January 1997 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 116682 January 2, 1997 - ROBLETT INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116682. January 2, 1997.]
ROBLETT INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and CONTRACTORS EQUIPMENT, Respondents.
A. S. DY & Associates for Petitioner.
Pelaez, Gregorio, Sipin, Bala & Robles for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL. � As regards the factual issue on the correctness of the amount of petitioner’s obligation, or whether it has been fully paid, petitioner insists that from a perusal of Exhs. "2", "2-A", to "2-Z" all of which refer to respondent’s Equipment Daily Time Reports for 2 May to 14 June 1985, it was established that the equipment leased was actually used for only 191 hours. Multiplying 191 hours by the rental rate of P540.00 per hour will amount to P103,140.00 which is petitioner’s correct rental obligation to respondent. Taking into account the construction materials worth P115,000.00 received by respondent from petitioner an overpayment of P12,000.00 more or less results. In the absence of any showing that the trial court failed to appreciate facts and circumstances of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, no compelling reason exists for this Court to impinge upon matters more appropriately within its province. Consequently, we sustain the finding of the trial court that the evidence relied upon by petitioner is incomplete as it does not reflect the entire period of the lease agreement which, on the basis of respondent’s evidence, covered the period of 28 March to 12 July 1985.
2. ID.; CIVIL ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL IN PAIS; MANIFEST IN RECEIPT OF STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR P376,350.18 WITHOUT PROTEST AND ASKING FOR AMPLE TIME TO SOURCE FUNDS. � Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. This doctrine obtains in the present case. A statement of account for P376,350.18 covering the period above mentioned was received from respondent by petitioner with nary a protest from the latter. Neither did petitioner controvert the demand letter concerning the overdue account of P237,909.38; on the contrary, it asked for ample time to source funds to substantially settle the account.
2. ID.; CIVIL ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL IN PAIS; MANIFEST IN RECEIPT OF STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR P376,350.18 WITHOUT PROTEST AND ASKING FOR AMPLE TIME TO SOURCE FUNDS. � Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. This doctrine obtains in the present case. A statement of account for P376,350.18 covering the period above mentioned was received from respondent by petitioner with nary a protest from the latter. Neither did petitioner controvert the demand letter concerning the overdue account of P237,909.38; on the contrary, it asked for ample time to source funds to substantially settle the account.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 23 September 1986 respondent Contractors Equipment Corporation (CEC) instituted an action for a sum of money against petitioner Roblett Industrial Construction Corporation (RICC) before the Regional Trial Court of Makati alleging that in 1985 it leased to the latter various construction equipment which it used in its projects. As a result RICC incurred unpaid accounts amounting to P342,909.38.
On 19 December 1985 RICC through its Assistant Vice President for Finance Candelario S. Aller Jr. entered into an Agreement 1 with CEC where it confirmed petitioner’s account. As an off-setting arrangement respondent received from petitioner construction materials worth P115,000.00 thus reducing petitioner’s balance to P227,909.38.
A day before the execution of their Agreement, or on 18 December 1985, RICC paid CEC P10,000.00 in postdated checks which when deposited were dishonored. As a consequence the latter debited the amount to petitioner’s account of P227,909.38 thus increasing its balance to P237,909.38.
On 24 July 1986 Mariano R. Manaligod, Jr., General Manager of CEC, sent a letter of demand to petitioner through its Vice President for Finance regarding the latter’s overdue account of P237,909.38 and sought settlement thereof on or before 31 July 1986. In reply, petitioner requested for thirty (30) days to have enough time to look for funds to substantially settle its account.
Traversing the allegations of respondent, Candelario S. Aller Jr. declared that he signed the Agreement with the real intention of having proof of payment. In fact Baltazar Banlot, Vice President for Finance of petitioner, claimed that after deliberation and audit it appeared that petitioner overpaid respondent by P12,000.00 on the basis of the latter’s Equipment Daily Time Reports for 2 May to 14 June 1985 which reflected a total obligation of only P103,000.00. He claimed however that the Agreement was not approved by the Board and that he did not authorize Aller Jr. to sign thereon.
