Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence


Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1970 > June 1970 Decisions > G.R. No. L-23214 June 30, 1970 - OFELIA GOMEZ v. JOAQUIN P. LIPANA:




PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-23214. June 30, 1970.]

OFELIA GOMEZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of the late ISIDRA GOMEZ Y AQUINO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOAQUIN P. LIPANA, Defendant-Appellant.

Marcelo Y. Hernandez for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Presentacion G. Santos, for Defendant-Appellant.


SYLLABUS


1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGES; ILLEGAL MARRIAGES; VOID MARRIAGE SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK IN INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. — Where the marriage contracted is bigamous and null and void for being in violation of Sec. 29 of the Marriage Law, Act 3613, which became effective on December 4, 1929, the marriage is subject to collateral attack in the intestate proceedings instituted by the judicial administratrix for the forfeiture of the husband’s share in the conjugal property.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE LAW. — Section 30 on annullable marriages cannot be relied upon in the instant case where a second marriage was contracted while the first was valid and subsisting for the controlling statute is Section 29 of Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law, which became effective on December 4, 1929.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS; BURDEN OF PROOF. — To the general rule stated in Sec. 29 that any marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, there are only two exceptions -- those mentioned in sub-section (a) when the first marriage was annulled or dissolved and (b) when the first spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years. The burden is on the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. — There is no suggestion here that the defendant’s 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). The defendant has not discharged the burden to prove that he comes under the exceptions; no evidence whatsoever having been adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less than seven years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was then generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP; TERMINATION; FORFEITURE OF GUILTY PARTY’ S SHARE AS DECREED BY ART. 1417 OF THE SPANISH CIVIL CODE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. — The facts of the case do not call for the application of Art. 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code which decrees that the spouse who in bad faith has given cause for nullity (of the marriage) shall have no share in the conjugal properties. The first paragraph of the article states the two causes for termination of the conjugal partnership: (1) dissolution of the marriage and (2) declaration of nullity, neither of which has occurred to defendant’ s first marriage. The second paragraph of the same articles states that it is upon the termination of the partnership by either of said causes that the forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse takes place. The conjugal partnership formed by virtue of the marriage of the defendant to the deceased Isidra Gomez was dissolved by the latter’s death in 1959. By that time, Art. 1417 was no longer in force having been eliminated in the New Civil Code, which took effect in 1950. Neither has there been any judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage, except possibly in the present action filed after the dissolution by death had taken place and when Art. 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.

6. ID., ID.; ID., ID.; ID., WIFE IN SECOND MARRIAGE IN GOOD FAITH. — The legal situation arising from the facts of the case is that while insofar as the second wife was concerned, she having acted in good faith, her marriage produced civil effects and gave rise just the same to the formation of a conjugal partnership, wherein she was entitled to an equal share upon dissolution, no action lies under Art. 1417 for the forfeiture of the husband’s share in her favor, much less in favor of her estate. The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half of the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.


D E C I S I O N


MAKALINTAL, J.:


The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the second marriage the first was still subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second wife.

On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage acquired by purchase a piece of land in Cubao, Quezon City, for the price of P3,000.00. The Torrens title for the property (Transfer Certificate No. 25289 of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City) was issued on February 1, 1944, in the name of "Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez."cralaw virtua1aw library

On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless, and survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives. On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate, commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the husband’s share in the Cubao property in favor of the said estate. Reliance is placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil Code, the Spanish text of which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse el matrimonio o al ser declarado nulo.

"El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere eido causa de la nulidad, no tendra parte en los bienes ganancialee."cralaw virtua1aw library

The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the aforequoted provision and declared his interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.

In the present appeal by the defendant he attributed two errors to the trial court. (1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the second marriage and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio; and (2) in holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.

The first error has not been committed. The controlling statute is Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which became effective on December 4, 1929 and was in force when the two marriages were celebrated. The pertinent provisions are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless;

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.

