February 1982 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-58692 February 25, 1982 - MARINDUQUE MINING & INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ET AL.:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-58692. February 25, 1982.]
MARINDUQUE MINING & INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HON. MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (BLAS F. OPLE), REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 8, Tacloban City (CARMELO Y. YANUARIO) and PONCIANO DABUET, Respondents.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Jr., for Petitioner.
Reynold Fajardo, Marcial Lagunzad, Jr., Jose Juan & Bartolome Reus for Private Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner corporation filed with the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) a clearance application to dismiss private respondent on the grounds of habitual absenteeism and for being AWOL. A decision was rendered on September 22, 1977 ordering it to reinstate him with backwages at the rate of P14.25 a day from August 1, 1977 until the date of his actual reinstatement. Pending its appeal therefrom, a second clearance application was filed by petitioner corporation to terminate 460 employees, among them the private respondent, on the grounds of "serious reverses." On September 29, 1977, judgment was rendered granting the application which in due time became final and thereafter executed. On December 22, 1980, the Minister of Labor and Employment dismissed the appeal from the decision in the first clearance application. the Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied, hence this present action.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, contended that the final and executory order of September 29, 1977 in the second clearance application may be deemed to have mooted, superseded and rendered unenforceable the earlier order of September 22, 1977 in the first clearance application which was pending appeal. He opined that private respondent cannot be legally entitled to backwages from August 1, 1977 until the date of his actual reinstatement because (1) from August 1,1977 to September 5, 1977 he has been absent without leave and cannot be entitled to any compensation under the principle of no-work-no-pay; and (2) from September 6, 1977 up to the present, he can no longer be validly and legally reinstated to his former position with petitioner corporation because he was included in the order of September 29, 1977 which already became final and executory, approving the second clearance application to terminate 460 employees. It was however recommended that private respondent be paid separation pay as a result of his being included in the partial shutdown of the corporation.
The Supreme Court set aside the challenged orders for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction but denied the payment to private respondent of separation pay inasmuch as such was not sought in the final and executed order of September 29, 1977 and as he was culpable of habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of his duties which led to the first clearance application to terminate him, just causes for termination of employment which forfeit the right to any separation pay.
Petition granted.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, contended that the final and executory order of September 29, 1977 in the second clearance application may be deemed to have mooted, superseded and rendered unenforceable the earlier order of September 22, 1977 in the first clearance application which was pending appeal. He opined that private respondent cannot be legally entitled to backwages from August 1, 1977 until the date of his actual reinstatement because (1) from August 1,1977 to September 5, 1977 he has been absent without leave and cannot be entitled to any compensation under the principle of no-work-no-pay; and (2) from September 6, 1977 up to the present, he can no longer be validly and legally reinstated to his former position with petitioner corporation because he was included in the order of September 29, 1977 which already became final and executory, approving the second clearance application to terminate 460 employees. It was however recommended that private respondent be paid separation pay as a result of his being included in the partial shutdown of the corporation.
The Supreme Court set aside the challenged orders for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction but denied the payment to private respondent of separation pay inasmuch as such was not sought in the final and executed order of September 29, 1977 and as he was culpable of habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of his duties which led to the first clearance application to terminate him, just causes for termination of employment which forfeit the right to any separation pay.
Petition granted.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAWS; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; APPROVAL OF SECOND CLEARANCE APPLICATION TO DISMISS; EFFECT ON EARLIER APPLICATION PENDING APPEAL. — Where the order dated September 22, 1977 denying the clearance application to dismiss private respondent was pending appeal when the Order dated September 29, 1977 approving the second clearance to terminate the employment of employees, among them the private respondent, became final and executory, the former order which was pending appeal may be deemed to have been mooted by The latter order which has superseded and rendered unenforceable the former order. The challenge order directing The reinstatement of private respondent to his former position with backwages was issued in grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction.
