Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence


Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1994 > August 1994 Decisions > G.R. No. 111523 August 10, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ROEL V. PONAYO:




PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111523. August 10, 1994.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROEL PONAYO Y VILLANUEVA, Accused-Appellant.


SYLLABUS


1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY; ELEMENTS; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The attendance of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is found in the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution which would insure the offender’s safety from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the offended party, which means that no opportunity is given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen (People v. Samonte, Jr., 64 SCRA 319 [1975]; People v. de la Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 [1992]). Said conditions are undoubtedly present in this case. The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim (People v. Alcantara, 206, SCRA 662 [1992]; People v. Gonzales, 210 SCRA 44 [1992]).

2. ID.; ID.; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; SELF-DEFENSE; REQUISITES; ESSENTIAL ELEMENT NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — To prove self-defense, an accused must establish three concurring requisites, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused (Article 11, No. 1, Revised Penal Code; People v. Aquino, 54 SCRA 409 [1973]; People v. Morato, 224 SCRA 361 [1993]). The foremost element that must be proved to establish self-defense is unlawful aggression, for the absence of this essential element negates the validity of the plea of self-defense (People v. Morato, supra; People v. Curaraton, 224 SCRA 372 [1993]). A review of the facts of the case clearly shows the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim who was coming from a barrio dance in the company of friends, conversing with them along the way, when suddenly accused-appellant, coming from behind the group, stabbed the victim, who was unarmed and totally unaware of the impending attack. There was, therefore, no hint of aggression whatsoever, much less unlawful aggression, initiated by the victim. Absent this essential element, there is thus no need to discuss the other elements of self-defense for if there is no unlawful aggression there is nothing to prevent or to repel and the second element of self-defense would have no basis (People v. Morato, supra; People v. Curaraton, supra).

3. ID.; ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; REQUISITES; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The Chief of Police of the Municipality of San Lorenzo Ruiz, Chief Police Inspector Gil Gangan, testified that accused-appellant, accompanied by his aunt, walked into the police, a few hours after the stabbing and voluntarily surrendered himself without having been arrested and without any physical compulsion by any person. In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be properly appreciated it must appear that (a) the accused had not been actually arrested; (b) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agent; and (c) his surrender is voluntary (People v. Molo, 88 SCRA 22 [1979]). All the requisites are present in this case. An accused was held to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender where he proceeded to the municipal building where he was placed under arrest (People v. Besara, Jr., 64 SCRA 84 [1975]). The fact that herein accused-appellant was accompanied by his aunt when he surrendered does not detract from his act of voluntary surrender for there is no evidence to show that his aunt compelled him to surrender.

4. ID.; ID.; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Republic Act No. 7659 amending said article cannot be given retroactive effect as it would be unfavorable to accused-appellant for said Republic Act imposes the graver penalty of reclusion perpetua to death). There being the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the imposable penalty is the minimum of said penalty or 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period (10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal).


D E C I S I O N


MELO, J.:


Charged with murder in an Information reading —

That on or about 12:30 o’clock early in the morning of January 26, 1991, at Barangay Mampurog, municipality of San Lorenzo Ruiz, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation assault, attack and stab one ROLANDO GAZA Y SABAS with a deadly weapon (knife), thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal stab wounds which were the proximate cause of the death of said Rolando S. Gaza, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.

(p. 7, Rollo.)

accused, after trial, was convicted by the trial court in a decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:chanrobles law library : red

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and hereby sentence him to suffer imprisonment of 16 years and 1 day to 20 years medium degree of reclusion temporal to death.

He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00.

(p. 17, Rollo; p. 112, Record.)

From the above verdict of conviction, the instant appeal was interposed, with accused-appellant arguing that the trial court erred —

I


. . . in giving full faith and credence to the inconsistent and improbable testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Rodel Labag and Leny Cao.

II


. . . in concluding that there was treachery even if the same was not proven clearly as the crime itself.

III


. . . in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite the clear and convincing evidence of self-defense which justifies the killing of the victim Rolando Gaza.

IV


. . . in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender despite clear evidence on the matter.

(p. 29, Rollo.)

