Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

These are eight (8) petitions for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they should not be set at liberty without further delay.

In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court against them. cralawnad

The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and void.

The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.

The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. � A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit en offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7."cralaw virtua1aw library

An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of People v. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."cralaw virtua1aw library

The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.

A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in order.



In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil v. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.

As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988.

On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case who has been released on bail. 2

As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.

However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. . . ." 3

The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him. For, as held in the early case of U.S. v. Wilson: 4

"In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he could have been released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested him we need not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error."cralaw virtua1aw library



In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque v. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admittedthat he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the National United Front Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess. chanrobles law library : red

The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents about the operations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of the Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia" a staff member in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy." He also pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.

In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) One (1 ) Colt M1 6A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;

b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK 8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;

c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;

d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56mm;

e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;

f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transceiver SN: 14903

g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;

h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);

i) One (1 ) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;

j) Voluminous Subversive documents.

When confronted, Renato Constantino could not produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms, ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

At about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily admitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constantino, and other members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he is known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated August 11, 1988;

(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated August 11, 1988;

(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11, 1988.

Also found in Buenaobra’s possession was a piece of paper containing a written but jumbled telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the given address the next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the place at about 11:00 o’clock in the morning. After identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking permission to search the place, which was granted, the military agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.

The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive documents as well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that the voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of the house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the said other occupants of the house were released from custody.

On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after which an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-150458.

An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.

On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Accordingly, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains for resolution. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and or members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/ or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license to possess them.



In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo v. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constantino, they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry.

The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o’clock in the evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constantino at Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under surveillance by military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) Voluminous subversive documents

b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same caliber;

c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one (1) magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.

At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "KaTed", and Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.

On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 and 74387, respectively. No bail was recommended.

On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and that the informations filed against them are null and void for having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.

The petitioners’ (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit. The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they were apprehended.

There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are null and void for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. � When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule."cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed against them, the prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary investigation was conducted because the accused has not made and signed a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library

Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their constitutional right to due process.



In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya v. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocayais justified under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya armed in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.

On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and denied the right to a preliminary investigation.

It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

V

The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim that the firearms, ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession when they were arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.

The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners are on the ‘AFP Order of Battle with a reward of P15,000.00 on each on their heads.’ " 6 On the other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel movement. cralawnad

The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure conducted by the military at the residence of Renato Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at Constantino’s residence, was not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the military. It was a result of an in-depth military surveillance coupled with the leads provided by former members of the underground subversive organizations. That raid produced positive results. To date, nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment, firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.

The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that other members of his group were coming to his place, reasonably conducted a ‘stake-out’ operation whereby some members of the raiding team were left behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid and Constantino’s arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino’s residence. He acted suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the military authorities, found in his person were letters. They are no ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that, Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to deliver the letters to Constantino.

Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino’s place. Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to believe that petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit Constantino’s residence considering that Constantino’s information was true, in that Buenaobra did come to that place? Was it unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the military agents, not to frisk and search anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such as petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple’s flimsy and bare assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were arrested thereat?.

As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to effect her arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque’s telephone number as written on a piece of paper taken from Buenaobra’s possession? Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason so far.

In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably, under the time, place and circumstances of the events in question, especially considering that at the time of petitioners’ arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found in their possession.

Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude that they were up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.."

VI

In G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.

The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual aid and protection. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he was sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of arrest arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.

He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o’clock of the same morning, he was brought before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section, Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7

The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).

The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a press conference at the National Press Club.

"Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to give in to their demands to lower the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988." 8

Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Press Club in order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o’clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at ang pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na." 10 (Emphasis supplied).

The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11

Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.

VII

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno v. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the submission of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that at about 8:30 o’clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regala pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.

On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).

