March 1968 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1968 > March 1968 Decisions >
G.R. No. L-25676 March 27, 1968 - ROSENDA A. DE NUQUI, ET AL. v. ILDEFONSO D. YAP:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-25676. March 27, 1968.]
ROSENDA A. DE NUQUI, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ILDEFONSO D. YAP, Defendant-Appellant.
Eligio C. Dajao and George Laurie Siton for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Conol, Conol & Conol, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENT; MODIFICATION; CONCLUSIVENESS; CASE AT BAR. — Where the lower court’s order of May 14, 1960 expressly amending and modifying its judgment rendered on March 31, 1960 by directing the appellant to pay legal interest starting July 31, 1956 had not been challenged before the appeal was perfected, and appellant failed again on appeal to raise any question regarding the same despite the fact that said order of May 31, 1960 was included in the record on appeal, the same can no longer be challenged for it was made before the appeal was perfected.
2. ID.; ID.; TIME TO MAKE MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT; COURT NEED NOT FULLY REVOKE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT; CASE AT BAR. — There is no rule which requires that when a court partially reconsiders its judgment, which is not yet final or subject of a perfected appeal, the former judgment must first be totally revoked and a new judgment be rendered. In Cordovero v. Villaruz, 46 Phil., 473, it was ruled that where a new trial is granted, the former decision must be revoked. In the case at bar, no new trial was granted for none was sought. In sustaining plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider, the lower court therefore did not have to revoke totally its former judgment. In Robles v. Timario, L- 13911, April 28, 1960, the judgment of the lower court cannot be modified by imposing legal interest therein when the judgment had already become final. In this case, the judgment was modified prior to the perfection of the appeal while the lower court still had control over said judgment.
2. ID.; ID.; TIME TO MAKE MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT; COURT NEED NOT FULLY REVOKE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT; CASE AT BAR. — There is no rule which requires that when a court partially reconsiders its judgment, which is not yet final or subject of a perfected appeal, the former judgment must first be totally revoked and a new judgment be rendered. In Cordovero v. Villaruz, 46 Phil., 473, it was ruled that where a new trial is granted, the former decision must be revoked. In the case at bar, no new trial was granted for none was sought. In sustaining plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider, the lower court therefore did not have to revoke totally its former judgment. In Robles v. Timario, L- 13911, April 28, 1960, the judgment of the lower court cannot be modified by imposing legal interest therein when the judgment had already become final. In this case, the judgment was modified prior to the perfection of the appeal while the lower court still had control over said judgment.
D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Appellant Ildefonso Yap was the defendant in Civil Case 1907 filed in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental on July 17, 1956 by plaintiffs Rosenda Nuqui, Sotero Dionisio, Jr., and the spouses Antolin and Erlinda Diaz for the rescission of a contract. This case was tried below jointly with Civil Case No. 1774, which involved the same contract and wherein Yap was also one of the defendants. On March 31, 1960, a joint decision was promulgated. With particular reference to Civil Case 1907, the dispositive portion thereof reads: 1
"In Civil Case No. 1907 only —
"(1) Defendant Ildefonso D. Yap is hereby ordered to restore to the plaintiffs in said case all the buildings and grounds described in the Mutual Agreement together with all the permanent improvements thereon;
"(2) To pay to the plaintiffs therein the amount of P300.00 monthly from July 31, 1956 up to the time he shall have surrendered the properties in question to the plaintiffs therein, plus P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees to plaintiffs Antolin and Erlinda D. Diaz."cralaw virtua1aw library
On May 10, 1960, plaintiffs in both Civil Cases moved for reconsideration requesting that legal interest be imposed on the sums to be paid by defendant Yap. Sustaining partially this motion, the lower court on May 14, 1960 issued an order, the pertinent portion of which recites: 2
"The motion for reconsideration dated May 10, 1960 in the sense that the Court uses its discretion to dispense the paying of interests is partly granted, to the effect that the dispositive part of the decision of this Court is hereby amended with respect to Civil Case. No. 1907 only, in the sense that defendant Yap should pay interests at the legal rate with regard to the payment of the monthly rental of P300.00 from July 31, 1956 until the possession of the property in question therein shall have been fully surrendered to the plaintiffs, plus attorney’s fee in the amount of P1,000.00, to plaintiffs Rosenda A.D. Nuqui, Sotero Dionisio, Jr., Erlinda Dionisio Diaz and Antolin Diaz." (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequently, or on June 25, 1960 to be exact, defendant Yap perfected his intended appeal in both civil cases to the Supreme Court with the approval of the record on appeal. 3 The motion for reconsideration of plaintiffs dated May 10, 1960 and the court order of May 14, 1960 were included in said record on appeal. 4
On February 26, 1965, this Court promulgated its decision 5 in said appeal taken by defendant Yap. The dispositive portion provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the Judgment appealed from is modified by eliminating therefrom the award of attorney’s fees of P1,000.00 in favor of Erlinda D. Diaz and her husband, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1907, and the award of nominal and exemplary damages in Civil Case No. 1774; and making the award of attorney’s fees in the sum of P2,000.00 payable to counsel for the account of the Mindanao Academy, Inc., instead of the plaintiff stockholders. In all other respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs." (Emphasis supplied).
