February 1965 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-20169 February 26, 1965 - IN RE: YU KIAN CHIE v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL.:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-20169. February 26, 1965.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF YU KIAN CHIE TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. YU KIAN CHIE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.
R. L. Rabayon for Petitioner-Appellee.
Solicitor General for Oppositor-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; LUCRATIVE INCOME; CONDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND BONUSES NOT CONSIDERED. — In considering whether an applicant for naturalization has a lucrative income, allowances and bonuses which may or may not be given to him as where they spring from purely voluntary actuations of his employer conditioned to the circumstances that the employer was making profits, should not be added to his basic salary.
2. ID,; ID.; ID.; SALARY OF P400 MONTHLY NOT LUCRATIVE FOR A MARRIED APPLICANT. — Even granting arguendo, that petitioner receives a fixed monthly salary of P400 after he applied for naturalization, still this amount cannot be considered lucrative in the face of a change in his status from single to married, thereafter.
2. ID,; ID.; ID.; SALARY OF P400 MONTHLY NOT LUCRATIVE FOR A MARRIED APPLICANT. — Even granting arguendo, that petitioner receives a fixed monthly salary of P400 after he applied for naturalization, still this amount cannot be considered lucrative in the face of a change in his status from single to married, thereafter.
D E C I S I O N
PAREDES, J.:
Yu Kian Chie, a citizen of the Republic of China, presented with the CFI of Manila, on February 4, 1960, a petition for Naturalization, containing all the jurisdictional requirements, the pertinent portions of which is hereby reproduced:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"THIRD. — My trade or profession is that of an employee in which I have been engaged since 1957 and from which I derive an average annual income of P3,000.00."cralaw virtua1aw library
Attached to the petition were affidavits of Marcelo de la Cruz and Federico G. Santos, who acted as character witnesses; Declaration of Intention and Certificate of Arrival. After the trial, the Office of the Solicitor General on October 4, 1961, filed an "Opposition" claiming that the two witnesses of petitioner are not credible and did not testify as to petitioner’s good reputation and moral irreproachability.
On December 18, 1961, the lower court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that petitioner has all the qualifications required by, and none of the disqualifications specified in, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535, and has complied with all the requisites established therein.
"WHEREFORE, the said petition of Yu Kian Chie to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines is hereby granted, and let the proper naturalization certificate be issued in his favor and the registration thereof in the proper civil registry, this decision to become executory in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 53."cralaw virtua1aw library
After the Solicitor General has perfected his appeal from the above judgment, but during the pendency of the approval of the record on appeal, petitioner-appellee herein presented with the lower court a "Motion to Reopen Case to Enable Petitioner to present Additional Documentary Proof of his Income," claiming that his income has risen from P3,000.00 in 1957, to P4,100.00 in 1960 and P5,200.00 in 1961. The increase in the income had been due to a little increase in the salary, plus the bonuses of P100.00 in 1960 and P1,000.00 in 1961. The motion was heard, and on July 18, 1962, the court a quo rendered a "Supplemental Decision." Both the original and the supplemental decision are the subjects of the instant appeal, the Solicitor General urging a reversal thereof on a singular assignment of error, allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit: in not finding that the petitioner failed to prove that he has a lucrative income.
There seem to be no question regarding the fact that there has been an increase in the income of petitioner, from the time he presented his petition, to the rendition of the Supplemental Decision. In 1961 also, there has been a change in the status of petitioner, from single to married. Even granting, for purposes of argument, that the figures appearing in the documentary evidence submitted are correct, although We entertain serious doubts regarding their veracity — a point which We will discuss later — the overriding issue would be, the same lucrative income. As a starter on this point, We quote a portion of the argument of counsel for petitioner-appellee, which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . He received a uniform living allowance of P150.00 a month, aside from the yearly bonus which the company gives him, depending of course, on the profit which said company realizes every year from its business." (p. 3, brief.)
And the living allowance is given regularly from the time the petitioner started working with the Republic Hardware in 1959 up to the present. In other words, it (living allowance) has assumed its regularity as a part of the salary in consideration of the services rendered by the petitioner . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above quoted portions of the arguments of petitioner’s counsel, is a clear indication that as far as salary is concerned, his client, appellee herein, was only receiving P150.00, the rest being in the form of allowances and bonuses which may or may not be given to appellee. In other words, petitioner’s employer was not duty bound to give such allowances and bonuses, but must spring from purely voluntary actuations, conditioned to the circumstance that the employer was making profits. When there are no profits, the allowances and the bonuses are not given. It is not, therefore, safe to consider that the income of petitioner is P3,000.00 yearly, or more. Insofar as the evidence is concerned, it becomes indisputable that petitioner’s true income is only P150.00, any additional thereof being purely contingent, accidental or incidental, which amount does not come up to the category of a lucrative income, considering that the petitioner is now a married man.
