June 1966 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-17411 June 30, 1966 LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL.:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17411. June 30, 1966.]
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and LUSTEVECO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-CCLU, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-18681. June 30, 1966.]
LUSTEVECO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-CCLU, ET AL., Petitioners, v. LUZON STEVEDORING CO., ET AL., Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-18683. June 30, 1966.]
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and LUSTEVECO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-CCLU, Respondents.
No. L-17411.
Jamir, San Luis & Morabe for Petitioner.
Paredes, Rafael, Ty, Gesmundo & Velasco for respondent Union.
Mariano D. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Rey & Santos counsel for respondent Union de Estevedores de Filipinas.
No. L18681.
Leon O. Ty, Gesmundo & Velasco for Petitioner.
Jalandoni & Jamir for respondent Luzon Stevedoring Company.
Vidal Magbanua for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Rey & Santos counsel for respondent Union de Estevedores de Filipinas.
No. L-186813.
Jamir & Jalandoni for Petitioner.
Leon O. Ty, Gesmundo & Rino for respondent Union.
Vidal Magbanua for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Rey & Santos for respondent Union de Estevedores de Filipinas.
D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioner Lusteveco Employees Association-CCLU (LEA) moved for reconsideration of our decision of December 31, 1965. It also filed a motion — which we granted — that all exhibits in Case 21-IPA Incident 4 (L-18681) be forwarded to this Court for perusal in resolving the motion for reconsideration. Said exhibits have now been elevated to Us. Respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUZON) filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration. And a reply to said opposition was likewise filed.
1. It is movant’s view that the nature of its strike underwent a change from economic to unfair labor practice strike from the moment respondent LUZON refused its alleged unconditional offer to return to work for 300 workers, dated June 2, 1959, and thereby committed unfair labor practice. After the first strike staged in June, 1958, LUZON gave LEA up to January 6, 1959 to return to work. None returned to work within that period. Four strikers, however, were allowed to return to work on January 26, 1959. Subsequently, on June 2, 1959, LEA, through a letter of its President, offered to return to work "under the status quo as directed by the Court of Industrial Relations in its order of June 21, 1958 without prejudice to whatever the decision of said Court may make on the issues involved in the second strike." (Exh. Q-1, Case 21-IPA[4]; Italics supplied). In a letter dated June 9, 1959 (Exh. Q-2, Case 21-IPA [4]) LUZON through its General Manager replied "We feel that inasmuch as the question of the legality or illegality of the second strike is now before that Court [CIR], and the Secretary of Labor has taken the initiative of conciliating the labor dispute between the parties, your aforesaid offer should be held in abeyance." In his letter of June 12, 1959, LEA’s President reiterated the afore-stated offer to return to work.
In this Court’s view LEA’s return-to-work offer was not unconditional. It provided for a return to work "as directed by the Court of Industrial Relations in its order of June 21, 1958." And said CIR order in turn provided, among other things, for payment of strike-duration pay. (See p. 11 of CIR Record, Vol. I, 21-IPA.) As the records disclose, LEA’s return-to-work offer, therefore, imposed as a condition, among others, the payment of strike-duration pay. Accordingly, LEA, cannot invoke Consolidated Labor Association of the Philippines v. Marsman & Co. Inc., L-17038 and L-17057, July 31, 1964 and similar cases to the effect that refusal of the company to accept an unconditional offer of the strikers to return to work constitutes unfair labor practice so as to convert the strike into a lawful one. And as regards the four strikers allowed to return to work, their acceptance cannot be deemed an act of discrimination, it not having been shown in the records that their offer to return to work imposed any condition as did that of LEA with respect to the 300 other strikers.
2. Anent the reduction of Christmas bonus, LEA contends that there is no evidence on decrease in percentage of profit as of December 31, 1958 to justify said reduction. This point was already passed upon in the decision. The Christmas bonus not having been included in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, it cannot be demanded by the union. And even assuming that Christmas bonus is a concession within the purview of Article 10 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, providing that "the Company agrees to maintain in effect all concessions presently being extended to its employees, whenever practicable," still the same cannot be demanded, in view of the phrase "whenever practicable." Furthermore, the Collective Bargaining Agreement expired sometime in September 1958 whereas the Christmas bonus in question was granted in December 1958, three months after. Philippine Education Co. v. CIR, 92 Phil. 385 is not in point fore there the bonus had already been previously set aside.
3. Regarding the Exhibits A, A-1 and A-2 LEA maintains that the CIR erred in discrediting them under the impression that they were found on top of the table of the union Secretary after office hours. It is claimed that they were found inside the log book which was on the table of the information police. This really makes no difference. It is just as improbable, if not more so, for company officials to put inside said log book, notes as confidential and damaging as Exhibits A, A-1 and A-2, the log book being accessible to all the guards, who were the persons concerned.
