February 1966 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-21447 February 28, 1966 JOSE REYES, ET AL. v. FRANCISCO ARCA, ET AL.:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-21447. February 28, 1966.]
JOSE REYES, SOLEDAD REYES and CARMELITA REYES DE PASTOR, Petitioners, v. HON. FRANCISCO ARCA, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch I) and EUSEBIO MILLAR, Respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for the petitioners.
L.B. Viloria for the respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court herein promulgated on November 29, 1965. It raises points deserving of full discussion, particularly the reference to an alleged error in our statement of the facts. An extended resolution is therefore given herein.
In the decision we stated inter alia that on December 3, 1949 the spouses Feliciano and Pilar Basa leased to Eusebio Millar three parcels of registered land, with the improvements thereon, situated in Del Pan and Lavezares Streets, Manila. We further said that among the terms of the lease agreement was, as to period, five years, of the lease agreement was, as to period, five years, counted from October 1, 1949, renewable for another five years upon written notice.
It is now urged by movant that the foregoing is an incorrect finding of fact. For, according to movant, on the same day that the lease agreement was executed — i.e., on December 3, 1949 — the parties thereto executed a supplemental lease agreement, under which the period of the lease was changed to "ten (10) years from and after October 1, 1949, subject to renewal for a period not later than September 30, 1968, under the same terms and conditions herein stated, on the option of the LESSEE upon thirty days written notice to the LESSOR."cralaw virtua1aw library
Anent this point it should first of all be emphasized that movant does not really dispute the facts stated in our decision, that the parties aforementioned entered into a lease agreement on December 3, 1949 providing among its terms a period of five (5) years renewable for another five (5) years. It is however sought to be added thereto the finding that on the same date a supplemental lease agreement was executed, containing a different stipulation regarding the period of the lease. Such a finding is not proper at this stage in the present suit.
The parties herein agree as to the lease agreement, its execution and its terms. They do not agree as to the existence of the supplemental lease agreement, let alone its terms. Such disputed facts ought first to be threshed out in the trial court. Accordingly, the decision of this Court limited its statement of facts to those accepted by the parties.
Furthermore — it may not be amiss to note — by this own annexes to his present motion, movant has only succeeded in showing that the annotations of the lease at the back of petitioners’ title certificates state the lease to be for a period of five years, renewable for another five years (Motion for Reconsideration, Annexes 8 and 9). Said annotation was first inscribed on December 9, 1949 (Ibid), or after the alleged execution of a supplemental agreement providing for a different period.
Regardless, however, of whether the lease was for five years or ten years, subject to renewal for the same period of five years or ten years, it remains the controlling fact herein that movant has continued — and was allowed to continue — possessing and enjoying the properties leased. In any event, therefore, he must still be deemed a lessee of the said properties, either by express agreement or by implied new lease under Article 1670 of the New Civil Code. For it should be stressed that until now the properties have not been sold to movant. It is precisely the reason of movant in filing the pending action in the lower court, to demand specific performance of the alleged obligation to sell the aforesaid performance of the alleged obligation to sell the aforesaid leased properties to him. It follows, that for movant now to stop depositing payment for rentals on the pretense that he is already occupying the premises "in the concept of owner" would be to improperly assume as true the very point still in litigation. And for the lower court to allow the same would in effect be to render its decision before the trial is over.
Assuming, finally, that movant is right — a point we do not for the present decide — in saying that if the sale in favor of the Reyeses is declared null and void and the Basas are ordered to sell the properties to him, the sale in his favor would retroact to the filing of his suit in the lower court, still until that uncertain eventuality happens, there is so far nothing that retroacts.
As stated in the decision, movant in depositing rentals in court pending the litigation, stated that he was doing it: "to avoid confusion and further complication as to who [between the Reyeses and the Basa spouses] is the proper party who is entitled to the rents." 1 Clearly, therefore, he thereby recognized that, pending the outcome of the suit, he cannot be regarded as owner but only as lessee. Rentals, therefore, must continue to be deposited by him. Never can it be overemphasized that the rentals are not to be given now to any of the parties, but merely deposited in court, to be disposed of in accordance with the final judgment in the main litigation.
Anent movant’s contention that the Reyeses were guilty of bad faith in purchasing the properties, in view of the annotations of the lease agreement and of the notice of lis pendens referring to his present suit for specific performance, all of which were allegedly recorded at the back of the title certificates at the time the Reyeses bough the properties, suffice it to state that the same has to do with the merits of the litigation pending in the lower court, not with the present incident herein. All that we have to resolve at present is whether movant can stop paying rentals although he continues staying on the properties leased by him and is not yet the owner of said properties. It was because of the obvious injustice in allowing the movant to o so that we referred to Article 19 of the New Civil Code. For such a course repugnant to the cardinal rule of human relations therein stated.