Furthermore, We are not convinced that petitioner’s employee could be that generous to him. It will be noted that the Republic Hardware did not present its books to show that it was making a good profit, as to enable it to give such big allowance and bonus to appellee, and considering that the raise in salary was given during the pendency of his naturalization case.
But even granting, for purpose of argument, that petitioner started to receive a fixed salary of P400.00 a month in 1962, still this amount cannot be considered lucrative in the face of the fact that in 1961 he got married, as pointed out in his Income Tax Return for 1961 (Exh. p-4).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from, should be, as it is hereby reversed and another entered denying Yu Kian Chie’s petition for Philippine citizenship. Costs against Petitioner-Appellee.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
"THIRD. — My trade or profession is that of an employee in which I have been engaged since 1957 and from which I derive an average annual income of P3,000.00."cralaw virtua1aw library
Attached to the petition were affidavits of Marcelo de la Cruz and Federico G. Santos, who acted as character witnesses; Declaration of Intention and Certificate of Arrival. After the trial, the Office of the Solicitor General on October 4, 1961, filed an "Opposition" claiming that the two witnesses of petitioner are not credible and did not testify as to petitioner’s good reputation and moral irreproachability.
On December 18, 1961, the lower court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
"In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that petitioner has all the qualifications required by, and none of the disqualifications specified in, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535, and has complied with all the requisites established therein.
"WHEREFORE, the said petition of Yu Kian Chie to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines is hereby granted, and let the proper naturalization certificate be issued in his favor and the registration thereof in the proper civil registry, this decision to become executory in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 53."cralaw virtua1aw library
After the Solicitor General has perfected his appeal from the above judgment, but during the pendency of the approval of the record on appeal, petitioner-appellee herein presented with the lower court a "Motion to Reopen Case to Enable Petitioner to present Additional Documentary Proof of his Income," claiming that his income has risen from P3,000.00 in 1957, to P4,100.00 in 1960 and P5,200.00 in 1961. The increase in the income had been due to a little increase in the salary, plus the bonuses of P100.00 in 1960 and P1,000.00 in 1961. The motion was heard, and on July 18, 1962, the court a quo rendered a "Supplemental Decision." Both the original and the supplemental decision are the subjects of the instant appeal, the Solicitor General urging a reversal thereof on a singular assignment of error, allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit: in not finding that the petitioner failed to prove that he has a lucrative income.
There seem to be no question regarding the fact that there has been an increase in the income of petitioner, from the time he presented his petition, to the rendition of the Supplemental Decision. In 1961 also, there has been a change in the status of petitioner, from single to married. Even granting, for purposes of argument, that the figures appearing in the documentary evidence submitted are correct, although We entertain serious doubts regarding their veracity — a point which We will discuss later — the overriding issue would be, the same lucrative income. As a starter on this point, We quote a portion of the argument of counsel for petitioner-appellee, which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . He received a uniform living allowance of P150.00 a month, aside from the yearly bonus which the company gives him, depending of course, on the profit which said company realizes every year from its business." (p. 3, brief.)
And the living allowance is given regularly from the time the petitioner started working with the Republic Hardware in 1959 up to the present. In other words, it (living allowance) has assumed its regularity as a part of the salary in consideration of the services rendered by the petitioner . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above quoted portions of the arguments of petitioner’s counsel, is a clear indication that as far as salary is concerned, his client, appellee herein, was only receiving P150.00, the rest being in the form of allowances and bonuses which may or may not be given to appellee. In other words, petitioner’s employer was not duty bound to give such allowances and bonuses, but must spring from purely voluntary actuations, conditioned to the circumstance that the employer was making profits. When there are no profits, the allowances and the bonuses are not given. It is not, therefore, safe to consider that the income of petitioner is P3,000.00 yearly, or more. Insofar as the evidence is concerned, it becomes indisputable that petitioner’s true income is only P150.00, any additional thereof being purely contingent, accidental or incidental, which amount does not come up to the category of a lucrative income, considering that the petitioner is now a married man.
Furthermore, We are not convinced that petitioner’s employee could be that generous to him. It will be noted that the Republic Hardware did not present its books to show that it was making a good profit, as to enable it to give such big allowance and bonus to appellee, and considering that the raise in salary was given during the pendency of his naturalization case.
But even granting, for purpose of argument, that petitioner started to receive a fixed salary of P400.00 a month in 1962, still this amount cannot be considered lucrative in the face of the fact that in 1961 he got married, as pointed out in his Income Tax Return for 1961 (Exh. p-4).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from, should be, as it is hereby reversed and another entered denying Yu Kian Chie’s petition for Philippine citizenship. Costs against Petitioner-Appellee.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
