November 1975 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1975 > November 1975 Decisions >
G.R. No. L-40895 November 6, 1975 - MILAGROS DE LA CRUZ v. BIENVENIDO EJERCITO:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-40895. November 6, 1975.]
MILAGROS DE LA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE BIENVENIDO EJERCITO, Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles City, Branch IV; TEODORO DAVID, City Fiscal of Angeles City, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Office of the SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
C. S. Gaddi Law Office and Maximino Q. Canlas for Petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Eulogio Raquel-Santos and Solicitor Tomas M. Dilig & Fiscal Eller Dula Torres for Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
For contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was subsisting, petitioner was charged with bigamy at the instance of her first husband. Subsequently, petitioner filed a complaint to annul the second marriage, on the ground of duress. The second marriage was annulled and the judgment became final, no appeal having been taken therefrom. In view thereof, petitioner moved to dismiss the bigamy charge. The trial judge denied the motion on the ground that the decision in the annulment case is not controlling in the criminal case because the parties and issues in the two cases are not the same.
On a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the Supreme Court held that the finding in the annulment case that the second marriage was a nullity rendered moot or untenable the bigamy case.
On a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the Supreme Court held that the finding in the annulment case that the second marriage was a nullity rendered moot or untenable the bigamy case.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; BIGAMY; ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE PRECLUDES RENDITION OF A VERDICT THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED BIGAMY. — The finding in the annulment case that the second marriage contracted by the accused was a nullity is determinative of her innocence and precludes the rendition of a verdict that she committed bigamy. To try the criminal case in the face of such a finding would be unwarranted.
2. ID.; ID.; ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE RENDERS MOOT THE PROSECUTION FOR BIGAMY. — The annulment of the second marriage, upon which the prosecution for bigamy is based, renders moot or untenable the bigamy case, because one element of bigamy is that the alleged second marriage, having all the requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. It is essential "que el segundo matrimonio ‘ha de constituir un acto solemne en que concurran los requisitos exigidos para la existencia del sacramento o del contrato.’" Thus, it is necessary in a prosecution for bigamy that the second marriage be valid if its validity was questioned in a civil action.
3. ID.; ID.; AN ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT IS NOT A VOID JUDGMENT. — Even if the decree annulling the second marriage is questionable or erroneous because it was issued in a judgment by default, still that would not prevent the decree from having legal effect. "An erroneous judgment is not a void judgment."
2. ID.; ID.; ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE RENDERS MOOT THE PROSECUTION FOR BIGAMY. — The annulment of the second marriage, upon which the prosecution for bigamy is based, renders moot or untenable the bigamy case, because one element of bigamy is that the alleged second marriage, having all the requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. It is essential "que el segundo matrimonio ‘ha de constituir un acto solemne en que concurran los requisitos exigidos para la existencia del sacramento o del contrato.’" Thus, it is necessary in a prosecution for bigamy that the second marriage be valid if its validity was questioned in a civil action.
3. ID.; ID.; AN ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT IS NOT A VOID JUDGMENT. — Even if the decree annulling the second marriage is questionable or erroneous because it was issued in a judgment by default, still that would not prevent the decree from having legal effect. "An erroneous judgment is not a void judgment."
D E C I S I O N
AQUINO, J.:
On May 20, 1974 Milagros de la Cruz was charged with bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Angeles City Branch IV for having married Sergeant Dominick L. Gaccino on September 15, 1973 while her prior marriage to Teodoro G. David was undissolved. The information was filed at the instance of her first husband (Criminal Case No. 3128).
On August 1, 1974 Milagros de la Cruz filed in the same court at its San Fernando Branch III a complaint for the annulment of her marriage to Sergeant Gaccino on the ground of duress (Civil Case No. 4188).
Defendant Gaccino did not answer the complaint. Judge Mariano Castañeda, Jr. ordered the Provincial Fiscal to investigate whether there was a collusion between the parties. A special counsel of the Fiscal’s office reported that there was no collusion.
On December 16, 1974 Judge Castañeda rendered a decision annulling the marriage of Milagros de la Cruz to Gaccino. No appeal was taken from that decision. It became final. In view of the annulment of her second marriage, Milagros de la Cruz filed on January 27, 1975 a motion to dismiss the bigamy charge. The private prosecutor and the prosecuting fiscal opposed the motion.
Judge Bienvenido Ejercito denied it in his order of May 27, 1975 on the ground that the decision in the annulment case is not controlling in the criminal case because the parties and the issues in the two cases are not the same.
