February 1983 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-39641 February 28, 1983 - METROPOL (BACOLOD) FINANCING & INVESTMENT CORP. v. SAMBOK MOTORS CO.
205 Phil. 758:
205 Phil. 758:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-39641. February 28, 1983.]
METROPOL (BACOLOD) FINANCING & INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAMBOK MOTORS COMPANY and NG SAMBOK SONS MOTORS CO., LTD., Defendants-Appellants.
Rizal Quimpo & Cornelio P. Revena for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Diosdado Garingalao, for Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. MERCANTILE LAW; PROMISSORY NOTE; QUALIFIED INDORSEMENT; EFFECT THEREOF. — A qualified indorsement constitutes the indorser a mere assignor of the title to the instrument. It may be made by adding to the indorser’s signature the words "without recourse" or any words of similar import. Such an indorsement relieves the indorser of the general obligation to pay if the instrument is dishonored but not of the liability arising from warranties on the instrument as provided in Section 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. However, appellant Sambok indorse the note "with recourse’’ and even waived the notice of demand, dishonor, protest and presentment.
2. ID.; ID.; ADDITION OF THE WORDS "WITH RECOURSE" DO NOT MAKE THE INDORSEMENT QUALIFIED; CASE AT BAR. — Appellant, by indorsing the note "with recourse’’ does not make itself a qualified indorser but a general indorser who is secondarily liable, because by such indorsement, it agreed that if Dr. Villaruel fails to pay the note, plaintiff-appellee can go after said appellant. The effect of such indorsement is that the note was indorsed without qualification. A person who indorses without qualification engages that on due presentment, the note shall be accepted or paid, or both as the case may be, and that if it be dishonored, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder. Appellant Sambok’s intention of indorsing the note without qualification is made even more apparent by the fact that the notice of’ demand, dishonor, protest and presentment were all waived. The words added by said appellant do not limit his liability, but rather confirm his obligations as a general indorser.
3. ID.; ID.; AFTER DISHONORED BY NON-PAYMENT, PERSON SECONDARILY LIABLE BECOMES THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR. — The lower court did not err in not declaring appellant as only secondarily liable because after an instrument is dishonored by, non-payment. the person secondarily liable thereon ceases to be such and becomes a principal debtor. His liability becomes the same as that of the original obligor. Consequently, the holder need not even proceed against the maker before suing the indorser.
2. ID.; ID.; ADDITION OF THE WORDS "WITH RECOURSE" DO NOT MAKE THE INDORSEMENT QUALIFIED; CASE AT BAR. — Appellant, by indorsing the note "with recourse’’ does not make itself a qualified indorser but a general indorser who is secondarily liable, because by such indorsement, it agreed that if Dr. Villaruel fails to pay the note, plaintiff-appellee can go after said appellant. The effect of such indorsement is that the note was indorsed without qualification. A person who indorses without qualification engages that on due presentment, the note shall be accepted or paid, or both as the case may be, and that if it be dishonored, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder. Appellant Sambok’s intention of indorsing the note without qualification is made even more apparent by the fact that the notice of’ demand, dishonor, protest and presentment were all waived. The words added by said appellant do not limit his liability, but rather confirm his obligations as a general indorser.
3. ID.; ID.; AFTER DISHONORED BY NON-PAYMENT, PERSON SECONDARILY LIABLE BECOMES THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR. — The lower court did not err in not declaring appellant as only secondarily liable because after an instrument is dishonored by, non-payment. the person secondarily liable thereon ceases to be such and becomes a principal debtor. His liability becomes the same as that of the original obligor. Consequently, the holder need not even proceed against the maker before suing the indorser.
D E C I S I O N
DE CASTRO, J.:
The former Court of Appeals, by its resolution dated October 16, 1974 certified this case to this Court the issue raised therein being one purely of law.
On April 15, 1969 Dr. Javier Villaruel executed a promissory note in favor of Ng Sambok Sons Motors Co., Ltd., in the amount of P15,939.00 payable in twelve (12) equal monthly installments, beginning May 18, 1969, with interest at the rate of one percent per month. It is further provided that in case on non-payment of any of the installments, the total principal sum then remaining unpaid shall become due and payable with an additional interest equal to twenty-five percent of the total amount due.chanrobles law library
On the same date, Sambok Motors Company (hereinafter referred to as Sambok), a sister company of Ng Sambok Sons Motors Co., Ltd., and under the same management as the former, negotiated and indorsed the note in favor of plaintiff Metropol Financing & Investment Corporation with the following indorsement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Pay to the order of Metropol Bacolod Financing & Investment Corporation with recourse. Notice of Demand; Dishonor; Protest; and Presentment are hereby waived.
