Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence


Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1966 > November 1966 Decisions > G.R. No. L-19495 November 24, 1966 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. LILIA YUSAY GONZALES, ET AL.:




PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-19495. November 24, 1966.]

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. LILIA YUSAY GONZALES and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, Respondents.

Solicitor General for the petitioner.

Ramon A. Gonzalez for respondent Lilia Yusay Gonzales.


SYLLABUS


1. TAXATION; DISPUTED ASSESSMENTS; APPEAL FROM A DECISION THEREON TO BE BROUGHT TO THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS. — An action involving a disputed assessment for internal revenue taxes falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (Sec. 7[1], Rep. Act 1125; Blaquera v. Rodriguez, L-11295, March 29, 1958). It is in that forum to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance where the taxpayer can ventilate his or her defense against the assessment.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; 30-DAY PERIOD TO COMMENCE FROM DATE OF RECEIPT OF COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE’S DECISION. — On November 17, 1959 Lilia Yusay disputed the legality of the assessment of February 13, 1958. On March 14, 1960, Lilia Yusay received the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on a disputed assessment. On April 13, 1960 she filed her petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals. HELD: The appeal was seasonably interposed pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act 1125. We already ruled in St. Stephen’s Association v. Collector of Internal Revenue (L-11238, August 21, 1958), that the counting of the thirty days within which to institute an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals should commence from the date of receipt of the decision of the Commissioner on the disputed assessment, not from the date the assessment was issued. Accordingly, the thirty-day period should begin running from March 14, 1960, the date Lilia Yusay received the appealable decision. From said date to April 13, 1960, when she filed her appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals, is exactly thirty days. Hence, the appeal was timely.

3. ID.; ID.; PROBATE COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE THE SAME. — The settlement court is of limited jurisdiction. And under the Rules (Rules 74-92, now Rules 73-91, Rules of Court), its authority relates only to matters of estates and probate of wills of deceased persons. Said Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on questions of disputed tax assessments.

4. ID.; TAX RETURNS; FRAUD IN THE MAKING THEREOF MUST BE PROVED. — Fraud is a question of fact. The circumstances constituting it must be alleged and proved in the court below. And the finding of said court as to its existence and non-existence is final unless clearly shown to be erroneous. (Perez v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-9738, May 31, 1957). As the court a quo found that no fraud was alleged and proved therein, we see no reason to entertain the Commissioner’s assertion that the return was fraudulent.

5. ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW. — A return need not be complete in all particulars. It is sufficient if it complies substantially with the law. There is substantial compliance (1) when the return is made in good faith and is not false or fraudulent; (2) when it covers the entire period involved; and (3) when it contains information as to the various items of income, deduction and credit with such definiteness as to permit the computation and assessment of the tax. (Jacob Mertens, Jr., The Law of Federal Income Taxation, 1958 ed., Vol. 10, Section 57.13.)

6. ID.; ID.; ESTATE AND INHERITANCE TAX RETURN IN CASE AT BAR INSUFFICIENT. — Tax return filed by Jose S. Yusay was substantially defective. First, it was incomplete. It declared only ninety-three parcels of land representing about 400 hectares and left out ninety- two parcels covering 503 hectares. Said huge under declaration could not have been the result of an oversight or mistake. Second, the return mentioned no heir. Thus, no inheritance tax could be assessed. As a matter of law, on the basis of the return, there would be no occasion for the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes.

7. ID.; ID.; RETURNS MADE ON THE WRONG FORM; PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN. — Where the return was made on the wrong form, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the filing thereof did not start the running of the period of limitations. The return filed in this case was so deficient, that it prevented the Commissioner from computing the taxes due on the estate. It was as though no return was made. The Commissioner had to determine and assess the taxes on data obtained, not from the return, but from other sources. We therefore hold the view that the return in question was no return at all as required in Section 93 of the Tax Code. If the taxpayer failed to observe the law, Section 332 of the National Internal Revenue Code which grants the Commissioner 10 years period within which to bring an action for tax collection applies. As stated, the Commissioner came to know of the identity of the heirs on September 24, 1953 and the huge under declaration in the gross estate on July 12, 1957. From the latter date, Section 94 of the Tax Code obligated him to make a return or amend one already filed based on his own knowledge and information obtained through testimony or otherwise, and subsequently to assess thereon the taxes due. The running of the period of limitations under Section 332(a) of the Tax Code should therefore be reckoned from said date. From July 12, 1957 to February 13, 1958, the date of the assessment now in dispute, less than ten years have elapsed. Hence, prescription did not abate the Commissioner’s right to issue said assessment.

