November 1961 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-16194 November 3, 1961 - VICENTE BASA v. ANTONIO V. ESCAÑO:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-16194. November 3, 1961.]
VICENTE BASA, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO V. ESCAÑO, Respondent.
Cesar E. Nitorreda for Petitioner.
Matias E. Vergara and Pacifico M. Castro for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES; MONEY CLAIMS; JURISDICTION OF REGULAR COURTS IF NO REINSTATEMENT IS SOUGHT. — It is true that where the employer-employee relationship is still existing or is sought to be reestablished because of the wrongful severance (as where the employee seeks reinstatement), the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection with employment, such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law, but after the termination of the relationship and no reinstatement is sought, such claims become mere money claims, and come within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
D E C I S I O N
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
This action was initiated in the Municipal Court of Davao City. Its purpose is to recover P885.27 representing wage differential, compensation for overtime work, separation pay and attorney’s fees allegedly due to plaintiff Vicente Basa, as former employee of defendant Antonio V. Escaño. Said court having rendered judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of Davao, in which the latter moved to dismiss the case for alleged lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the subject matter of the action, the party named in the complaint as defendant being the "Eagle Theater", which is not a juridical person. Acting upon the motion said court of first instance ordered that an amended complaint naming Antonio V. Escaño as defendant be filed, it being alleged in the first paragraph of the original complaint that said Eagle Theater is a business enterprise engaged in the theater business, which is owned and operated by said Antonio V. Escaño. In due course, after the filing of said amended complaint, the defendant was sentenced to pay the aforementioned amount to the plaintiff. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the lower court had erred in denying his aforementioned motion to dismiss and in rendering judgment for the plaintiff. Without passing upon the merits of these issues, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case without costs, upon the ground that the cause of action set forth in plaintiff’s complaint "falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations." Hence, this appeal by certiorari taken by the plaintiff, who maintains that this case is within the jurisdiction, not of the Court of Industrial Relations, but of our regular courts.
Plaintiff’s contention is borne out by the doctrine laid down in Price Stabilization Corporation (PRISCO) v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-13806 (May 23, 1960), from which we quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . where the employer-employee relationship is still existing or is sought to be reestablished because of its wrongful severance (as where the employee seeks reinstatement), the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection with employment, such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law. After the termination of the relationship and no reinstatement is sought, such claims become mere money claims, and come within the jurisdiction of the regular courts." (Italics ours)
and subsequently adhered to in Pomeroy & Company, Inc., Et. Al. v. Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., G.R. No. L-16057 (Sept. 29, 1961), Sy Huan v. Bautista, Et Al., L-16115 (Aug. 29, 1961), Southwestern Sugar & Molasses (Far East), Inc. v. CIR, Et Al., L-17219 (Aug. 29, 1961), De los Santos v. Quisumbing, L-15270 (June 30, 1961), Dableo v. Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., L-15370 (May 31, 1961), Fookien Times Co., Inc., Et. Al. v. CIR, Et Al., L-16025, (March 27, 1961), New Angat-Manila Transportation, Et. Al. v. CIR, Et Al., L-16283 (Dec. 27, 1960), Elizalde Paint & Oil Factory, Inc. v. Bautista, Et Al., L-15904 (Nov. 23, 1960), Sta. Cecilia Sawmills Co., Inc. v. CIR, Et Al., L-14254-14255 (May 23, 1960) and Board of Liquidators, Et. Al. v. CIR, Et Al., L-15485 (May 23, 1960), in line with the view previously taken in Aguilar v. Salumbides, L-10124 (Dec. 28, 1957) Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Yanson, Et Al., L-12341 and Elizalde & Co., Inc. v. Yanson, Et Al., L-12345 (April 30, 1958), and Chua Workers’ Union v. City Automotive Co., Et Al., L-11655 (April 29, 1959).
Inasmuch as plaintiff is no longer defendant’s employee and does not seek reinstatement as such employee, it is clear that the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the case is remanded to said Court for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision, without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
This action was initiated in the Municipal Court of Davao City. Its purpose is to recover P885.27 representing wage differential, compensation for overtime work, separation pay and attorney’s fees allegedly due to plaintiff Vicente Basa, as former employee of defendant Antonio V. Escaño. Said court having rendered judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of Davao, in which the latter moved to dismiss the case for alleged lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the subject matter of the action, the party named in the complaint as defendant being the "Eagle Theater", which is not a juridical person. Acting upon the motion said court of first instance ordered that an amended complaint naming Antonio V. Escaño as defendant be filed, it being alleged in the first paragraph of the original complaint that said Eagle Theater is a business enterprise engaged in the theater business, which is owned and operated by said Antonio V. Escaño. In due course, after the filing of said amended complaint, the defendant was sentenced to pay the aforementioned amount to the plaintiff. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the lower court had erred in denying his aforementioned motion to dismiss and in rendering judgment for the plaintiff. Without passing upon the merits of these issues, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case without costs, upon the ground that the cause of action set forth in plaintiff’s complaint "falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations." Hence, this appeal by certiorari taken by the plaintiff, who maintains that this case is within the jurisdiction, not of the Court of Industrial Relations, but of our regular courts.
Plaintiff’s contention is borne out by the doctrine laid down in Price Stabilization Corporation (PRISCO) v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-13806 (May 23, 1960), from which we quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . where the employer-employee relationship is still existing or is sought to be reestablished because of its wrongful severance (as where the employee seeks reinstatement), the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection with employment, such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law. After the termination of the relationship and no reinstatement is sought, such claims become mere money claims, and come within the jurisdiction of the regular courts." (Italics ours)
and subsequently adhered to in Pomeroy & Company, Inc., Et. Al. v. Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., G.R. No. L-16057 (Sept. 29, 1961), Sy Huan v. Bautista, Et Al., L-16115 (Aug. 29, 1961), Southwestern Sugar & Molasses (Far East), Inc. v. CIR, Et Al., L-17219 (Aug. 29, 1961), De los Santos v. Quisumbing, L-15270 (June 30, 1961), Dableo v. Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., L-15370 (May 31, 1961), Fookien Times Co., Inc., Et. Al. v. CIR, Et Al., L-16025, (March 27, 1961), New Angat-Manila Transportation, Et. Al. v. CIR, Et Al., L-16283 (Dec. 27, 1960), Elizalde Paint & Oil Factory, Inc. v. Bautista, Et Al., L-15904 (Nov. 23, 1960), Sta. Cecilia Sawmills Co., Inc. v. CIR, Et Al., L-14254-14255 (May 23, 1960) and Board of Liquidators, Et. Al. v. CIR, Et Al., L-15485 (May 23, 1960), in line with the view previously taken in Aguilar v. Salumbides, L-10124 (Dec. 28, 1957) Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Yanson, Et Al., L-12341 and Elizalde & Co., Inc. v. Yanson, Et Al., L-12345 (April 30, 1958), and Chua Workers’ Union v. City Automotive Co., Et Al., L-11655 (April 29, 1959).
Inasmuch as plaintiff is no longer defendant’s employee and does not seek reinstatement as such employee, it is clear that the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case and that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the same.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the case is remanded to said Court for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision, without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