2. ID.; ID.; PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHO HAS BEEN AWOL AND INCLUDED IN THE ORDER ALLOWING PETITIONER TO TERMINATE EMPLOYEES DUE TO BUSINESS REVERSES, NOT ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES. — Private respondent cannot be legally entitled to backwages from August 1, 1977 "until date of his actual reinstatement" because: (1) from August 1, 1977 to September 5, 1977, he has been absent without leave, and not entitled to any compensation under the principle of "no-work-no-pay" ; and (2) from September 6, 1977 up to the present, he can no longer be validly and legally reinstated to his former position with the petitioner corporation because he was included in the Order dated September 29, 1977 issued by the Regional Director of the Ministry of Labor and Employment in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 8-10-77, which had already become final and executory, approving the second clearance application to terminate the employment of 460 employees, one of whom is private respondent himself, due to business reverses.
3. ID.; ID.; PRIVATE RESPONDENT INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF EMPLOYEES ALLOWED TO BE TERMINATED AND GUILTY OF HABITUAL ABSENTEEISM AND GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTIES, NOT ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY. — The Court is not inclined to act favorably on the Solicitor General’s recommendation that private respondent be deemed "entitled to collect separation pay as a result of his being included in the partial shutdown or partial termination of employees, he being considered legally and finally terminated from employment as of September 5, 1977" for two reasons: first, such separation pay should have been sought but was not granted in the final and executed order of September 29, 1977 granting the second clearance application, under the provisions of Article 284 of the Labor Code on reduction of personnel; and secondly, the record of his absences without leave shows him clearly to be culpable of habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of his duties so much so that on July 22, 1977, petitioner was constrained to file its first clearance application to terminate officially his services since he had been absent and had not reported for work since May 17, 1977 to the time of his termination on September 5, 1977 under the clearance given in public respondents’ Order of September 29, 1977 in the second clearance application. Even conceding his alleged oral sick leave from May 18, 1977 to July 31, 1977, there was no justification for his continued failure to report for work since August 1, 1977 and thereafter, and the first clearance application should have been granted for just cause under Art. 283 of the Labor Code, forfeiting his right to any separation pay.
2. ID.; ID.; PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHO HAS BEEN AWOL AND INCLUDED IN THE ORDER ALLOWING PETITIONER TO TERMINATE EMPLOYEES DUE TO BUSINESS REVERSES, NOT ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES. — Private respondent cannot be legally entitled to backwages from August 1, 1977 "until date of his actual reinstatement" because: (1) from August 1, 1977 to September 5, 1977, he has been absent without leave, and not entitled to any compensation under the principle of "no-work-no-pay" ; and (2) from September 6, 1977 up to the present, he can no longer be validly and legally reinstated to his former position with the petitioner corporation because he was included in the Order dated September 29, 1977 issued by the Regional Director of the Ministry of Labor and Employment in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 8-10-77, which had already become final and executory, approving the second clearance application to terminate the employment of 460 employees, one of whom is private respondent himself, due to business reverses.
3. ID.; ID.; PRIVATE RESPONDENT INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF EMPLOYEES ALLOWED TO BE TERMINATED AND GUILTY OF HABITUAL ABSENTEEISM AND GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTIES, NOT ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY. — The Court is not inclined to act favorably on the Solicitor General’s recommendation that private respondent be deemed "entitled to collect separation pay as a result of his being included in the partial shutdown or partial termination of employees, he being considered legally and finally terminated from employment as of September 5, 1977" for two reasons: first, such separation pay should have been sought but was not granted in the final and executed order of September 29, 1977 granting the second clearance application, under the provisions of Article 284 of the Labor Code on reduction of personnel; and secondly, the record of his absences without leave shows him clearly to be culpable of habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of his duties so much so that on July 22, 1977, petitioner was constrained to file its first clearance application to terminate officially his services since he had been absent and had not reported for work since May 17, 1977 to the time of his termination on September 5, 1977 under the clearance given in public respondents’ Order of September 29, 1977 in the second clearance application. Even conceding his alleged oral sick leave from May 18, 1977 to July 31, 1977, there was no justification for his continued failure to report for work since August 1, 1977 and thereafter, and the first clearance application should have been granted for just cause under Art. 283 of the Labor Code, forfeiting his right to any separation pay.