8. ID.; ID.; TAXPAYER’S WILLINGNESS TO PAY NO BAR TO RAISE DEFENSES AGAINST THE TAX LEGALITY. — Commissioner contends that Lilia Yusay is estopped from raising the defense of prescription because she failed to raise the same in her answer to the motion for allowance of claim and for the payment of taxes filed in the settlement court. Held: The Court of First Instance acting as a settlement court is not the proper tribunal to pass upon such defense, therefore it would be futile to raise it therein. Moreover, the Tax Code does not bar the right to contest the legality of the tax after a taxpayer pays it. Under Section 306 thereof, he can pay the tax and claim a refund therefor. A fortiori his willingness to pay the tax is no waiver to raise defenses against the tax’s legality.


D E C I S I O N


BENGZON, J.P., J.:


Matias Yusay, a resident of Pototan, Iloilo, died intestate on May 13, 1948, leaving two heirs, namely, Jose S. Yusay, a legitimate child, and Lilia Yusay Gonzales, an acknowledged natural child. Intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Special Proceedings No. 459). Jose S. Yusay was therein appointed administrator.

On May 11, 1949 Jose S. Yusay filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue an estate and inheritance tax return declaring therein the following properties:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Personal properties:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Palay P6,444.00

Carabaos 1,000.00 P7,444.00

Real properties:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Capital, 74)

parcels)

Conjugal 19)

parcels)

assessed at P179,760.00

—————

Total gross estate P187,204.00

—————

The return mentioned no heir.

Upon investigation however the Bureau of Internal Revenue found the following properties:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Personal properties:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Palay P6,444.00

Carabaos 1,500.00

Packard Automobile 2,000.00

2 Aparadors 500.00 P10,444.00

————

Real properties:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Capital, 25 parcels

assessed P 87,715.32

1/2 of Conjugal, 130

parcels assessed at P121,425.00 P209,140.32

————— —————

Total P219,584.32

—————

The fair market value of the real properties was computed by increasing the assessed value by forty percent.

Based on the above findings, the Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed on October 29, 1953 estate and inheritance taxes in the sums of P6,849.78 and P16,970.63, respectively.

On January 25, 1955 the Bureau of Internal Revenue increased the assessment to P8,225.89 as estate tax and P22,117.10 as inheritance tax plus delinquency interest and demanded payment thereof on or before February 28, 1955. Meanwhile, on February 16, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo required Jose S. Yusay to show proof of payment of said estate and inheritance taxes.

On March 3, 1955 Jose S. Yusay requested an extension of time within which to pay the tax. He posted a surety bond to guarantee payment of the taxes in question within one year. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue however denied the request. Then he issued a warrant of distraint and levy which he transmitted to the Municipal Treasurer of Pototan for execution. This warrant was not enforced because all the personal properties subject to distraint were located in Iloilo City.

On May 20, 1955 the Provincial Treasurer of Iloilo requested the BIR Provincial Revenue Officer to furnish him copies of the assessment notices to support a motion for payment of taxes which the Provincial Fiscal would file in Special Proceedings No. 459 before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The papers requested were sent by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Provincial Revenue Officer of Iloilo to be transmitted to the Provincial Treasurer. The records do not however show whether the Provincial Fiscal filed a claim with the Court of First Instance for the taxes due.

