Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence


Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1985 > March 1985 Decisions > G.R. No. 39537 March 19, 1985 - IRENE REYES v. COURT OF APPEALS:




PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 39537. March 19, 1985.]

IRENE REYES (alias IRENE RAMERO, alias IRENE DELGADO), MOISES VILLANUEVA and GENOVEVA RAMERO, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PLACIDA DELGADO, DOMINGO DELGADO, PAULA. DELGADO and MAXIMINA DELGADO, Respondents.

Ruben M. Orteza for Petitioner.

Leovigildo L. Cerilla for Private Respondents.


SYLLABUS


1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; TO INHERIT, AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD MUST BE RECOGNIZED. — The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit must be first recognized voluntarily or by court action is well settled in Our Jurisprudence (Bercilles v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]).

2. ID.; PERSONS; CLASSIFICATION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; TO CLASSIFY UNRECOGNIZED NATURAL CHILDREN UNDER THE CLASS OF SPURIOUS CHILDREN IS NOT LEGALLY POSSIBLE. — There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock. They may be either natural (actually or by fiction) or spurious (the incestuous, adulterous or illicit). Natural children are defined as those born outside of wedlock of parents, who at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to many each other (Article 269, New Civil Code). On the other hand, spurious children are those born of parents, who at the time of their conception, are disqualified to marry each other on account of certain impediment. Because of this basic distinction between these children, it is not legally class possible to classify unrecognized natural children under the class of spurious children.

3. ID.; ID.; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN OTHER THAN NATURAL, UNDER ARTICLE 287 OF THE CIVIL CODE; REFERS TO NATURAL CHILD PROPER BY BIRTH AND WHO HAVE NOT SECURED RECOGNITION. — Besides, commentators construe the phrase "illegitimate children other than natural" as excluding from the grants of rights under Article 287 of the New Civil Code those children who are natural child proper by birth and who have not secured voluntary or compulsory recognition (p. 276. An Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. 1). They fall within the scope of the definition of natural children enumerated in Article 269, New Civil Code (p. 142, Civil Law. Reviewer, D. Jurado, 1982 ed.).

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNRECOGNIZED NATURAL CHILD HAS NO RIGHTS AGAINST PARENT OR HIS ESTATE; RIGHT SPRINGS FROM ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY THE NATURAL PARENTS. — It is an elementary and basic principle under the old and new Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural child has no rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His rights spring not from the filiation itself, but from the child’s acknowledgment by the natural parent (Alabat v. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [19671]).

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECOGNITION; CERTIFIED COPY OF BIRTH CERTIFICATE, NOT SUFFICIENT RECOGNITION. — It can be seen from the record of birth (Exhibit "L-2") that the name of the petitioner was Irene Ramero, and signed by Genoveva Ramero and of an unknown father. This was certified to by the treasurer of the municipality of Alitagtag, Batangas (Exhibits "L" and "L-1"). Another certified copy of another birth certificate issued by the municipal treasurer and local civil registrar of the municipality of Alitagtag (Exhibit "20") stated therein that the name of the child is Irene Ramero, and the name of the father is "Francisco" and the mother "Genoveva Ramero." Any of these records of birth cannot be sufficient recognition under the law.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BIRTH CERTIFICATE MUST BE SIGNED EITHER JOINTLY BY THE FATHER AND MOTHER OR BY THE MOTHER ALONE. — The birth certificate to be sufficient recognition must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses, otherwise she may be penalized (Sec. 5, Act 3753; Madredejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]); and if the alleged father did not sign in the birth certificate. the placing of his name by the mother, or doctor or registrar is incompetent evidence of paternity of said child (Bercilles v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984], Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil 1050 [1958]). Since any of the certificates of birth presented were not signed by Francisco Delgado, it cannot be taken as record of birth to prove recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can this birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument (Pareja v. Pareja, 95 Phil. 167 [1954]).

