Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence


Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1969 > June 1969 Decisions > G.R. No. L-24877 June 30, 1969 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. GAUDENCIO MONGADO, ET AL.:




PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-24877. June 30, 1969.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, v. GAUDENCIO MONGADO, JILLY SEGADOR, AND BELESANDE SALAR, Accused.

Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya for plaintiff.

Pacifico B. Tacub for accused.


SYLLABUS


1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND CREDIBILITY; AFFIDAVITS, NEED OF FORMAL OFFER AND ADMISSION OF THE SAME, SECTION 35 OF RULE 132. — Affidavits are generally classed as hearsay evidence; they are objectionable on hearsay grounds, they are not admissible evidence of the facts they narrate. These affidavits must first be formally offered and admitted in evidence before the court may consider their contents. The fundamental rule on this point is found in Section 35, Rule 132, Rules of Court, which provides that" (t)he court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. CRIMINAL LAW; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; PLEA OF GUILTY; ADMISSION OF MATERIAL FACTS ALLEGED IN INFORMATION, EXCEPTIONS. — There is the firmly settled jurisprudential principle that an unqualified plea of guilty constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information including the aggravating circumstances therein stated. Excepted therefrom are conclusions of fact, and mere conjectures. Thus it is, that plea of guilty is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof.

3. ID.; ID.; LACK OF INSTRUCTION; NEED OF PROOF. — Counsel de oficio invokes in mitigation lack of instruction. But lack of instruction should be proved; it cannot be inferred. There is no such proof here. It was not invoked below.

4. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; BASIS THEREFOR. — Deep-rooted in criminal law is the precept that the existence of aggravating circumstances must be based on positive and conclusive proof, not merely on hypothetical facts, no matter how truthful suppositions and presumptions may seem.

5. ID.; ID.; ALEVOSIA; REQUIREMENT AS TO PRESENCE THEREOF AT THE INCEPTION OF THE ATTACK, EXCEPTION. — The general rule is that treachery should normally attend the inception of the attack. But "if a person is first seized and bound, with a view to rendering him incapable of defense, and he is then slain either by the person who reduced him to this helpless state or by another," alevosia is present.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, the second amended information specifically charged that defendants killed Silvino Lincuna "in a treacherous manner . . . that is, the accused Belesande Salar clubbing Silvino Lincuna on the head, Gaudencio Mongado tying him helplessly to a chair with the use of radio antennae and stuffing his mouth with rolls of gauze, and Jilly Segador attacking him with fatal thrusts by means of a sharp-pointed bolo." Such being the case, treachery has been properly appreciated.

7. ID.; ID.; PRESENCE OF IGNOMINY DOUBTFUL IN INSTANT CASE. — Nothing in the information suggests that the rape of Emilia Dalit was perpetrated by the satyr in the presence or with the knowledge of her husband Silvino Lincuna. This act was done after the fatal thrusts were inflicted on Lincuna. Thereafter, the wife was first fatally assaulted and, while still alive and helpless, was ravished. This last averment by itself and without more leaves us under serious doubt as to whether rape did really "add ignominy" to the killing.

8. ID.; ID.; DWELLING CONSIDERED IN INSTANT CASE. — Dwelling was properly included as an aggravating circumstance, although not specifically alleged in the information as such an aggravating circumstance. And this, because from the factual narration in the second amended information, the robbery, the killing and the rape were all perpetrated in the "residence" of the offended parties.

9. ID.; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; RAPE AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE. — Where the crime charged is robbery with homicide and rape, the legal definition of the crime is robbery with homicide punishable under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Penal Code; and the rape committed on the occasion of that crime is considered as aggravating circumstance. Instead of ignominy, therefore, it is the rape itself that aggravates.


