September 1981 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
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G.R. No. L-56989 September 4, 1981 - RODOLFO B. SOQUE v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-56989. September 4, 1981.]
RODOLFO B. SOQUE, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and SULPUCIO LIBUTON, Respondents.
Rodolfo B. Garbanzos, Jr. for Petitioner.
Romulo A. Deles for Private Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Eighteen days after the decision of the Court of Appeals on an agrarian case, was served on the petitioner, he filed a motion for reconsideration which was not acted upon by the Court of Appeals for the reason that Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 does not allow a motion for rehearing or reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals in agrarian cases. Entry of judgment was made sixteen days after service thereon on the defeated party. Petitioner filed in the Supreme Court an urgent motion for an extension of thirty days within which to file a petition for review where he inaccurately alleged that his motion for reconsideration was "denied." The extension was erroneously granted through oversight and the petition was mailed within the extension period requested.
The Supreme Court ruled that the provision of Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 giving the petitioner a "non-extendible period of thirty (30) days" from notice of the decision within which to file an appeal to this Court by means of a petition for review on certiorari is peremptory or mandatory in character. Pursuant thereto, the entry of judgment made in the Court of Appeals is erroneous while the petition filed in this Court should be dismissed because it was filed out of time.
Petition dismissed.
The Supreme Court ruled that the provision of Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 giving the petitioner a "non-extendible period of thirty (30) days" from notice of the decision within which to file an appeal to this Court by means of a petition for review on certiorari is peremptory or mandatory in character. Pursuant thereto, the entry of judgment made in the Court of Appeals is erroneous while the petition filed in this Court should be dismissed because it was filed out of time.
Petition dismissed.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; AGRARIAN CASES; FINALITY; WHEN ENTRY OF JUDGMENT SHOULD BE MADE; CASE AT BAR. — Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 gives the petitioner a "non-extendible period of thirty (30) days "from notice of the decision within which to file an appeal to the Supreme Court by means of a petition for review on certiorari. Hence, the entry of judgment made by the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals in the case at bar on the assumption that the decision became final and executory on February 7, 1981, sixteen days after the service thereof on Soque, the defeated party, is erroneous, because the judgment became final on February 23, or after thirty days from notice to Soque’s counsel. In agrarian cases, the Court of Appeals should enter judgment on the thirty-first day or thereafter, that is, after the expiration of the thirty-day period within which to appeal to this Court and no appeal is interposed.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR REHEARING OR RECONSIDERATION OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS; NOT ALLOWED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 946; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, Soque mailed to this Court on March 19, 1981 an urgent motion for extension of time within which to file a petition for review where he inaccurately alleged that his counsel received on March 10 a copy of the Appellate Court’s resolution of February 13, "denying" his motion for reconsideration. His motion was not denied. It was simply "noted" because that motion was out of order as it was not authorized by section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERIOD TO FILE A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI IN THE SUPREME COURT; NON- EXTENDIBLE. — Where petitioner was served with a copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals on January 22, 1981, his petition for review on certiorari of said decision should have been filed within the non-extendible period of thirty days from notice thereof, or on or before February 21. The thirty-day extension to file said petition was granted by this Court through oversight and the resolution granting it is hereby set aside. The petition having been mailed on April 14, 1981, the same should be dismissed because it was filed out of time.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF THE PROVISION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 946, SECTION 18, INTENTION OF THE LAWMAKER. — The provision of Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 that the thirty-day period is non-extendible is peremptory or mandatory in character. The obvious intent of the lawmaker is to avoid delays in the disposition of agrarian cases. Dura lex, sed lex. (Caparas, v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 56772-84, July 9, 1981 (thirteen cases). That intention is evident in another provision of section 18, directing that the complete records of the Agrarian Court should be forwarded to the Court of Appeals "within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a notice of appeal."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR REHEARING OR RECONSIDERATION OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS; NOT ALLOWED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 946; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, Soque mailed to this Court on March 19, 1981 an urgent motion for extension of time within which to file a petition for review where he inaccurately alleged that his counsel received on March 10 a copy of the Appellate Court’s resolution of February 13, "denying" his motion for reconsideration. His motion was not denied. It was simply "noted" because that motion was out of order as it was not authorized by section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERIOD TO FILE A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI IN THE SUPREME COURT; NON- EXTENDIBLE. — Where petitioner was served with a copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals on January 22, 1981, his petition for review on certiorari of said decision should have been filed within the non-extendible period of thirty days from notice thereof, or on or before February 21. The thirty-day extension to file said petition was granted by this Court through oversight and the resolution granting it is hereby set aside. The petition having been mailed on April 14, 1981, the same should be dismissed because it was filed out of time.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF THE PROVISION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 946, SECTION 18, INTENTION OF THE LAWMAKER. — The provision of Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 that the thirty-day period is non-extendible is peremptory or mandatory in character. The obvious intent of the lawmaker is to avoid delays in the disposition of agrarian cases. Dura lex, sed lex. (Caparas, v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 56772-84, July 9, 1981 (thirteen cases). That intention is evident in another provision of section 18, directing that the complete records of the Agrarian Court should be forwarded to the Court of Appeals "within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a notice of appeal."