The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna are based upon the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People v. Ancheta: 12

"The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein."cralaw virtua1aw library

VIII

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment." (Emphasis supplied)

At this point, we refer to petitioners’ plea for the Court to re-examine and, thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan v. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment is issued by the court where said information has been filed. 14 The petitioners claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present democratic dispensation and collides with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military authorities file the criminal information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless and arbitrary State action.

We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to limit the function of habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner’s detention � from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition. chanrobles law library : red

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner’s provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.



CRUZ, J., dissenting and concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile that subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest without warrant of any person at any time as long as the authorities say he has been placed under surveillance on suspicion of the offense. That is a dangerous doctrine. A person may be arrested when he is doing the most innocent acts, as when he is only washing his hands, or taking his supper, or even when he is sleeping, on the ground that he is committing the "continuing" offense of subversion. Libertarians were appalled when that doctrine was imposed during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even now this new Court is willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it altogether as one of the disgraceful vestiges of the past dictatorship and uphold the rule guaranteeing the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. We can do no less if we are really to reject the past oppression and commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be argued that the military should be given every support in our fight against subversion, I maintain that that fight must be waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of Rights. I do not believe that in fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the enemy, which are precisely what we are fighting against. I submit that our more important motivation should be what are we fighting for.

Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated Petitions for Habeas Corpus. At the same time, I have some reservations concerning certain statements made by the Court in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, Et Al. v. Ramos) (Part I of the Decision) and in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision).

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, Et Al. v. Ramos), the per curiam opinion states categorically that: "the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes." The majority here relies upon Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (121 SCRA 472 [1983]). The majority there made the same equally broad statement but without any visible effort to examine the basis, scope and meaning of such a sweeping statement. Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the specific offenses which it regarded as "in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses" (121 SCRA at 489). It appears to me that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision), the per curiam opinion has in effect included the offense of "inciting to sedition" penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code as a "continuing offense" under the capacious blanket of the majority opinion in Garcia-Padilla, at least for purposes of determining the legality of the arrest without a warrant of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu.

I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court that "inciting to sedition" is defined in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code in terms of speech 1 and that consequently it is important constantly to distinguish between speech which is protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of the press and speech which may constitutionally be regarded as violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. Precisely because speech which the police authorities might regard as seditious or as criminal inciting to sedition may well turn out to be only an exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I would submit that we must apply the concept of "continuing offense" narrowly for purposes of application of Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In my view, the very broad statement made about "continuing crimes" in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, Et Al. v. Ramos) constitutes dictum, considering that Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. had already been tried in the court below for "double murder, etc." and found guilty of the offense charged, sentenced accordingly, and at least in the case of Rolando Dural, service of the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had already begun. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that the arrest of petitioner Espiritu without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court does not appear strictly necessary, considering that the petitioner had already been charged in a valid information filed with the competent court, which court had presumably issued an order for his commitment, and considering further that he is entitled to bail.

There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of the doctrine of "continuing crimes" as applied to such offenses as subversion and inciting to sedition and possibly other offenses, in some future case where that issue is raised squarely and is unavoidable.

Cortes, J., concurs.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in all eight cases.

G.R. No. 81567

The majority says that Rolando Dural’s arrest without a warrant is lawful under the Rules of Court, which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. � A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. 1

"Rolando Dural," so states the majority, "was arrested for being a member of the New People’s Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization," 2 and that "[s]ubversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested." 3

As I said, I beg to differ.

First, Rolando Dural was charged with "Double Murder with Assault upon Agents of Authority." 4 If he had been guilty of subversion � the offense for which he was supposedly arrested via a warrantless arrest � subversion was the logical crime with which he should have been charged.

