July 1982 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-59283 July 30, 1982 - CRISANTO MOLINO v. COURT OF APPEALS
201 Phil. 385:
201 Phil. 385:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-59283. July 30, 1982.]
SPOUSES CRISANTO MOLINO and LORETO MOLINO, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ERNESTO M. MENDOZA, DISTRICT JUDGE CAR FIFTEENTH REGIONAL DISTRICT BRANCH II, SURIGAO CITY, HEIRS OF NICOLASA QUINTOS BY ROSITA Q. PIMENTEL, Respondents.
Amable S. Pagonzaga, for Petitioners.
Romeo Buenaflor for Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
In CAR Case No. 32 for "Recovery of Possession of Leased Agricultural Land With Damages," the plaintiffs obtained a favorable judgment after an ex-parte trial, defendants and their counsel having failed to appear at the hearing despite due notice and having filed instead a telegraphic motion to reset the hearing which the court denied. In a motion for reconsideration, the defendants claimed that they were not afforded due process when the trial court proceeded with the ex-parte trial despite the telegraphic motion to reset the hearing sent by their counsel. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court held that P. D. No. 946, which authorizes ex-parte hearing provided both counsel and parties have been duly notified, cannot be deemed repugnant to due process, since it has been promulgated for the purpose, among others, of the speedy disposition of cases and it has a counterpart in the constitutional provision of Section 19, Article IV.
Petition denied for lack of merit.
The Supreme Court held that P. D. No. 946, which authorizes ex-parte hearing provided both counsel and parties have been duly notified, cannot be deemed repugnant to due process, since it has been promulgated for the purpose, among others, of the speedy disposition of cases and it has a counterpart in the constitutional provision of Section 19, Article IV.
Petition denied for lack of merit.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; AGRARIAN LAWS; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 946; PURPOSE OF ISSUANCE. — One of the important reasons for the promulgation of P. D. No. 946 is expressed in the following preambular words: ". . . to streamline their (Courts of Agrarian Relations) procedures to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive disposition of agrarian cases." It can thus be seen that speedy disposition of cases is the key phrase. For this purpose, the decree contains provisions to hasten the disposition of cases and avoid frustrating interminable delays.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISION ON EX-PARTE HEARING NOT REPUGNANT TO DUE PROCESS. — The purpose of the Presidential Decree No. 946 is desirable and the means provided to accomplish it are reasonable. In particular the provision which authorizes ex-parte hearing provided both counsel and parties have been duly notified has a counterpart in the constitutional provisions of Article IV, Section 19, and, therefore, cannot be deemed repugnant to due process.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISION ON EX-PARTE HEARING NOT REPUGNANT TO DUE PROCESS. — The purpose of the Presidential Decree No. 946 is desirable and the means provided to accomplish it are reasonable. In particular the provision which authorizes ex-parte hearing provided both counsel and parties have been duly notified has a counterpart in the constitutional provisions of Article IV, Section 19, and, therefore, cannot be deemed repugnant to due process.
R E S O L U T I O N
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This concerns a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed a judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch II at Surigao City.
The petition lacks merit and could have been denied in a minute resolution but for the fact that the petitioners raised an important legal question before the CAR when they moved for the reconsideration of its judgment but which that court did not discuss adequately and the Court of Appeals ignored it entirely so that We feel that the ends of justice will best be served by a signed resolution.
CAR Case No. 32 was filed by the private respondents against the petitioners for "Recovery of Possession of Leased Agricultural Land With Damages." In its Judgment dated July 29, 1980, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The judgment contains the following statements:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"During the hearing, the defendants, their counsel and witnesses, did not appear despite due notice of the said hearing as borne out by the signatures of both counsels on the notice of hearing and receipt thereof dated May 14, 1980, (page 86 of the records). Despite due notice, the defendants, through counsel, filed telegraphic motion to reset the hearing to August 18, 19 and 20, 1980; said motion of the counsel for the defendants was denied for lack of merit.
"Pursuant to Section 17, P.D. 946, the absence of the defendants’ counsel can not be a ground for postponement of the scheduled hearing for they were duly notified of the dates of the hearing. Consequently, trial, ex-parte, was conducted and the Court received the plaintiffs’ evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library
The defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration invoking, inter alia, the following grounds:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"I. Section 17, of PD 946 does not confer upon the Honorable Presiding Judge the power to render judgment without giving the parties their day in Court;
"II. The judgment of the Honorable Court dated July 29, 1980 is an obvious violation of due process."cralaw virtua1aw library
In its Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the lower court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A telegraphic motion, especially of the kind sent by counsel for defendants, is not deserving and does not deserve consideration of the Courts of Agrarian Relations. Parties and counsels should not rely on the liberality of the Court that their motion, like a telegraphic motion, will be granted. It is likewise noteworthy to state that defendants’ counsel telegraphic motion does not even mention that a medical certificate will follow for the Court to believe that it is not interposed for delay. Up to that time this case was decided on July 29, 1980 and even up to this time (October 11, 1980), no such medical certificate was submitted by defendants. Section 17, Presidential Decree No. 946, provided that the absence of counsel of any or both the parties shall not be a ground for postponement or continuance, provided they were duly notified.