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATE OF BAPTISM IS NOT PROOF OF RECOGNITION. — Irene’s certificate of baptism (Exhibit "1") cannot be taken as proof of recognition (Bercilles v. GSIS, supra; People v. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [1968]; Vudaurrazaga v. CA, 91 Phil. 492 [1952]; Capistrano v. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 [1907]. In the case of Macadangdang v. CA, 100 SCRA 73 [1980]), this Court said that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NEITHER STUDENT PERMANENT RECORD NOR WRITTEN CONSENT TO FATHER’S OPERATION CAN BE TAKEN AS AN AUTHENTIC WRITING. — Irene’s secondary student permanent record (Exhibits "12", "13", "15" and "16") nor the written consent given by Irene to the operation of her alleged father (Exhibit "4") cannot be taken as an authentic writing. An authentic writing does not have to be a public instrument; it is sufficient that it is genuine and not a forgery. It must generally be signed by the alleged parent (Madredejo v. De Leon, supra) unless the whole instrument is in the handwriting of the alleged parent and the facts mentioned therein correspond to actual and real facts (Varela v. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248 [1954]). Thus, Irene’s secondary student permanent record and her written consent to the operation of her father not being signed nor written in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado cannot be taken as an authentic writing to prove her recognition by her alleged father.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MARRIAGE CONTRACT WHERE ALLEGED FATHER GAVE CONSENT CANNOT BE TAKEN AS AUTHENTIC WRITING. — The marriage contract (Exhibit "17") of Irene Delgado and Moises Villanueva wherein it was stated that Francisco Delgado gave his consent or advice for Irene Delgado to marry and that he was her father cannot be also taken as recognition in an authentic document because it was not signed nor in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado. It cannot also be taken as recognition in a public instrument as held in the case of Lim v. C.A. (65 SCRA 161, 165 [1975]).

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAMILY PICTURES ARE NOT SUFFICIENT FOR RECOGNITION. — The family pictures (Exhibits "11" to "11-E") presented by Irene showing Irene posing with Francisco Delgado cannot be a sufficient proof of recognition. In the case of Bercilles v. GSIS, supra, it was held that pictures do not constitute proof of filiation.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CHILD HAS RIGHT TO COMPEL JUDICIAL RECOGNITION; MUST BE BROUGHT WITHIN THE PROPER PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD. — She nevertheless possesses the right to compel judicial recognition and the action for this must be brought within the proper prescriptive period (Clemeña v. Clemeña, supra). Article 285 of the New Civil Code provides "that the action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except when the father or mother dies during the minority of the child, the action shall be brought within four years from the age of majority, or if after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child, the action shall be brought within four years from the finding of the document." Since Irene was already of age (35 years old) when her alleged father died, and she had not presented any discovered document wherein her presumed father recognized her, the action to compel recognition is already barred (Canales v. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]).

AQUINO, J., dissenting opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN; RECOGNITION; VOLUNTARY OR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION OF SPURIOUS CHILDREN OR BASTARDS IS NOT MANDATORY. — In my opinion the rule requiring voluntary or compulsory recognition for the so-called spurious children or bastards is not mandatory. Article 289 of the Civil Code does not make such recognition mandatory.