On May 30, 1956 the commissioner appointed by the Court of First Instance for the purpose, submitted a recommended project of partition which listed the following properties:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Personal properties:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Buick Sedan P 8,100.00

Packard car 2,000.00

Aparadors 500.00

Cash in Bank (PNB) 8,858.46

Palay 6,444.00

Carabaos 1,500.00 P27,402.46

————

Real properties:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Land, 174 parcels

assessed at P324,797.21

Buildings 4,500.00 P329,297.21

———— ————

Total P356,699.67

More than a year later particularly on July 12, 1957, an agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue apprised the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of the existence of said recommended project of partition. Whereupon, the Internal Revenue Commissioner caused the estate of Matias Yusay to be reinvestigated for estate and inheritance tax liability. Accordingly, on February 13, 1958 he issued the following assessment:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Estate tax P16,246.04

5% surcharge 411.29

Delinquency interest 11,868.90

Compromise

No notice of death P15.00

Late payment 40.00 55.00

——— ————

Total P28,581.23

————

Inheritance Tax P38,178.12

5% surcharge 1,105.86

Delinquency interest 28,808.75

Compromise for late payment 50.00

————

Total P69,142.73

————

Total estate and inheritance taxes P97,723.96

————

Like in previous assessments, the fail market value of the real properties was arrived at by adding 40% to the assessed value.

In view of the demise of Jose S. Yusay, said assessment was sent to his widow, Mrs. Florencia Piccio Vda. de Yusay, who succeeded him in the administration of the estate of Matias Yusay.

No payment having been made despite repeated demands, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed a proof of claim for the estate and inheritance taxes due and a motion for its allowance with the settlement court invoking priority of lien pursuant to Section 315 of the Tax Code.

On June 1, 1959, Lilia Yusay, through her counsel, Ramon Gonzalez, filed an answer to the proof of claim alleging non-receipt of the assessment of February 13, 1958, the existence of two administrators, namely, Florencia Piccio Vda. de Yusay who administered two-thirds of the estate, and Lilia Yusay, who administered the remaining one-third, and her willingness to pay the taxes corresponding to her share, and praying for deferment of the resolution on the motion for the payment of taxes until after a new assessment corresponding to her share was issued.

On November 17, 1959 Lilia Yusay disputed the legality of the assessment dated February 13, 1958. She claimed that the right to make the same had prescribed inasmuch as more than five years had elapsed since the filing of the estate and inheritance tax return on May 11, 1949. She therefore requested that the assessment be declared invalid and without force and effect. This request was rejected by the Commissioner in his letter dated January 20, 1960, received by Lilia Yusay on March 14, 1960, for the reasons, namely, (1) that the right to assess the taxes in question has not been lost by prescription since the return which did not name the heirs cannot be considered a true and complete return sufficient to start the running of the period of limitations of five years under Section 331 of the Tax Code and pursuant to Section 332 of the same Code he has ten years within which to make the assessment counted from the discovery on September 24, 1953 of the identity of the heirs; and (2) that the estate’s administrator waived the defense of prescription when he filed a surety bond on March 3, 1955 to guarantee payment of the taxes in question and when he requested postponement of the payment of the taxes pending determination of who the heirs are by the settlement court.

On April 13, 1960 Lilia Yusay filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals assailing the legality of the assessment dated February 13, 1958. After hearing the parties, said court declared the right of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to assess the estate and inheritance taxes in question to have prescribed and rendered the following judgment:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent assessing against the estate of the late Matias Yusay estate and inheritance taxes is hereby reversed. No. costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue appealed to this Court and raises the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Was the petition for review filed in the Court of Tax Appeals within the 30-day period provided for in Section 11 of Republic Act 1125?

2. Could the Court of Tax Appeals take cognizance of Lilia Yusay’s appeal despite the pendency of the "Proof of Claim" and "Motion for Allowance of Claim and for an Order of Payment of Taxes" filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in Special Proceedings No. 459 before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo?

3. Has the right of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to assess the estate and inheritance taxes in question prescribed?

On November 17, 1959 Lilia Yusay disputed the legality of the assessment of February 13, 1958. On March 14, 1960 she received the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the disputed assessment. On April 13, 1960 she filed her petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals. Said Court correctly held that the appeal was seasonably interposed pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act 1125. We already ruled in St. Stephen’s Association v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 1 that the counting of the thirty days within which to institute an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals should commence from the date of receipt of the decision of the Commissioner on the disputed assessment, not from the date the assessment was issued.