"As stated in their motion for reconsideration, the main thrust of defendants’ arguments is that they were allegedly not afforded due process. They lost sight of the fact that under Section 1, Rule 18 of the Uniform Rules of Procedures of the Courts of Agrarian Relations, motions for reconsideration shall be based on only two (2) grounds, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. That the findings of facts in the said decision or order are not supported by substantial evidence; and
2. That the conclusions stated therein are against the law and jurisprudence.
"The motion for reconsideration failed to point out, to the satisfaction of this Court, valid and convincing arguments that the decision of this Court is not supported by substantial evidence and that it is against the law and jurisprudence."cralaw virtua1aw library
The claim that there was a denial of due process was made in relation to the ex-parte trial and not on the Motion for Reconsideration and for this reason the trial court was off-tangent in answering the claim.cralawnad
Appeal was then made by the defendants to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment on the ground that it is supported by substantial evidence. The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda but only the plaintiffs who are now the private respondents elected to do so.
The two grounds quoted above from the Motion for Reconsideration may be reduced to this single legal question: Was the ex-parte trial legal?
We have to answer in the affirmative.
One of the important reasons for the promulgation of P.D. No. 946 is expressed in the following preambular words: ". . . to streamline their [Courts of Agrarian Relations] procedures to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive disposition of agrarian cases."cralaw virtua1aw library
It can thus be seen that speedy disposition of cases is the key phrase. For this purpose, the decree contains the following provisions, among others, in order to hasten the disposition of cases and avoid frustrating interminable delays:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a)." . . the Court shall proceed with the trial, which shall be continuous until terminated. The absence of counsel of any or both the parties shall not be a ground for postponement or continuance, provided they were duly notified. No motion to dismiss shall be entertained at any stage of the proceedings." (Sec. 17, par. 1.)
(b) "No order of the Courts of Agrarian Relations on any issue, question, matter or incident raised before them shall be contested in any action or proceeding before the appellate courts until the hearing shall have been terminated and the case decided on the merits." (Sec. 17, par. 2.)
(c) "Only one motion for reconsideration [of an order or decision] shall be allowed a party." (Sec. 18, par. 2.)
(d) "The Court of Agrarian Relations shall forward to the Court of Appeals the complete records of the case within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a notice of appeal." (Sec. 18, par. 4.) This does away with the time consuming procedure for submitting a record on appeal.
(e) "Appeal shall not stay the decision or order except where the ejectment of a tenant-farmer, agricultural lessee or tiller, settler, or amortizing owner-cultivator is directed." (Sec. 18, par. 5.)
(f) "Upon receipt of the records of the case from the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Court of Appeals may, if it deems necessary, require the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice; the appellate court shall decide the case within thirty (30) days from receipt of said records or memoranda." (Sec. 18, par. 6.)
(g) "No motion for rehearing or reconsideration shall be allowed in the Court of Appeals." (Sec. 18, par. 7.)
(h) "Upon the effectivity of this Decree, the Court of Appeals shall designate at least two (2) of its Divisions to which all appealed agrarian cases shall be assigned and those cases shall have priority over other cases." (Sec. 18, par. 9.)
(i) "The decisions or orders of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari only on questions of law, within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt by the appellant of a copy of the decision or order." (Sec 18, par. 10.)
The aforestated purpose of the statute is desirable and the means provided to accomplish it are reasonable. In particular the provision which authorizes ex-parte hearing provided both counsel and parties have been duly notified has a constitutional counterpart and, therefore, cannot be deemed repugnant to due process. Thus the Constitution states: ". . . after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." (Art. IV, Sec. 19.)cralawnad
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
The petition lacks merit and could have been denied in a minute resolution but for the fact that the petitioners raised an important legal question before the CAR when they moved for the reconsideration of its judgment but which that court did not discuss adequately and the Court of Appeals ignored it entirely so that We feel that the ends of justice will best be served by a signed resolution.
CAR Case No. 32 was filed by the private respondents against the petitioners for "Recovery of Possession of Leased Agricultural Land With Damages." In its Judgment dated July 29, 1980, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The judgment contains the following statements:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"During the hearing, the defendants, their counsel and witnesses, did not appear despite due notice of the said hearing as borne out by the signatures of both counsels on the notice of hearing and receipt thereof dated May 14, 1980, (page 86 of the records). Despite due notice, the defendants, through counsel, filed telegraphic motion to reset the hearing to August 18, 19 and 20, 1980; said motion of the counsel for the defendants was denied for lack of merit.
