September 1955 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
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G.R. No. L-7796 September 29, 1955 - JOSE PIDELO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS.
097 Phil 632:
097 Phil 632:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-7796. September 29, 1955.]
In the matter of the petition of JOSE PIDELO to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, JOSE PIDELO, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.
Lanzona & Ilagan for Appellee.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Juan T. Alano for Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CITIZENSHIP; DECLARATION OF INTENTION, ESSENTIAL; MERE BIRTH DOES NOT DISPENSED WITH THE FILLING OF DECLARATION; UNLESS PETITIONER FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS. — Although petitioner claims to have been born in the City of Cebu and, for this reason, he has not filed the declaration of intention required in section 5 of the Commonwealth Act No. 473, his birth in the Philippines does not suffice to dispense with the filing of said declaration, unless the applicant has "received the primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government, and not limited to any race or nationality." The records show that petitioners has reached only the third high school, which he does not even appear to have finished.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXEMPTION FROM FILING DECLARATION; RESIDENCE FOR OVER 30 YEARS BE SATISFACTORILY PROVEN. — Even assuming that his alleged birth in the Philippines were true, it has not been proven satisfactorily that petitioner resided in the Philippines for over 30 years. The very petitioner has not so testified, although he declared that he resided in Davao since 1951. Considering that his residence from birth, followed that of his father, a Chinese, who in the absence of proof to the country, and there is none — must be presumed to be domiciled in China, petitioner’s alleged birth in the Philippines does not imply necessary that he resided therein since 1918. Indeed, the fact that he went to China, and stayed there, for three (3) years in order to study, strongly indicates that his father and he regarded China as their homeland and domicile, and consequently, the they were not residents of the Philippines at the time. Hence, petitioner was bound to file a declaration of intention and failure to do bars his naturalization.
3. ID.; PETITION; AFFIDAVIT OF AT LEAST TWO FILIPINO CITIZENS OF THE REQUISITES REQUIRED BY LAW. — Affiants have not stated in their affidavits (1) that they "personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period required" by law; or (2) that petitioner is "a person of good reputes" ; or (3) "that petitioner has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions" of the Naturalization Law. Inasmuch as the same must be strictly construed and non-compliance with the provisions thereof relative to the contents of, and the annexes to, the petition for naturalization, renders the same void, it follows that petitioner’s application for naturalization should have not been entertained.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXEMPTION FROM FILING DECLARATION; RESIDENCE FOR OVER 30 YEARS BE SATISFACTORILY PROVEN. — Even assuming that his alleged birth in the Philippines were true, it has not been proven satisfactorily that petitioner resided in the Philippines for over 30 years. The very petitioner has not so testified, although he declared that he resided in Davao since 1951. Considering that his residence from birth, followed that of his father, a Chinese, who in the absence of proof to the country, and there is none — must be presumed to be domiciled in China, petitioner’s alleged birth in the Philippines does not imply necessary that he resided therein since 1918. Indeed, the fact that he went to China, and stayed there, for three (3) years in order to study, strongly indicates that his father and he regarded China as their homeland and domicile, and consequently, the they were not residents of the Philippines at the time. Hence, petitioner was bound to file a declaration of intention and failure to do bars his naturalization.
3. ID.; PETITION; AFFIDAVIT OF AT LEAST TWO FILIPINO CITIZENS OF THE REQUISITES REQUIRED BY LAW. — Affiants have not stated in their affidavits (1) that they "personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period required" by law; or (2) that petitioner is "a person of good reputes" ; or (3) "that petitioner has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions" of the Naturalization Law. Inasmuch as the same must be strictly construed and non-compliance with the provisions thereof relative to the contents of, and the annexes to, the petition for naturalization, renders the same void, it follows that petitioner’s application for naturalization should have not been entertained.
D E C I S I O N
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal, taken by the Office of the Solicitor General, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, granting, over the former’s opposition, the application for naturalization, as citizen of the Philippines, of petitioner Jose Pidelo.