2. ID.; SUCCESSION; SPURIOUS CHILDREN; MAY INHERIT BY PROVING FILIATION ACCORDING TO RULES ON ACKNOWLEDGMENT FOR NATURAL CHILDREN. — Irene’s status as an heir is governed by the Civil Code pursuant to its Article 2264. To enjoy successional rights, she has to prove her filiation as required in Article 887 of the Civil Code. To prove filiation, the rules on acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children. But there may be cases, where the filiation of an illegitimate child, other than natural, has been duly proven and such proof does not satisfy the requirements of recognition under Articles 278 and 283.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLES 278 AND 283 ADMIT EXCEPTIONS; SUFFICIENT PROOF OF FILIATION ENTITLES THE CHILD TO SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS; CASE AT BAR. — In such exceptional cases, Articles 278 and 283 should not be applied. If sufficient proof to satisfy the judicial mind has been adduced to prove the spurious child’s filiation, he or she should be entitled to successional rights. This is justified by the liberal policy of the Civil Code towards illegitimate children. The natural child needs acknowledgment because he may become a legitimated child. The spurious child will never attain the status of a legitimate child. I agree with Judge Lorenzo Relova that Irene’s filiation as Francisco Delgado’s child was duly proven within the meaning of Article 887. She is the nearest compulsory and legal heir of Francisco. She excludes the brother, two sisters and niece of Francisco (Art. 988, Civil Code).


D E C I S I O N


MAKASIAR, J.:


This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals Special Division of Five dated October 7, 1974 in CA-G.R. No. L-44964-R, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, dated December 26, 1969, in Civil Case No. 1144 dismissing the action for reconveyance.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On January 29, 1967, private respondents as plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of first Instance of Batangas praying that the defendant Irene Reyes, alias Irene Romero or Irene Delgado, be ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado, and Paula Delgado over four parcels of land located in Tayabas, Quezon, and one parcel of land located in Pagbilao, Quezon, and another deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiff Maximina Delgado over three parcels of land located in Alitagtag, Batangas.

It was alleged in the complaint that the defendants thru abuse of confidence, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and other falsifications succeeded in registering in the offices of the Register of Deeds of Quezon and Batangas a document of self-adjudication (Exhibit "24"), wherein defendant Irene Delgado alleged that she was the sole child of the deceased Francisco Delgado and entitled to inherit the parcels of lands described in the complaint; that as a result thereof Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 were cancelled and new Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in the name of Irene Delgado; that defendant Irene Delgado is not the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, who died without issue, but is the legitimate daughter of Genoveva Romero and Justino Reyes; that plaintiffs Placida Delgado, Domingo Delgado and Paula Delgado, sisters and brother of the deceased Francisco Delgado are the heirs entitled to inherit from Francisco Delgado; and that Paula, Placido and Domingo Delgado defrayed the expenses of the last illness and the funeral expenses of Francisco Delgado and for the purpose they borrowed the sum of P7,000.00 from their niece, plaintiff Maximina Delgado, and to pay Maximina Delgado they conveyed to her the three parcels of land described in subparagraphs (f) to (g) of paragraph 9 of the complaint. They also alleged that the defendant spouses Irene and Moises Villanueva borrowed from plaintiffs common fund the sum of P23,000.00 which they used in the purchase of a parcel of land (pp. 1-14, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On or about March 2, 1967, defendant Irene Delgado, one of the petitioners herein, filed an answer to the complaint and set up the affirmative defense that she is the illegitimate daughter of the defendant Genoveva Romero and the deceased Francisco Delgado; that for several years preceding the birth of Irene Delgado, her mother Genoveva Ramero had separated from her lawful husband Justino Reyes and never reconciled since then; and that Irene was born during the cohabitation of Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero as common-law husband and wife, and since her birth, lived with Francisco Delgado and Genoveva Ramero, who reared and treated her as their child, maintaining her and sending her through college. Defendants also denied having contracted a debt of P23,000.00 from plaintiffs, or that plaintiffs spent for the last illness and funeral of Francisco Delgado. Irene Delgado likewise set up a counterclaim, alleging that, as the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, she has the right to represent her father to the inheritance left by her grandmother (pp. 15-43, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).

On March 16, 1967, the plaintiffs thru counsel filed an answer to the counterclaim denying that the defendant Irene Delgado was the illegitimate child of Francisco Delgado, and hence has no right to claim from the estate of Francisco’s mother, Benigna Castillo, and that the properties claimed by the defendant Irene Delgado no longer formed part of the estate of Benigna Castillo as she had previously disposed of them during her lifetime (pp. 43-46, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).

