July 1967 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-26959 July 21, 1967 - OSCAR V. CO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26959. July 21, 1967.]
OSCAR V. CO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil Service and CECILIO O. ESTOESTA, as Election Registrar of the Commission on Elections, Respondents.
Romeo D. Ballesil and Filemon A. Asperin for Petitioner.
Cecilio O. Estoesta for and in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Antonio Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General F .C . Zaballero and Solicitor General R.L. Pronove, Jr. for Commission on Elections Et. Al.
SYLLABUS
1. PUBLIC OFFICERS; APPOINTMENTS; SECURITY OF TENURE NOT AVAILABLE WHERE APPOINTEE IS MERELY ASSIGNED, NOT APPOINTED, TO PARTICULAR STATION; CASE AT BAR. — The rule which prescribes transfers without consent as anathema to the security of tenure, is predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station (Miclat v. Ganaden, Et Al., 108 Phil. 439; Jaro v. Valencia, Et Al., L-18352, August 30, 1963). Since in the case before us, the appointment relied upon did not specifically state the particular station to which the appointee is appointed, and that he is merely assigned to a specific place by means of a subsequent separate directive or assignment, we reject the theory that he acquired any vested right to the place to which he was thus detailed so as to entitle him to the protection of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution.
2. ID.; ID. EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT AND ITS BENEFITS. — Having accepted said appointment as it is and having reaped benefits therefrom, he cannot now be heard to impugn its validity. Besides, whichever way the verdict on the question of validity may go, petitioner will profit nothing by it. Were we do uphold said appointment, petitioner’s cause will necessarily fail because the same involves not an appointment to a particular station, but a mere assignment to a certain place in the interest of the service. Upon the other hand, striking down said appointment as void would virtually pull the rug from under the petitioner’s feet. For, a void appointment confers no rights whatsoever except, perhaps, those recognized under the de facto doctrine, but definitely never so far as to entitle the incumbent to take shelter under the aegis of the guarantee of security of tenure. That the respondent Commission may have erred in extending the defectively formulated appointments relied upon is of no moment. The mistake, acquiescence and tolerance of the proper officials resulting in the non-observance of legal requirements do not bestow upon petitioner any right to the position in question or to the guarantee provided by law (Ibañez, Et. Al. v. Commission on Elections, L-26558, April 27, 1967).
2. ID.; ID. EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT AND ITS BENEFITS. — Having accepted said appointment as it is and having reaped benefits therefrom, he cannot now be heard to impugn its validity. Besides, whichever way the verdict on the question of validity may go, petitioner will profit nothing by it. Were we do uphold said appointment, petitioner’s cause will necessarily fail because the same involves not an appointment to a particular station, but a mere assignment to a certain place in the interest of the service. Upon the other hand, striking down said appointment as void would virtually pull the rug from under the petitioner’s feet. For, a void appointment confers no rights whatsoever except, perhaps, those recognized under the de facto doctrine, but definitely never so far as to entitle the incumbent to take shelter under the aegis of the guarantee of security of tenure. That the respondent Commission may have erred in extending the defectively formulated appointments relied upon is of no moment. The mistake, acquiescence and tolerance of the proper officials resulting in the non-observance of legal requirements do not bestow upon petitioner any right to the position in question or to the guarantee provided by law (Ibañez, Et. Al. v. Commission on Elections, L-26558, April 27, 1967).
D E C I S I O N
CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto, with prayer for preliminary injunction.
Main protagonists are the petitioner Oscar V. Co and the respondent Cecilio O. Estoesta, both election registrar-appointees of the respondent Commission on Elections (hereinafter called COMELEC), in reference to the office of Municipal election registrar for Agoo, La Union, to which the petitioner claims to be entitled and from which he prays that the respondent be excluded.