Thereafter, plaintiffs in Civil Case 1907 only filed on July 25, 1965, a motion for the satisfaction of all money judgments against defendant Yap alleging that out of a total award of P42,460.75, 6 defendant had paid only the sum of P32,400.00 thus still leaving an unsatisfied balance of P10,060.75. Over appellant’s opposition, the lower court on September 3, 1965, granted the motion but directed that appellant should only deposit the sum of P1,935.00 as the legal interest on the total amount of rentals. The request for attorney’s fees was denied pursuant to the Supreme Court decision.
Plaintiffs and defendant subsequently moved for reconsideration. The lower court, on October 1, 1965, denied both motions.
Plaintiffs pressed further with a second motion to reconsider praying that appellant be ordered to pay the sum of P8,748.00 representing the legal interests that had accrued since July 31, 1956 pursuant to the court order of May 14, 1960. Over appellant’s opposition again, the lower court on October 21, 1965, granted plaintiff’s motion and ordered appellant to deposit the sum of P8,740.30 as legal interest within three days from notification.
Hence, this direct appeal by appellant Yap questioning the court a quo’s orders of September 3, 1965, October 1, 1965 and October 21, 1965. It is appellant’s principal submission that the judgment in Civil Case 1907 which became final and executory did not provide for payment of legal interest.
The appeal is without merit. Appellant would have this Court overlook and disregard the lower court’s order of May 14, 1960 which expressly amended and modified the judgment rendered on March 31, 1960 by directing the former to pay legal interest starting July 31, 1956. Said court’s authority to modify its judgment is not challenged and it cannot be challenged for the modification was made before the appeal was perfected. In fact, this order of May 14, 1960 was even included in the record on appeal submitted in L-17681-82 but appellant failed to raise any question regarding the same in said case, altho he should have done so. Plaintiffs, as the prevailing parties, could not be expected to raise any question regarding the same.
Appellant would also refer this Court to Cordovero v. Villaruz, 46 Phil. 473 and Robles v. Timario, L-13911, April 28, 1960 in support of the proposition that there was no effective modification of the original judgment since the lower court never set aside nor revoked the same. We know of no rule requiring that when a court partially reconsiders its judgment, which is not yet final or subject of a perfected appeal, the former judgment must first be totally revoked and a new judgment be rendered. Neither are We impressed by the cases cited. In Cordovero v. Villaruz, it was ruled, inter alia, that where a new trial is granted, the former decision must be revoked. In the case at bar, no new trial was granted for none was sought. In sustaining plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider, the lower court therefore did not have to revoke totally its former judgment. In Robles v. Timario, the judgment of the lower court, which inadvertently omitted the imposition of interest, had already become final and it was only in the order of execution that attempt was made to cure the oversight. This Court ruled there that said oversight should have been cured prior to the finality of the judgment. In the case at bar, however, the judgment was modified prior to the perfection of the appeal, and while the lower court still had control over said judgment.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with treble costs to be paid by appellant Yap’s counsel. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L,, Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Castro, J., did not take part.
x x x
"In Civil Case No. 1907 only —
"(1) Defendant Ildefonso D. Yap is hereby ordered to restore to the plaintiffs in said case all the buildings and grounds described in the Mutual Agreement together with all the permanent improvements thereon;
"(2) To pay to the plaintiffs therein the amount of P300.00 monthly from July 31, 1956 up to the time he shall have surrendered the properties in question to the plaintiffs therein, plus P1,000.00 as attorney’s fees to plaintiffs Antolin and Erlinda D. Diaz."cralaw virtua1aw library
x x x
On May 10, 1960, plaintiffs in both Civil Cases moved for reconsideration requesting that legal interest be imposed on the sums to be paid by defendant Yap. Sustaining partially this motion, the lower court on May 14, 1960 issued an order, the pertinent portion of which recites: 2
"The motion for reconsideration dated May 10, 1960 in the sense that the Court uses its discretion to dispense the paying of interests is partly granted, to the effect that the dispositive part of the decision of this Court is hereby amended with respect to Civil Case. No. 1907 only, in the sense that defendant Yap should pay interests at the legal rate with regard to the payment of the monthly rental of P300.00 from July 31, 1956 until the possession of the property in question therein shall have been fully surrendered to the plaintiffs, plus attorney’s fee in the amount of P1,000.00, to plaintiffs Rosenda A.D. Nuqui, Sotero Dionisio, Jr., Erlinda Dionisio Diaz and Antolin Diaz." (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequently, or on June 25, 1960 to be exact, defendant Yap perfected his intended appeal in both civil cases to the Supreme Court with the approval of the record on appeal. 3 The motion for reconsideration of plaintiffs dated May 10, 1960 and the court order of May 14, 1960 were included in said record on appeal. 4
On February 26, 1965, this Court promulgated its decision 5 in said appeal taken by defendant Yap. The dispositive portion provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the Judgment appealed from is modified by eliminating therefrom the award of attorney’s fees of P1,000.00 in favor of Erlinda D. Diaz and her husband, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1907, and the award of nominal and exemplary damages in Civil Case No. 1774; and making the award of attorney’s fees in the sum of P2,000.00 payable to counsel for the account of the Mindanao Academy, Inc., instead of the plaintiff stockholders. In all other respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs." (Emphasis supplied).