D E C I S I O N
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Petitioner company in its petition has complained of respondent public officials’ orders, with regard to its first clearance application to dismiss its employee, private respondent Ponciano Dabuet, on grounds of habitual absenteeism and for being AWOL since December 18, 1976, whereby it was ordered "to reinstate him and pay him backwages at the rate of P14.25 a day from August 1, 1977 until the date of his actual reinstatement," notwithstanding that during the course of its appeal therefrom, the same respondents officials had a week thereafter granted a second clearance application of petitioner to terminate 460 employees, among them the same respondent Ponciano Dabuet, on grounds of "serious reverses," which clearance order was not appealed and long became final and has already been executed.
The Solicitor General and his assistants in their comment of January 6, 1982, as counsel for public respondents, agree that petitioner has valid cause for complaint and that the challenged orders were issued "with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction," thus:chanrobles law library : red
"It should be emphasized here that the first and second clearance applications were filed by the petitioner corporation barely one month between each other, with the same MOLE Regional Office; both were heard by the same labor arbiter, Marianito Dilao, and decided by the same regional director, Carmelo Yanuario. The decision in the first clearance application, CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77, was issued on September 22, 1977 while the decision in the second clearance application, CDO-STF-APP Case No. 8-10-77 was issued on September 29, 1977, which is barely five days between each other. The decision in the first clearance was seasonably appealed by the petitioner corporation on October 10, 1977 to the Minister of Labor and Employment (See Annex ‘C,’ id.) while the decision in the second clearance application became final and executory, since not one of the 460 employees affected by the shutdown or termination appealed from said decision.
"Consequently, the aforesaid Order dated September 22, 1977 in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77 is legally considered pending appeal, which was its status, when the Order dated September 29, 1977 in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 8-10-77 became final and executory, which was also before respondent Minister of Labor & Employment issued his Order dated December 22, 1980, dismissing petitioner corporation’s appeal in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77 (see Exhibit ‘E’, Petition). Such being the case, the final and executory Order dated September 29, 1977 in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 8-10-77 may be deemed to have mooted the Order dated September 22, 1977 in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77 which was pending appeal. And this latter order is the subject of the instant petition before this Honorable Supreme Court. The former Order, which had already become final and executory, has superseded and rendered unenforceable the latter Order, even if the instant petition is granted.
"In his Order dated December 22, 1980, respondent Minister of Labor & Employment stated, in denying the motion for reconsideration of his previous order dismissing the appeal of the petitioner corporation in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77, that nothing is shown from the records that an Order had already been issued, approving the second clearance application of the petitioner corporation to terminate the services of 460 employees, one of whom is employee Ponciano Dabuet himself. Such observation is inaccurate. Precisely, in its motion for reconsideration and/or appeal dated October 19, 1977 filed in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77, petitioner corporation called the attention of the respondent Minister of Labor & Employment to this fact. Respondent Minister of Labor & Employment, it being an administrative proceeding, should have directed the regional office to forward to him the records of CDO-STF-APP Case No. 8-10-77 to verify the allegations of the petitioner corporation of the existence of such final and executory order.
C. Employee Ponciano Dabuet not having been illegally dismissed, is not entitled to reinstatement nor to backwages in view of the circumstances obtaining, involving the two clearance applications of the petitioner corporation.
"In view of the circumstances obtaining, involving the two clearance applications of the petitioner corporation insofar as they affect employee Ponciano Dabbet, the herein questioned orders in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77 are no longer enforceable.
"Unless employee Dabuet has some leave credits to set-off for his absences from work during the periods of his verbal sick leaves from May 10, 1977 to May 16, 1977 and from May 18, 1977 to July 31, 1977, and his absences without leave (AWOL) on May 17, 1977 and from August 1, 1977 to September 5, 1977, including his previous absences and those without leave of absence which were the basis of the first clearance application filed by the petitioner corporation, he cannot be entitled to any compensation for those days under the principle of ‘no-work-no-pay.’
