November 1960 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-11001 November 23, 1960 - FORTUNATO V. BORROMEO v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
110 Phil 1:
110 Phil 1:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-11001. November 23, 1960.]
FORTUNATO V. BORROMEO, petitioner and appellant, v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondent and appellee.
Jesus N. Borromeo for Appellant.
Leovigildo Monasterial and L.A. Diokno, Jr. for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. RETIREMENT GRATUITY; DOUBLE PENSION PROHIBITED. — For petitioner to receive full benefits under the later laws, in addition to the gratuity he had already received under Act 2589, would amount to allowing him to receive double pension for exactly the same services, contrary to the expressed policy of the State in both Act 2589 and Republic Act 910 against double pensions for the same service.
2. ID.; REFUND OF GRATUITY RECEIVED UNDER PREVIOUS RETIREMENT LAWS. — The deduction of the gratuity already received by petitioner under Act 2589 from what he was to receive under the provisions of Republic Act 910, as amended, is justified by the common sense consideration that if the petitioner is being credited with his service prior to his retirement in 1949, it is but just that all retirement benefits received by him prior to that date should also be deducted from the more extensive benefits petitioner was entitled to received under the provisions of Act 910, as amended.
3. ID.; INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF GRATUITY LAWS; STATEMENT OF THE RULE. — The rule in construing or applying pension and gratuity laws is that, in the absence of express provision to the contrary, they will be so interpreted as to prevent any person from receiving a double compensation. (70 C.J.S., Sec. 5, p. 429.)
4. ID.; RETIREE ENTITLED ONLY TO BENEFITS CHOSEN. — While a retiree may choose under which retirement plan he is going to retire, he is entitled only to the benefits so chosen. Thus, when petitioner applied for the benefits provided for in Republic Act 910, as amended, he is entitled only to the benefits so chosen, and this carries the natural and necessary implication that the gratuity already received by him under Act 2589 must be deducted from the more extensive benefits petitioner was entitled to receive under the provisions of Act 910, as amended.
2. ID.; REFUND OF GRATUITY RECEIVED UNDER PREVIOUS RETIREMENT LAWS. — The deduction of the gratuity already received by petitioner under Act 2589 from what he was to receive under the provisions of Republic Act 910, as amended, is justified by the common sense consideration that if the petitioner is being credited with his service prior to his retirement in 1949, it is but just that all retirement benefits received by him prior to that date should also be deducted from the more extensive benefits petitioner was entitled to received under the provisions of Act 910, as amended.
3. ID.; INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF GRATUITY LAWS; STATEMENT OF THE RULE. — The rule in construing or applying pension and gratuity laws is that, in the absence of express provision to the contrary, they will be so interpreted as to prevent any person from receiving a double compensation. (70 C.J.S., Sec. 5, p. 429.)
4. ID.; RETIREE ENTITLED ONLY TO BENEFITS CHOSEN. — While a retiree may choose under which retirement plan he is going to retire, he is entitled only to the benefits so chosen. Thus, when petitioner applied for the benefits provided for in Republic Act 910, as amended, he is entitled only to the benefits so chosen, and this carries the natural and necessary implication that the gratuity already received by him under Act 2589 must be deducted from the more extensive benefits petitioner was entitled to receive under the provisions of Act 910, as amended.
D E C I S I O N
DIZON, J.:
On December 15, 1949, Petitioner, then an associate justice of the Court of Appeals, retired under the provisions of Act No. 2589 and received a gratuity in the total amount of P24,000.00. On August 6, 1954, after the enactment of Republic Act 1057, amending Act 910, petitioner applied for retirement under their provisions and respondent found him entitled thereto. Pursuant to Section 3 Republic Act 910, as amended, petitioner was entitled to a lump sum payment equivalent to his salary for five years, or the total amount of P60,000.00., from which however, respondent deducted the P24,000.00 gratuity which the former had already received. Petitioner brought this action for mandamus in the court of First Instance of Cebu to compel respondent to pay the aforementioned amount. Said court sustained the legality of the deduction; hence this appeal by petitioner.
The only issue here is whether the gratuity received by petitioner under the provisions of Act 2589 is deducted from the retirement benefits to which he was subsequently found to be entitled under the provisions of Republic Acts 910 and 1057.
The answer must be in the affirmative.
Section 1 of Act 2589 itself provides that any officer or employee entitled to its benefits, and "who is entitled to any benefits from any pension fund created by authority of the Philippine Legislature" — without specifying whether the pension fund was created before or after its enactment — shall be required to designate which of such benefit he desires to take advantage of, and in such case he shall be entitled only to the benefits so chosen. It is beyond question that Republic Act 910, as amended, constituted or created a pension fund or plan. Therefore, when petitioner applied for the benefits provided for in said act, as amended, he must be deemed to have made his choice. Consequently, he is entitled only to the benefits so chosen - this carrying the natural and necessary implication that the gratuity already received by him under Act 2589 must be deducted from the more extensive benefits petitioner was entitled to receive under the provisions of Act 910, as amended.