On August 15, 1967, a pre-trial in Civil Case No. 1144 was conducted.

On March 25, 1969, the plaintiffs filed a motion to admit an amended answer to the counterclaim posed by defendant, wherein the plaintiffs alleged that the counterclaim of the defendant, in so far as it would have the effect of being an indirect action for acknowledgment, has already prescribed (pp. 50-55, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).

On April 14, 1969, the lower court admitted the amended answer to the counterclaim over the objections of the defendant (pp. 56-61, Record on Appeal; p. 63, rec.).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

After trial on the merits, the Court rendered its decision on December 26, 1969 dismissing the action for reconveyance and declaring defendant Irene Delgado the lawful owner of the eight parcels of land. The counterclaim of Irene Delgado was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (now IAC), the plaintiffs with respect to their complaint and the defendants with respect to their counterclaim.

The then Court of Appeals sitting as a Special Division of Five rendered its decision on October 7, 1974, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Wherefore, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed The deed of self-adjudication executed by Irene Delgado is hereby declared null and void and set aside. The transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Irene Delgado in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 are hereby canceled, and T.C.T. 9913, 10348, 14937, T-11747 and 13489 are reinstated in the name of Francisco Delgado. Likewise, the extrajudicial declaration executed by Irene Delgado adjudicating to herself the 3 parcels of land located in Alitagtag, Batangas, with Tax Declaration Nos. 8625, 8626 and 8627 are declared null and void. No costs" (pp. 52-53, rec.).

The then Court of Appeals in arriving at this decision found that, although Irene Delgado was the spurious daughter of Francisco Delgado, she nevertheless cannot merit from the estate of the deceased Francisco Delgado because she was not recognized either voluntarily or by court action (pp. 52-53, rec.).

The titles to the questioned lot however cannot be executed in favor of the plaintiffs; because in so doing it will be in effect a recognition by the court that the plaintiffs are the only heirs of Francisco Delgado to the prejudice of other possible heirs or creditors of the deceased.

As to alleged loan contracted by Irene from the plaintiffs, the then Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision that it was without merit, because if it were true, the plaintiffs could have demanded a receipt for such a big amount.

The counterclaim of Irene that she has the share to the inheritance of Benigna Castillo, Francisco Delgado’s mother, and her alleged share in the expenses for the sickness and funeral of Francisco Delgado which was advanced by the plaintiffs, need not be ruled upon because of the findings that Irene is not an heir of Francisco Delgado (pp. 57-58, rec.).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

On December 2, 1974, Defendants, petitioners herein, filed a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals (pp. 22-37, rec.).

On January 2, 1975, the plaintiffs, respondents herein, submitted their comment on the petition for review filed by the petitioner (pp. 67-71, rec.).

On January 15, 1975, the petition for review filed by petitioners was denied in a resolution by the First Division of the Supreme Court for lack of merit (p. 75, rec.).

On February 18, 1975, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 86-113, rec.).

On April 5, 1975, respondents filed their comments on the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners (pp. 130-134, rec.).

On April 23, 1975, petitioners filed their reply to respondents’ comment (pp. 118-125, rec.).

On May 23, 1975, the Supreme Court reconsidered its resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration (p. 142, rec.).

In their petition, petitioners sought to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals raising the following arguments:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. "There are strong and cogent reasons why this Honorable Court must return to and even enhance the doctrine in Zuzuarregui v. Zuzuarregui, considering serious flaws in the reasoning of the currently prevailing doctrine, so that assuming arguendo and pro hac vice that Irene was not duly recognized or acknowledged as illegitimate child, she is nevertheless entitled to successional rights as sole heir of the late Francisco Delgado, considering that her filiation as illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado is undisputed and beyond question" (p. 12, Petitioner’s Brief; p. 164, rec.).