Accordingly, the thirty-day period should begin running from March 14, 1960, the date Lilia Yusay received the appealable decision. From said date to April 13, 1960, when she filed her appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals, is exactly thirty days. Hence, the appeal was timely.

Next, the Commissioner attacks the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals to take cognizance of Lilia Yusay’s appeal on the ground of lis pendens. He maintains that the pendency of his motion for allowance of claim and for order of payment of taxes in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo would preclude the Court of Tax Appeals from acquiring jurisdiction over Lilia Yusay’s Appeal. This contention lacks merit.

Lilia Yusay’s cause seeks to resist the legality of the assessment in question. Should she maintain it in the settlement court or should she elevate her cause to the Court of Tax Appeals? We say, she acted correctly by appealing to the latter court. An action involving a disputed assessment for internal revenue taxes falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. 2 It is in that forum, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance, 3 where she could ventilate her defenses against the assessment.

Moreover, the settlement court, where the Commissioner would wish Lilia Yusay to contest the assessment is of limited jurisdiction. And under the Rules, 4 its authority relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of estates and probate of wills of deceased persons. 5 Said court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the contentions in question, which — assuming they do not come exclusively under the Tax Court’s cognizance — must be submitted to the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general Jurisdiction. 6

We now come to the issue of prescription. Lilia Yusay claims that since the latest assessment was issued only on February 13, 1958 or eight years, nine months and two days from the filing of the estate and inheritance tax return, the Commissioner’s right to make it has expired. She would rest her stand on Section 331 of the Tax Code which limits the right of the Commissioner to assess the tax within five years from the filing of the return.

The Commissioner claims that fraud attended the filing of the return; that this being so, Section 332(a) of the Tax Code would apply. 7 It may be well to note that the assessment letter itself (Exhibit 22) did not impute fraud in the return with intent to evade payment of the tax. Precisely, no surcharge for fraud was imposed. In his answer to the petition for review filed by Lilia Yusay in the Court of Tax Appeals, the Commissioner alleged no fraud. Instead, he broached the insufficiency of the return as barring the commencement of the running of the statute of limitations. He raised the point of fraud for the first time in the proceedings, only in his memorandum filed with the Tax Court subsequent to resting his case. Said Court rejected the plea of fraud for lack of allegation and proof, and ruled that the return, although not accurate, was sufficient to start the period of prescription.

Fraud is a question of fact. 8 The circumstances constituting it must be alleged and proved in the court below. 9 And the finding of said court as to its existence and nonexistence is final unless clearly shown to be erroneous. 10 As the court a quo found that no fraud was alleged and proved therein, we see no reason to entertain the Commissioner’s assertion that the return was fraudulent.

The conclusion, however, that the return filed by Jose S. Yusay was sufficient to commence the running of the prescriptive period, under Section 331 of the Tax Code rests on no solid ground.

Paragraph (a) of Section 93 of the Tax Code lists the requirements of a valid return. It states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) Requirements. — In all cases of inheritance or transfers subject to either the estate tax or the inheritance tax, or both, or where, though exempt from both taxes, the gross value of the estate exceeds three thousand pesos, the executor, administrator, or anyone of the heirs, as the case may be, shall file a return under oath in duplicate, setting forth (1) the value of the gross estate of the decedent at the time of his death, or, in case of a nonresident not a citizen of the Philippines, or that part of his gross estate situated in the Philippines; (2) the deductions allowed from gross estate in determining net estate as defined in section eighty-nine; (3) such part of such information as may at the time be ascertainable and such supplemental data as may be necessary to establish the correct taxes."cralaw virtua1aw library

A return need not be complete in all particulars. It is sufficient if it complies substantially with the law. There is substantial compliance (1) when the return is made in good faith and is not false or fraudulent; (2) when it covers the entire period involved; and (3) when it contains information as to the various items of income, deduction and credit with such definiteness as to permit the computation and assessment of the tax. 11

There is no question that the estate and inheritance tax return filed by Jose S. Yusay was substantially defective.