The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion on account of the slay of the two CAPCOM soldiers, a possible basis for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act, because as the majority points out, "he was not arrested while in the act of shooting [them] .. [n]or was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident." 5

Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen’s) arrest is possible in case of subversion � in the absence of any overt act that would justify the authorities to act. "Subversion," as the term is known in law, means "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliat[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or remain[ing] a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and or its successor or of any subversive association as defined in sections two and three hereof . . ." 6 Logically, the military could not have known that Dural, at the time he was taken, was a member of the New People’s Army because he was not performing any overt act that he was truly, a rebel. Indeed, it had to take a "verification" before he could be identified as allegedly a member of the underground army. Under these circumstances, I am hard put to say that he was committing subversion when he was arrested, assuming that he was guilty of subversion, for purposes of a warrantless arrest. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

"Overt act" is made up of "[e]very act, movement, deed and word of the [accused]," 7 indicating intent to accomplish a criminal objective. Dural, at the time he was arrested, was lying in a hospital bed. This is not the overt act contemplated by law.

Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been apprehended in flagranti (first paragraph) or after the act, provided that the peace officer has "personal knowledge" that he, the suspect, is guilty. (second paragraph.) As I stated, Dural was not caught in the act. Moreover, what the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a mere "confidential information." I do not think that this is the personal knowledge referred to by the second paragraph. 8 Plainly and simply, it is hearsay.

The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one. By its language, it may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and when the guilt of an offender is plain and evident. What I think we have here is purely and simply, the military taking the law in its hands.

By stamping validity to Rolando Dural’s warrantless arrest, I am afraid that the majority has set a very dangerous precedent. With all due respect, my brethren has accorded the military a blanket authority to pick up any Juan, Pedro, and Maria without a warrant for the simple reason that subversion is supposed to be a continuing offense.

That Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People’s Army" 9 is furthermore to me, a hasty statement. It has yet to be established that Dural is indeed a member of the Communist Party’s military arm. And unless proven guilty, he is presumed, and must be presumed most of all by this Court, to be innocent.

The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic because Dural has been convicted and is serving sentence. I likewise take exception. It has been held that: "The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final." 10

The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ. 11 Vindication of due process is its historic office. 12

G.R. Nos. 84581-82

In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers that he had "manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade," 13 for which habeas corpus has supposedly become moot and academic. I am not convinced that that is reason enough to dismiss habeas corpus as moot and academic. It is the duty of this Court, in my opinion, to make sure that Buenaobra has made his choice freely and voluntarily. Personally, I find it indeed strange why he should prefer to stay in jail than go scotfree.

There is further no doubt that Buenaobra’s petition is one impressed with a public interest. In one case 14 we denied a motion to withdraw a petition for habeas corpus in view of its far-reaching importance to the nation, I do not see how we should act differently, perhaps even insouciantly, here, especially since it involves persons who think and believe differently from the rest of us.

Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that they were ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines. According to the majority, Buenaobra and Roque are bound by their admissions. 15

That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (the National United Front Commission) is a naked contention of the military. The fact that it has not been controverted, in my view, does not justify the couple’s arrest without a warrant. Worse, by relying on the bare word of the military, this very Court has, to all intents and purposes, condemned the duo for a crime (subversion and/or illegal possession of firearms) the bone of contention, precisely, below.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84

I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon Casiple to be contrary to law. That they are "admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC" 16 and that "subversive materials" 17 and unlicensed firearms were found in their possession, are, like Buenaobra’s and Roque’s cases, barren claims of the military. I also fear that by the majority’s strong language (that Añonuevo and Casiple are admitted NUCF officers) the majority has pronounced the petitioners guilty, when the lower courts have yet to sit in judgment. I think we should be the last to preempt the decision of the trial courts. We would have set to naught the presumption of innocence accused persons enjoy. chanrobles.com : virtual law library

G.R. No. 83162

With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am inclined towards the same conclusion. There was no basis � at the outset � to say that Ocaya was probably guilty of illegal possession of firearms. As I have observed, a warrantless arrest must be predicated upon the existence of a crime being actually committed or having been committed. What I find here, rather, is nothing less than a successful fishing expedition conducted by the military upon an unwary citizen. I am quite distressed to note that this is still possible under a supposed democracy.