2. "Upon the other hand, this time assuming arguendo and pro hac vice that under the Civil Code recognition of an ‘other illegitimate’ is a pre-requisite to enjoyment of rights, Irene Delgado was legally acknowledged by her father Francisco Delgado, specially by his consent or advice to her marriage with Moises Villanueva contrary to the erroneous conclusions of the Court of Appeals" (p. 39, Petitioner’s Brief, p. 164, rec.).

The petition is without merit.

The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit must be first recognized voluntarily or by court action is well settled in Our jurisprudence. (Bercilles v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Divinagracia v. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307 [1976]; Clemeña v. Clemeña, 24 SCRA 720 [1968]; Noble v. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104 [1966]; Republic v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 13 SCRA 272 [1969]; Paulino v. Paulino, 3 SCRA 730 [1961]; Barles v. Ponce Enrile, 109 Phil. 522 [1960]).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

There is no reason to overturn this doctrine and revert to what was enunciated in the case of Zuzuarregui v. Zuzuarregui (103 Phil. 346 [1958]); as suggested by herein petitioners in their first assignment of errors.

It is the contention of the petitioners that the silence of the Civil Code as to the recognition of illegitimate children other than natural, in contrast to natural children who are expressly required to be recognized in order to inherit, only meant that illegitimate children need not be recognized in order to inherit from his or her alleged parent (p. 13, Petitioner’s Brief; p. 164, rec.). Petitioners also raised the argument that under Article 287 of the New Civil Code which reads: "Illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in this code." The term "other illegitimate children" refers not only to those who are not natural or merely adulterous or incestuous but also includes natural children who were not acknowledged or recognized (p. 18, Petitioner’s Brief; p. 164, rec.). In other words, unrecognized natural children can inherit not the share of a natural child but the share of a spurious child so long as his filiation shall be duly proved. So, in effect, illegitimate children need only to prove his filiation to inherit and such does not place him in a more advantageous position than natural children, as they are placed in the same situation.

WE do not find these arguments persuasive.

Though the Civil Code is silent with respect to spurious children as to their recognition, this Court, in applying the rules of recognition, applicable to natural children, to said spurious children, declared in Clemeña v. Clemeña, supra that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The considerations of fairness and justice that underlie the time limit fixed in Article 285 of the Civil Code for actions seeking compulsory acknowledgment of natural children are fully applicable, if not more, to actions to investigate and declare the paternity of illegitimate children that are not natural. The motive that led the codifiers to restrict the period for bringing action for compulsory recognition of natural children were stated by this Court in Serrano v. Aragon, 22 Phil. 18, to be as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘. . . the writers of the code no doubt had in mind that there would arise instances where certain illegitimate children, on account of the strong temptation due to the large estates left by deceased persons, would attempt to establish that they were natural children of such persons in order to get part of the property, and furthermore, they considered that it is nothing but just and right that alleged parents should have a personal opportunity to be heard. It was for these reasons and others equally as well founded that Article 137 was enacted’" (p. 724).

There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock. They may be either natural (actually or by fiction) or spurious (the incestuous, adulterous or illicit). Natural children are defined as those born outside of wedlock of parents, who at the time of conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 269, New Civil Code). On the other hand, spurious children are those born of parents, who at the time of their conception, are disqualified to marry each other on account of certain impediment. Because of this basic distinction between these children, it is not legally possible to classify unrecognized natural children under the class of spurious children. Besides, commentators construe the phrase "illegitimate children other than natural" as excluding from the grants of rights under Article 287 of the New Civil Code those children who are natural child proper by birth and who have not secured voluntary or compulsory recognition (p. 276, An Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. 1). They fall within the scope of the definition of natural children enumerated in Article 269, New Civil Code (p. 142, Civil Law Reviewer, D. Jurado, 1982 ed.). Lastly, to follow petitioners’ contention will not be in accordance with the consistent pronouncements of this Court. It is an elementary and basic principle under the old and new Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural child has no rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His rights spring not from the filiation itself, but from the child’s acknowledgment by the natural parent (Alabat v. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 [1967]; Mise v. Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 396 [1954]; Magallanes v. CA, 95 Phil. 797 [1954]; Canales v. Ugarte, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]; Malonda v. Malonda, 81 Phil. 149 [1948]; Buenaventura v. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1 [1905]).