First, it was incomplete. It declared only ninety-three parcels of land representing about 400 hectares and left out ninety-two parcels covering 503 hectares. Said huge under declaration could not have been the result of an oversight or mistake. As found in L-11378, supra note 7, Jose S. Yusay very well knew of the existence of the omitted properties. Perhaps his motive in under declaring the inventory of properties attached to the return was to deprive Lilia Yusay from inheriting her legal share in the hereditary estate, but certainly not because he honestly believed that they did not form part of the gross estate.

Second, the return mentioned no heir. Thus, no inheritance tax could be assessed. As a matter of law, on the basis of the return, there would be no occasion for the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes. When there is no heir — the return showed none — the intestate estate is escheated to the State. 12 The State taxes not itself.

In a case where the return was made on the wrong form, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the filing thereof did not start the running of the period of limitations. 13 The reason is that the return submitted did not contain the necessary information required in the correct form. In this jurisdiction, however, the Supreme Court refrained from applying the said ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Collector of Internal Revenue v. Central Azucarera de Tarlac, L-11760-61, July 31, 1958, on the ground that the return was complete in itself although inaccurate. To our mind, it would not make much difference where a return is made on the correct form prescribed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue if the data therein required are not supplied by the taxpayer. Just the same, the necessary information for the assessment of the tax would be missing.

The return filed in this case was so deficient that it prevented the Commissioner from computing the taxes due on the estate. It was as though no return was made. The Commissioner had to determine and assess the taxes on data obtained, not from the return, but from other sources. We therefore hold the view that the return in question was no return at all as required in Section 93 of the Tax Code.

The law imposes upon the taxpayer the burden of supplying by the return the information upon which an assessment would be based. 14 His duty complied with, the taxpayer is not bound to do anything more than to wait for the Commissioner to assess the tax. However, he is not required to wait forever. Section 331 of the Tax Code gives the Commissioner five years within which to make his assessment. 15 Except, of course, if the taxpayer failed to observe the law, in which case Section 332 of the same Code grants the Commissioner a longer period. Non-observance consists in filing a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade the tax or in filing no return at all.

Accordingly, for purposes of determining whether or not the Commissioner’s assessment of February 13, 1958 is barred by prescription, Section 332 (a) which is an exception to Section 331 of the Tax Code finds application. 16 We quote Section 332(a):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 332. Exception as to period of limitations of assessment and collection of taxes. — (a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within ten years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission."cralaw virtua1aw library

As stated, the Commissioner came to know of the identity of the heirs on September 24, 1953 and the huge under declaration in the gross estates on July 12, 1957. From the latter date, Section 94 of the Tax Code obligated him to make a return or amend one already filed based on his own knowledge and information obtained through testimony or otherwise, and subsequently to assess thereon the taxes due. The running of the period of limitations under Section 332(a) of the Tax Code should therefore be reckoned from said date for, as aforesaid, it is from that time that the Commissioner was expected by law to make his return and assess the tax due thereon. From July 12, 1957 to February 13, 1958, the date of the assessment now in dispute, less than ten years have elapsed. Hence, prescription did not abate the Commissioner’s right to issue said assessment.

Anent the Commissioner’s contention that Lilia Yusay is estopped from raising the defense of prescription because she failed to raise the same in her answer to the motion for allowance of claim and the payment of taxes filed in the settlement court (Court of First Instance of Iloilo), suffice it to state that it would be unjust to the taxpayer if We were to sustain such a view. The Court of First Instance acting as a settlement court is not the proper tribunal to pass upon such defense, therefore it would be but futile to raise it therein. Moreover, the Tax Code does not bar the right to contest the legality of the tax after a taxpayer pays it. Under Section 306 thereof, he can pay the tax and claim a refund therefore. A fortiori his willingness to pay the tax is no waiver to raise defenses against the tax’s legality.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is set aside and another entered affirming the assessment of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated February 13, 1958. Lilia Yusay Gonzales, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Matias Yusay, is hereby ordered to pay the sums of P16,246.04 and P39,178.12 as estate and inheritance taxes, respectively, plus interest and surcharge for delinquency in accordance with Section 101 of the National Internal Revenue Code, without prejudice to reimbursement from her co-administratrix, Florencia Piccio Vda. de Yusay for the latter’s corresponding tax liability. No costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., took no part.