G.R. No. 85727

Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed under arrest. For the life of me, I can not figure out how one can be picked upon in one’s own home and held moments later without a warrant of arrest.

Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of a speech delivered in a press conference at the National Press Club on November 21, 1988. He was, however, arrested the day after, November 22, 1988. Under these circumstances, it eludes me how an arrest without a warrant could be justified, either under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the Rule on warrantless arrests.

The majority avers that since an information had been filed with the court, Espiritu’s detention, is allegedly justifiable. The question is whether or not an information is an authority to hold a person in custody. Under the Rules, an information means "an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court." 18 It is not, however, an order to keep one under detention.

G.R. No. 86332

The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held � the fatal shooting of Romulo Bunye II � was committed on December 14, 1988. It was, however, only on December 28, 1988 that the police collared a suspect, Ramil Regala, who subsequently pointed to Nazareno as his accomplice. It also escapes me how Nazareno, under these circumstances, could have been validly put under arrest without a warrant or the existence of the circumstance described under either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above-quoted: The crime had long been committed prior to the arrest.

G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162;

85727 & 86332; Postscripts

The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of what I view as doctrines that have lost their luster:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 19 which held that subversion is a continuing offense;

2. The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile; 20

I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of the fundamental rights of the petitioners under the Constitution in the authorities’ handling of the petitioners’ cases.

I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the present Constitution. Two reasons persuade me. First, it is repugnant to due process of law. ("The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which require the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable." 21 Under the 1987 Constitution, not even "[a] state of martial law suspend[s] the operation of [the Charter] . . ." 22 Second, it leaves the liberty of citizens to the whim of one man ("On these occasions [the existence of a state of emergency], the President takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and its government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President, the people can only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty and without patriotism, the President will not fail them." 23 Under the Charter now prevailing, the Chief Executive shares, to a certain extent, the exercise of emergency powers, with Congress. 24

As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged the soundness of Garcia-Padilla. I doubted whether it could stand up under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution. I still doubt whether it can withstand scrutiny under the 1987 Constitution. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-Padilla was handed down, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 25 a case that in my view has significantly whittled down Garcia-Padilla’s very esse. In that case, Mr. Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. wrote for the majority:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library



16. After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the proper complaint or information against him must be filed with the courts of justice within the time prescribed by law . . .

17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the person detained would be entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting process issued by a competent court. 26

I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been: (1 ) informed of their right to remain silent; and (2) to have competent and independent counsel. 27

As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving claims of the military that the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Añonuevo, and Casiple) are members of the Communist Party of the Philippines � and that they have supposedly confessed to be in fact members of the outlawed organization. The question that has not been answered is whether or not these supposed confessions are admissible, for purposes of a warrantless arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the absence of any showing that they were apprised of their constitutional rights. I am perturbed by the silence of the majority. I am distressed because as we held in one case, violation of the Constitution divests the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused to habeas corpus. 28

According to the majority, a "re-examination or re-appraisal . . . of the Ilagan doctrine is not the answer." 29 In my considered opinion, Ilagan v. Enrile 30 does not rightfully belong in the volumes of Philippine jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners, three Davao-based lawyers, were held by virtue of a simple information ("the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion . . . and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them" 31 ) without any preliminary investigation (examination) having been previously conducted (to justify the issuance of a warrant). As I have stated, an information is not a warrant of arrest. The fact that an information exists does not mean that a warrant will be issued.

Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation (examination). 32 It forms part and parcel of due process of law. 33

I find the majority’s reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, 34 an ancient (1905) decision, inapt and untenable. In that case, the accused had been served with a warrant and thereafter taken into custody. The question that faced the Court was whether or not the warrant was valid, amid the accused’s charges that the judge who issued it did not examine the complainant under oath. We held that the query was academic, because the accused had already pleaded, and the case had entered the trial stage. chanrobles.com : virtual law library

The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been issued. I submit that in that event, the petitioners are entitled to freedom by way of the writ of liberty.



