November 1965 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-21447 November 29, 1965 - JOSE REYES, ET., AL. v. FRANCISCO ARCA:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-21447. November 29, 1965.]
JOSE REYES, SOLEDAD and CARMELITA REYES DE PASTOR, Petitioners, v. HON. FRANCISCO ARCA, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch I) and EUSEBIO MILLAR, Respondents.
Jose W. Diokno, for Petitioners.
L. B. Viloria for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LEASE; SUSPENSION OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS NOTWITHSTANDING ABSENCE OF LEGAL GROUNDS. — Article 1658 of the New Civil Code provides only two instances wherein the lessee may suspend payment of rent, namely, when the lessor fails to make the necessary repairs or to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property leased. In its questioned orders, however, the trial court sustained and allowed suspension of payment for rentals by respondent, notwithstanding the absence of any legal ground for the same. It thereby acted in grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction. Said court in effect sanctioned the unjust enjoyment of another’s property without payment for the same.
2. ID.; ID.; REMEDY FOR CERTIORARI AVAILABLE TO SET ASIDE ORDERS SUSPENDING PAYMENT OF RENTALS. — Appeal from the aforementioned orders of the trial court would not be a speedy and adequate remedy, since it could not be taken until after the case is decided by said court on the merits, and the parties agree that the trial is far from being finished. For this reason, the remedy of certiorari is available to set aside the afore-stated orders (Sec. 1 Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court).
2. ID.; ID.; REMEDY FOR CERTIORARI AVAILABLE TO SET ASIDE ORDERS SUSPENDING PAYMENT OF RENTALS. — Appeal from the aforementioned orders of the trial court would not be a speedy and adequate remedy, since it could not be taken until after the case is decided by said court on the merits, and the parties agree that the trial is far from being finished. For this reason, the remedy of certiorari is available to set aside the afore-stated orders (Sec. 1 Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court).
D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J. P., J.:
Feliciano and Pilar Basa, spouses, leased to Eusebio Millar on December 3, 1949 three parcels of registered land, with the improvements thereon, situated in Del Pan and Lavezares Streets, Manila. Among the terms of the lease agreement were: Period — five years, counted from October 1, 1949, renewable for another five years upon written notice; Rentals — P320.00 monthly, payable in advance during the first ten days of each month; Option to buy — "Should the LESSORS dispose or sell the above-described property, the LESSEE is hereby given the first option to buy the said property. However, should it be sold to a third party, the terms and conditions of this agreement shall be respected by the buyer."cralaw virtua1aw library
The properties subject matter of the lease were sold by Feliciano and Pilar Basa on August 28, 1953 for P42,000.00 to Jose Reyes, Soledad Reyes and Carmelita Reyes de Pastor. A transfer certificate of title over said properties was thereafter issued in the names of the buyers, pro indiviso. The purchasers respected the lease in favor of Eusebio Millar.
On March 16, 1954 Eusebio Millar filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, against Feliciano and Pilar Basa as well as the buyers, Jose Reyes, Soledad Reyes and Carmelita Reyes de Pastor, an action to declare the sale null and void, to be allowed to exercise the option to purchase the properties, and to recover P10,000.00 as actual and moral damages and P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Plaintiff Eusebio Millar at the same time deposited with the aforesaid court the monthly rentals from September 1953 "to avoid confusion and further complication as to who is the proper party who is entitled to the rents, and due to the present litigation."cralaw virtua1aw library
Defendants stated in their answer that Eusebio Millar had waived or renounced his option to buy in a letter dated March 19, 1951; and they counterclaimed for actual damages and attorney’s fees.
By motion of June 22, 1959 plaintiff Millar asked for withdrawal of the deposits upon the filing of a surety bond for the same amount. The deposits had reached P20,000.00 covering the period from September 1953 to December 1958. The trial court granted the motion on September 25, 1959. As a result, Millar withdrew the P20,000.00 cash deposit upon the filing on September 28, 1959 of an "Undertaking Covering Real Property" putting his property at Caloocan City with market value of P26,000.00 as security for the withdrawal of the amount deposited.
On February 2, 1963 defendants-purchasers, Jose Reyes, Soledad Reyes and Carmelita Reyes de Pastor, moved that plaintiff be required to deposit with the court the rentals after the withdrawal, that is, from January 1959 up to December 1962, in the total amount of P15,360.00, and to deposit thereafter monthly rentals of P320.00. The court, on March 20, 1963, after opposition, reply and rejoinder had been filed, denied the motion. On April 6, 1963 it denied a motion for reconsideration thereon.
Defendants-purchasers therefore filed on June 25, 1963 the petition herein, for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction. Petitioners ask the setting aside of the order of March 20,1963 and April 6, 1963. Furthermore, they seek to compel Eusebio Millar to deposit with the Court of First Instance the sum of P16,640.00 as rentals for his occupancy of the lots in question from January 1959 to April 1963.
First of all it is clear that respondent Eusebio Millar did not cease to be the lessee of the properties sold to petitioners herein. As stated, even after the sale, said lessee deposited monthly rentals in court for his lease of the properties, leaving it to said court to resolve "as to who is the proper party who is entitled to the rents." Above all, his status as lessee was respected by the purchasers, and he continued to occupy the properties leased to him.