Again, movant raises the argument that appeal and not the present special civil action is petitioners’ remedy. For reasons already given in our decision, appeal, in this instance, is not an adequate remedy.
Wherefore, respondents’ motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Sanchez concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.
In the decision we stated inter alia that on December 3, 1949 the spouses Feliciano and Pilar Basa leased to Eusebio Millar three parcels of registered land, with the improvements thereon, situated in Del Pan and Lavezares Streets, Manila. We further said that among the terms of the lease agreement was, as to period, five years, of the lease agreement was, as to period, five years, counted from October 1, 1949, renewable for another five years upon written notice.
It is now urged by movant that the foregoing is an incorrect finding of fact. For, according to movant, on the same day that the lease agreement was executed — i.e., on December 3, 1949 — the parties thereto executed a supplemental lease agreement, under which the period of the lease was changed to "ten (10) years from and after October 1, 1949, subject to renewal for a period not later than September 30, 1968, under the same terms and conditions herein stated, on the option of the LESSEE upon thirty days written notice to the LESSOR."cralaw virtua1aw library
Anent this point it should first of all be emphasized that movant does not really dispute the facts stated in our decision, that the parties aforementioned entered into a lease agreement on December 3, 1949 providing among its terms a period of five (5) years renewable for another five (5) years. It is however sought to be added thereto the finding that on the same date a supplemental lease agreement was executed, containing a different stipulation regarding the period of the lease. Such a finding is not proper at this stage in the present suit.
The parties herein agree as to the lease agreement, its execution and its terms. They do not agree as to the existence of the supplemental lease agreement, let alone its terms. Such disputed facts ought first to be threshed out in the trial court. Accordingly, the decision of this Court limited its statement of facts to those accepted by the parties.
Furthermore — it may not be amiss to note — by this own annexes to his present motion, movant has only succeeded in showing that the annotations of the lease at the back of petitioners’ title certificates state the lease to be for a period of five years, renewable for another five years (Motion for Reconsideration, Annexes 8 and 9). Said annotation was first inscribed on December 9, 1949 (Ibid), or after the alleged execution of a supplemental agreement providing for a different period.
Regardless, however, of whether the lease was for five years or ten years, subject to renewal for the same period of five years or ten years, it remains the controlling fact herein that movant has continued — and was allowed to continue — possessing and enjoying the properties leased. In any event, therefore, he must still be deemed a lessee of the said properties, either by express agreement or by implied new lease under Article 1670 of the New Civil Code. For it should be stressed that until now the properties have not been sold to movant. It is precisely the reason of movant in filing the pending action in the lower court, to demand specific performance of the alleged obligation to sell the aforesaid performance of the alleged obligation to sell the aforesaid leased properties to him. It follows, that for movant now to stop depositing payment for rentals on the pretense that he is already occupying the premises "in the concept of owner" would be to improperly assume as true the very point still in litigation. And for the lower court to allow the same would in effect be to render its decision before the trial is over.
Assuming, finally, that movant is right — a point we do not for the present decide — in saying that if the sale in favor of the Reyeses is declared null and void and the Basas are ordered to sell the properties to him, the sale in his favor would retroact to the filing of his suit in the lower court, still until that uncertain eventuality happens, there is so far nothing that retroacts.
As stated in the decision, movant in depositing rentals in court pending the litigation, stated that he was doing it: "to avoid confusion and further complication as to who [between the Reyeses and the Basa spouses] is the proper party who is entitled to the rents." 1 Clearly, therefore, he thereby recognized that, pending the outcome of the suit, he cannot be regarded as owner but only as lessee. Rentals, therefore, must continue to be deposited by him. Never can it be overemphasized that the rentals are not to be given now to any of the parties, but merely deposited in court, to be disposed of in accordance with the final judgment in the main litigation.
Anent movant’s contention that the Reyeses were guilty of bad faith in purchasing the properties, in view of the annotations of the lease agreement and of the notice of lis pendens referring to his present suit for specific performance, all of which were allegedly recorded at the back of the title certificates at the time the Reyeses bough the properties, suffice it to state that the same has to do with the merits of the litigation pending in the lower court, not with the present incident herein. All that we have to resolve at present is whether movant can stop paying rentals although he continues staying on the properties leased by him and is not yet the owner of said properties. It was because of the obvious injustice in allowing the movant to o so that we referred to Article 19 of the New Civil Code. For such a course repugnant to the cardinal rule of human relations therein stated.
Again, movant raises the argument that appeal and not the present special civil action is petitioners’ remedy. For reasons already given in our decision, appeal, in this instance, is not an adequate remedy.
Wherefore, respondents’ motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Sanchez concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.
Endnotes:
1. See Order dated September 25, 1959, Petition, Annex B.
