September 1963 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-18223 & L-18224 September 30, 1963 - COMM. BANK & TRUST CO. OF THE PHIL. v. REP. ARMORED CAR SERVICE CORP., ET AL.:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-18223 & L-18224. September 30, 1963.]
COMMERCIAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC ARMORED CAR SERVICE CORPORATION and DAMASO PEREZ, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
R E S O L U T I O N
LABRADOR, J.:
Defendant-appellant Damaso Perez has presented a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. It is claimed that movant was not aware of the nature of the power of attorney that Ramon Racelis used, purportedly signed by him, to secure the loans for the Republic Armored Car Service Corporation and the Republic Credit Corporation. In the motion it is claimed that a photostatic copy of the power of attorney used by Ramon Racelis was presented at the trial. This photostatic copy or a copy thereof has not been submitted to Us, for this reason We cannot rule upon his claim and contention that Ramon Racelis had no authority to bind the movant as surety for the loans obtained from the appellee Commercial Bank & Trust Company. Not having before Us the supposed photostatic copy of the power of attorney used to secure the loans, there is no reason for Us to rule, in accordance with his contention, that Racelis exceeded his authority in securing the loans subject of the present actions.
The motion for reconsideration, however, presents a copy of a power of attorney purportedly executed by movant on October 22, 1952. It is not expressly mentioned that this is the precise power of attorney that Ramon Racelis utilized to secure the loans the collection of which is sought in these cases. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that the said power of attorney incorporated in the motion for reconsideration was the one used to obtain the loans, We find that the movant’s contention has no merit. In accordance with the document, Racelis was authorized to negotiate for a loan or various loans . . . with other banking institution, financing corporation, insurance companies or investment corporations, in such sum or sums, aforesaid Attorney-in-fact Mr. Ramon Racelis, may deem proper and convenient to my interests, . . . and to execute any and all documents he deems requisite and necessary in order to obtain such loans, always having in mind my best interest; . . ." We hold that this general power of attorney to secure loans from any banking institution was sufficient authority for Ramon Racelis to obtain the credits subject of the present suits.
It will be noted furthermore that Racelis, as agent of Damaso Perez, executed the documents evidencing the loans signing the same "Damaso Perez by Ramon Racelis," and in the said contracts Damaso Perez agreed jointly and severally to be responsible for the loans. As the document as signed makes Perez jointly and severally responsible, there is no merit in the contention that Perez was only being held liable as a guarantor.
Furthermore, the promissory notes evidencing the loans are attached to the complaint in G.R. Nos. L-18223 and L-18224. If the movant Perez claims that Racelis had no authority to execute the said promissory notes, the authenticity of said documents should have been specifically denied under oath in defendant’s answers in the lower court. This was not done; consequently Perez could not and may not now claim that his agent did not have authority to execute the loan agreements.
Motion for new trial is denied.
Padilla, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
The motion for reconsideration, however, presents a copy of a power of attorney purportedly executed by movant on October 22, 1952. It is not expressly mentioned that this is the precise power of attorney that Ramon Racelis utilized to secure the loans the collection of which is sought in these cases. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that the said power of attorney incorporated in the motion for reconsideration was the one used to obtain the loans, We find that the movant’s contention has no merit. In accordance with the document, Racelis was authorized to negotiate for a loan or various loans . . . with other banking institution, financing corporation, insurance companies or investment corporations, in such sum or sums, aforesaid Attorney-in-fact Mr. Ramon Racelis, may deem proper and convenient to my interests, . . . and to execute any and all documents he deems requisite and necessary in order to obtain such loans, always having in mind my best interest; . . ." We hold that this general power of attorney to secure loans from any banking institution was sufficient authority for Ramon Racelis to obtain the credits subject of the present suits.
It will be noted furthermore that Racelis, as agent of Damaso Perez, executed the documents evidencing the loans signing the same "Damaso Perez by Ramon Racelis," and in the said contracts Damaso Perez agreed jointly and severally to be responsible for the loans. As the document as signed makes Perez jointly and severally responsible, there is no merit in the contention that Perez was only being held liable as a guarantor.
Furthermore, the promissory notes evidencing the loans are attached to the complaint in G.R. Nos. L-18223 and L-18224. If the movant Perez claims that Racelis had no authority to execute the said promissory notes, the authenticity of said documents should have been specifically denied under oath in defendant’s answers in the lower court. This was not done; consequently Perez could not and may not now claim that his agent did not have authority to execute the loan agreements.
Motion for new trial is denied.
Padilla, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