The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the increasing pattern of arrests and detention in the country without the sanction of a judicial decree. Four years ago at "EDSA", and many years before it, although with much fewer of us, we valiantly challenged a dictator and all the evils his regime had stood for: repression of civil liberties and trampling on of human rights. We set up a popular government, restored its honored institutions, and crafted a democratic constitution that rests on the guideposts of peace and freedom. I feel that with this Court’s ruling, we have frittered away, by a stroke of the pen, what we had so painstakingly built in four years of democracy, and almost twenty years of struggle against tyranny. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a quixotic outlook of Philippine law on warrantless arrests and its implications on liberty. It is an impression that does not surprise me. Quixotic as they may seem, and modesty aside, my views reflect a strong bias on my part � forged by years of experience and sharpened by a painful and lonely struggle for freedom and justice � toward men and women who challenge settled beliefs. If this dissent can not gain any adherent for now, let it nevertheless go on record as a plea to posterity and an appeal for tolerance of opinions with which we not only disagree, but opinions we loathe.

I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent.

Endnotes:

---

1. 63 Phil. 221.

2. Zacarias v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-25899, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 728.

3. Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472, 488-489.

4. Phil. 317, 325.

5. Lorenzo v. Mc Coy, 15 Phil. 559.

6. Rollo of G.R. Nos. 84583-84, p. 105.

7. Petition, Nos. 4 to 8, inclusive.

8. Return of Writ.

9. Exhibit 2.

10. Exhibit 1.

11. Exhibit 4.

12. 68 Phil. 415.

13. G.R. No. 70748, Oct. 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.

14. Actually, the requirement in the Ilagan case doctrine that awarrant of arrest or order of commitment should be issued even after the information has been filed against the detained person, would seem superfluous. As aptly stated in the early case of U.S. v. Wilson, 4 Phil. 381, "where a person who has been legally arrested without a warrant was actually before a court, that court had a right to proceed against him without in the first place issuing a warrant for his detention."cralaw virtua1aw library

15. G.R. Nos. 61016 and 61107, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538, 563.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Article 142. Inciting to sedition. � The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices. (As amended by Com. Act No. 202).

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, sec. 5.

2. Decision, 7.

3. Supra; emphasis in the original.

4. Supra, 6.

5. Supra, 6; emphasis in the original.

6. Exec. Order No. 276, sec. 3; emphasis ours.

7. Cramer v. U.S., 325 U.S. 1, 34 (1944), a treason case.

8. Prior to its amendment, paragraph (b) required merely "reasonable ground" to justify a warrantless arrest. See RULES OF COURT (1964), Rule 113, sec. 6, par. (b). The amendment was made to stop warrantless arrests based on suspicion and hearsay. See FERIA, 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 20 (1987).

9. Decision, supra, 7.

10. Chavez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663, 684; see Castro, J., Concurring, citing Fay v. Noia, 372 US 391 (1963).

11. Supra, 683.

12. Supra, 690.

13. Decision, supra. 14.

14. Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, Nos. L-35546, 35538, 35539, 35540, 35547, 35556, 35567, 35571, and 35573, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183, 247-248, citing among other cases, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835 and Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).

15. Decision, supra.

16. Supra.

17. Supra.

18. RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 4.

19. No. 61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472.

20. No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.

21. Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, supra, 489.

22. CONST., art. VII, sec 18.

23. Garcia-Padilla, supra, 501.

24. CONST., supra.

25. Nos. 61016-7, April 16, 1983, 121 SCRA 538.

26. Supra, 560, 562.

27. CONST., art. III, sec. 12.

28. Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 (1949).

29. Decision, supra, 28.

30. Supra.

31. Supra, 364-365.

32. Ilagan v. Enrile, supra, 384, Teehankee, J., Dissenting.

33. Supra.

34. 4 Phil. 316 (March 24, 1905).