The facts of the case as established by the evidence were summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in its brief as follows:chanrobles law library

At around 12:30 o’clock in the morning of January 26, 1991, prosecution witnesses Leny Cao and Roel Labag, together with the victim Rolando Gaza and one Anna Rose Gantong, were walking home to Barangay Mampurog, San Lorenzo Ruiz, Camarines Norte. Labag and Gantong were a few steps ahead of Cao and Gaza. The group just came from a dance at Barangay Dagutdutan. Suddenly, appellant, who came from behind, stabbed the victim on the left side near the spinal cord. Upon being hit, the victim ran towards Barangay Mampurog. Appellant chased him. Labag, who got frightened, went straight home, while Cao and Gantong stopped walking for a while and thereafter continued. After walking a certain distance, Cao and Gantong saw the victim, sprawled on the ground bathed in his own blood and already dead. Cao sought help from the residents but no one responded. Cao and Gantong proceeded to the nearby police station and reported the incident (pp. 14-22, tsn, November 20, 1991, testimony of Leny Cao).

(pp. 4-5, Appellee’s Brief; ff. p. 54, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant impugns the testimony of prosecution witnesses Leny Cao and Rodel Labag as characterized by inconsistencies and contradictions. He points out that on the witness stand prosecution witness Leny Cao testified that after seeing the victim, Rolando Gaza, sprawled on the ground and already dead, Leny Cao immediately called out for help and that, since nobody responded to her cry for help, she and her companion, Anna Rose Gantong, left and reported the matter to the police. This is contrasted to Cao’s affidavit where she declared that she went home and did not report the killing to the police. With regard to prosecution witness Rodel Labag, it is argued that his testimony that after being stabbed, Gaza ran, leaving accused-appellant behind who then approached the witness is inconsistent with Labag’s subsequent testimony that he was approached by accused-appellant before the stabbing happened. Further, Accused-appellant asserts that Cao’s testimony that while they were walking, Labag and Gantong were ahead of Gaza who was beside her while accused-appellant was behind the group, is at variance with the testimony of Labag that at the time of the stabbing he was walking on the left side of Gaza.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The above inconsistencies and contradictions are minor, trivial, and inconsequential, and cannot impair the credibility of the witnesses. On the contrary, it has been held, inconsistencies and discrepancies on minor details of the testimony of a witness serve to strengthen the credibility of the witness (People v. Buka, 205 SCRA 567 [1992]). They are badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood. Whether Leny Cao called out for help after the stabbing and immediately reported the stabbing to the police or went home is clearly immaterial for she in fact reported the matter to the police as she executed her affidavit at the police station of San Lorenzo Ruiz, Camarines Norte on January 28, 1991 (pp. 6-7, Original Record). Whether accused-appellant approached Rodel Labag before or after the stabbing is likewise immaterial. Due to the occurrence of the startling event, said witness might have confused the sequence of events. What can not be erased is the fact that this witness actually saw the stabbing. Again, the particular positions of the victim, Cao, Labag, and Gantong while they were walking home are inconsequential for they could have changed positions while conversing and walking. Further, whenever there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness, the testimony commands greater weight (People v. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47 [1990]).

Accused-appellant next assails the findings of the trial court that the attack upon the victim was characterized by treachery.

The contention is devoid of merit.

The evidence unquestionably supports the findings of the trial court that treachery attended the killing. Rodel Labag testified that while he, the victim, Ana Rose Gantong, and Leni Cao, were walking towards home in Barangay Mampurog, coming from a dance at Barrio Dagutdutan, Accused-appellant, approaching from behind suddenly stabbed the victim, Roland Gaza at the back and pursued the victim when the victim tried to escape (pp. 5-8, t.s.n., September 19, 1991), and that he, the witness, was only an arm’s length away from the victim when accused-appellant stabbed the latter (p. 5, id.). Leny Cao fully corroborated the testimony of Labag that the attack was sudden and unexpected and came from behind (pp. 14-19, t.s.n., November 20, 1991). These declarations indisputably establish that the attack of accused-appellant upon the victim was sudden, unexpected, and without warning coming from behind upon a totally unarmed victim, thus insuring accused-appellant’s safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the victim.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The attendance of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is found in the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution which would insure the offender’s safety from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the offended party, which means that no opportunity is given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen (People v. Samonte, Jr., 64 SCRA 319 [1975]; People v. de la Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 [1992]). Said conditions are undoubtedly present in this case. The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim (People v. Alcantara, 206, SCRA 662 [1992]; People v. Gonzales, 210 SCRA 44 [1992])chanrobles law library : red

