January 1979 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions

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Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1979 > January 1979 Decisions > G.R. No. L-45121 January 9, 1976

ROSARIO P. ARCEO v. NARCISO A. AQUINO, ET AL.:

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-45121 and L-45122. January 9, 1976.]

ROSARIO P. ARCEO, Petitioner, v. HON. NARCISO A. AQUINO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV at Rosales, and ANICETO SANDOVAL, Respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Although the motion to dismiss was based on factual issues, and despite plaintiff’s motion to set the same for hearing so that evidence may be presented on the factual issues involved in the motion, the trial judge granted the motion without setting the same for hearing.

The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in not setting the motion to dismiss for hearing for the reception of evidence and that it acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting it.

SYLLABUS

1. MOTION TO DISMISS; EVIDENCE MUST BE RECEIVED WHERE MOTION TO DISMISS IS BASED ON FACTUAL ISSUES. — Where the motion to dismiss is based on disputed facts such as the capacity in which the plaintiff sued the defendant, whether the obligation had already been paid, and whether plaintiff had reserved the right to file a separate action for civil liability of defendant in the grave coercion case, the trial judge should receive evidence on the factual issues before resolving the motion to dismiss or should defer its determination until the trial is finished. It is grave abuse of discretion for a trial judge to grant a motion to dismiss based on factual issues without setting the motion for hearing for the reception evidence.

R E S O L U T I O N

AQUINO, J.:

Petitioner Rosario P. Arceo filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Court’s resolution dated June 16, 1973, dismissing her petitions for certiorari and prohibition in these two cases on the ground that the same have become moot and academic due to the retirement of respondent Judge as of February 23, 1978.

Mrs. Arceo had assailed Judge Aquino’s order of September 24, 1976, denying her petition to disqualify the latter, on the ground of partiality, from acting in Special Proceeding No. 116-R, the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased husband, Honorato L. Arceo, and in Civil Case No. 283-R, entitled "Rosario P. Arceo v. Aniceto Sandoval."cralaw virtua1aw library

Mrs. Arceo in her motion for reconsideration invited attention to the fact that she had also assailed two other orders of respondent Judge, namely: (1) his order in Civil Case No. 283-R dated October 12, 1976 denying her motion that Sandoval’s motion to dismiss be set for hearing for the reception of evidence and (2) his order of October 25, 1976 granting Sandoval’s motion to dismiss.

We find Mrs. Arceo’s motion for reconsideration to be meritorious. Those two orders were questioned by Mrs. Arceo on the theory that respondent Judge, whose inhibition she had vigorously sought, was partial to Sandoval because the two were members of the Lions Club and because on some occasions respondent Judge allegedly fraternized with Sandoval.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The petition for certiorari impugning the said order of October 25, 1976 (whose reconsideration was denied in the order of November 5, 1976) was filed on November 29, 1976. So, the same may be treated as a petition for review under Republic Act No. 5440. It was apparently filed within the reglementary period.

Mrs. Arceo had repeatedly asked the lower court to set the motion to dismiss for hearing so that evidence may be presented on the factual issues involved in that motion. The trial court refused to set for hearing Sandoval’s motion to dismiss to which she had registered an opposition.

We hold that the trial court erred in not setting that motion to dismiss for hearing for the reception of evidence and that it acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting it. The order of dismissal was based on disputed facts such as the capacity in which Mrs. Arceo had sued Sandoval, whether the obligation had already been paid (first cause of action) and whether she had reserved the right to file a separate action for the civil liability of Sandoval in the grave coercion case (second cause of action). Evidence should have been received on these factual issues before the motion to dismiss was resolved or its determination could have been deferred until the trial is finished.

WHEREFORE, this Court’s resolution of June 16, 1978 is reconsidered insofar as it dismissed Mrs. Arceo’s petition assailing the two aforementioned orders of Judge Aquino in Civil Case No. 283-R. The two orders are hereby set aside. The lower court is directed to receive evidence at the hearing of Sandoval’s motion to dismiss and, after such hearing, it may resolve the said motion or defer the resolution thereof according to the exercise of its sound discretion. Costs against respondent Sandoval.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

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