"Consequently, employee Ponciano Dabuet cannot be legally entitled to backwages from August 1, 1977 ‘until date of his actual reinstatement’ because: (1) from August 1, 1977 to September 5, 1977, he has been absent without leave, and not entitled to any compensation under the principle of ‘no-work-no-pay’; and (2) from September 6, 1977 and up to the present, he can no longer be validly and legally reinstated to his former position with the petitioner corporation because he was included in the Order dated September 6, 1977 issued by Regional Director Yanuario in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 8-10-77, which had already become final and executory, approving the second clearance application to terminate the employment of 460 employees, one of whom is employee Dabuet himself, due to business reverses.
"All the foregoing demonstrate clearly that herein public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders in CDO-STF-APP Case No.7-5-77, subject of the instant petition, insofar as employee Ponciano Dabuet is concerned, more particularly, the directives therein to reinstate him to his former position with petitioner corporation and to pay him backwages from August 1, 1977 until actual reinstatement." 1
The Court finds the foregoing considerations to be in accordance with law and the record, and dispensing with the filing of memoranda, grants the petition.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
One final observation. The Court is not inclined to act favorably on the Solicitor General’s recommendation that "if at all," respondent be deemed "entitled to collect separation pay . . . as a result of his being included in the partial shutdown or partial termination of employees, he being considered legally and finally terminated from employment as of September 5, 1977" for two reasons: first, such separation pay should have been sought but was not granted in the long final and executed order of September 29, 1977 granting the second clearance application, under the provisions of Article 284 of the Labor Code on reduction of personnel; and secondly, the record of his absences without leave as shown above 2 shows him clearly to be culpable of habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of his duties, so much so that on July 22, 1977, petitioner was constrained to file its first clearance application to terminate officially his services since he had been absent and had not reported for work since May 17, 1977 to the time of his termination on September 5, 1977 under the clearance given in public respondents’ Order of September 29, 1977 in the second clearance application. Thus, even conceding his alleged oral sick leave from May 18, 1977 to July 31, 1977, there was no justification for his continued failure to report for work since August 1, 1977 and thereafter, and the first clearance application should likewise have been granted for just cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code, forfeiting his right to any separation pay.
ACCORDINGLY, the Orders of December 22, 1980 and August 13, 1981 of respondent Minister affirming respondent director’s Order of September 22, 1977 are hereby set aside and the restraining order of November 8, 1981 against their enforcement is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera and Plana, JJ., concur.
The Solicitor General and his assistants in their comment of January 6, 1982, as counsel for public respondents, agree that petitioner has valid cause for complaint and that the challenged orders were issued "with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction," thus:chanrobles law library : red
"It should be emphasized here that the first and second clearance applications were filed by the petitioner corporation barely one month between each other, with the same MOLE Regional Office; both were heard by the same labor arbiter, Marianito Dilao, and decided by the same regional director, Carmelo Yanuario. The decision in the first clearance application, CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77, was issued on September 22, 1977 while the decision in the second clearance application, CDO-STF-APP Case No. 8-10-77 was issued on September 29, 1977, which is barely five days between each other. The decision in the first clearance was seasonably appealed by the petitioner corporation on October 10, 1977 to the Minister of Labor and Employment (See Annex ‘C,’ id.) while the decision in the second clearance application became final and executory, since not one of the 460 employees affected by the shutdown or termination appealed from said decision.
"Consequently, the aforesaid Order dated September 22, 1977 in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77 is legally considered pending appeal, which was its status, when the Order dated September 29, 1977 in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 8-10-77 became final and executory, which was also before respondent Minister of Labor & Employment issued his Order dated December 22, 1980, dismissing petitioner corporation’s appeal in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77 (see Exhibit ‘E’, Petition). Such being the case, the final and executory Order dated September 29, 1977 in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 8-10-77 may be deemed to have mooted the Order dated September 22, 1977 in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77 which was pending appeal. And this latter order is the subject of the instant petition before this Honorable Supreme Court. The former Order, which had already become final and executory, has superseded and rendered unenforceable the latter Order, even if the instant petition is granted.
