March 1988 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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A.C. No. 2756 March 15, 1988 - PRUDENTIAL BANK v. JOSE P. CASTRO, ET AL.:
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 2756. March 15, 1988.]
PRUDENTIAL BANK, Complainant, v. JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
Acting on the "Petition for Redress and Exoneration and for Voluntary Inhibition" filed by respondent Benjamin M. Grecia himself, dated February 8, 1988, praying that the decision of November 12, 1987, and the resolution of the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said decision be set aside and a new one entered by this Court dismissing the administrative complaint and exonerating the respondent, the Court RESOLVED (1) the EXPUNGE said Petition, it being in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration filed without leave of Court, besides the fact that the first motion for reconsideration filed by the same respondent had already been denied with finality on January 12, 1988; (2) to STRIKE OUT Annex "1" of the Petition and its exclosures, Annex "1" being a xerox copy of a letter dated 04 August 1986 written by Judge Dionisio N. Capistrano to an unknown addressee, for being immaterial and impertinent to this case for disbarment (Sec. 5, Rule 9, Rules of Court). The Court will not allow the filing of such kinds of Petitions/Annexes that are not only irrelevant to the issue and presented out of time as hereinafter explained, but are also scurrilous and defamatory.
Certain points raised in the Petition, however, can for separate treatment and determination.
1) The "Petition for Voluntary Inhibition" of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee and Justice Teodoro R. Padilla is DENIED there being no legal nor factual basis therefor. It is settled jurisprudence that after a member has given an opinion on the merits of the case, a motion to disqualify a member of the Supreme Court cannot be considered because a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has been rendered (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, citing Government of the Philippine Islands v. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil. 374).
The decision to disbar respondent lawyer was the collective judgment of the Court, with the exception of Justice Sarmiento who had inhibited himself, with no member in the least bit attempting to influence one or the other. In fairness to the Chief Justice, and to disabuse the fears and suspicions of respondent Grecia, it should be made of record that at no time during the deliberations on the case did the Chief Justice show any illwill nor any signs of "vindictiveness" much less any attempt to "exact vengeance for past affront" against respondent lawyer. All discussions were characterized by judicial objectivity dictated only by the highest interests of the profession and public welfare.
Similarly, the plea for the inhibition of Justice Padilla has to be DENIED for being devoid of any valid reason. Justice Padilla was counsel for Cityland Development Corporation in the case of Manchester Development Corporation, Et. Al. v. Court of Appeals, Cityland Development Corporation, Et. Al. (G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562), for which reason he took no part in the said suit. Cityland, however, is not a party in this administrative case.
2) The challenge huried against this Court’s decision as violative of the 1987 Constitution due to lack of certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court, is bereft of basis. The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court. The certification in AM No. R-510-P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba v. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is but an oversight.
But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members who actually took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente although any member of the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is obviously not required.
3) No constitutional provision has been disregarded either in the Court’s Minute Resolution, dated January 12, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration "for lack of merit, the issues raised therein having been previously duly considered and passed upon." It bears repeating that this is an administrative case so that the Constitutional mandate that "no . . . motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be . . . denied without stating the legal basis therefor" is inapplicable. And even if it were, said Resolution stated the legal basis for the denial and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the Constitutional requirement. "Lack of merit," which was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis (see Sec. 3, Rule 45).
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur,.
Sarmiento, J., no part.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
As the Court’s unanimous Resolution states, respondents’ so-called petition for redress dated February 8, 1988 (in effect a second motion, filed without leave of Court, for reconsideration of the disbarment decision of November 12, 1987 and the Resolution of January 12, 1988 denying reconsideration) has been filed out of time and has been expunged. Aside from the fact that the petition for my voluntary inhibition is devoid of factual and legal basis, there is nothing left before the Court for determination on the merits. Be that as it may, I had refrained from taking part in the deliberation on this incident and had wanted to abstain even as a beau geste but submitted the question to the judgment of my peers. Bowing to their collective judgment against my inhibition, I herewith express my full concurrence with the Court’s action.
PADILLA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur. In addition, I wish to make this brief statement. I do not personally know respondent Benjamin M. Grecia. As far as my memory can recall, I have not dealt with said respondent, personally or professionally at any time. There is therefore absolutely no basis for respondent’s claim that I have acted with bias or prejudice against his cause.