D E C I S I O N


PER CURIAM:



Up for automatic review, in this case of robbery with double homicide and rape, is the trial court’s decision imposing the capital penalty upon the accused Gaudencio Mongado, Jilly Segador and Belesande Salar, on a plea of guilty 1 entered into by each of them with the assistance of counsel de oficio, to the second amended information of June 16, 1965, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECOND AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal hereby accuses GAUDENCIO MONGADO, JILLY SEGADOR, BELESANDE SALAR, ANASTACIO CADENAS and ANDRES CAGADAS of the crime of ROBBERY WITH DOUBLE HOMICIDE AND RAPE, committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on or about the 17th day of March, 1965, in the municipality of Mainit, province of Surigao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Gaudencio Mongado, Jilly Segador, Belesande Salar, Anastacio Cadenas and Andres Cagadas with evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, and armed with an unlicensed .22 cal. revolver, a small sharp-pointed bolo, a toy revolver, marked ‘Kit gun’ and a wooden club, with intent to gain, after having gained entrance to the residence of Silvino Lincuna and Emilia Dalit, husband and wife respectively, by abusing the goodwill of the said spouses, the latter being the uncle and aunt respectively of the accused Gaudencio Mongado, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force upon things thru violence as alleged in the third paragraph of this information that is by breaking the aparadors and a trunk where valuables and personal effects were then kept, take, steal and carry away the following articles, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. One (1) shotgun, 12 gauge P250.00 more or less

2. One (1) radio (Kharman) 250.00" ""

3. One (1) radiophono 450.00" ""

4. One (1) ring 75.00" ""

5. One (1) ring 40.00" ""

6. One (1) necklace (chinese gold) 180.00" ""

7. One (1) necklace (gold alloy) 75.00" ""

8. One (1) microphone 90.00" ""

Cash money 300.00" ""

———

P1,710.00

having a total value of P1,710.00, more or less, belonging to the said Silvino Lincuna and Emilia Dalit, as owners, to their ultimate damage and prejudice in the aforementioned amount.

That on the same occasion, in the foregoing manner as charged and pursuant to their conspiracy, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault in a treacherous manner the said spouses, Silvino Lincuna and Emilia Dalit; that is, the accused Belesande Salar clubbing Silvino Lincuna on the head, Gaudencio Mongado tying him helplessly to a chair with the use of radio antennae and stuffing his mouth with rolls of gauze, and Jilly Segador attacking him with fatal thrusts by means of a sharp-pointed bolo, and finally with Belesande Salar, also with the use of the same sharp-pointed bolo, stabbing Emilia Dalit with several fatal thrusts; who as a result thereof suffered the following injuries, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SILVINO LINCUNA.

‘Contusion: 1. Frontal region, left;

2. Orbital region, left;

3. Maxillary region, left;

4. Nasal region.

‘Incised wounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Earlobe, left;

2. Hemathorax, anteriorly, left (4)

(a) 4 inches below midelevicular bone;

3 inches deep

(b) Upper-lateral to nipple

(c) Below nipple

(d) Lateral to nipple’

EMILIA DALIT

‘1. Contusions buccal region with fracture right mandible;

2. Incised wounds

1. Infraclavicular region, left;

2. Mammary region, laterally left;

3. 4 inches below axilla, mid-axillary line, right;

4. Humeral region (2) right;

a. Lateral aspect

b. Medial aspect

5. Mammary region, upper right;

6. Numural region, left;

7. Infrascapular region, left (3);

8. Back right.’

which injuries directly caused the death of the said Silvino Lincuna and Emilia Dalit.

That on the occasion of the said Robbery, with Double Homicide, in the manner as charged in this information and pursuant to their conspiracy, the accused Belesande Salar after having fatally assaulted the wife, Emilia Dalit, and while she was still alive and helpless, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the said Emilia Dalit at the residence referred to where the aforementioned crime was committed.

Contrary to Article 294, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, ignominy, evident premeditation and abuse of confidence, and with an additional aggravating circumstance of recidivism against Gaudencio Mongado for having been previously convicted of the crime for Robbery in Case No. 2470 before this Honorable Court on December 8, 1960 and made to suffer the penalty of not less than 2 years, 4 months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to not more than 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum.