The facts are indubitable. On November 2, 1964 the petitioner was extended by the COMELEC a provisional appointment as "Election Registrar of the Commission on Elections," without statement of any specific official station. On November 9, 1964, per a telegram- directive, he was "directed to report and assume duty as election registrar for the municipality of Agoo, province of La Union," which he did. He served in that capacity until September 6, 1966 when he was extended a permanent appointment as "Election Registrar in the Commission on Elections for Sabangan, Mountain Province," and directed to immediately proceed to his new station. On the following day, September 7, 1966, the respondent Cecilio O. Estoesta was also appointed "Election Registrar in the Commission on Elections for Agoo, La Union," which appointment was duly certified by the Civil Service Commission and accepted by the said Respondent. Viewing these moves as violative of civil service rules and regulations and as infringing upon his right to security of tenure as election registrar of Agoo, La Union, the petitioner declined the preferred appointment and forthwith moved the COMELEC to reconsider its action in the premises. Thereafter, he came to this Court on the present recourse.
The only issue to be resolved here is whether, under the circumstances at bar, the appointment of the petitioner as election registrar for Sabangan, Mountain Province, trenches upon his right to security of tenure as election registrar of Agoo, La Union. This question has since been set at rest in Ibañez, Et. Al. v. Commission on Elections, Et Al., G.R. L-26558, April 27, 1967, which arose from factual circumstances similar to those in the case at bar. We there reaffirmed our adherence to the view that "the rule which prescribes transfers without consent as anathema to the security of tenure is predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station (Miclat v. Ganaden, Et Al., 108 Phil. 439; Jaro v. Valencia, Et Al., G.R. L-18352, August 30, 1963)." Since there, as in the case now before us, the appointments relied upon did not specifically state the particular stations to which the appointees were appointed, and that the said appointees were merely assigned to specific places by means of subsequent separate directives or assignments, we rejected the theory that they acquired any vested right to the places to which they were thus detailed as to entitle them to the protection of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution. On this point, we there made the pronouncement that —
". . . the prospective appointees were entitled only to such security of tenure as the appointment papers concerned actually conferred — not in that of any place to which they may have been subsequently assigned . . . As things stand, in default of any particular station stated in their respective appointments, no security of tenure can be asserted by the petitioners on the basis of the mere assignments which were given to them. A contrary rule will erase altogether the demarcation line we have repeatedly drawn between appointment and assignment as two distinct concepts in the law of public officers."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Ibañez v. COMELEC, supra, we also made the following observations which we consider pertinent to the case at bar:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Nor is there necessity to dwell at length on the validity of the appointments extended to the petitioners which do not state any specific station contrary to the spirit and expressed mandate of the Permanent Registration Act. At the very least, having accepted said appointments as they are and having reaped benefits therefrom, they cannot now be heard to impugn their validity. Besides, whichever way the verdict on the question of validity may go, the petitioners will profit nothing by it. Were we to uphold said appointments, the petitioners’ cause will necessarily fail because, as aforesaid, the same involves not an appointment to a particular station but a mere assignment to a certain place in the interest of the service. Upon the other hand, striking down said appointments as void would virtually pull the rug from under the petitioners’ feet. For, a void appointment confers no rights whatsoever except, perhaps, those recognized under the de facto doctrine, but definitely never so far as to entitle the incumbent to take shelter under the aegis of the guarantee of security of tenure. That the respondent Commission may have erred in extending the defectively formulated appointments relied upon is of no moment. The mistake, acquiescence and tolerance of the proper officials resulting in the non-observance of legal requirements do not bestow upon the petitioners any right to the positions in question or to the guarantees provided by law."cralaw virtua1aw library
No valid reason has been advanced why the foregoing ratiocination should not similarly control the present controversy.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby dismissed, at petitioner’s cost.
Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., did not take part.
Main protagonists are the petitioner Oscar V. Co and the respondent Cecilio O. Estoesta, both election registrar-appointees of the respondent Commission on Elections (hereinafter called COMELEC), in reference to the office of Municipal election registrar for Agoo, La Union, to which the petitioner claims to be entitled and from which he prays that the respondent be excluded.