R E S O L U T I O N
AQUINO, J.:
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Libuton v. Soque, CA-G.R. No. SP-11252-CAR, January 13, 1981, an agrarian case, was served on January 22, 1981 upon the counsel for the landowner, Rodolfo B. Soque.
Eighteen days thereafter or on February 9, Soque filed a motion for reconsideration. That motion was not acted upon because, as stated by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of February 12, 1981, section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 does not allow a motion for rehearing or reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals in agrarian cases.
On March 17, 1981, the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals entered judgment in the said case on the assumption that the decision became final and executory on February 7, 1981, sixteen days after the service thereof on Soque, the defeated party. The record was remanded on March 20, 1981 to the Agrarian Court in Bacolod City.
The entry of judgment is erroneous because the judgment did not become final on February 7. It became final on February 22 or after thirty days from notice to Soque’s counsel. Section 18 gives Soque a "non-extendible period of thirty (30) days" from notice of the decision within which to file an appeal to this Court by means of a petition for review on certiorari.
In ordinary cases or non-agrarian cases, the reglementary period for appealing to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals is fifteen days. So, if there is no appeal within that period, the judgment becomes final on the sixteenth day. In agrarian cases, the Court of Appeals should enter judgment on the thirty-first day or thereafter, that is, after the expiration of the thirty-day period within which to appeal to this Court and no appeal is interposed.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
In the instant case, Soque mailed to this Court on March 19, 1981 an urgent motion for extension of time within which to file a petition for review. He inaccurately alleged that his counsel received on March 10 a copy of the Appellate Court’s resolution of February 12, "denying" his motion for reconsideration.
His motion was not denied. It was simply "noted" because that motion was out of order. It was not authorized by section 18.
This Court in its resolution of June 5, 1981 erroneously granted Soque an extension of thirty days from March 15 within which to file his petition for review on certiorari. The petition was mailed on April 14, 1981.
We hold that the petition should be dismissed because it was filed out of time. It should have been filed within the non-extendible period of thirty days from January 22, when Soque was served with a copy of the decision, or on or before February 21.
The thirty-day extension was granted to Soque through oversight. The resolution granting it is hereby set aside. He was not entitled to that extension.
As held in Caparas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 56772-84, July 9, 1981 (thirteen cases), the provision of section 18 that the thirty-day period is non-extendible is peremptory or mandatory in character. The obvious intent of the lawmaker is to avoid delays in the disposition of agrarian cases. Dura lex, sed lex.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
That intention is evident in another provision of Section 18, directing that the complete records of the Agrarian Court should be forwarded to the Court of Appeals "within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a notice of appeal."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.
Fernandez, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Eighteen days thereafter or on February 9, Soque filed a motion for reconsideration. That motion was not acted upon because, as stated by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of February 12, 1981, section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 946 does not allow a motion for rehearing or reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals in agrarian cases.
On March 17, 1981, the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals entered judgment in the said case on the assumption that the decision became final and executory on February 7, 1981, sixteen days after the service thereof on Soque, the defeated party. The record was remanded on March 20, 1981 to the Agrarian Court in Bacolod City.
The entry of judgment is erroneous because the judgment did not become final on February 7. It became final on February 22 or after thirty days from notice to Soque’s counsel. Section 18 gives Soque a "non-extendible period of thirty (30) days" from notice of the decision within which to file an appeal to this Court by means of a petition for review on certiorari.
In ordinary cases or non-agrarian cases, the reglementary period for appealing to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals is fifteen days. So, if there is no appeal within that period, the judgment becomes final on the sixteenth day. In agrarian cases, the Court of Appeals should enter judgment on the thirty-first day or thereafter, that is, after the expiration of the thirty-day period within which to appeal to this Court and no appeal is interposed.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
In the instant case, Soque mailed to this Court on March 19, 1981 an urgent motion for extension of time within which to file a petition for review. He inaccurately alleged that his counsel received on March 10 a copy of the Appellate Court’s resolution of February 12, "denying" his motion for reconsideration.
His motion was not denied. It was simply "noted" because that motion was out of order. It was not authorized by section 18.
This Court in its resolution of June 5, 1981 erroneously granted Soque an extension of thirty days from March 15 within which to file his petition for review on certiorari. The petition was mailed on April 14, 1981.
We hold that the petition should be dismissed because it was filed out of time. It should have been filed within the non-extendible period of thirty days from January 22, when Soque was served with a copy of the decision, or on or before February 21.
The thirty-day extension was granted to Soque through oversight. The resolution granting it is hereby set aside. He was not entitled to that extension.
As held in Caparas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 56772-84, July 9, 1981 (thirteen cases), the provision of section 18 that the thirty-day period is non-extendible is peremptory or mandatory in character. The obvious intent of the lawmaker is to avoid delays in the disposition of agrarian cases. Dura lex, sed lex.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
That intention is evident in another provision of Section 18, directing that the complete records of the Agrarian Court should be forwarded to the Court of Appeals "within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a notice of appeal."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.
Fernandez, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