4. As to the reasons for the strike, this Court, contrary to LEA’s impression, considered not only the suspension of the 7 security guards; in fact, our decision stated the acts complained against by the union.
5. Regarding the charge that the CIR did not view the over-all attitude of the company towards the union, this too is not correct. The CIR even discussed the factual background of the strike in page 2 of its decision.
6. LEA would again press the argument in its brief that it could legally declare a strike even as the causes for it were pending in the CIR. We still find it unnecessary to discuss the question whether LEA could have thus legally gone on strike. The fact is that in view of other circumstances, apart from the above question, its strike was illegal.
7. The necessity of a strike notice is again challenged. Suffice it to reiterate that, as the CIR found, LUZON not having engaged in unfair labor practice, the strike was but an economic one, requiring a strike notice.
8. Seeking to exclude from those whose dismissals were authorized by the CIR, strikers with pending criminal cases, movant states anew its contention that what was involved were isolated acts of violence imputable to both the company and the strikers. We find no reason, however to disturb the CIR’s finding that the violence committed during the strike was not provoked by LUZON.
9. LEA further contends that the CIR decision dismisses 13 LEA members for having been "active unionists" and thus is discriminatory and illegal. Said dismissals, authorized by the CIR’s decision, however, are not for lawful union activity but precisely for participation in an illegal strike. They are therefore in order.
10. Similarly, the CIR rightly held the strike of the Lusteveco Bulk Oil Union (LBOU) illegal, as a sympathetic strike to LEA’s illegal strike. It was not in adjudication of the pending suit in the CIR as to the legality of the certification election in the Sta. Mesa Slipways and Engineering Company and the inclusion of the Bulk Oil Terminal at Pandacan in said election.
11. As to the notices sent by LUZON to the strikers, the same were not threats of dismissal levelled directly at the strikers, but a publication calling all strikers to return to work by January 6, 1959 or an offer to accept the strikers back to their jobs.
12. Anent the alleged permission by the CIR for the Secretary of Labor to intervene in the case while the same was pending in court, the same has no relevance to the legality or illegality of LEA’s strike.
13. It is asserted that the strike should be deemed as one against an unfair labor practice in view of LEA’s "good faith" that LUZON’s acts constituted unfair labor practice. In Interwood Employees Association v. International Hardwood & Veneer Co., L-7409, May 18, 1956. 52 O.G. 3936, 3941, the Court has ruled that if the strikers act from an unlawful, illegitimate, unjust, unreasonable, or trivial ground, reason or motive, even if they do so in good faith, and the Court of Industrial Relations so finds, the strike may be declared illegal notwithstanding their good faith.
14. Finally LEA insists that the CIR misapprehended facts and arbitrarily thrust aside the evidence presented by the union. This argument has been raised in the brief and was already passed upon by us in the decision. Substantial evidence supports the findings and conclusions affirmed. Preponderance of evidence, invoked by LEA, is not the criterion in these cases (National Fastener Corporation of the Philippines v. CIR, L-15834, January 20, 1961.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied for lack of merit. So ordered.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, J.B.L. Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., reserved his vote.
1. It is movant’s view that the nature of its strike underwent a change from economic to unfair labor practice strike from the moment respondent LUZON refused its alleged unconditional offer to return to work for 300 workers, dated June 2, 1959, and thereby committed unfair labor practice. After the first strike staged in June, 1958, LUZON gave LEA up to January 6, 1959 to return to work. None returned to work within that period. Four strikers, however, were allowed to return to work on January 26, 1959. Subsequently, on June 2, 1959, LEA, through a letter of its President, offered to return to work "under the status quo as directed by the Court of Industrial Relations in its order of June 21, 1958 without prejudice to whatever the decision of said Court may make on the issues involved in the second strike." (Exh. Q-1, Case 21-IPA[4]; Italics supplied). In a letter dated June 9, 1959 (Exh. Q-2, Case 21-IPA [4]) LUZON through its General Manager replied "We feel that inasmuch as the question of the legality or illegality of the second strike is now before that Court [CIR], and the Secretary of Labor has taken the initiative of conciliating the labor dispute between the parties, your aforesaid offer should be held in abeyance." In his letter of June 12, 1959, LEA’s President reiterated the afore-stated offer to return to work.