Thereafter, plaintiffs in Civil Case 1907 only filed on July 25, 1965, a motion for the satisfaction of all money judgments against defendant Yap alleging that out of a total award of P42,460.75, 6 defendant had paid only the sum of P32,400.00 thus still leaving an unsatisfied balance of P10,060.75. Over appellant’s opposition, the lower court on September 3, 1965, granted the motion but directed that appellant should only deposit the sum of P1,935.00 as the legal interest on the total amount of rentals. The request for attorney’s fees was denied pursuant to the Supreme Court decision.
Plaintiffs and defendant subsequently moved for reconsideration. The lower court, on October 1, 1965, denied both motions.
Plaintiffs pressed further with a second motion to reconsider praying that appellant be ordered to pay the sum of P8,748.00 representing the legal interests that had accrued since July 31, 1956 pursuant to the court order of May 14, 1960. Over appellant’s opposition again, the lower court on October 21, 1965, granted plaintiff’s motion and ordered appellant to deposit the sum of P8,740.30 as legal interest within three days from notification.
Hence, this direct appeal by appellant Yap questioning the court a quo’s orders of September 3, 1965, October 1, 1965 and October 21, 1965. It is appellant’s principal submission that the judgment in Civil Case 1907 which became final and executory did not provide for payment of legal interest.
The appeal is without merit. Appellant would have this Court overlook and disregard the lower court’s order of May 14, 1960 which expressly amended and modified the judgment rendered on March 31, 1960 by directing the former to pay legal interest starting July 31, 1956. Said court’s authority to modify its judgment is not challenged and it cannot be challenged for the modification was made before the appeal was perfected. In fact, this order of May 14, 1960 was even included in the record on appeal submitted in L-17681-82 but appellant failed to raise any question regarding the same in said case, altho he should have done so. Plaintiffs, as the prevailing parties, could not be expected to raise any question regarding the same.
Appellant would also refer this Court to Cordovero v. Villaruz, 46 Phil. 473 and Robles v. Timario, L-13911, April 28, 1960 in support of the proposition that there was no effective modification of the original judgment since the lower court never set aside nor revoked the same. We know of no rule requiring that when a court partially reconsiders its judgment, which is not yet final or subject of a perfected appeal, the former judgment must first be totally revoked and a new judgment be rendered. Neither are We impressed by the cases cited. In Cordovero v. Villaruz, it was ruled, inter alia, that where a new trial is granted, the former decision must be revoked. In the case at bar, no new trial was granted for none was sought. In sustaining plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider, the lower court therefore did not have to revoke totally its former judgment. In Robles v. Timario, the judgment of the lower court, which inadvertently omitted the imposition of interest, had already become final and it was only in the order of execution that attempt was made to cure the oversight. This Court ruled there that said oversight should have been cured prior to the finality of the judgment. In the case at bar, however, the judgment was modified prior to the perfection of the appeal, and while the lower court still had control over said judgment.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with treble costs to be paid by appellant Yap’s counsel. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L,, Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Castro, J., did not take part.
Endnotes:
1. Record on Appeal, pp. 36-37.
2. Record on Appeal, pp. 39-40.
3. See Record on Appeal filed in Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap, L-17681-82, Feb. 26, 1965, p. 143.
4. See, at pp. 141-143.
5. Mindanao Academy, Inc. v. Yap, L-17681-82, Feb. 26, 1965.
6. This is the aggregate of the following items: (1) P32,550, the monthly rental of P300 for 108.5 months; (2) P8,910.75, legal interest from July 31, 1956, until July 15, 1965; and (3) P1,000 as attorney’s fees.