The gratuity received by petitioner under Act 2589 was obviously in consideration of his services to the government as of his retirement on December 15, 1949. It is similarly obvious that the retirement benefits he was found to be entitled to receive under the provisions of Act 910, as amended, were in consideration of the same services to the government. Therefore, for petitioner to receive full benefits under the later laws, in addition to the gratuity he had already received under Act 2589, would amount to allowing him to receive double pension for exactly the same services as consideration. The rule in construing or applying pension and gratuity laws is that, in the absence of express provision to the contrary, they will be so interpreted as to prevent any person from receiving a double compensation. (70 C.J.S., sec. 5, p. 429).
Although the facts involved in the present case are not exactly the same as those in Espejo v. The Auditor General, etc. (97 Phil., 216; 51 Off. Gaz. No. 6, pp. 2563-2864), we believe that the person for the decision in the latter is applicable to the one before us. The deduction of the gratuity already received by petitioner under Act 2589 from what he was to receive under the provisions of Act 910, as amended, is, as stated in the Espejo case, "justified by the common sense consideration that if the petitioner is being credited with his services prior to 1945 in computing his retirement annuity, it is but just that all retirement benefits received by him prior to that date should also be charged to his account. Otherwise, the petitioner would benefit both under Act 4051 and Republic Act 660, which is contrary to the plain intent of the law."cralaw virtua1aw library
That Acts 910 and 1057 were enacted after petitioner’s retirement is not a circumstance of sufficient weight to justify our ignoring the general policy of the State — expressed both in Act 2589 as well as in Act 910 — against double pensions for the same services. To the contrary, the fact that even after petitioners’ retirement under Act 2589 another pension law was enacted under which he could claim greater benefits affords a greater reason for the application of the general policy against double pensions, unless the contrary was expressly and clearly provided in the later enactment. Acts 910 and 1057 do not contain such provision.
Wherefore, finding the appealed judgment to be in accordance with law and the facts of the case, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutiérrez David, and Paredes, JJ., concur.
The only issue here is whether the gratuity received by petitioner under the provisions of Act 2589 is deducted from the retirement benefits to which he was subsequently found to be entitled under the provisions of Republic Acts 910 and 1057.
The answer must be in the affirmative.
Section 1 of Act 2589 itself provides that any officer or employee entitled to its benefits, and "who is entitled to any benefits from any pension fund created by authority of the Philippine Legislature" — without specifying whether the pension fund was created before or after its enactment — shall be required to designate which of such benefit he desires to take advantage of, and in such case he shall be entitled only to the benefits so chosen. It is beyond question that Republic Act 910, as amended, constituted or created a pension fund or plan. Therefore, when petitioner applied for the benefits provided for in said act, as amended, he must be deemed to have made his choice. Consequently, he is entitled only to the benefits so chosen - this carrying the natural and necessary implication that the gratuity already received by him under Act 2589 must be deducted from the more extensive benefits petitioner was entitled to receive under the provisions of Act 910, as amended.
The gratuity received by petitioner under Act 2589 was obviously in consideration of his services to the government as of his retirement on December 15, 1949. It is similarly obvious that the retirement benefits he was found to be entitled to receive under the provisions of Act 910, as amended, were in consideration of the same services to the government. Therefore, for petitioner to receive full benefits under the later laws, in addition to the gratuity he had already received under Act 2589, would amount to allowing him to receive double pension for exactly the same services as consideration. The rule in construing or applying pension and gratuity laws is that, in the absence of express provision to the contrary, they will be so interpreted as to prevent any person from receiving a double compensation. (70 C.J.S., sec. 5, p. 429).
Although the facts involved in the present case are not exactly the same as those in Espejo v. The Auditor General, etc. (97 Phil., 216; 51 Off. Gaz. No. 6, pp. 2563-2864), we believe that the person for the decision in the latter is applicable to the one before us. The deduction of the gratuity already received by petitioner under Act 2589 from what he was to receive under the provisions of Act 910, as amended, is, as stated in the Espejo case, "justified by the common sense consideration that if the petitioner is being credited with his services prior to 1945 in computing his retirement annuity, it is but just that all retirement benefits received by him prior to that date should also be charged to his account. Otherwise, the petitioner would benefit both under Act 4051 and Republic Act 660, which is contrary to the plain intent of the law."cralaw virtua1aw library
That Acts 910 and 1057 were enacted after petitioner’s retirement is not a circumstance of sufficient weight to justify our ignoring the general policy of the State — expressed both in Act 2589 as well as in Act 910 — against double pensions for the same services. To the contrary, the fact that even after petitioners’ retirement under Act 2589 another pension law was enacted under which he could claim greater benefits affords a greater reason for the application of the general policy against double pensions, unless the contrary was expressly and clearly provided in the later enactment. Acts 910 and 1057 do not contain such provision.
Wherefore, finding the appealed judgment to be in accordance with law and the facts of the case, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutiérrez David, and Paredes, JJ., concur.