Upon a review of the record, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the decision appealed from is untenable for the following reasons, namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Petitioner claims to have been born in the City of Cebu on September 3, 1918 and, seemingly, for this reason, among others, he has not filed the declaration of intention required in section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. However, birth in the Philippines does not suffice to dispense with the filing of said declaration, unless the applicant has "received the primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government, and not limited to any race or nationality" ? (Commonwealth Act No. 535, sec. 6). The record shows that petitioner has reached only the third year high school, which he does not even appear to have finished. (De la Cruz v. Republic of the Philippines, 49 Off. Gaz., 958; Cerverleon T. Dy v. Republic of the Philippines, 49 Off. Gaz., 939; Yu v. Republic of the Philippines, L-3808, decided on July 29, 1952; by Kiap v. Republic of the Philippines, 48 Off. Gaz., 3362; Uy Yap v. Republic of the Philippines, L-4270, decided on May 8, 1952; Carlos Chua v. Republic of the Philippines, L-4112, decided on August 28, 1952.)
2. Petitioner, likewise, invokes exemption from the duty to file said declaration of intention upon the ground that, since his alleged birth in the Philippines, on September 3, 1918, he had continuously resided in the Philippines, although it is admitted that he went to Amoy, China, once, to study for three (3) years. Even assuming that this alleged birth in the Philippines which is assailed by the Government — were true, it has not been proven satisfactorily that petitioner "resided" in the Philippines for over 30 years. The very petitioner has not so testified, although he declared that he resided in Davao since 1951. Considering that his residence, from birth, followed that of his father, a Chinese, who — in the absence of proof to the contrary, and there is none — must be presumed to be domiciled in China, petitioner’s alleged birth in the Philippines does not imply necessarily that he resided therein since 1918. Indeed, the fact that he went to China, and stayed there for three (3) years (from 1933 to 1936), in order "to study," strongly indicates that his father and he regarded China as their homeland and domicile, and, consequently, that they were not residence of the Philippines at that time. Hence, petitioner was bound to file a declaration of intention and his failure to do so bars his naturalization.
3. After specifying the facts required to be set forth in petitions for naturalization, section 7 of Commonwealth Act 473 provides that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The petition must . . . be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they . . . personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all those qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act . . . (Italics supplied.)
In the case at bar, petitioner herein attached to his application the affidavits of Jose S. Raymundo and Faustino Florida. The former declared, in his affidavit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That I know JOSE PIDELO since 1946 in Manila;
"That I have known him to be a peace loving person and had never heard him to be ever in trouble;
"That ever since I have known him, he had conducted himself to be gentlemanly and peacefully and had confined his activities to his work and had always behaved himself in irreproachable manner;
"That I believe that he would be a good asset to any community where he may reside and I have no doubt that he would be a good Filipino citizens." (Record on Appeal, pp. 5-6.)
The pertinent portion of Florida’s affidavit states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That I know JOSE PIDELO since the year 1947;
"That I have known him to be a peace-loving person and had never heard him to be ever in trouble;
"That ever since I have known him, he had conducted himself to be gentlemanly and peacefully and had confined his activities to his studies and had always behaved himself in irreproachable manner;
"That I believe that he would be a good asset to any community where he may reside and I have no doubt that he would be a good Filipino citizen." (Record on Appeal, pp. 6-7.)