As to the second assignment of error raised by petitioners, We find that there was no sufficient legal recognition of petitioner Irene Delgado by Francisco Delgado.

It can be seen from the record of birth (Exhibit "L-2") that the name of the petitioner was Irene Ramero, and signed by Genoveva Ramero and of an unknown father. This was certified to by the treasurer of the municipality of Alitagtag, Batangas (Exhibits "L" and "L-1"). Another certified copy of another birth certificate issued by the municipal treasurer and local civil registrar of the municipality of Alitagtag (Exhibit "20") stated therein that the name of the child is Irene Ramero, and the name of the father is "Francisco" and the mother "Genoveva Ramero." Any of these records of birth cannot be sufficient recognition under the law. The birth certificate, to be sufficient recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses, otherwise she may be penalized (Sec. 5, Act 3753; Madredejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]); and if the alleged father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, or doctor or registrar, is incompetent evidence of paternity of said child (Bercilles v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 [1984]; Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil. 1050 [1958]). Since any of the certificates of birth presented were not signed by Francisco Delgado, it cannot be taken as record of birth to prove recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can this birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument (Pareja v. Pareja, 95 Phil. 167 [1954l).

Irene’s certificate of baptism (Exhibit "1") cannot be taken as proof of recognition (Bercilles v. GSIS, supra, People v. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 [1984]; Cid v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 [19681; Vudaurrazaga v. CA, 91 Phil. 492 [1952]; Capistrano v. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 [1907]). In the case of Macadangdang v. CA [100 SCRA 73 [1980]), this Court said that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk.chanrobles law library : red

Irene’s secondary student permanent record (Exhibits "12", "13", "15" and "16") nor the written consent given by Irene to the operation of her alleged father (Exhibit "4") cannot be taken as an authentic writing. An authentic writing does not have to be a public instrument; it is sufficient that it is genuine and not a forgery. It must generally be signed by the alleged parent (Madredejo v. De Leon, supra) unless the whole instrument is in the handwriting of the alleged parent and the facts mentioned therein correspond to actual and real facts (Varela v. Villanueva, 95 Phil. 248 [1954]). Thus, Irene’s secondary student permanent record and her written consent to the operation of her father, not being signed nor written in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado, cannot be taken as an authentic writing to prove her recognition by her alleged father.

The marriage contract (Exhibit "17") of Irene Delgado and Moises Villanueva, wherein it was stated that Francisco Delgado gave his consent or advice for Irene Delgado to marry, and that he was her father cannot be also taken as recognition in an authentic document because it was not signed nor in the handwriting of Francisco Delgado. It cannot also be taken as recognition in a public instrument as held in the case of Lim v. CA, (65 SCRA 161, 164 [1975]) wherein the Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"According to Article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, public documents are those authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities required by law.’ Thus, ‘there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office.’ "The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class.’

"The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is not a written act with the intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary and certified by him. The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife, signed by signature or mark by said contracting parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. The marriage contract does not possess the requisites of a public document of recognition . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The family pictures (Exhibits "11" to "11-E") presented by Irene, showing Irene posing with Francisco Delgado, cannot be a sufficient proof of recognition. In the case of Bercilles v. (GSIS, supra, it was held that pictures do not constitute proof of filiation.

