August 1962 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1962 > August 1962 Decisions >
G.R. No. L-14129 August 30, 1962 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. GUILLERMO MANANTAN:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-14129. August 30, 1962.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GUILLERMO MANANTAN, Defendant-Appellee.
Solicitor General, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Padilla Law Office, for Defendant-Appellee.
R E S O L U T I O N
REGALA, J.:
This resolution refers to a motion for reconsideration filed by the counsel for defendant-appellee, Guillermo Manantan.
Defendant-appellee does not dispute the correctness of this Court’s ruling in the main case. He concedes that a justice of the peace is covered by the prohibition of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, he takes exception to the dispositive portion of this Court’s ruling promulgated on July 31, 1962, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For the above reasons, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is now urged by the defendant-appellee that the ultimate effect of remanding the case to the lower court for trial on the merits is to place him twice in jeopardy of being tried for the same offense. He calls the attention of this Court to the fact that when the charge against him was dismissed by the lower court, jeopardy had already attached to his person. To support his claim, he cites the case of People v. Labatete, G.R. No. L-12917, April 27, 1960.
Defendant-appellee’s plea of double jeopardy should be rejected. The accused cannot now invoke the defense of double jeopardy. When the government appealed to this Court the order of dismissal, defendant Manantan could have raised that issue by way of resisting the appeal of the state. Then again, when defendant-appellee filed his brief, he could have argued therein his present plea of double jeopardy. Yet, on neither occasion did he do so. He must, therefore, be deemed to have waived his constitutional right thereunder. This is in accord with this Court’s ruling in the cases of People v. Rosalina Casiano, G.R. No. L-15309, February 16, 1961 and People v. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, May 30, 1958, hereunder quoted:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . defendant herein has filed a brief in which she limited herself to a discussion of the merits of the appeal. Thus, she not only failed to question, in her brief, either expressly or impliedly, the right of the prosecution to interpose the present appeal, but also, conceded in effect the existence of such right. She should be deemed, therefore, to have waived her aforementioned constitutional immunity.
"It is true that in People v. Hernandez (49 O.G. 5342), People v. Ferrer, L-9072 (October 23, 1956), People v. Bao, L-12102 (September 29, 1959) and People v. Golez, L-14160, we dismissed the appeal taken by the Government from a decision or order of a lower court, despite defendant’s failure to object thereto. However, the defendants in those cases, unlike the defendant herein, did not file any brief. Hence, they had performed no affirmative act from which a waiver could be implied. (People v. Casiano, supra)
"In his appeal brief, appellant’s counsel does not raise this question of double jeopardy, confining himself as he does, to the discussion of the evidence in the record, contending that the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. One aspect of his case as regards double jeopardy is that defense may be waived, and, that failure to urge it in the appeal may be regarded as a waiver of said defense of double jeopardy. (People v. Pinuila, supra.)
There are other grounds raised by the defendant-appellee in his motion for reconsideration. The Court, however, does not believe that they were well taken.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the motion for reconsideration filed in this case, is, as it is hereby, denied.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Defendant-appellee does not dispute the correctness of this Court’s ruling in the main case. He concedes that a justice of the peace is covered by the prohibition of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, he takes exception to the dispositive portion of this Court’s ruling promulgated on July 31, 1962, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For the above reasons, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is now urged by the defendant-appellee that the ultimate effect of remanding the case to the lower court for trial on the merits is to place him twice in jeopardy of being tried for the same offense. He calls the attention of this Court to the fact that when the charge against him was dismissed by the lower court, jeopardy had already attached to his person. To support his claim, he cites the case of People v. Labatete, G.R. No. L-12917, April 27, 1960.
Defendant-appellee’s plea of double jeopardy should be rejected. The accused cannot now invoke the defense of double jeopardy. When the government appealed to this Court the order of dismissal, defendant Manantan could have raised that issue by way of resisting the appeal of the state. Then again, when defendant-appellee filed his brief, he could have argued therein his present plea of double jeopardy. Yet, on neither occasion did he do so. He must, therefore, be deemed to have waived his constitutional right thereunder. This is in accord with this Court’s ruling in the cases of People v. Rosalina Casiano, G.R. No. L-15309, February 16, 1961 and People v. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, May 30, 1958, hereunder quoted:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . defendant herein has filed a brief in which she limited herself to a discussion of the merits of the appeal. Thus, she not only failed to question, in her brief, either expressly or impliedly, the right of the prosecution to interpose the present appeal, but also, conceded in effect the existence of such right. She should be deemed, therefore, to have waived her aforementioned constitutional immunity.
"It is true that in People v. Hernandez (49 O.G. 5342), People v. Ferrer, L-9072 (October 23, 1956), People v. Bao, L-12102 (September 29, 1959) and People v. Golez, L-14160, we dismissed the appeal taken by the Government from a decision or order of a lower court, despite defendant’s failure to object thereto. However, the defendants in those cases, unlike the defendant herein, did not file any brief. Hence, they had performed no affirmative act from which a waiver could be implied. (People v. Casiano, supra)
"In his appeal brief, appellant’s counsel does not raise this question of double jeopardy, confining himself as he does, to the discussion of the evidence in the record, contending that the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. One aspect of his case as regards double jeopardy is that defense may be waived, and, that failure to urge it in the appeal may be regarded as a waiver of said defense of double jeopardy. (People v. Pinuila, supra.)
There are other grounds raised by the defendant-appellee in his motion for reconsideration. The Court, however, does not believe that they were well taken.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the motion for reconsideration filed in this case, is, as it is hereby, denied.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