SAMBOK MOTORS CO. (BACOLOD)
By:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
RODOLFO G. NONILLO
Asst. General Manager"
The maker, Dr. Villaruel defaulted in the payment of his installments when they became due, so on October 30, 1969 plaintiff formally presented the promissory note for payment to the maker. Dr. Villaruel failed to pay the promissory note as demanded, hence plaintiff notified Sambok as indorsee of said note of the fact that the same has been dishonored and demanded payment.
Sambok failed to pay, so on November 26, 1969 plaintiff filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch I. Sambok did not deny its liability but contended that it could not be obliged to pay until after its co-defendant Dr. Villaruel, has been declared insolvent.
During the pendency of the case in the trial court, defendant Dr. Villaruel died, hence, on October 24, 1972 the lower court, on motion, dismissed the case against Dr. Villaruel pursuant to Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 1
On plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court rendered its decision dated September 12, 1973, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Ordering Sambok Motors Company to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P15,939.00 plus the legal rate of interest from October 30, 1969;
"(b) Ordering same defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum equivalent to 25% of P15,939.00 plus interest thereon until fully paid; andchanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"(c) To pay the cost of suit."cralaw virtua1aw library
Not satisfied with the decision, the present appeal was instituted, appellant Sambok raising a lone assignment of error as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint by finding defendant-appellant Sambok Motors Company as assignor and a qualified indorsee of the subject promissory note and in not holding it as only secondarily liable thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appellant Sambok argues that by adding the words "with recourse" in the indorsement of the note, it becomes a qualified indorser; that being a qualified indorser, it does not warrant that if said note is dishonored by the maker on presentment, it will pay the amount to the holder; that it only warrants the following pursuant to Section 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law: (a) that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be; (b) that he has a good title to it; (c) that all prior parties had capacity to contract; (d) that he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or render it valueless.
The appeal is without merit.
A qualified indorsement constitutes the indorser a mere assignor of the title to the instrument. It may be made by adding to the indorser’s signature the words "without recourse" or any words of similar import. 2 Such an indorsement relieves the indorser of the general obligation to pay if the instrument is dishonored but not of the liability arising from warranties on the instrument as provided in Section 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law already mentioned herein. However, appellant Sambok indorsed the note "with recourse" and even waived the notice of demand, dishonor, protest and presentment.
"Recourse" means resort to a person who is secondarily liable after the default of the person who is primarily liable. 3 Appellant, by indorsing the note "with recourse" does not make itself a qualified indorser but a general indorser who is secondarily liable, because by such indorsement, it agreed that if Dr. Villaruel fails to pay the note, plaintiff-appellee can go after said appellant. The effect of such indorsement is that the note was indorsed without qualification. A person who indorses without qualification engages that on due presentment, the note shall be accepted or paid, or both as the case may be, and that if it be dishonored, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder. 4 Appellant Sambok’s intention of indorsing the note without qualification is made even more apparent by the fact that the notice of demand, dishonor, protest and presentment were all waived. The words added by said appellant do not limit his liability, but rather confirm his obligation as a general indorser.
Lastly, the lower court did not err in not declaring appellant as only secondarily liable because after an instrument is dishonored by non-payment, the person secondarily liable thereon ceases to be such and becomes a principal debtor. 5 His liability becomes the same as that of the original obligor. 6 Consequently, the holder need not even proceed against the maker before suing the indorser.chanrobles law library
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., is on leave.
Abad Santos, J., I concur and wish to add the observation that the appeal could have been treated as a petition for review under R.A. 5440 and dismissed by minute resolution.
On April 15, 1969 Dr. Javier Villaruel executed a promissory note in favor of Ng Sambok Sons Motors Co., Ltd., in the amount of P15,939.00 payable in twelve (12) equal monthly installments, beginning May 18, 1969, with interest at the rate of one percent per month. It is further provided that in case on non-payment of any of the installments, the total principal sum then remaining unpaid shall become due and payable with an additional interest equal to twenty-five percent of the total amount due.chanrobles law library
On the same date, Sambok Motors Company (hereinafter referred to as Sambok), a sister company of Ng Sambok Sons Motors Co., Ltd., and under the same management as the former, negotiated and indorsed the note in favor of plaintiff Metropol Financing & Investment Corporation with the following indorsement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Pay to the order of Metropol Bacolod Financing & Investment Corporation with recourse. Notice of Demand; Dishonor; Protest; and Presentment are hereby waived.
