June 1959 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-10832 June 29, 1959 - ANTONIO M. BUENAVENTURA v. PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, ET AL.
105 Phil 978:
105 Phil 978:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-10832. June 29, 1959.]
ANTONIO M. BUENAVENTURA, VIRGINIA JURADO DE LEON, GODOFREDO JURADO and CORAZON JURADO LAMAGNA, Petitioners, v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY and HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon city, Respondents.
Eduardo J. Manipula, for Petitioners.
Feria, Manglapus & Associate for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION; WITHIN ONE YEAR FROM WITHHOLDING, INFERIOR COURT; AFTER ONE YEAR COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE. — Within a year after unlawful deprivation of possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; or within a year from the withholding of possession of any land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession thereof by virtue of any contract, the proper action to recover possession is forcible entry or detainer, as the case maybe, exclusively cognizable by the inferior Courts. One year thereafter, the remedy is accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion for the recovery of possession, exclusively cognizable by the Courts of First Instance.
2. ID.; ID.; PROBATE COURT. — The contention that it is incidental to the probate Court’s power to gather and collect the properties of the deceased for the purpose of administration and distribution cannot be sustained, because the law expressly provides that an action to dispossess a party of a land or building claimed to be unlawfully in possession of such party must be brought either in the Municipal Court or Court of First Instance.
2. ID.; ID.; PROBATE COURT. — The contention that it is incidental to the probate Court’s power to gather and collect the properties of the deceased for the purpose of administration and distribution cannot be sustained, because the law expressly provides that an action to dispossess a party of a land or building claimed to be unlawfully in possession of such party must be brought either in the Municipal Court or Court of First Instance.
D E C I S I O N
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annual and set aside an order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, dated 21 April 1956, entered in Special Proceedings No. Q-673.
On 26 May 1955 Antonio M. Buenaventura filed a petition in the probate court of Quezon City praying for the allowance of a will purportedly executed by the late Antonio L. Geronimo (Annex 3). On 30 June 1955 the Philippine Trust Company was appointed special administrator of the estate pending the probate of the will. On 2 December 1955 the special administrator reported to the probate court that the petitioners were occupying the premises at Nos. 34-B, 34-E Dapitan street and 164 Kanlaon street, Quezon City, belonging to the estate, and prayed that they be ordered to vacate the premises if they cannot pay the rentals (Annex A). On 8 and 10 December 1955 Leonardo Geronimo, oppositor to the probate of the will, moved that the special administrator be directed to file an action for detainer against the petitioners and to sell at public auction the personal properties of the estate listed as Items Nos. 1 to 35 in the inventory report dated 24 October 1955 submitted to the inventory court by the special administrator (Annexes B and D). On 12 and 22 December 1955 Antonio M. Buenaventura filed his objections thereto (Annexes C and E). Acting upon both the motion and opposition, on 2 February 1956 the probate court denied the motions for the reasons that it did not deem necessary to direct the special administrator to file an action for detainer against the occupants of the premises referred to belonging to the estate for their failure to pay the monthly rentals, because the special administrator is granted discretion to file or not such action in the interest and for the benefit of the estate, and that the special administrator may file a petition for authority to sell personal properties of the estate, if there be sufficient ground therefor (Annex F). On 12 March 1956 the special administrator filed a petition praying for authority to sell the personal property consisting of furniture and fixtures listed as Items Nos. 9 to 35 in the inventory report submitted by it, in the possession of Corazon Jurado Lamagna, "on the ground that said furniture and fixtures are being used, (and) consequently would depreciate in value" (Annex G). On 16 March 1956 Antonio M. Buenaventura filed his objection to the petition on the ground that the personal properties in question are not perishable in nature; that they are antiques and aside form their intrinsic worth have great sentimental value; that the estate is solvent and for that reason there is no need of selling the same; and that they were left in the possession of Corazon Jurado Lamagna by the special administrator (Annex H). On 16 April 1956 the special administrator filed a motion praying that the petitioners be directed to deliver to it the possession of th premises occupied by them (Annex I). On 19 April 1956 Antonio M. Buenaventura filed an objection thereto, on the ground that the probate court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, as the proper action should be one of detainer (Annex J). On 21 April 1956 the probate court an order, the dispositive part of which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
As prayed for, Virginia Jurado de Leon, Godofredo Jurado, Antonio Buenaventura and Corazon Jurado Lamagna, who are presently occupying the estate’s premises at Nos. 34-A, and 34-B Dapitan St., and 164 Kanlaon St., respectively, are hereby granted 15 days from receipt hereof within which to pay the rentals in arrears and to vacate the premises occupied by them, otherwise they will be declared in contempt.