Affiants have not stated in their aforementioned affidavits: (1) that they "personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period required" by law or (2) that petitioner is a "person of good repute;" or (3) "that petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions" of the Naturalization Law. Inasmuch as the same must be strictly construed (In re Tomarchio, 169 Fed. 409; In re Kempon, 14 Fed. 2d, 669; U.S. v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 479, 61 L. ed. 853), and noncompliance with the provisions thereof relative to the contents of, and the annexes to, the petition for naturalization, renders the same void (In re Robert Cu, * L-3018, decided on July 18, 1951; U. S. v. Martorana, 171 Fed. Rep. 397), it follows that petitioner’s application for naturalization should have not been entertained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the case dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Upon a review of the record, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the decision appealed from is untenable for the following reasons, namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Petitioner claims to have been born in the City of Cebu on September 3, 1918 and, seemingly, for this reason, among others, he has not filed the declaration of intention required in section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. However, birth in the Philippines does not suffice to dispense with the filing of said declaration, unless the applicant has "received the primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government, and not limited to any race or nationality" ? (Commonwealth Act No. 535, sec. 6). The record shows that petitioner has reached only the third year high school, which he does not even appear to have finished. (De la Cruz v. Republic of the Philippines, 49 Off. Gaz., 958; Cerverleon T. Dy v. Republic of the Philippines, 49 Off. Gaz., 939; Yu v. Republic of the Philippines, L-3808, decided on July 29, 1952; by Kiap v. Republic of the Philippines, 48 Off. Gaz., 3362; Uy Yap v. Republic of the Philippines, L-4270, decided on May 8, 1952; Carlos Chua v. Republic of the Philippines, L-4112, decided on August 28, 1952.)
2. Petitioner, likewise, invokes exemption from the duty to file said declaration of intention upon the ground that, since his alleged birth in the Philippines, on September 3, 1918, he had continuously resided in the Philippines, although it is admitted that he went to Amoy, China, once, to study for three (3) years. Even assuming that this alleged birth in the Philippines which is assailed by the Government — were true, it has not been proven satisfactorily that petitioner "resided" in the Philippines for over 30 years. The very petitioner has not so testified, although he declared that he resided in Davao since 1951. Considering that his residence, from birth, followed that of his father, a Chinese, who — in the absence of proof to the contrary, and there is none — must be presumed to be domiciled in China, petitioner’s alleged birth in the Philippines does not imply necessarily that he resided therein since 1918. Indeed, the fact that he went to China, and stayed there for three (3) years (from 1933 to 1936), in order "to study," strongly indicates that his father and he regarded China as their homeland and domicile, and, consequently, that they were not residence of the Philippines at that time. Hence, petitioner was bound to file a declaration of intention and his failure to do so bars his naturalization.
3. After specifying the facts required to be set forth in petitions for naturalization, section 7 of Commonwealth Act 473 provides that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The petition must . . . be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they . . . personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all those qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act . . . (Italics supplied.)
In the case at bar, petitioner herein attached to his application the affidavits of Jose S. Raymundo and Faustino Florida. The former declared, in his affidavit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That I know JOSE PIDELO since 1946 in Manila;
"That I have known him to be a peace loving person and had never heard him to be ever in trouble;
"That ever since I have known him, he had conducted himself to be gentlemanly and peacefully and had confined his activities to his work and had always behaved himself in irreproachable manner;
"That I believe that he would be a good asset to any community where he may reside and I have no doubt that he would be a good Filipino citizens." (Record on Appeal, pp. 5-6.)
The pertinent portion of Florida’s affidavit states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That I know JOSE PIDELO since the year 1947;
"That I have known him to be a peace-loving person and had never heard him to be ever in trouble;
"That ever since I have known him, he had conducted himself to be gentlemanly and peacefully and had confined his activities to his studies and had always behaved himself in irreproachable manner;
"That I believe that he would be a good asset to any community where he may reside and I have no doubt that he would be a good Filipino citizen." (Record on Appeal, pp. 6-7.)
Affiants have not stated in their aforementioned affidavits: (1) that they "personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period required" by law or (2) that petitioner is a "person of good repute;" or (3) "that petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions" of the Naturalization Law. Inasmuch as the same must be strictly construed (In re Tomarchio, 169 Fed. 409; In re Kempon, 14 Fed. 2d, 669; U.S. v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 479, 61 L. ed. 853), and noncompliance with the provisions thereof relative to the contents of, and the annexes to, the petition for naturalization, renders the same void (In re Robert Cu, * L-3018, decided on July 18, 1951; U. S. v. Martorana, 171 Fed. Rep. 397), it follows that petitioner’s application for naturalization should have not been entertained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the case dismissed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
* 89 Phil., 473.