SAMBOK MOTORS CO. (BACOLOD)
By:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
RODOLFO G. NONILLO
Asst. General Manager"
The maker, Dr. Villaruel defaulted in the payment of his installments when they became due, so on October 30, 1969 plaintiff formally presented the promissory note for payment to the maker. Dr. Villaruel failed to pay the promissory note as demanded, hence plaintiff notified Sambok as indorsee of said note of the fact that the same has been dishonored and demanded payment.
Sambok failed to pay, so on November 26, 1969 plaintiff filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch I. Sambok did not deny its liability but contended that it could not be obliged to pay until after its co-defendant Dr. Villaruel, has been declared insolvent.
During the pendency of the case in the trial court, defendant Dr. Villaruel died, hence, on October 24, 1972 the lower court, on motion, dismissed the case against Dr. Villaruel pursuant to Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 1
On plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court rendered its decision dated September 12, 1973, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Ordering Sambok Motors Company to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P15,939.00 plus the legal rate of interest from October 30, 1969;
"(b) Ordering same defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum equivalent to 25% of P15,939.00 plus interest thereon until fully paid; andchanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"(c) To pay the cost of suit."cralaw virtua1aw library
Not satisfied with the decision, the present appeal was instituted, appellant Sambok raising a lone assignment of error as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint by finding defendant-appellant Sambok Motors Company as assignor and a qualified indorsee of the subject promissory note and in not holding it as only secondarily liable thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appellant Sambok argues that by adding the words "with recourse" in the indorsement of the note, it becomes a qualified indorser; that being a qualified indorser, it does not warrant that if said note is dishonored by the maker on presentment, it will pay the amount to the holder; that it only warrants the following pursuant to Section 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law: (a) that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be; (b) that he has a good title to it; (c) that all prior parties had capacity to contract; (d) that he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or render it valueless.
The appeal is without merit.
A qualified indorsement constitutes the indorser a mere assignor of the title to the instrument. It may be made by adding to the indorser’s signature the words "without recourse" or any words of similar import. 2 Such an indorsement relieves the indorser of the general obligation to pay if the instrument is dishonored but not of the liability arising from warranties on the instrument as provided in Section 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law already mentioned herein. However, appellant Sambok indorsed the note "with recourse" and even waived the notice of demand, dishonor, protest and presentment.
"Recourse" means resort to a person who is secondarily liable after the default of the person who is primarily liable. 3 Appellant, by indorsing the note "with recourse" does not make itself a qualified indorser but a general indorser who is secondarily liable, because by such indorsement, it agreed that if Dr. Villaruel fails to pay the note, plaintiff-appellee can go after said appellant. The effect of such indorsement is that the note was indorsed without qualification. A person who indorses without qualification engages that on due presentment, the note shall be accepted or paid, or both as the case may be, and that if it be dishonored, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder. 4 Appellant Sambok’s intention of indorsing the note without qualification is made even more apparent by the fact that the notice of demand, dishonor, protest and presentment were all waived. The words added by said appellant do not limit his liability, but rather confirm his obligation as a general indorser.
Lastly, the lower court did not err in not declaring appellant as only secondarily liable because after an instrument is dishonored by non-payment, the person secondarily liable thereon ceases to be such and becomes a principal debtor. 5 His liability becomes the same as that of the original obligor. 6 Consequently, the holder need not even proceed against the maker before suing the indorser.chanrobles law library
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., is on leave.
Abad Santos, J., I concur and wish to add the observation that the appeal could have been treated as a petition for review under R.A. 5440 and dismissed by minute resolution.
Endnotes:
1. Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive. — When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules.
2. Section 38, The Negotiable Instruments Law.
3. Ogden, The Law of Negotiable Instruments, p. 200 citing Industrial Bank and Trust Company v. Hesselberg, 195 S.W. (2d) 470.
4. Ang Tiong v. Ting, 22 SCRA 715.
5. Pittsburg Westmoreland Coal, v. Kerr, 15 N.E.
6. American Bank v. Macondray & Co., 4 Phil. 695.