Finally, Accused-appellant sets up the defense of self-defense in his bid for reversal. To prove self-defense, an accused must establish three concurring requisites, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused (Article 11, No. 1, Revised Penal Code; People v. Aquino, 54 SCRA 409 [1973]; People v. Morato, 224 SCRA 361 [1993]). The foremost element that must be proved to establish self-defense is unlawful aggression, for the absence of this essential element negates the validity of the plea of self-defense (People v. Morato, supra; People v. Curaraton, 224 SCRA 372 [1993]). A review of the facts of the case clearly shows the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim who was coming from a barrio dance in the company of friends, conversing with them along the way, when suddenly accused-appellant, coming from behind the group, stabbed the victim, who was unarmed and totally unaware of the impending attack. There was, therefore, no hint of aggression whatsoever, much less unlawful aggression, initiated by the victim. Absent this essential element, there is thus no need to discuss the other elements of self-defense for if there is no unlawful aggression there is nothing to prevent or to repel and the second element of self-defense would have no basis (People v. Morato, supra; People v. Curaraton, supra).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

The Solicitor General recommends that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated. We concur. The Chief of Police of the Municipality of San Lorenzo Ruiz, Chief Police Inspector Gil Gangan, testified that accused-appellant, accompanied by his aunt, walked into the police, a few hours after the stabbing and voluntarily surrendered himself without having been arrested and without any physical compulsion by any person. In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be properly appreciated it must appear that (a) the accused had not been actually arrested; (b) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agent; and (c) his surrender is voluntary (People v. Molo, 88 SCRA 22 [1979]). All the requisites are present in this case. An accused was held to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender where he proceeded to the municipal building where he was placed under arrest (People v. Besara, Jr., 64 SCRA 84 [1975]). The fact that herein accused-appellant was accompanied by his aunt when he surrendered does not detract from his act of voluntary surrender for there is no evidence to show that his aunt compelled him to surrender.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Republic Act No. 7659 amending said article cannot be given retroactive effect as it would be unfavorable to accused-appellant for said Republic Act imposes the graver penalty of reclusion perpetua to death). There being the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the imposable penalty is the minimum of said penalty or 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period (10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, but with the modification that the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is hereby reduced to an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years, and one (1) day of prison mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. (People v. Sarol, 139 SCRA 125 [1985]).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.




Back to Home | Back to Main




















chanrobles.com





ChanRobles On-Line Bar Review

ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : www.chanroblesbar.com

ChanRobles MCLE On-line

ChanRobles Lawnet Inc. - ChanRobles MCLE On-line : www.chanroblesmcleonline.com






August-1994 Jurisprudence                 

  • A.M. No. RTJ-93-1099 August 1, 1994 - ZENON L. DE GUIA v. FRANCISCO MA. GUERRERO, JR.

  • G.R. No. 110518 August 1, 1994 - JOSE L. GARCIA, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

  • G.R. Nos. 112389-90 August 1, 1994 - MERCEDES D. NAVARRO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 95758 August 2, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. REYNALDO RETUTA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 100153 August 2, 1994 - SPS. TOMAS CLOMA AND VICTORIA LUZ CLOMA v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 109902 August 2, 1994 - ALU-TUCP, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

  • G.R. No. 111110 August 2, 1994 - ZENCO SALES, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

  • G.R. No. 110058 August 3, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. VICENTE GENOBIA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 110553 August 3, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ROMEO T. PINCA

  • G.R. No. 114061 August 3, 1994 - KOREAN AIRLINES CO., LTD. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • A.M. No. MTJ-92-718 August 4, 1994 - MELENCIO PARANE v. RICARDO A. RELOZA

  • A.M. No. MTJ-93-893 August 4, 1994 - IN RE: FREDDIE P. MANUEL

  • G.R. No. 92502 August 4, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. RICARDO C. AMARO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 92508 August 4, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. IRENEO BAYRANTE, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 99026 August 4, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. RAFAEL M. BAGARES

  • G.R. No. 106695 August 4, 1994 - EDWARD T. MARCELO, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 107874 August 4, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. GEORGE R. DECENA

  • G.R. No. 110103 August 4, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. RUPERTO SAN GABRIEL

  • G.R. No. 110168 August 4, 1994 - RODOLFO R. PALMERA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 110261 August 4, 1994 - REY PABLO D. SICANGCO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 110503 August 4, 1994 - ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994 - TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 110778 August 4, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ALEJANDRO C. MENDIOLA

  • G.R. No. 111707 August 4, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. RAFAEL APOLONIA

  • G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994 - FRANKLIN M. DRILON v. ALFREDO S. LIM, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 114300 August 4, 1994 - CATALINO SAN PEDRO, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 115576 August 4, 1994 - IN RE: LEONARDO PAQUINTO, ET AL. v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

  • G.R. Nos. 105376-77 August 5, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ALEXANDER M. MARTINEZ

  • G.R. Nos. 105621-23 August 5, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JAIME Q. MUYANO

  • G.R. No. 107327 August 5, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ALLEN C. BASILGO

  • G.R. No. 86020 August 5, 1994 - RAMON CORPORAL v. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • A.M. No. P-91-611 August 5, 1994 - ROSITA ANDAMO VDA. DE GILLEGO v. HENRY AMADO ROXAS

  • G.R. No. 109272 August 10, 1994 - GEORG GROTJAHN GMBH & CO v. LUCIA VIOLAGO ISNANI, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 111523 August 10, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ROEL V. PONAYO

  • G.R. No. 92369 August 10, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. TEODORO MIRANDA, ET AL.