"Pursuant to Section 17, P.D. 946, the absence of the defendants’ counsel can not be a ground for postponement of the scheduled hearing for they were duly notified of the dates of the hearing. Consequently, trial, ex-parte, was conducted and the Court received the plaintiffs’ evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library
The defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration invoking, inter alia, the following grounds:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"I. Section 17, of PD 946 does not confer upon the Honorable Presiding Judge the power to render judgment without giving the parties their day in Court;
"II. The judgment of the Honorable Court dated July 29, 1980 is an obvious violation of due process."cralaw virtua1aw library
In its Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the lower court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A telegraphic motion, especially of the kind sent by counsel for defendants, is not deserving and does not deserve consideration of the Courts of Agrarian Relations. Parties and counsels should not rely on the liberality of the Court that their motion, like a telegraphic motion, will be granted. It is likewise noteworthy to state that defendants’ counsel telegraphic motion does not even mention that a medical certificate will follow for the Court to believe that it is not interposed for delay. Up to that time this case was decided on July 29, 1980 and even up to this time (October 11, 1980), no such medical certificate was submitted by defendants. Section 17, Presidential Decree No. 946, provided that the absence of counsel of any or both the parties shall not be a ground for postponement or continuance, provided they were duly notified.
"As stated in their motion for reconsideration, the main thrust of defendants’ arguments is that they were allegedly not afforded due process. They lost sight of the fact that under Section 1, Rule 18 of the Uniform Rules of Procedures of the Courts of Agrarian Relations, motions for reconsideration shall be based on only two (2) grounds, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. That the findings of facts in the said decision or order are not supported by substantial evidence; and
2. That the conclusions stated therein are against the law and jurisprudence.
"The motion for reconsideration failed to point out, to the satisfaction of this Court, valid and convincing arguments that the decision of this Court is not supported by substantial evidence and that it is against the law and jurisprudence."cralaw virtua1aw library
The claim that there was a denial of due process was made in relation to the ex-parte trial and not on the Motion for Reconsideration and for this reason the trial court was off-tangent in answering the claim.cralawnad
Appeal was then made by the defendants to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment on the ground that it is supported by substantial evidence. The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda but only the plaintiffs who are now the private respondents elected to do so.
The two grounds quoted above from the Motion for Reconsideration may be reduced to this single legal question: Was the ex-parte trial legal?
We have to answer in the affirmative.
One of the important reasons for the promulgation of P.D. No. 946 is expressed in the following preambular words: ". . . to streamline their [Courts of Agrarian Relations] procedures to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive disposition of agrarian cases."cralaw virtua1aw library
It can thus be seen that speedy disposition of cases is the key phrase. For this purpose, the decree contains the following provisions, among others, in order to hasten the disposition of cases and avoid frustrating interminable delays:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a)." . . the Court shall proceed with the trial, which shall be continuous until terminated. The absence of counsel of any or both the parties shall not be a ground for postponement or continuance, provided they were duly notified. No motion to dismiss shall be entertained at any stage of the proceedings." (Sec. 17, par. 1.)
(b) "No order of the Courts of Agrarian Relations on any issue, question, matter or incident raised before them shall be contested in any action or proceeding before the appellate courts until the hearing shall have been terminated and the case decided on the merits." (Sec. 17, par. 2.)
(c) "Only one motion for reconsideration [of an order or decision] shall be allowed a party." (Sec. 18, par. 2.)
(d) "The Court of Agrarian Relations shall forward to the Court of Appeals the complete records of the case within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a notice of appeal." (Sec. 18, par. 4.) This does away with the time consuming procedure for submitting a record on appeal.
(e) "Appeal shall not stay the decision or order except where the ejectment of a tenant-farmer, agricultural lessee or tiller, settler, or amortizing owner-cultivator is directed." (Sec. 18, par. 5.)
(f) "Upon receipt of the records of the case from the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Court of Appeals may, if it deems necessary, require the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice; the appellate court shall decide the case within thirty (30) days from receipt of said records or memoranda." (Sec. 18, par. 6.)
(g) "No motion for rehearing or reconsideration shall be allowed in the Court of Appeals." (Sec. 18, par. 7.)
(h) "Upon the effectivity of this Decree, the Court of Appeals shall designate at least two (2) of its Divisions to which all appealed agrarian cases shall be assigned and those cases shall have priority over other cases." (Sec. 18, par. 9.)
(i) "The decisions or orders of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari only on questions of law, within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt by the appellant of a copy of the decision or order." (Sec 18, par. 10.)
The aforestated purpose of the statute is desirable and the means provided to accomplish it are reasonable. In particular the provision which authorizes ex-parte hearing provided both counsel and parties have been duly notified has a constitutional counterpart and, therefore, cannot be deemed repugnant to due process. Thus the Constitution states: ". . . after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." (Art. IV, Sec. 19.)cralawnad
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
