Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

This concerns a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of this Court awarding back wages to the respondents for a period from December 8, 1941 to June 8, 1942, modifying the previous ruling affirmed the grant of back wages to the extent to two to three years. It is contended in the motion for reconsideration that the grant of back pay for a period of two or three years had already been decided in the previous decision and resolution of this Court (decision of January 31, 1963, resolution of July 31, 1963).

It is not true the previous judgment of this Court on December 29, 1954 (L-6608), remanding the case for new trial to determine the specific amount that each of the claimants should be entitled to receive, had already specifically decided that the back pay should be for the period of two to three years. The resolution itself saying that the back pay was to be for a period of two or three years shows that no specific period had been found. Besides, the first decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in which back pay was denied on the ground that the claim therefor was already barred by prescription, did not specifically determine for what period of time was the back pay to be given. So the period for which the back pay was to be awarded was properly the subject of the new trial after which the Court of Industrial Relations rendered its decision of December 29, 1959 in its Case No. 397-V(7). In this decision the court actually considered the period or length of time for which back pay was to be granted. That decision considered the conflicting testimonies offered by the parties as to the period for which back pay was to be given; thus in the portion of the decision quoted in Our resolution of October 31, 1963 ** We started with a portion of the decision thus: "Respondent union tried to prove that before claimants left Manila for Bataan . . ." and the conclusion of the decision as to the issue (as to whether or not back pay for two or the three years was promised) is as follows: "Considering however . . ." (the conflicting testimonies)." . . the court has to give the claimants the benefit of the doubt." So, in the decision appealed from the court below concluded as a finding a fact that the promise to give back pay was for a period of two or three years because the court found that the testimonies on the said subject were conflicting, for which reason the court was in duty bound "to give the claimants the benefits of the doubt." This finding of fact was based on the rule laid by the court below that in case of doubt the claimants were entitled to the benefits thereof. But the ruling was reversed by Us in Our resolution of October 31, 1963.

In the original decision in this case, rendered by this Court on January 31, 1963, and in the first resolution on the motion for reconsideration dated July 31, 1963, the Court had assumed all the time that the finding of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations as to the existence of a promise to give two to three years back pay was correct. In the first resolution on the motion for reconsideration dated July 31, 1963 the said finding of fact was not reviewed. Neither was this finding of fact reviewed in the original decision; hence it cannot be stated that this finding of fact was passed upon in the previous decision and resolution of this Court. We therefore hold that the finding of fact in question was never passed upon in the previous decision and resolutions of this Court and may still be the subject of the motion for reconsideration.

The second question presented refers to the denial by the Court in its resolution subject of the motion for reconsideration, of the so-called "incidental expenses." It is claimed that these "incidental expenses" represented money of the laborer spent while in their operations in Bataan. We held that since there was no agreement that all incidental expenses or money spent by them should be charged against the Luzon Brokerage Company, the claim therefore cannot be granted. They received both their back pay from the Luzon Brokerage Company and their wages from the United States Army, and in view of these circumstances We believe that the denial of the right to incidental expenses is just and proper.

The last question raised is the fact that back wages were granted only from December 8, 1941 to June 8, 1942, and that the claimants were not paid salaries even before December 31, 1941. The subject of the present suit is back wages when the claimants went to Bataan. These back wages could not include the wages that they were supposed to have received from the Luzon Brokerage Company up to the day of the declaration of war. The claims for such wages should be the subject of another claim because the same can not be included in the claim for back wages.

WHEREFORE finding no merit in the motion for reconsideration, it is hereby denied.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

Endnotes:

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* Editor’s Note: See decision in 7 SCRA 116, and resolution in 8 SCRA 509.

** Editor’s Note: See second motion for reconsideration in 9 SCRA 388.