Surigao, Surigao del Norte, June 16, 1965

(SGD.)ILDEFONSO G. MANTILLA

Assistant Provincial Fiscal"

It was on June 28, 1965 when the three accused, together with two others, were arraigned before His Honor, Judge Teofilo B. Buslon of the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte. 2 According to the decision below, during the arraignment, the information was translated to the accused "into the Visayan dialect, the dialect which each of the five accused speaks and understands." The accused Gaudencio Mongado, Jilly Segador and Belesande Salar pleaded guilty. The two others, Anastacio Cadenas and Andres Cagadas, pleaded not guilty. Those who admitted guilt were asked by the court, in the words of the trial judge, "if they understood the consequence of their plea of guilty which is that they would be punished according to law which might be death in the Electric Chair, to which question each of the three accused answered in the affirmative." Thus did the trial court state in its decision that it "is satisfied that when each of the abovenamed accused, GAUDENCIO MONGADO, BELESANDE SALAR and JILLY SEGADOR, entered the plea of guilty, each of them was well aware of its consequences and that each of them did so freely and voluntarily."cralaw virtua1aw library

On July 8, 1965, without taking any evidence, but taking stock of the affidavits of admission of the three accused, as attached to the record, the trial court found that the commission of the crime charged was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery, ignominy, evident premeditation, dwelling and abuse of confidence for all the three accused, and recidivism as regards the accused Gaudencio Mongado (who was a parolee at the time of the commission of this crime), all offset only by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty. The court, accordingly, sentenced the three Gaudencio Mongado, Belesande Salar and Jilly Segador (Anastacio Cadenas and Andres Cagadas were to be tried separately) to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of robbery with double homicide and rape defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victims Silvino Lincuna and Emilia Dalit in the amount of P6,000 each, plus P596.15, 3 the value of the things taken by the accused but not recovered, with 3/5 of the costs. The trial court also directed the return to the heirs of the victims, of a radio receiving set, a radiophono, cash money of P163.85, six pieces of assorted clothes of the victims and other things taken by the accused but recovered; and likewise ordered the deposit with the Philippine Constabulary Provincial Command of Surigao del Norte of the 12 ga. shotgun until it can be bought by any qualified person, the proceeds of which shall be turned over to the heirs of the victims. The homemade revolver, cal. .22, the rounds of ammunitions thereof, the toy gun revolver, the small sharp-pointed bolo, and the wooden club used as instruments of the crime, were ordered forfeited in favor of the government.

On July 15, 1965, the trial court came out with an order directing that the decision disposing of the things recovered and forfeiting to the government all the articles used in the commission of the crime, shall not be implemented until after the case of the remaining two defendants, Andres Cagadas and Anastacio Cadenas, "will have been tried and decided."cralaw virtua1aw library

1. It is clear error on the part of the trial court to consider the affidavits of admission of the three accused attached to the record in appreciating aggravating circumstances against them. Affidavits are generally classed as hearsay evidence; they are objectionable on hearsay grounds; 4 they are not admissible evidence of the facts they narrate. 5 These affidavits must first be formally offered and admitted in evidence before the court may consider their contents. Thus, in People v. Parayno (1968), 24 SCRA 3, 17, affidavits of prosecution witnesses and the record of the preliminary investigation "were offered as exhibits" and "legally before the Court" and were thus properly considered. And again, in People v. Tarrayo, L-26489, April 21, 1969, a capital case, the transcript of stenographic notes taken at the preliminary investigation was received in evidence after the accused pleaded guilty. It was thus also appropriately utilized by the court.

The fundamental rule on this point is found in Section 35, Rule 132, Rules of Court, which provides that" [t]he court, shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." It is the duty of the judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence adduced. 6 Here, the affidavits of admission have not been formally offered, much less admitted, in evidence. They cannot be taken into account.

The result is that solely the factual averments in the second amended information—to which the three accused have pleaded guilty—may be made the basis of any court finding as to the aggravating circumstances.

