October 1962 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-20389 October 31, 1962 - FRANCISCO B. BAUTISTA v. PRIMITIVO A. GARCIA:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-20389. October 31, 1962.]
FRANCISCO B. BAUTISTA, Petitioner, v. PRIMITIVO A. GARCIA, Respondent.
Medel, Ortega, De las Alas, Daza, Jose, Peña & Baysa for Petitioner.
J. M. Dator, T. T. Riel & J. V. Reyes for Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1962 Santos Ambagan, the duly elected and incumbent municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite, left the Philippines for Brazilia, Brazil. On the same date, and after the departure of Mayor Ambagan, petitioner Francisco B. Bautista, the duly elected and incumbent vice-mayor, assumed the powers, duties and prerogatives of the mayor of said municipality, and, on the following day, informed the President of the Republic of the Philippines of said fact in writing.
It appeared, however, that before leaving the Philippines, Mayor Ambagan had designated herein respondent Primitivo A. Garcia, in writing, to take charge of the municipal government as a "caretaker" subject to his instructions, as of October 3, 1962. Pursuant to such designation, on October 9 of the same year, respondent sent a circular letter to all officials, employees and residents of the municipality of Amadeo, Cavite, making it known to them that he had officially assumed on October 3, 1962 the position of acting mayor of Amadeo during the absence of Mayor Ambagan and, since his designation, had also assumed and exercised the powers, duties and prerogatives of the office aforesaid.
Upon the facts stated above, which are not disputed, petitioner brought the present action for quo warranto to secure judgment declaring him legally and exclusively entitled to assume the office of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite, during the absence of Mayor Santos Ambagan and for the period of the latter’s stay outside the Philippines.
As prayed for in the verified petition submitted by petitioner, we issued on the 19th of October, 1962 a writ of preliminary injunction restraining respondent from further assuming, exercising, and usurping the powers, duties and prerogatives of petitioner acting as mayor of the municipality of Amadeo, Cavite.
The facts of the present case are on all fours with those involved in Ansberto P. Paredes, Petitioner, v. Rosalind P. Antillon, respondent, G.R. No. L-19168, promulgated on December 22, 1961 where, among other things, we said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The question before us, therefore, is whether under the facts above stated and existing laws applicable to Pasay City, petitioner was entitled to assume the office of, and act as mayor of Pasay City during the absence of Mayor Cuneta, or the latter had legal authority to appoint respondent not only as Acting Secretary to the mayor but as "Office Caretaker of the Office of the Mayor of Pasay City" for the duration of his official trip abroad, with authority to act on official and business matters submitted to the Mayor’s office, according to previous instructions.
"The pertinent legal provisions are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 183, otherwise known as the Charter of Pasay City;
‘. . .shall act as Mayor and perform the duties and exercise the powers of the Mayor, in the event of sickness, absence, or other permanent or temporary incapacity of the Mayor and shall, when occupying the Position of Mayor, be entitled to the salary and allowance of the Mayor. . . .’
(2) Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 2259, known as the Omnibus Law:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The Vice-Mayor shall perform the duties and exercise the powers of the Mayor in the event the latter’s inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.’
(3) Section 7, paragraph 3 of Republic Act No. 2264, known as the Local Autonomy Law:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘In the event of temporary incapacity of the Mayor to perform the duties of his office on account of absence on leave, sickness or any temporary incapacity, the Vice-Mayor shall perform the duties and exercise the powers of the Mayor, except the power to appoint, suspend or dismiss employees.’
"Respondent claims that the above provisions of Republic Act No. 183 had been repealed by those of Republic Act No. 2264 above-quoted, and attempts to make a distinction between the two legal provisions by stating that while the former provided that the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City shall act as mayor etc., in the event of ‘sickness, absence, or other permanent or temporary incapacity of the Mayor’, the latter Act provides that the Vice-Mayor may do so only in the event of ‘temporary incapacity of the mayor to perform the duties of his office on account of absence on leave, sickness or any other temporary incapacity, . . .’ From this respondent further draws the conclusion that the ‘temporary incapacity’ mentioned in the law ‘should be related to caused by and on account of absence on leave, sickness . . .’.