As such lessee, respondent Millar has the specific duty under the law to pay the rent. Article 1657 of the New Civil Code enjoins him to do so:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1657. The lessee is obliged:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) To pay the price of the lease according to the terms stipulated; . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Furthermore, the law provides only two instances wherein the lessee may suspend payment of rent; namely, those mentioned in Article 1658 of the New Civil Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1658. The lessee may suspend the payment of the rent in case the lessor fails to make the necessary repairs or to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property leased."cralaw virtua1aw library
None of the instances above mentioned obtains in the present case. In its questioned orders, however, the trial court sustained and allowed suspension of payment of rentals by respondent Millar, notwithstanding the absence of any legal ground for the same. It thereby acted in grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction. Said court in effect sanctioned the unjust enjoyment of another’s property without payment for the same. Such a course runs counter to the cardinal rule on human relations. "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." (Art. 19, New Civil Code.)
Appeal from the orders of the trial court would not be a speedy and adequate remedy, since it could not be taken until after the case is decided by said court on the merits, and the parties agree that the trial is far from being finished. For this reason, the remedy of certiorari is available to set aside the above-stated orders (Sec. 1, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, the orders dated March 20 and April 6, 1963 are set aside, and respondent Eusebio Millar is ordered to deposit with the trial court the sum of P16,640.00 for rentals from January 1959 to April 1963, and monthly rentals of P320.00 for every month thereafter. No costs. So ordered.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
The properties subject matter of the lease were sold by Feliciano and Pilar Basa on August 28, 1953 for P42,000.00 to Jose Reyes, Soledad Reyes and Carmelita Reyes de Pastor. A transfer certificate of title over said properties was thereafter issued in the names of the buyers, pro indiviso. The purchasers respected the lease in favor of Eusebio Millar.
On March 16, 1954 Eusebio Millar filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, against Feliciano and Pilar Basa as well as the buyers, Jose Reyes, Soledad Reyes and Carmelita Reyes de Pastor, an action to declare the sale null and void, to be allowed to exercise the option to purchase the properties, and to recover P10,000.00 as actual and moral damages and P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Plaintiff Eusebio Millar at the same time deposited with the aforesaid court the monthly rentals from September 1953 "to avoid confusion and further complication as to who is the proper party who is entitled to the rents, and due to the present litigation."cralaw virtua1aw library
Defendants stated in their answer that Eusebio Millar had waived or renounced his option to buy in a letter dated March 19, 1951; and they counterclaimed for actual damages and attorney’s fees.
By motion of June 22, 1959 plaintiff Millar asked for withdrawal of the deposits upon the filing of a surety bond for the same amount. The deposits had reached P20,000.00 covering the period from September 1953 to December 1958. The trial court granted the motion on September 25, 1959. As a result, Millar withdrew the P20,000.00 cash deposit upon the filing on September 28, 1959 of an "Undertaking Covering Real Property" putting his property at Caloocan City with market value of P26,000.00 as security for the withdrawal of the amount deposited.
On February 2, 1963 defendants-purchasers, Jose Reyes, Soledad Reyes and Carmelita Reyes de Pastor, moved that plaintiff be required to deposit with the court the rentals after the withdrawal, that is, from January 1959 up to December 1962, in the total amount of P15,360.00, and to deposit thereafter monthly rentals of P320.00. The court, on March 20, 1963, after opposition, reply and rejoinder had been filed, denied the motion. On April 6, 1963 it denied a motion for reconsideration thereon.
Defendants-purchasers therefore filed on June 25, 1963 the petition herein, for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction. Petitioners ask the setting aside of the order of March 20,1963 and April 6, 1963. Furthermore, they seek to compel Eusebio Millar to deposit with the Court of First Instance the sum of P16,640.00 as rentals for his occupancy of the lots in question from January 1959 to April 1963.
First of all it is clear that respondent Eusebio Millar did not cease to be the lessee of the properties sold to petitioners herein. As stated, even after the sale, said lessee deposited monthly rentals in court for his lease of the properties, leaving it to said court to resolve "as to who is the proper party who is entitled to the rents." Above all, his status as lessee was respected by the purchasers, and he continued to occupy the properties leased to him.
As such lessee, respondent Millar has the specific duty under the law to pay the rent. Article 1657 of the New Civil Code enjoins him to do so:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1657. The lessee is obliged:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) To pay the price of the lease according to the terms stipulated; . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Furthermore, the law provides only two instances wherein the lessee may suspend payment of rent; namely, those mentioned in Article 1658 of the New Civil Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1658. The lessee may suspend the payment of the rent in case the lessor fails to make the necessary repairs or to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property leased."cralaw virtua1aw library
None of the instances above mentioned obtains in the present case. In its questioned orders, however, the trial court sustained and allowed suspension of payment of rentals by respondent Millar, notwithstanding the absence of any legal ground for the same. It thereby acted in grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction. Said court in effect sanctioned the unjust enjoyment of another’s property without payment for the same. Such a course runs counter to the cardinal rule on human relations. "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." (Art. 19, New Civil Code.)
Appeal from the orders of the trial court would not be a speedy and adequate remedy, since it could not be taken until after the case is decided by said court on the merits, and the parties agree that the trial is far from being finished. For this reason, the remedy of certiorari is available to set aside the above-stated orders (Sec. 1, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, the orders dated March 20 and April 6, 1963 are set aside, and respondent Eusebio Millar is ordered to deposit with the trial court the sum of P16,640.00 for rentals from January 1959 to April 1963, and monthly rentals of P320.00 for every month thereafter. No costs. So ordered.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