What Irene may have proved is that she had been in continuous possession of a status of an illegitimate child who is not natural. But such fact alone without a valid recognition in a record of birth, will, statement before a court of record, or authentic writing does not make Irene a recognized illegitimate child who is not natural. She nevertheless possesses the right to compel judicial recognition and the action for this must be brought within the proper prescriptive period (Clemeña v. Clemeña, supra). Article 285 of the New Civil Code provides "that the action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except when the father or mother dies during the minority of the child, the action shall be brought within four years from the age of majority, or if after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child, the action shall be brought within four years from the finding of the document." Since Irene was already of age (35 years old) when her alleged father died, and she had not presented any discovered document wherein her presumed father recognized her, the action to compel recognition is already barred (Canales v. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]).

WE affirm the findings of the then Court of Appeals that Irene Reyes has Irene Delgado is not an heir of the late Francisco Delgado.chanrobles law library

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE THEN COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN TOTO, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS.

Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions


AQUINO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I dissent. The spouses Justino Reyes and Genoveva Ramero, natives of Tayabas town, were married there in 1903. They had seven children. An eighth child, named Irene, was born to Genoveva, either on May 5, 1930 in Tayabas town, or on September 1, 1931 in Barrio Dalipit, Alitagtag, Batangas. Of course, the presumption under article 255 of the Civil Code is that Irene was Justino’s child. Was that presumption rebutted?

Joaquin Reyes, Irene’s elder brother, testified that his parents, the Reyes spouses, separated in 1928 when his father surprised Francisco Delgado in his house. On that occasion, there was a commotion in the house which was investigated by the police. Justino eventually decided to allow Genoveva to go with Francisco. That testimony is sufficient to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. It shows that Irene was not Justino’s child. Was Delgado her father?

Her birth certificate shows that she was horn on September 1, 1931 as the child of Genoveva at Barrio Dalipit, Alitagtag, Batangas with an unknown (desconocido) father (Exh. L-2 or 22).chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Since 1928, Genoveva lived with Francisco Delgado and was never reconciled to Justino who died in 1935. Irene was educated at their expense.

Justino was not mentioned as the father of Irene in her record of birth. Among the eight children of Genoveva, Irene’s birth was the only one registered in Alitagtag, Francisco’s native town. Irene had always lived with Genoveva and Francisco up to 1951, when she was 19 and she got married.

She was baptized in 1949, when she was 18. Francisco and Genoveva were listed as her parents in the baptismal certificate, Exhibit 1. In the certificate of marriage of Irene and Moises Villanueva, Francisco Delgado was mentioned as her father and as the one who gave consent to the marriage (Exh. 17).

Irene consented to the operation of Francisco when he was submitted to an operation at the Family Clinic in 1966 (Exh. 2). The paid his hospital bills (Exh. 4). She used the surname "Delgado" in her school records and Francisco Delgado was indicated therein as her guardian (Exh. 12 to 16).

Francisco died intestate on October 28, 1966. On November 25, 1966 Irene adjudicated to herself the lands left by Francisco (Exh. H or 9). On January 30, 1967, the brother, two sisters and a niece of Francisco Delgado sued her for the annulment of said adjudication. They sought a declaration that they are the nearest legal heirs of Francisco.

Judge Lorenzo Relova ruled that Irene’s filiation was duly proven. The Appellate Court disagreed because she was not duly acknowledged within the meaning of articles 278 and 283 of the Civil Code. It held that the evidence submitted by her does not amount to voluntary and compulsory recognition required of natural children.

In my opinion the rule requiring voluntary or compulsory recognition for the so-called spurious children or bastards is not mandatory. Article 289 of the Civil Code does not make such recognition mandatory.

Irene’s status as an heir is governed by the Civil Code pursuant to its article 2264. To enjoy successional rights, she has to prove her filiation as required in article 887 of the Civil Code. To prove filiation, the rules on acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children. But there may be cases, where the filiation of an illegitimate child, other than natural, has been duly proven and such proof does not satisfy the requirements of recognition under articles 278 and 283.