"We do not deem it necessary to decide for the present the question of the alleged repeal of the provisions of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 183, by those of Section 7, paragraph 3 of Republic Act No. 2264 for the reason that, in our opinion, whether we decide the question at issue in the light of the provisions of either Act or in those of Republic Act No. 2259, the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City is entitled to assume the powers, duties and prerogatives of the Officer of the Mayor of said city if the Mayor is ‘effectively absent.’
"It must be admitted that the word ‘absence’ used in the pertinent legal provisions is a fair example of words which may have one meaning in their ordinary employment and a materially different or modified one in their legal sense. It is indeed a difficult if not an impossible task to lay done a rule that could apply to all cases, defining the meaning of ‘absence’, but the weight of authority seems to be that under the legal provisions authorizing a Municipal or City Vice-Mayor to discharge the duties of the Mayor in the ‘absence’ of the latter, said term must be reasonably construed, and so construed means ‘effective’ absence. (Gelinas v. Fugere, 180 A. 346, 351, 55 R.I. 225; Watkins v. Mooney, 71 S.W. 622, 624, 114 Ky. 646 quoted with approval in Grapilon v. Municipal Council of Carigara, Leyte, G.R. No. L-12347, May 30, 1961). by ‘effective’ absence is meant one that renders the officer concerned powerless, for the time being, to discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office.
"Considering that Mayor Cuneta left the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines on November 20, 1961 for Japan to remain there at least for a number of days, one cannot but conclude that during the period of his absence, he was ‘effectively’ absent, for it would be preposterous to claim that any municipal or city official of the Philippines may lawfully continue to exercise or discharge the powers, duties and prerogatives of his office even while in a foreign country. That he was there on official business or with the approval of a superior officer is quite immaterial.
"That Mayor Cuneta considered himself disabled to act on official and business transactions of his office during his absence is clearly inferable from the fact that, before he left for Japan, he designated respondent as ‘Caretaker’ of his office to act on such matters in accordance with previous instructions given to her. This set up or arrangement — a sort of government by remote control — is not authorized by any law applicable to Pasay City."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring petitioner to be legally and exclusively entitled to assume the office of municipal mayor of the municipality of Amadeo, Cavite, during the absence of Mayor Santos Ambagan and for the period of his stay outside the Philippines. The writ of preliminary injunction issued heretofore against respondent is hereby made permanent.
The handwritten petition filed on October 29, 1962 by Attorney Leonido S. Cruz who calls himself "Emergency Counsel" for respondent for the postponement of the hearing etc. is hereby denied for lack of merits. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
It appeared, however, that before leaving the Philippines, Mayor Ambagan had designated herein respondent Primitivo A. Garcia, in writing, to take charge of the municipal government as a "caretaker" subject to his instructions, as of October 3, 1962. Pursuant to such designation, on October 9 of the same year, respondent sent a circular letter to all officials, employees and residents of the municipality of Amadeo, Cavite, making it known to them that he had officially assumed on October 3, 1962 the position of acting mayor of Amadeo during the absence of Mayor Ambagan and, since his designation, had also assumed and exercised the powers, duties and prerogatives of the office aforesaid.
Upon the facts stated above, which are not disputed, petitioner brought the present action for quo warranto to secure judgment declaring him legally and exclusively entitled to assume the office of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite, during the absence of Mayor Santos Ambagan and for the period of the latter’s stay outside the Philippines.
As prayed for in the verified petition submitted by petitioner, we issued on the 19th of October, 1962 a writ of preliminary injunction restraining respondent from further assuming, exercising, and usurping the powers, duties and prerogatives of petitioner acting as mayor of the municipality of Amadeo, Cavite.
The facts of the present case are on all fours with those involved in Ansberto P. Paredes, Petitioner, v. Rosalind P. Antillon, respondent, G.R. No. L-19168, promulgated on December 22, 1961 where, among other things, we said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The question before us, therefore, is whether under the facts above stated and existing laws applicable to Pasay City, petitioner was entitled to assume the office of, and act as mayor of Pasay City during the absence of Mayor Cuneta, or the latter had legal authority to appoint respondent not only as Acting Secretary to the mayor but as "Office Caretaker of the Office of the Mayor of Pasay City" for the duration of his official trip abroad, with authority to act on official and business matters submitted to the Mayor’s office, according to previous instructions.