The facts are indubitable. On November 2, 1964 the petitioner was extended by the COMELEC a provisional appointment as "Election Registrar of the Commission on Elections," without statement of any specific official station. On November 9, 1964, per a telegram- directive, he was "directed to report and assume duty as election registrar for the municipality of Agoo, province of La Union," which he did. He served in that capacity until September 6, 1966 when he was extended a permanent appointment as "Election Registrar in the Commission on Elections for Sabangan, Mountain Province," and directed to immediately proceed to his new station. On the following day, September 7, 1966, the respondent Cecilio O. Estoesta was also appointed "Election Registrar in the Commission on Elections for Agoo, La Union," which appointment was duly certified by the Civil Service Commission and accepted by the said Respondent. Viewing these moves as violative of civil service rules and regulations and as infringing upon his right to security of tenure as election registrar of Agoo, La Union, the petitioner declined the preferred appointment and forthwith moved the COMELEC to reconsider its action in the premises. Thereafter, he came to this Court on the present recourse.
The only issue to be resolved here is whether, under the circumstances at bar, the appointment of the petitioner as election registrar for Sabangan, Mountain Province, trenches upon his right to security of tenure as election registrar of Agoo, La Union. This question has since been set at rest in Ibañez, Et. Al. v. Commission on Elections, Et Al., G.R. L-26558, April 27, 1967, which arose from factual circumstances similar to those in the case at bar. We there reaffirmed our adherence to the view that "the rule which prescribes transfers without consent as anathema to the security of tenure is predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station (Miclat v. Ganaden, Et Al., 108 Phil. 439; Jaro v. Valencia, Et Al., G.R. L-18352, August 30, 1963)." Since there, as in the case now before us, the appointments relied upon did not specifically state the particular stations to which the appointees were appointed, and that the said appointees were merely assigned to specific places by means of subsequent separate directives or assignments, we rejected the theory that they acquired any vested right to the places to which they were thus detailed as to entitle them to the protection of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution. On this point, we there made the pronouncement that —
". . . the prospective appointees were entitled only to such security of tenure as the appointment papers concerned actually conferred — not in that of any place to which they may have been subsequently assigned . . . As things stand, in default of any particular station stated in their respective appointments, no security of tenure can be asserted by the petitioners on the basis of the mere assignments which were given to them. A contrary rule will erase altogether the demarcation line we have repeatedly drawn between appointment and assignment as two distinct concepts in the law of public officers."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Ibañez v. COMELEC, supra, we also made the following observations which we consider pertinent to the case at bar:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Nor is there necessity to dwell at length on the validity of the appointments extended to the petitioners which do not state any specific station contrary to the spirit and expressed mandate of the Permanent Registration Act. At the very least, having accepted said appointments as they are and having reaped benefits therefrom, they cannot now be heard to impugn their validity. Besides, whichever way the verdict on the question of validity may go, the petitioners will profit nothing by it. Were we to uphold said appointments, the petitioners’ cause will necessarily fail because, as aforesaid, the same involves not an appointment to a particular station but a mere assignment to a certain place in the interest of the service. Upon the other hand, striking down said appointments as void would virtually pull the rug from under the petitioners’ feet. For, a void appointment confers no rights whatsoever except, perhaps, those recognized under the de facto doctrine, but definitely never so far as to entitle the incumbent to take shelter under the aegis of the guarantee of security of tenure. That the respondent Commission may have erred in extending the defectively formulated appointments relied upon is of no moment. The mistake, acquiescence and tolerance of the proper officials resulting in the non-observance of legal requirements do not bestow upon the petitioners any right to the positions in question or to the guarantees provided by law."cralaw virtua1aw library
No valid reason has been advanced why the foregoing ratiocination should not similarly control the present controversy.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby dismissed, at petitioner’s cost.
Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., did not take part.