The Special Administrator is hereby authorized to take possession of the furniture and other articles appearing in Items 9 to 35 of the Inventory and which are allegedly in possession of Mrs. Carazon Lamagna, and to sell the same at the best price obtainable at the sound discretion of said Special Administrator (Annex K).
On 4 June 1956 the motion for reconsideration dated 10 May 1956 (Annex L), objected to by the special administrator (Annex M), was denied (Annex N). Hence this petition for certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. On 3 July 1956, upon the filing of the requisited bond, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.
Within a year after unlawful deprivation of possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; or within a year from the withholding of possession of any land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession thereof by virtue of any contract, the proper action to recover possession is forcible entry or detainer, as the case may be, 1 exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts. 2 One year thereafter, the remedy is accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion for the recovery of possession, exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance. 3
The petitioners have been occupying the premises in question before the death of the owner. Whether it be gratuitously as beneficiaries, or onerously as lessees, the action to dispossess the petitioners must be brought in the proper court and not in the probate court. The two women petitioners are not heirs instituted, the petitioner Antonio M. Buenaventura is named executor, and the petitioner Godofredo Jurado, father of the two women petitioners, is alleged to be the universal heir named, in the will sought to be probated. The respondents’ contention that the order sought to be annulled is incidental to the probate court’s power to gather and collect the properties of the deceased for the purpose of administration and distribution cannot be sustained, because the law expressly provides that an action to dispossess a party of a land or building claimed to be unlawfully in possession of such party must be brought either in the municipal court or Court of First Instance.
As to the sale of furniture and fixtures belonging to the estate, section 2, Rule 81, provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Such special administrator shall collect and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator, and may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased.
The special administrator, by authority of the probate court may only sell perishable and other property as the Court may direct. The chattels ordered to be sold, consisting of furniture and fixtures, are not perishable. The only reason given by the special administrator for authority to sell the chattels is that it is "for the best interest of the estate." The authority to the special administrator given by the probate court is unauthorized.
The writ prayed for is granted and the order of 21 April 1956 complained of being unauthorized is annulled and set aside, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made final, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.