RESOLUTION

ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

April 24, 1967

BENGZON, J.P., J.:



Respondent Lilia Yusay Gonzales seeks reconsideration of our decision holding her liable for the payment of P97,723.96 as estate and inheritance taxes plus delinquency penalties as administratrix of the intestate estate of Matias Yusay. The grounds raised by her deserve this extended resolution.

Firstly, movant maintains that the issue of whether or not the estate and inheritance tax return filed by Jose Yusay on May 13, 1949 was sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations on assessment, was neither raised in the Court of Tax Appeals nor assigned as error before this Court. The records in the Court of Tax Appeals however show the contrary. Paragraph 2 of the answer filed by the Commission of Internal Revenue states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2. That he likewise admits, as alleged in paragraph 1 thereof having received the letter of the petitioner dated November 27, 1959 (Annex "A" of the Petition for Review), contesting the assessment of estate and inheritance taxes levied against the Intestate Estate of the late Matias Yusay, Special Proceedings No. 459, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, on the ground that the said assessment has already prescribed, but specifically denies the allegations that the assessments have already prescribed, the truth of the matter being that the returns filed on May 11, 1949 cannot be considered as a true, and complete return sufficient to start the running of the period of five (5) years prescribed in Sec. 331 of the Tax Code;"

This point was discussed in the memorandum of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the estate and inheritance tax return filed by Jose S. Yusay (Exhibits B & 1, pp. 14-20, B.I.R. records) the net value of the estate of the deceased was claimed to be P203,354.00 and no inheritance tax was shown as the heirs were not indicated. In the final computation of the estate by an examiner of the respondent, the net estate was found to be worth P410,518.38 (p. 105, B.I.R. records) or about more than twice the original amount declared in the return. In the subsequent investigation of this case, it was also determined that the heirs of the deceased were Jose S. Yusay, a legitimate son, and Lilia Yusay, an acknowledged natural child, (petitioner herein).

"Under the circumstances, we believe the return filed on May 11, 1949 was false or fraudulent in the sense that the value of the properties were under declared and that the said return was also incomplete as the heirs to the estate were not specified. Inasmuch as the respondent was not furnished adequate data upon which to base an assessment, the said return cannot be considered a true and complete return sufficient to start the running of the period of limitations of five (5) years prescribed in Section 331 of the Tax Code."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the lower court the defense of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue against Lilia Yusay Gonzales’ plea of prescription, centered on the insufficiency and fraudulence or falsity of the return filed by Jose Yusay. The Court of Tax Appeals overruled the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Said of Tax Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The provision of Section 332 (a) of the Tax Code cannot be invoked in this case as it was neither alleged in respondent’s answer, nor proved during the hearing that the return was false or fraudulent with intent to evade the payment of tax. Moreover, the failure of respondent to charge fraud and impose the penalty thereof in the assessments made in 1953, 1955 and 1956 is an eloquent demonstration that the filing of petitioner’s transfer tax return was not attended by falsity or fraud with intent to evade tax.

x       x       x


"But respondent urges upon us that the filing of the return did not start the running of the five (5) year period for the reason that the return did not disclose the heirs of the deceased Matias, Yusay, and contained inadequate data regarding the value of the estate. We believe that these mere omissions do not require additional returns for the same. Altho incomplete for being deficient on these matters, the return cannot be regard as a case of failure to file a return where want of good faith and intent to evade the tax on the part of petitioner are not charged. It served as a sufficient notice of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make his assessment and start the running of the period of limitation. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the Commissioner is not confined to the taxpayer’s return in making assessment of the tax, and for his purpose he may secure additional information from other sources. As was done in the case at bar, he sends investigators to examine the taxpayer’s records and other pertinent data. His assessment is based upon the facts uncovered by the investigation (Collector v. Central Azucarera de Tarlac, G.R. Nos. L-11760 and L-11761, July 31, 1958).