"SEC. 30. Annullable marriages. — A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x


(b) That the former husband or wife of either was living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force;

x       x       x


SEC. 31. Time for filing action for decree of nullity. — The action to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage, for causes mentioned in the preceding section, must be commenced within the periods and by the parties as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x       x       x


(b) For causes mentioned in subdivision (b); by either party during the life of the other, or by the former husband or wife.

x       x       x


The appellant, relying on Section 30(b) quoted above, maintains that his marriage to Isidra Gomez was valid and could be annulled only in an action for that purpose, which in the light of Section 31 could be filed only by either party thereto, during the lifetime of the other, or by the former spouse.

However, it is not Section 30 but Section 29 which governs in this case, particularly the first paragraph thereof, which says that "any marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance." This is the general rule, to which the only exceptions are those mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) of the same provision.

There is no suggestion here that the defendant’s 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). The burden is on the party invoking the exception to prove that be comes under it; and the defendant has not discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less than seven years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was then generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so.

The second error bears closer analysis. Is Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code applicable under the facts of this case?

There is one primordial fact which must be considered, namely, that since the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s share in the property here in dispute, even if it was acquired during the second marriage, of which interest she would be deprived if his share should be declared forfeited in favor of the second wife.

There is a difference of opinion among the members of this Court as to whether such resulting prejudice to the first wife is within the contemplation of the Spanish Civil Code when it decrees in general terms in Article 1417 that the spouse who in bad faith has given cause for nullity (of the marriage) shall have no share in the conjugal properties, considering that in the present case the first marriage has not been terminated and therefore likewise impresses the conjugal stamp of that marriage upon whatever properties are acquired during its existence. We believe, however, that it is not necessary to resolve that question here inasmuch as the facts do not call for the application of Article 1417. The first paragraph of this Article states two causes for the termination of the conjugal partnership: (1) dissolution of the marriage and (2) declaration of nullity. Under the second paragraph of the same Article it is upon the termination of the partnership by either of said causes that the forfeiture of the guilty spouse takes place. Now then, when did the conjugal partnership formed by virtue of the marriage of the defendant to the deceased Isidra Gomez terminate? Obviously when the marriage was dissolved by the latter’s death in 1958. By that time Article 1417 was no longer in force, having been eliminated in the new Civil Code, which took effect in 1950. The legal situation arising from these facts is that while insofar as the second wife was concerned, she having acted in good faith, her marriage produced civil effects and gave rise, just the same, to the formation of a conjugal partnership wherein she was entitled to an equal share upon dissolution, 1 no action lies under Article 1417 for the forfeiture of the husband’s share in her favor. much less in favor of her estate, with respect to which there are after all no children, but only collateral relatives, who are entitled to succeed.

It would not do to say that since the second marriage in this case was void ab initio the application of Article 1417 should be reckoned as of the date it was celebrated in 1935. This article speaks from the moment of the termination of the conjugal partnership (either by the dissolution of the marriage or by the declaration of its nullity); and it would be self-contradictory to consider that the conjugal partnership was formed and terminated at the same time and by the same act, that is, by the celebration itself of the marriage. Colin y Capitant 2 comments on this provision as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Disuelven matrimonio y, por tanto, la sociedad de gananciales, la muerte de uno de los conjuges y la declaracion de nulidad."cralaw virtua1aw library

"En caso de declaracion de nulidad, la sociedad de gananciales se extingue al ser declarado nulo el matrimonio, es decir, en el momento en que sea firme la sentencia declarativa de la nulidad."cralaw virtua1aw library

x       x       x


It may thus be seen that if the nullity, or annulment, of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose. In the instant case, however, the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved by the death of the second wife; and there has been no judicial declaration of nullity except possibly in this very action, filed after dissolution by death had taken place and when Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.

There is, to be sure, a statement of Manresa 3 that in case of nullity it is presumed, with respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that neither the marriage nor the conjugal partnership ever existed, and hence such spouse has no right to a share in the conjugal properties; but this legal effect of such presumption derives from the premise that Article 1417 is still in force, and in any event is of doubtful application if it would be in derogation of and to the prejudice of the right of the other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal partnership farmed thereby, which includes properties acquired by the husband during its existence.

The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:



1. Colin Capitant, Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil, Tomo 60, Tercera Edicion, pag. 364; Francisco v. Jason, 60 Phil. 442; Lao v. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745.

2. Id., pag. 362, 363.

3. Tomo 9, Cuarta Edicion, pag. 580.




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