In Manchester Development Corporation, Et Al., Petitioners, v. Court of Appeals, City Land Development Corporation, Et Al., Respondents, G.R. No. 75919, I took no part simply because I was a retained counsel of the respondent City Land Development Corporation before my appointment to the Court. In this administrative case, I have not been related, personally or professionally, with any party or counsel. There is thus absolutely no reason for me not to take part in this case. In fact, I consider it a part of my sworn duty to take part therein since there is absolutely no legal, moral or ethical ground which would justify my inhibition.
Certain points raised in the Petition, however, can for separate treatment and determination.
1) The "Petition for Voluntary Inhibition" of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee and Justice Teodoro R. Padilla is DENIED there being no legal nor factual basis therefor. It is settled jurisprudence that after a member has given an opinion on the merits of the case, a motion to disqualify a member of the Supreme Court cannot be considered because a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has been rendered (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, citing Government of the Philippine Islands v. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil. 374).
The decision to disbar respondent lawyer was the collective judgment of the Court, with the exception of Justice Sarmiento who had inhibited himself, with no member in the least bit attempting to influence one or the other. In fairness to the Chief Justice, and to disabuse the fears and suspicions of respondent Grecia, it should be made of record that at no time during the deliberations on the case did the Chief Justice show any illwill nor any signs of "vindictiveness" much less any attempt to "exact vengeance for past affront" against respondent lawyer. All discussions were characterized by judicial objectivity dictated only by the highest interests of the profession and public welfare.
Similarly, the plea for the inhibition of Justice Padilla has to be DENIED for being devoid of any valid reason. Justice Padilla was counsel for Cityland Development Corporation in the case of Manchester Development Corporation, Et. Al. v. Court of Appeals, Cityland Development Corporation, Et. Al. (G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562), for which reason he took no part in the said suit. Cityland, however, is not a party in this administrative case.
2) The challenge huried against this Court’s decision as violative of the 1987 Constitution due to lack of certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court, is bereft of basis. The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court. The certification in AM No. R-510-P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba v. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is but an oversight.
But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members who actually took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente although any member of the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is obviously not required.
3) No constitutional provision has been disregarded either in the Court’s Minute Resolution, dated January 12, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration "for lack of merit, the issues raised therein having been previously duly considered and passed upon." It bears repeating that this is an administrative case so that the Constitutional mandate that "no . . . motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be . . . denied without stating the legal basis therefor" is inapplicable. And even if it were, said Resolution stated the legal basis for the denial and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the Constitutional requirement. "Lack of merit," which was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis (see Sec. 3, Rule 45).
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur,.
Sarmiento, J., no part.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
As the Court’s unanimous Resolution states, respondents’ so-called petition for redress dated February 8, 1988 (in effect a second motion, filed without leave of Court, for reconsideration of the disbarment decision of November 12, 1987 and the Resolution of January 12, 1988 denying reconsideration) has been filed out of time and has been expunged. Aside from the fact that the petition for my voluntary inhibition is devoid of factual and legal basis, there is nothing left before the Court for determination on the merits. Be that as it may, I had refrained from taking part in the deliberation on this incident and had wanted to abstain even as a beau geste but submitted the question to the judgment of my peers. Bowing to their collective judgment against my inhibition, I herewith express my full concurrence with the Court’s action.
PADILLA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur. In addition, I wish to make this brief statement. I do not personally know respondent Benjamin M. Grecia. As far as my memory can recall, I have not dealt with said respondent, personally or professionally at any time. There is therefore absolutely no basis for respondent’s claim that I have acted with bias or prejudice against his cause.
In Manchester Development Corporation, Et Al., Petitioners, v. Court of Appeals, City Land Development Corporation, Et Al., Respondents, G.R. No. 75919, I took no part simply because I was a retained counsel of the respondent City Land Development Corporation before my appointment to the Court. In this administrative case, I have not been related, personally or professionally, with any party or counsel. There is thus absolutely no reason for me not to take part in this case. In fact, I consider it a part of my sworn duty to take part therein since there is absolutely no legal, moral or ethical ground which would justify my inhibition.