2. Of importance here is the existence of circumstances in aggravation or in mitigation of the penalty for the crime committed. For, at stake are the lives of the three accused. Deep-rooted in criminal law is the precept that the existence of aggravating circumstances must be based on positive and conclusive proof, not merely on hypothetical facts, no matter how truthful suppositions and presumptions may seem. 7

There is, of course, the firmly settled jurisprudential principle that an unqualified plea of guilty constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information including the aggravating circumstances therein stated. 8 Excepted therefrom are conclusions of fact, 9 and mere conjectures. 10 Thus it is, that a plea of guilty is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense charged in the information, even a capital offense, without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant having himself supplied the necessary proof. 11

Parting from the foregoing premises, we take a look at the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court.

3. Counsel de oficio contends that alevosia may not be considered in aggravation, because here it did not exist at the inception of the attack.

True, the general rule is that treachery should normally attend the inception of the attack. 12 But "if a person is first seized and bound, with a view to rendering him incapable of defense, and he is then slain either by the person who reduced him to this helpless state or by another," alevosia is present. 13 Reason for this is that" [i]n a case of that kind it is obvious that the binding of the victim of the aggression introduces a material change in the conditions of the homicide; and in slaying a person so circumstanced, the author of the crime obviously avails himself of a form or means directly tending to insure the execution of the deed without risk to himself from any defense on the part of the person slain." 14

In this case, the second amended information specifically charged that defendants killed Silvino Lincuna "in a treacherous manner . . . that is, the accused Belesande Salar clubbing Silvino Lincuna on the head, Gaudencio Mongado tying him helplessly to a chair with the use of radio antennae and stuffing his mouth with rolls of gauze, and Jilly Segador attacking him with fatal thrusts by means of a sharp- pointed bolo." No doubt, the principles heretofore stated fit into the foregoing facts. Treachery has been properly appreciated.

4. Ignominy was deemed an aggravating circumstance because of the rape committed on the occasion of the robbery with double homicide.

The second amended information charges: "That on the occasion of the said Robbery, with Double Homicide, in the manner as charged in this information and pursuant to their conspiracy, the accused Belesande Salar after having fatally assaulted the wife, Emilia Dalit, and while she was still alive and helpless, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with said Emilia Dalit at the residence referred to where the aforementioned crime was committed."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, in enumerating aggravating cirscumstances, states in its paragraph 17: "That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act."cralaw virtua1aw library

We do not believe that the rape here committed added ignominy to the crime. Nothing in the information suggests that the rape of Emilia Dalit was perpetrated by the satyr in the presence or with the knowledge of her husband Silvino Lincuna. This act was done after the fatal thrusts were inflicted on Lincuna. Thereafter, the wife was first fatally assaulted and, while still alive and helpless, was ravished. This last averment by itself and without more leaves us under serious doubt as to whether rape did really "add ignominy" to the killing.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it is the uniform jurisprudence of this Court that where the crime charged is robbery with homicide and rape, the legal definition of the crime is robbery with homicide punishable under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Penal Code; and the rape committed on the occasion of that crime is considered an aggravating circumstance. 15 Instead of ignominy, therefore, it is the rape itself that aggravates.

5. Dwelling was properly included as an aggravating circumstance, although not specifically alleged in the information as such an aggravating circumstance. 16 And this, because from the factual narration in the second amended information, the robbery, the killing and the rape were all perpetrated in the "residence" of the offended parties. We have said in the recent case of People v. Apduhan (August 30, 1968), supra, at p. 815, that—

"The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons, 17 like the offense at bar. The rationale behind this pronouncement is that this class of robbery could be committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. Morada is inherent only in crimes which could be committed in no other place than in the house of another, such as trespass and robbery in an inhabited house. This Court in People v. Pinca, citing People v. Valdez, ruled that the ‘circumstances (of dwelling and scaling) were certainly not inherent in the crime committed, because, the crime being robbery with violence or intimidation against persons (specifically, robbery with homicide) that authors thereof could have committed it without the necessity of violating or scaling the domicile of their victim.’ Cuello Calon opines that the commission of the crime in another’s dwelling shows greater perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm."cralaw virtua1aw library

No reason exist why we should depart from the pronouncement just quoted. 18

6. Counsel de oficio invokes in mitigation lack of instruction.

But lack of instruction should be proved; it cannot be inferred. 19 There is no such proof here. It was not invoked below.