"Furthermore, the failure to state the heirs in the return can be attributed to the then unsettled conflict raging before the probate court as to who are the heirs of the estate. Such failure could not have been a deliberate attempt to mislead the government in the assessment of the correct taxes."cralaw virtua1aw library

In his appeal, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assigned as third error of the Court of Tax Appeals the finding that the assessment in question was "made beyond the five-year statutory period provided in Section 332(a) of the Tax Code," and that the right of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to assess the estate and inheritance taxes has already prescribed. To sustain his side, the Commissioner ventilated in his brief, fraud in the filing of the return, absence of certain data from the return which prevented him from assessing thereon the tax due and the pendency in this Court of L-11374 entitled "Intestate Estate of the late Yusay Gonzales" which allegedly had the effect of suspending the running of the period of limitations on assessment.

Clearly, therefore, it would be incorrect to say that the question of whether or not the return filed by Jose Yusay was sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations to assess the corresponding tax, was not raised by the Commissioner in the Court of Tax Appeals and in this Court.

Second. Movant contends that contrary to Our ruling, the return filed by Jose Yusay was sufficient to start the statute of limitations on assessment. Inasmuch as this question was amply discussed in Our decision sought to be reconsidered, and no new argument was advanced, We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the same. There is no reason for any change on Our stand on this point.

Third. Movant insists that since she administers only one-third of the estate of Matias Yusay, she should not be liable for the whole tax. And she suggests that We hold the intestate estate of Matias Yusay liable for said taxes, one-third to be paid by Lilia Yusay Gonzales and two-thirds to be paid by Florencia P. Vda. de Yusay.

The foregoing suggestion to require payment of two-thirds of the totals taxes by Florencia P. Vda. de Yusay is not acceptable, for she (Florencia P. Vda. de Yusay) is not a party in this case.

It should be pointed out that Lilia Yusay Gonzales appealed the whole assessment to the Court of Tax Appeals. Thereupon, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue questioned her legal capacity to institute the appeal on the ground that she administered only one- third of the estate of Matias Yusay. In opposition, she espoused the view, which was sustained by the Tax Court, that in co-administration, the administratrices are regarded as one person and the acts of one of them in relation to the regular administration of the estate are deemed to be the acts of all; hence, each administratrix can represent the whole estate. In advancing such proposition, Lilia Yusay Gonzales represented the whole estate and hoped to benefit from the favorable outcome of the case. For the same reason that she represented her co- administratrix and the whole estate of Matias Yusay, she risked being ordered to pay the whole assessment, should the assessment be sustained.

Her change of stand adopted in the motion for reconsideration to the effect that she should be made liable for only one-third of the total tax, would negate her aforesaid proposition before the Court of Tax Appeals. She is now estopped from denying liability for the whole tax.

At any rate, estate and inheritance taxes are satisfied from the estate and are to be paid by the executor or administrator. 1 Where there are two or more executors, all of them are severally liable for the payment of the estate tax. 2 The inheritance tax, although charged against the account of each beneficiary, should be paid by the executor or administrator. 3 Failure to pay the estate and inheritance taxes before distribution of the estate would subject the executor or administrator to criminal liability under Section 107(c) of the Tax Code.

It is immaterial therefore that Lilia Yusay Gonzales administers only one-third of the estate and will receive as her share only said portion, for her right to the estate comes after taxes. 4 As an administratrix, she is liable for the entire estate tax. As an heir, she is liable for the entire inheritance tax although her liability would not exceed the amount of her share in the estate. 5 The entire inheritance tax which amounts to P39,178.12 excluding penalties is obviously much less than her distributive share.

Motion for reconsideration denied.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., did not take part.

Endnotes:



1. L-11238, August 21, 1958. See also Baguio Country Club Corporation v. Collector of Internal Revenue, Et Al., L-11419, April 22, 1959.