That refusal of Judge Ejercito to dismiss the bigamy case, notwithstanding the judicial pronouncement that her second marriage was a nullity, prompted Milagros de la Cruz to file the instant special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
The issue is whether the bigamy case became moot or untenable after the second marriage, on which the prosecution for bigamy is based, was annulled.
The City Fiscal of Angeles City contends that the lower court acted correctly in denying the motion to dismiss the bigamy charge. He argues that the decision in the annulment case should be set up as a defense by Milagros de la Cruz during the trial and that it would not justify the outright dismissal of the criminal case.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General manifested that the stand of Milagros de la Cruz should be sustained because one element of bigamy is that the alleged second marriage, having all the requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage (People v. Mora Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246, 248; Merced v. Hon. Diez, 109 Phil. 155; Zapanta v. Montesa, 114 Phil. 1227).
We hold that the finding in the annulment case that the second marriage contracted by Milagros de la Cruz with Sergeant Gaccino was a nullity is determinative of her innocence and precludes the rendition of a verdict that she committed bigamy. To try the criminal case in the face of such a finding would be unwarranted.
As noted by Groizard, it is essential "que el segundo matrimonio ‘ha de constituir un acto solemne en que concurran los requisitos exigidos para la existencia del sacramento o del contrato" ‘ (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 12th ed., p. 675, note 2). As pointed out in the Merced case, supra, it is necessary in a prosecution for bigamy that the second marriage be declared valid if its validity was questioned in a civil action.
And even supposing arguendo that the decree annulling the second marriage was questionable or erroneous because it was issued in a judgment by default, still that would not prevent the decree from having legal effect. "An erroneous judgment is not a void judgment" (Chereau v. Fuentebella, 43 Phil. 216).
WHEREFORE, the lower court’s order of May 27, 1975, denying the motion to dismiss of Milagros de la Cruz is set aside. The writ of prohibition is granted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., is on leave.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
On August 1, 1974 Milagros de la Cruz filed in the same court at its San Fernando Branch III a complaint for the annulment of her marriage to Sergeant Gaccino on the ground of duress (Civil Case No. 4188).
Defendant Gaccino did not answer the complaint. Judge Mariano Castañeda, Jr. ordered the Provincial Fiscal to investigate whether there was a collusion between the parties. A special counsel of the Fiscal’s office reported that there was no collusion.
On December 16, 1974 Judge Castañeda rendered a decision annulling the marriage of Milagros de la Cruz to Gaccino. No appeal was taken from that decision. It became final. In view of the annulment of her second marriage, Milagros de la Cruz filed on January 27, 1975 a motion to dismiss the bigamy charge. The private prosecutor and the prosecuting fiscal opposed the motion.
Judge Bienvenido Ejercito denied it in his order of May 27, 1975 on the ground that the decision in the annulment case is not controlling in the criminal case because the parties and the issues in the two cases are not the same.
That refusal of Judge Ejercito to dismiss the bigamy case, notwithstanding the judicial pronouncement that her second marriage was a nullity, prompted Milagros de la Cruz to file the instant special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.
The issue is whether the bigamy case became moot or untenable after the second marriage, on which the prosecution for bigamy is based, was annulled.
The City Fiscal of Angeles City contends that the lower court acted correctly in denying the motion to dismiss the bigamy charge. He argues that the decision in the annulment case should be set up as a defense by Milagros de la Cruz during the trial and that it would not justify the outright dismissal of the criminal case.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General manifested that the stand of Milagros de la Cruz should be sustained because one element of bigamy is that the alleged second marriage, having all the requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage (People v. Mora Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246, 248; Merced v. Hon. Diez, 109 Phil. 155; Zapanta v. Montesa, 114 Phil. 1227).
We hold that the finding in the annulment case that the second marriage contracted by Milagros de la Cruz with Sergeant Gaccino was a nullity is determinative of her innocence and precludes the rendition of a verdict that she committed bigamy. To try the criminal case in the face of such a finding would be unwarranted.
As noted by Groizard, it is essential "que el segundo matrimonio ‘ha de constituir un acto solemne en que concurran los requisitos exigidos para la existencia del sacramento o del contrato" ‘ (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 12th ed., p. 675, note 2). As pointed out in the Merced case, supra, it is necessary in a prosecution for bigamy that the second marriage be declared valid if its validity was questioned in a civil action.
And even supposing arguendo that the decree annulling the second marriage was questionable or erroneous because it was issued in a judgment by default, still that would not prevent the decree from having legal effect. "An erroneous judgment is not a void judgment" (Chereau v. Fuentebella, 43 Phil. 216).
WHEREFORE, the lower court’s order of May 27, 1975, denying the motion to dismiss of Milagros de la Cruz is set aside. The writ of prohibition is granted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., is on leave.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
