one year before the presentation of the complaint. Later, after hearing the parties he rendered judgment for the plaintiff ordering the delivery of the property to her, and requiring defendant to pay damages. The latter appealed, insisting merely on the issue of jurisdiction.
This appeal may not be sustained. Inasmuch as the forcible occupation of the land began on January 7, 1948, the complaint filed on February 15, 1949 could not be one of forcible entry and detainer for adjudication by the justice of the peace, because more than one year had elapsed from the date of deprivation of possession (Rule 72, section 1). The action was an ordinary one to recover possession (accion publiciana) cognizable by the court of first instance. Based on decisions of this court former Chief Justice Moran, explains in his recent Comments on the Rules of Court (1952 ed. Vol. 2, p. 290):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There are three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property, namely, (1) the summary action for forcible entry or detainer (denominated accion interdictal under the former law of procedure Ley de injuiciamiento Civil), which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one year in the justice of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana, which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance: and (3) accion de reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership (which of course includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi), also brought in the Court of First Instance." 1
It does not matter that the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act 296) expressly gives original jurisdiction to justices of the peace over forcible entry and detainer proceedings; because strictly speaking, plaintiff Firmeza’s action was not a forcible entry and detainer case, but an ordinary civil action to recover possession and use of a parcel of realty. The trial judge was correct in holding that the 1948 Judiciary Act did not introduce any modification to the well-established principle that when deprivation of possession has lasted more than one year the action to recover falls within the jurisdiction of the courts of first instance.
There being no other error complained of, the appealed decision is affirmed with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
The answer ascribed fraud to the acquisition of the certificate, and asserted ownership by defendant thru inheritance from his predecessors and ancestors.
When the case was called for hearing, the defendant orally questioned the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that, as the allegations of the complaint had made out a case of forcible entry and detainer, the matter should be referred to the corresponding justice of the peace. The Honorable Francisco Arellano, Judge, overruled the objection, observing that the seizure of the land had taken place more than one year before the presentation of the complaint. Later, after hearing the parties he rendered judgment for the plaintiff ordering the delivery of the property to her, and requiring defendant to pay damages. The latter appealed, insisting merely on the issue of jurisdiction.
This appeal may not be sustained. Inasmuch as the forcible occupation of the land began on January 7, 1948, the complaint filed on February 15, 1949 could not be one of forcible entry and detainer for adjudication by the justice of the peace, because more than one year had elapsed from the date of deprivation of possession (Rule 72, section 1). The action was an ordinary one to recover possession (accion publiciana) cognizable by the court of first instance. Based on decisions of this court former Chief Justice Moran, explains in his recent Comments on the Rules of Court (1952 ed. Vol. 2, p. 290):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There are three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property, namely, (1) the summary action for forcible entry or detainer (denominated accion interdictal under the former law of procedure Ley de injuiciamiento Civil), which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one year in the justice of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana, which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance: and (3) accion de reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership (which of course includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi), also brought in the Court of First Instance." 1
It does not matter that the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act 296) expressly gives original jurisdiction to justices of the peace over forcible entry and detainer proceedings; because strictly speaking, plaintiff Firmeza’s action was not a forcible entry and detainer case, but an ordinary civil action to recover possession and use of a parcel of realty. The trial judge was correct in holding that the 1948 Judiciary Act did not introduce any modification to the well-established principle that when deprivation of possession has lasted more than one year the action to recover falls within the jurisdiction of the courts of first instance.
There being no other error complained of, the appealed decision is affirmed with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Roman Catholic Bishop, 6 Phil., 286; Lucido v. Vita, 25 Phil., 414; Quiñones v. Padrigon, 71 Phil., 138; Baguioro v. Barrios, 43 Off. Gaz., 2031; 77 Phil., 120.