"The pertinent legal provisions are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 183, otherwise known as the Charter of Pasay City;
‘. . .shall act as Mayor and perform the duties and exercise the powers of the Mayor, in the event of sickness, absence, or other permanent or temporary incapacity of the Mayor and shall, when occupying the Position of Mayor, be entitled to the salary and allowance of the Mayor. . . .’
(2) Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 2259, known as the Omnibus Law:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The Vice-Mayor shall perform the duties and exercise the powers of the Mayor in the event the latter’s inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.’
(3) Section 7, paragraph 3 of Republic Act No. 2264, known as the Local Autonomy Law:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘In the event of temporary incapacity of the Mayor to perform the duties of his office on account of absence on leave, sickness or any temporary incapacity, the Vice-Mayor shall perform the duties and exercise the powers of the Mayor, except the power to appoint, suspend or dismiss employees.’
"Respondent claims that the above provisions of Republic Act No. 183 had been repealed by those of Republic Act No. 2264 above-quoted, and attempts to make a distinction between the two legal provisions by stating that while the former provided that the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City shall act as mayor etc., in the event of ‘sickness, absence, or other permanent or temporary incapacity of the Mayor’, the latter Act provides that the Vice-Mayor may do so only in the event of ‘temporary incapacity of the mayor to perform the duties of his office on account of absence on leave, sickness or any other temporary incapacity, . . .’ From this respondent further draws the conclusion that the ‘temporary incapacity’ mentioned in the law ‘should be related to caused by and on account of absence on leave, sickness . . .’.
"We do not deem it necessary to decide for the present the question of the alleged repeal of the provisions of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 183, by those of Section 7, paragraph 3 of Republic Act No. 2264 for the reason that, in our opinion, whether we decide the question at issue in the light of the provisions of either Act or in those of Republic Act No. 2259, the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City is entitled to assume the powers, duties and prerogatives of the Officer of the Mayor of said city if the Mayor is ‘effectively absent.’
"It must be admitted that the word ‘absence’ used in the pertinent legal provisions is a fair example of words which may have one meaning in their ordinary employment and a materially different or modified one in their legal sense. It is indeed a difficult if not an impossible task to lay done a rule that could apply to all cases, defining the meaning of ‘absence’, but the weight of authority seems to be that under the legal provisions authorizing a Municipal or City Vice-Mayor to discharge the duties of the Mayor in the ‘absence’ of the latter, said term must be reasonably construed, and so construed means ‘effective’ absence. (Gelinas v. Fugere, 180 A. 346, 351, 55 R.I. 225; Watkins v. Mooney, 71 S.W. 622, 624, 114 Ky. 646 quoted with approval in Grapilon v. Municipal Council of Carigara, Leyte, G.R. No. L-12347, May 30, 1961). by ‘effective’ absence is meant one that renders the officer concerned powerless, for the time being, to discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office.
"Considering that Mayor Cuneta left the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines on November 20, 1961 for Japan to remain there at least for a number of days, one cannot but conclude that during the period of his absence, he was ‘effectively’ absent, for it would be preposterous to claim that any municipal or city official of the Philippines may lawfully continue to exercise or discharge the powers, duties and prerogatives of his office even while in a foreign country. That he was there on official business or with the approval of a superior officer is quite immaterial.
"That Mayor Cuneta considered himself disabled to act on official and business transactions of his office during his absence is clearly inferable from the fact that, before he left for Japan, he designated respondent as ‘Caretaker’ of his office to act on such matters in accordance with previous instructions given to her. This set up or arrangement — a sort of government by remote control — is not authorized by any law applicable to Pasay City."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring petitioner to be legally and exclusively entitled to assume the office of municipal mayor of the municipality of Amadeo, Cavite, during the absence of Mayor Santos Ambagan and for the period of his stay outside the Philippines. The writ of preliminary injunction issued heretofore against respondent is hereby made permanent.
The handwritten petition filed on October 29, 1962 by Attorney Leonido S. Cruz who calls himself "Emergency Counsel" for respondent for the postponement of the hearing etc. is hereby denied for lack of merits. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