On 26 May 1955 Antonio M. Buenaventura filed a petition in the probate court of Quezon City praying for the allowance of a will purportedly executed by the late Antonio L. Geronimo (Annex 3). On 30 June 1955 the Philippine Trust Company was appointed special administrator of the estate pending the probate of the will. On 2 December 1955 the special administrator reported to the probate court that the petitioners were occupying the premises at Nos. 34-B, 34-E Dapitan street and 164 Kanlaon street, Quezon City, belonging to the estate, and prayed that they be ordered to vacate the premises if they cannot pay the rentals (Annex A). On 8 and 10 December 1955 Leonardo Geronimo, oppositor to the probate of the will, moved that the special administrator be directed to file an action for detainer against the petitioners and to sell at public auction the personal properties of the estate listed as Items Nos. 1 to 35 in the inventory report dated 24 October 1955 submitted to the inventory court by the special administrator (Annexes B and D). On 12 and 22 December 1955 Antonio M. Buenaventura filed his objections thereto (Annexes C and E). Acting upon both the motion and opposition, on 2 February 1956 the probate court denied the motions for the reasons that it did not deem necessary to direct the special administrator to file an action for detainer against the occupants of the premises referred to belonging to the estate for their failure to pay the monthly rentals, because the special administrator is granted discretion to file or not such action in the interest and for the benefit of the estate, and that the special administrator may file a petition for authority to sell personal properties of the estate, if there be sufficient ground therefor (Annex F). On 12 March 1956 the special administrator filed a petition praying for authority to sell the personal property consisting of furniture and fixtures listed as Items Nos. 9 to 35 in the inventory report submitted by it, in the possession of Corazon Jurado Lamagna, "on the ground that said furniture and fixtures are being used, (and) consequently would depreciate in value" (Annex G). On 16 March 1956 Antonio M. Buenaventura filed his objection to the petition on the ground that the personal properties in question are not perishable in nature; that they are antiques and aside form their intrinsic worth have great sentimental value; that the estate is solvent and for that reason there is no need of selling the same; and that they were left in the possession of Corazon Jurado Lamagna by the special administrator (Annex H). On 16 April 1956 the special administrator filed a motion praying that the petitioners be directed to deliver to it the possession of th premises occupied by them (Annex I). On 19 April 1956 Antonio M. Buenaventura filed an objection thereto, on the ground that the probate court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, as the proper action should be one of detainer (Annex J). On 21 April 1956 the probate court an order, the dispositive part of which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
As prayed for, Virginia Jurado de Leon, Godofredo Jurado, Antonio Buenaventura and Corazon Jurado Lamagna, who are presently occupying the estate’s premises at Nos. 34-A, and 34-B Dapitan St., and 164 Kanlaon St., respectively, are hereby granted 15 days from receipt hereof within which to pay the rentals in arrears and to vacate the premises occupied by them, otherwise they will be declared in contempt.
The Special Administrator is hereby authorized to take possession of the furniture and other articles appearing in Items 9 to 35 of the Inventory and which are allegedly in possession of Mrs. Carazon Lamagna, and to sell the same at the best price obtainable at the sound discretion of said Special Administrator (Annex K).
On 4 June 1956 the motion for reconsideration dated 10 May 1956 (Annex L), objected to by the special administrator (Annex M), was denied (Annex N). Hence this petition for certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. On 3 July 1956, upon the filing of the requisited bond, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.
Within a year after unlawful deprivation of possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; or within a year from the withholding of possession of any land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession thereof by virtue of any contract, the proper action to recover possession is forcible entry or detainer, as the case may be, 1 exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts. 2 One year thereafter, the remedy is accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion for the recovery of possession, exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance. 3
The petitioners have been occupying the premises in question before the death of the owner. Whether it be gratuitously as beneficiaries, or onerously as lessees, the action to dispossess the petitioners must be brought in the proper court and not in the probate court. The two women petitioners are not heirs instituted, the petitioner Antonio M. Buenaventura is named executor, and the petitioner Godofredo Jurado, father of the two women petitioners, is alleged to be the universal heir named, in the will sought to be probated. The respondents’ contention that the order sought to be annulled is incidental to the probate court’s power to gather and collect the properties of the deceased for the purpose of administration and distribution cannot be sustained, because the law expressly provides that an action to dispossess a party of a land or building claimed to be unlawfully in possession of such party must be brought either in the municipal court or Court of First Instance.
As to the sale of furniture and fixtures belonging to the estate, section 2, Rule 81, provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Such special administrator shall collect and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator, and may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased.
The special administrator, by authority of the probate court may only sell perishable and other property as the Court may direct. The chattels ordered to be sold, consisting of furniture and fixtures, are not perishable. The only reason given by the special administrator for authority to sell the chattels is that it is "for the best interest of the estate." The authority to the special administrator given by the probate court is unauthorized.
The writ prayed for is granted and the order of 21 April 1956 complained of being unauthorized is annulled and set aside, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made final, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Section 1, Rule 72.
2. Section 88, in connection with section 44 (b), Republic Act No. 296.
3. Section 44 (b), Republic Act No. 296.