2. Sec. 7(1), Rep. Act 1125; Blaquera v. Rodriguez, L-11295, March 29, 1958.

3. Castro v. Blaquera, L-8429, February 28, 1957, 53 Off. Gaz. 2135; Ledesma v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-11343, January 29, 1958, 55 Off. Gaz. 2883.

4. Rules 74-92, Now Rules 73-91, Rules of Court.

5. Adapon v. Naralit, 69 Phil. 383, 387.

6. Guzman v. Anog and Anog, 37 Phil. 62.

7. Brief for Petitioner, p. 26.

8. Collector of Internal Revenue v. Bautista, L-12250 & L-12259, May 27, 1959.

9. Gutierrez v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-9738 & L-9771, May 31, 1957.

10. Perez v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-9738, May 31, 1957.

11. Jacob Mertens, Jr., The Law of Federal Income Taxation, 1958 ed., Vol. 10, Section 57.13.

12. Articles 1011-1014, Civil Code; Rules 91, Rules of Court.

13. Florsheim Brothers Dry-Goods Company, Ltd. v. United States, 280 US 453, 74 L. ed. 542. See also Commissioner v. Lana-Wells Co., 321 US 219, 88 L. ed. 684; Rockland &: Rockport Lime Corporation v. Ham, 38 F. 2d. 239 (D.C.S.D. Main, 1930); Dubuque Packing Co. v. US, 126 F. Supp. 796 (D.C.N.D. Iowa, 1954).

14. FIorsheim Brothers Dry-Goods Company, Ltd. v. United States, 280 U.S. 453, 74 L. ed. 542, 547.

15. Republic of the Philippines v. Lim De Yu, L-17438, April 30, 1964.

16. Taligaman Lumber Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, L- 15717, March 31, 1962: Tan Tiong Bio, Et Al., v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15778, April 23, 1962.

BENGZON, J.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Section 95 (a) (1), Tax Code.

2. Baldwin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 94 F. 2d 355, 20 AFTER 940.

3. Jose Arañas, Annotation and Jurisprudence on the National Internal Revenue Code, As Amended, Second Edition, 1963, Vol. I, p. 630.

4. Section 105, Tax Code.

5. Section 95(c), Tax Code.




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November-1966 Jurisprudence                 

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  • G.R. No. L-18281 November 22, 1966 IN RE: TSE VIW v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL.

  • G.R. No. L-21270 November 22, 1966 PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MANUEL DADIS

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  • G.R. No. L-19716 November 23, 1966 HERMINIGILDO GUEVARA v. JOSE M. SANTOS

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  • G.R. No. L-19051 November 23, 1966 A. D. SANTOS, INC. v. ZOSIMO DABOCOL

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  • G.R. No. L-22553 November 24, 1966 PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. URBANO DAMASO

  • G.R. No. L-18500 November 24, 1966 ARSENIO DE LA PAZ, ET AL. v. MARIO F. GARCIA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-22102 November 24, 1966 JUAN PARANPAN v. PERFECTO B. QUERUBIN, ET AL.

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  • G.R. No. L-19633 November 28, 1966 PEOPLE OF THE PHIL., ET AL. v. EULOGIO MENCIAS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-22000 November 29, 1966 ESTELITA BERNABE v. ANDRES BOLINAS, JR., ET AL.

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  • G.R. No. L-19667 November 29, 1966 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. AMERICAN RUBBER COMPANY, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-20813 November 29, 1966 IN RE: JACINTO UY TIAN HUA, JR. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL.

  • G.R. No. L-20814 November 29, 1966 IN RE: CARMEN DY v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL.

  • G.R. No. L-21108 November 29, 1966 REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v. LEONOR DE LA RAMA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-24563 November 29, 1966 MILAGROS PACHECO RIVERA v. ARSENIO SANTOS

  • G.R. No. L-21352 November 29, 1966 ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS v. AUDITOR GENERAL, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-21582 November 29, 1966 TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC., ET AL. v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-21917 November 29, 1966 CARLOS M. GURREA v. MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA

  • G.R. No. L-22288 November 29, 1966 ASUNCION ABORDO, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-22526 November 29, 1966 PEDRO PACIS v. ALBERTO V. AVERIA, ET AL.