In such exceptional cages, article 278 and 283 should not be applied. If sufficient proof to satisfy the judicial mind has been adduced to prove the spurious child’s filiation, he or she should be entitled to successional rights. This is justified by the liberal policy of the Civil Code towards illegitimate children.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

The natural child needs acknowledgment because he may become a legitimated child. The spurious child will never attain the status of a legitimated child.

I agree with Judge Lorenzo Relova that Irene’s filiation as Francisco Delgado’s child was duly proven within the meaning of article 887. She is the nearest compulsory and legal heir of Francisco. She excludes the brother, two sisters and niece of Francisco (Art. 988, Civil Code).

I vote to reverse the decision of the Appellate Court and affirm the decision of Judge Relova.chanrobles.com : virtual law library




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March-1985 Jurisprudence                 

  • G.R. No. 56598 March 15, 1985 - CORNELIO R. CALABIG v. FLORENTINO M. VILLANUEVA

  • G.R. No. L-42283 March 18, 1985 - BUENAVENTURA ANGELES v. URSULA TORRES CALASANZ

  • G.R. No. L-45456 March 18, 1985 - REGINA A. AFABLE v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION

  • G.R. No. L-46000 March 18, 1985 - GLICERIO AGUSTIN v. LAUREANO BACALAN

  • G.R. No. L-46768 March 18, 1985 - BASILIO GODINEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS

  • G.R. No. L-49648 March 18, 1985 - LORETA CABRIAS v. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL

  • G.R. No. 50695 March 18, 1985 - MINDA M. AQUINO v. JOSEFINA R. NAVARRO

  • G.R. No. 57211 March 18, 1985 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. v. GEORGE P. MACLI-ING

  • G.R. Nos. 57425-27 March 18, 1985 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. COURT OF APPEALS

  • G.R. No. 57589 March 18, 1985 - AMADO G. SORIANO v. RUBEN B. ANCHETA

  • G.R. No. 57682 March 18, 1985 - RONALD CABE v. SOTERO L. TUMANG

  • G.R. No. 58823 March 18, 1985 - DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS

  • G.R. No. 60038 March 18, 1985 - SUMMIT TRADING AND DEV’T. CORP. v. HERMINIO A. AVENDAÑO

  • G.R. No. 61416 March 18, 1985 - FELDA ALBIENDA v. COURT OF APPEALS

  • G.R. No. 62051 March 18, 1985 - RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE, INC. v. ISIDRA REMOLADO

  • G.R. No. 65792 March 18, 1985 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. CARLOS CRISANTO, JR.

  • G.R. No. 67284 March 18, 1985 - TEOFISTO UMBAY v. PLACIDO ALECHA

  • G.R. No. 68159 March 18, 1985 - HOMOBONO A. ADAZA v. FERNANDO PACANA, JR.

  • G.R. No. 70237 March 18, 1985 - JESUS C. EBOL v. OMAR U. AMIN

  • G.R. No. 39537 March 19, 1985 - IRENE REYES v. COURT OF APPEALS

  • G.R. No. L-38276 March 20, 1985 - LUZON CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

  • G.R. No. 51770 March 20, 1985 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. FRANCISCO GALIT

  • G.R. No. 60039-40 March 20, 1985 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. PEDRO MABANSAG

  • G.R. No. 60100 March 20, 1985 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JAIME RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 62126 March 25, 1985 - TERENCIO RAÑON v. COURT OF APPEALS

  • G.R. No. 42914 March 27, 19885

    RODOLFO CEPEDA v. BACOLOD MURCIA MILLING CO., INC.

  • G.R. No. 68828 March 27, 1985 - RELI GERMAN, ET AL. v. SANTIAGO BARANGAN

  • G.R. No. 52479 March 28, 1985 - JAIME F. MARIÑO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.

  • G.R. No. L-36249 March 29, 1985 - ANIANO OBAÑA v. COURT OF APPEALS

  • G.R. No. 59407 March 29, 1985 - CITY SERVICE CORP. WORKERS UNION v. CITY SERVICE CORP.