In this Court’s view LEA’s return-to-work offer was not unconditional. It provided for a return to work "as directed by the Court of Industrial Relations in its order of June 21, 1958." And said CIR order in turn provided, among other things, for payment of strike-duration pay. (See p. 11 of CIR Record, Vol. I, 21-IPA.) As the records disclose, LEA’s return-to-work offer, therefore, imposed as a condition, among others, the payment of strike-duration pay. Accordingly, LEA, cannot invoke Consolidated Labor Association of the Philippines v. Marsman & Co. Inc., L-17038 and L-17057, July 31, 1964 and similar cases to the effect that refusal of the company to accept an unconditional offer of the strikers to return to work constitutes unfair labor practice so as to convert the strike into a lawful one. And as regards the four strikers allowed to return to work, their acceptance cannot be deemed an act of discrimination, it not having been shown in the records that their offer to return to work imposed any condition as did that of LEA with respect to the 300 other strikers.
2. Anent the reduction of Christmas bonus, LEA contends that there is no evidence on decrease in percentage of profit as of December 31, 1958 to justify said reduction. This point was already passed upon in the decision. The Christmas bonus not having been included in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, it cannot be demanded by the union. And even assuming that Christmas bonus is a concession within the purview of Article 10 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, providing that "the Company agrees to maintain in effect all concessions presently being extended to its employees, whenever practicable," still the same cannot be demanded, in view of the phrase "whenever practicable." Furthermore, the Collective Bargaining Agreement expired sometime in September 1958 whereas the Christmas bonus in question was granted in December 1958, three months after. Philippine Education Co. v. CIR, 92 Phil. 385 is not in point fore there the bonus had already been previously set aside.
3. Regarding the Exhibits A, A-1 and A-2 LEA maintains that the CIR erred in discrediting them under the impression that they were found on top of the table of the union Secretary after office hours. It is claimed that they were found inside the log book which was on the table of the information police. This really makes no difference. It is just as improbable, if not more so, for company officials to put inside said log book, notes as confidential and damaging as Exhibits A, A-1 and A-2, the log book being accessible to all the guards, who were the persons concerned.
4. As to the reasons for the strike, this Court, contrary to LEA’s impression, considered not only the suspension of the 7 security guards; in fact, our decision stated the acts complained against by the union.
5. Regarding the charge that the CIR did not view the over-all attitude of the company towards the union, this too is not correct. The CIR even discussed the factual background of the strike in page 2 of its decision.
6. LEA would again press the argument in its brief that it could legally declare a strike even as the causes for it were pending in the CIR. We still find it unnecessary to discuss the question whether LEA could have thus legally gone on strike. The fact is that in view of other circumstances, apart from the above question, its strike was illegal.
7. The necessity of a strike notice is again challenged. Suffice it to reiterate that, as the CIR found, LUZON not having engaged in unfair labor practice, the strike was but an economic one, requiring a strike notice.
8. Seeking to exclude from those whose dismissals were authorized by the CIR, strikers with pending criminal cases, movant states anew its contention that what was involved were isolated acts of violence imputable to both the company and the strikers. We find no reason, however to disturb the CIR’s finding that the violence committed during the strike was not provoked by LUZON.
9. LEA further contends that the CIR decision dismisses 13 LEA members for having been "active unionists" and thus is discriminatory and illegal. Said dismissals, authorized by the CIR’s decision, however, are not for lawful union activity but precisely for participation in an illegal strike. They are therefore in order.
10. Similarly, the CIR rightly held the strike of the Lusteveco Bulk Oil Union (LBOU) illegal, as a sympathetic strike to LEA’s illegal strike. It was not in adjudication of the pending suit in the CIR as to the legality of the certification election in the Sta. Mesa Slipways and Engineering Company and the inclusion of the Bulk Oil Terminal at Pandacan in said election.
11. As to the notices sent by LUZON to the strikers, the same were not threats of dismissal levelled directly at the strikers, but a publication calling all strikers to return to work by January 6, 1959 or an offer to accept the strikers back to their jobs.
12. Anent the alleged permission by the CIR for the Secretary of Labor to intervene in the case while the same was pending in court, the same has no relevance to the legality or illegality of LEA’s strike.
13. It is asserted that the strike should be deemed as one against an unfair labor practice in view of LEA’s "good faith" that LUZON’s acts constituted unfair labor practice. In Interwood Employees Association v. International Hardwood & Veneer Co., L-7409, May 18, 1956. 52 O.G. 3936, 3941, the Court has ruled that if the strikers act from an unlawful, illegitimate, unjust, unreasonable, or trivial ground, reason or motive, even if they do so in good faith, and the Court of Industrial Relations so finds, the strike may be declared illegal notwithstanding their good faith.
14. Finally LEA insists that the CIR misapprehended facts and arbitrarily thrust aside the evidence presented by the union. This argument has been raised in the brief and was already passed upon by us in the decision. Substantial evidence supports the findings and conclusions affirmed. Preponderance of evidence, invoked by LEA, is not the criterion in these cases (National Fastener Corporation of the Philippines v. CIR, L-15834, January 20, 1961.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied for lack of merit. So ordered.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, J.B.L. Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., reserved his vote.