"In his Order dated December 22, 1980, respondent Minister of Labor & Employment stated, in denying the motion for reconsideration of his previous order dismissing the appeal of the petitioner corporation in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77, that nothing is shown from the records that an Order had already been issued, approving the second clearance application of the petitioner corporation to terminate the services of 460 employees, one of whom is employee Ponciano Dabuet himself. Such observation is inaccurate. Precisely, in its motion for reconsideration and/or appeal dated October 19, 1977 filed in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77, petitioner corporation called the attention of the respondent Minister of Labor & Employment to this fact. Respondent Minister of Labor & Employment, it being an administrative proceeding, should have directed the regional office to forward to him the records of CDO-STF-APP Case No. 8-10-77 to verify the allegations of the petitioner corporation of the existence of such final and executory order.
C. Employee Ponciano Dabuet not having been illegally dismissed, is not entitled to reinstatement nor to backwages in view of the circumstances obtaining, involving the two clearance applications of the petitioner corporation.
"In view of the circumstances obtaining, involving the two clearance applications of the petitioner corporation insofar as they affect employee Ponciano Dabbet, the herein questioned orders in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 7-5-77 are no longer enforceable.
"Unless employee Dabuet has some leave credits to set-off for his absences from work during the periods of his verbal sick leaves from May 10, 1977 to May 16, 1977 and from May 18, 1977 to July 31, 1977, and his absences without leave (AWOL) on May 17, 1977 and from August 1, 1977 to September 5, 1977, including his previous absences and those without leave of absence which were the basis of the first clearance application filed by the petitioner corporation, he cannot be entitled to any compensation for those days under the principle of ‘no-work-no-pay.’
"Consequently, employee Ponciano Dabuet cannot be legally entitled to backwages from August 1, 1977 ‘until date of his actual reinstatement’ because: (1) from August 1, 1977 to September 5, 1977, he has been absent without leave, and not entitled to any compensation under the principle of ‘no-work-no-pay’; and (2) from September 6, 1977 and up to the present, he can no longer be validly and legally reinstated to his former position with the petitioner corporation because he was included in the Order dated September 6, 1977 issued by Regional Director Yanuario in CDO-STF-APP Case No. 8-10-77, which had already become final and executory, approving the second clearance application to terminate the employment of 460 employees, one of whom is employee Dabuet himself, due to business reverses.
x x x
"All the foregoing demonstrate clearly that herein public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders in CDO-STF-APP Case No.7-5-77, subject of the instant petition, insofar as employee Ponciano Dabuet is concerned, more particularly, the directives therein to reinstate him to his former position with petitioner corporation and to pay him backwages from August 1, 1977 until actual reinstatement." 1
The Court finds the foregoing considerations to be in accordance with law and the record, and dispensing with the filing of memoranda, grants the petition.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
One final observation. The Court is not inclined to act favorably on the Solicitor General’s recommendation that "if at all," respondent be deemed "entitled to collect separation pay . . . as a result of his being included in the partial shutdown or partial termination of employees, he being considered legally and finally terminated from employment as of September 5, 1977" for two reasons: first, such separation pay should have been sought but was not granted in the long final and executed order of September 29, 1977 granting the second clearance application, under the provisions of Article 284 of the Labor Code on reduction of personnel; and secondly, the record of his absences without leave as shown above 2 shows him clearly to be culpable of habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of his duties, so much so that on July 22, 1977, petitioner was constrained to file its first clearance application to terminate officially his services since he had been absent and had not reported for work since May 17, 1977 to the time of his termination on September 5, 1977 under the clearance given in public respondents’ Order of September 29, 1977 in the second clearance application. Thus, even conceding his alleged oral sick leave from May 18, 1977 to July 31, 1977, there was no justification for his continued failure to report for work since August 1, 1977 and thereafter, and the first clearance application should likewise have been granted for just cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code, forfeiting his right to any separation pay.
ACCORDINGLY, the Orders of December 22, 1980 and August 13, 1981 of respondent Minister affirming respondent director’s Order of September 22, 1977 are hereby set aside and the restraining order of November 8, 1981 against their enforcement is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera and Plana, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Solicitor General’s Comment, pages 14-18.
2. Supra, at page 3 hereof.