The result, therefore, of our review of the record is that the crime here under consideration is attended by the aggravating circumstances of (1) treachery, (2) dwelling, and (3) rape against all the three accused, with the added aggravating circumstance of (4) recidivism against Gaudencio Mongado. And only one mitigating circumstance — that of voluntary plea of guilty — can be considered in favor of the three accused. By the law, the three accused merit the penalty of death.

We do not thus find it necessary to pass upon the lower court’s pronouncement that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of confidence also attended the commission of the crime. The result is the same. The penalty is death.

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the decision under review is hereby affirmed; the three defendants Gaudencio Mongado, Jilly Segador and Belesande Salar are hereby sentenced to DEATH, and are ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased, Silvino Lincuna and Emilia Dalit, in the sum of P12,000.00, and to pay the said heirs, jointly and severally, the sum of P596.15, the value of the things taken but not recovered, and to pay the costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., took no part.

Endnotes:



1. The three accused Gaudencio Mongado, Jilly Segador and Belesande Salar, assisted by counsel de oficio, also pleaded guilty upon arraignment before the municipal judge of Mainit, Surigao del Norte, on March 27, 1965. Record below, pp. 26, 28, 29, 72.

2. Criminal Case 3946, Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Gaudencio Mongado, Jilly Segador, Belesande Salar, Anastacio Cadenas and Andres Cagadas, Accused."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. "Of the things taken by the accused on the occasion of the robbery, the amount of P163.85 in cash, the Kharman Radiophono, valued at P450.00 and the 12 ga. shotgun valued at P250.00; have been recovered, the total value of which is P1,113.85, leaving a balance of P596.15 not recovered." Decision below, Record, p. 75.

4. People v. Pagkalinawan, 76 Phil. 457, 460; People v. Caggauan, 94 Phil. 118, 125-126. See: Salonga, Philippine Law on Evidence, 3rd ed., p. 372.

5. 1 Am. Jur., p. 955, citing cases.

6. U.S. v. Solaña, 33 Phil. 582, 593.

7. I Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1961 ed., pp. 273-274, citing U.S. v. Barbosa, 1 Phil. 741; U.S. v. Perdon, 4 Phil. 141; U.S. v. Rana, 4 Phil. 231; People v. Talledo, 85 Phil. 533.

8. U.S. v. Burlado, 42 Phil. 72, 74; People v. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798, 814, citing People v. Egido, 90 Phil. 762 and People v. Santos, 105 Phil. 40; People v. Arpa, L-26789, April 25, 1969, citing People v. Boyles, L-15308, May 29, 1964, citing cases; People v. Pujinio, L-21690, April 29, 1969.

9. People v. Venus, 63 Phil. 435, 440-442.

10. People v. Serrano, 85 Phil. 835, 838.

11. U.S. v. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305, 317; People v. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058, 1063-1064. See also: People v. Pujinio, supra.

12. U.S. v. Balagtas, 19 Phil. 164, 172-173; People v. Cañete, 44 Phil. 478, 481; People v. Durante, 53 Phil. 363, 368-369; People v. De la Peña, 54 Phil. 818, 820; People v. Elizaga, 86 Phil. 364, 382-383.

13. People v. Cañete, supra at p. 481, citing U.S. v. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209, 218 and cases there cited.

14. Id., at pp. 481-482.

15. People v. Ganal, 85 Phil. 743, 751; People v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136, 142; and People v. Tarrayo, supra. See also: People v. Carillo, 85 Phil. 611, 635.

16." [G]eneric aggravating circumstances, although not alleged in the information, may be proved." People v. Raquinio, 17 SCRA 914, 919, citing cases.

17. Citing U.S. v. Leyba, 8 Phil. 671; People v. Sebastian, 85 Phil. 602; People v. Napili, S5 Phil. 521.

18. See also: People v. Atencio, 22 SCRA 88, 103; People v. Condemena, 23 SCRA 910, 920; People v. Tarrayo, supra.

19. People v. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27, 34.




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