  • A.M. No. MTJ-93-855 August 10, 1994 - ALFONSO H. MARDOQUIO v. EVELIO ILANGA

  • G.R. No. 107683 August 11, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MARIO B. EVANGELISTA

  • G.R. No. 110260 August 11, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JOSE P. VIVAR

  • G.R. No. 115286 August 11, 1994 - INTER-ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 81002 August 11, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ALBERTO P. DOROJA

  • A.M. No. P-93-797 August 11, 1994 - LUZVIMINDA E. GARCIA v. ANATOLIO NAPE

  • A.M. RTJ-93-1097 August 12, 1994 - FRANCISCO Q. AURILLO, JR. v. GETULIO M. FRANCISCO

  • A.M. No. P-94-1005 August 12, 1994 - RAFAEL D. LACUATA v. ANTONIO J.M. BAUTISTA

  • A.M. No. P-94-1033 August 12, 1994 - FELIPE T. TORRES v. ROWENA B. TAYROS

  • G.R. No. 97255 August 12, 1994 - SOLID HOMES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 82680 August 13, 1994 - NICANOR SOMODIO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 107167 August 15, 1994 - LUMEN POLICARPIO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 108773 August 15, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JESUS JIMENEZ, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 109998 August 15, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MANUEL I. CAÑEJA

  • G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994 - PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 85329 August 16, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. EDDIE APAWAN

  • G.R. No. 105667 August 16, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. WINIFRED DAVID

  • G.R. No. 105805 August 16, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. EVELYN D. GARCIA

  • G.R. No. 109119 August 16, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ALICIA DE LA CRUZ CONSTANTINO

  • G.R. No. 109328 August 16, 1994 - ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS-TUCP, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 109667 August 16, 1994 - METROPOLITAN BANK, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

  • G.R. No. 101614 August 17, 1994 - LORENZITO BUAN v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 106053 August 17, 1994 - OTTOMAMA BENITO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 109146 August 17, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ARIEL GOMEZ

  • G.R. No. 110357 August 17, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. CARLOS A. TRANCA

  • G.R. No. 110993 August 17, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. EUTIQUIO APA-AP, JR., ET AL.

  • A.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994 - CERINA B. LIKONG v. ALEXANDER H. LIM

  • A.C. No. 3721 August 17, 1994 - JULIAN C. DINOY v. JESUS ROSAL

  • A.M. No. P-93-977 August 17, 1994 - OSCAR E. MIRO v. RUBEN C. TAN

  • G.R. No. 109144 August 19, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MORENO L. TUMIMPAD

  • G.R. No. 109172 August 19, 1994 - TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

  • G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994 - PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, ET AL. v. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ

  • G.R. No. 99868 August 19, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ARIEL LIMBAUAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994 - FIVE J TAXI v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • A.M. No. P-90-429 August 24, 1994 - NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. ROLANDO SAA

  • G.R. No. 100283 August 25, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. LEOPOLDO TAYCO

  • G.R. No. 109771 August 25, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ANTONIO BUYOK

  • G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994 - ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, ET AL.

  • A.M. No. P-90-416 August 25, 1994 - ANGELINE GASULAS v. ANECITA MARALIT

  • A.M. No. RTJ-93-1062 August 25, 1994 - ELIZA RATILLA DE LA CRUZ, ET AL. v. CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION

  • A.M. No. P-93-953 August 25, 1994 - OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. NANCY G. BUCOY

  • G.R. Nos. 103754-78 August 30, 1994 - MARIANO UN OCAMPO, III v. SANDIGANBAYAN

  • G.R. No. 104708 August 30, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. RANIEL O. MARTINEZ

  • G.R. No. 106579 August 30, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. DANILO CANILLO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 110272 August 30, 1994 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JAYSON A. DIADID, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 112283 August 30, 1994 - EVELYN ABEJA v. FEDERICO TAÑADA

  • G.R. No. 112884 August 30, 1994 - PLACIDO O. URBANES, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 103200 August 31, 1994 - LA NAVAL DRUG CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.