On rebuttal, Manaligod Jr. declared that petitioner had received a statement of account covering the period from 28 March to 12 July 1985 in the amount of P376,350.18 which it never questioned. From this amount P3,440.80, based on respondent’s account with petitioner and P30,000.00, representing payments made by the latter, were deducted thus leaving a balance of P342,909.38 as mentioned in the Agreement. chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary
On 19 December 1990 the trial court rendered judgment ordering petitioner to pay respondent: (a) P237,909.38 plus legal interest from 31 July 1986 until full payment; (b) P2,000.00 as litigation expenses; (c) 20% of the sum due and payable as attorney’s fees and, (d) cost of suit. 2 Its ruling is anchored on its finding that �
1. The Court finds the Agreement (EXHIBIT "A," EXHIBIT "I")between the parties valid and that it reflects the true intention of the parties. It must be emphasized that the same agreement was used by plaintiff as the basis for claiming defendant’s obligation of P237,909.38 and also used by defendant as the same basis for its alleged payment in full of its obligation to plaintiff. But while plaintiff treats the entire agreement as valid, defendant wants the court to treat that portion which treats of the offsetting of P115,000.00 as valid, whereas it considers the other terms and conditions as "onerous, illegal and want of prior consent and Board approval." This Court cannot agree to defendant’s contention. It must be stressed that defendant’s answer was not made under oath, and therefore, the genuineness and due execution of the agreement (EXHIBIT "A," EXHIBIT "I") which was the basis for plaintiff’s claim is deemed admitted (Section 8, Rule 8, Rules of Court). Such admission, under the principle of estoppel, is rendered conclusive upon defendant and cannot be denied or disproved as against plaintiff (Art. 1431, Civil Code). Either the agreement (EXHIBIT "A," EXHIBIT "I") is valid or void. It must be treated as a whole and not to be divided into parts and consider only those provisions which favor one party (in this case the defendant). Contracts must bind both contracting parties, its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them (Art. 1308, New Civil Code).
Defendant further contends that the agreement did not reflect the real intention of the parties. However, when plaintiff wrote defendant in its letter dated July 24, 1986 (EXHIBIT "F") that it be given thirty (30) days to substantially settle the same, clearly, at this point in time, defendant did not question its account with plaintiff, nor did it question the validity nor the contents of the Agreement (EXHIBIT "A," EXHIBIT "I"). This Court is not convinced that the Agreement (EXHIBIT "A," EXHIBIT "I") does not reflect the true intention of the parties. On the contrary, it does.
2. To the issue that defendant has fully paid its obligation to plaintiff by way of offset for the P115,000.00 construction materials received by plaintiff, this Court finds the contention of defendant without basis in fact. Defendant’s presentation of evidence (EXHIBITS "2," "2-A" up to "2-Z") merely consists of daily time reports of plaintiff consisting of 191 hours only, the period May 2, 1985 to June 14, 1985 and does not reflect the entire period of the lease agreement (EXHIBIT "L"), while plaintiff accurately reflects in Exhibits "I," "J," "K" and its submarkings the entire period, covered by the lease agreement (EXHIBIT "L"), which is from March 28, 1985 to July 12, 1985 and correctly states the amount due plaintiff from defendant in the amount of P376,350.18. 3
On 29 July 1994 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4
Petitioner imputes the following errors to respondent court: (1) in not holding that, insofar as it fixed petitioner’s alleged obligation to respondent at P342,909.38, the Agreement is unenforceable for being in the nature of an unauthorized contract; and, (2) in not holding that petitioner’s obligation to respondent had been fully paid and that petitioner even overpaid respondent by P12,000.00.
As regards the first error, petitioner asserts that the Agreement is unenforceable for having been executed by Candelario S. Aller Jr. without authority.
Significantly, in the proceedings before respondent Court of Appeals, petitioner assigned a lone error allegedly committed by the trial court, i.e., full payment, if not overpayment by P12,000.00, of the obligation referred to in the second issue raised in the petition therein. Quite obviously, having limited itself to that particular issue to the exclusion of any other, petitioner can no longer be permitted to assail the finding of the trial court on the validity of the Agreement. 5
As regards the factual issue on the correctness of the amount of petitioner’s obligation, or whether it has been fully paid, petitioner insists that from a perusal of Exhs. "2," "2-A" to "2-Z" all of which refer to respondent’s Equipment Daily Time Reports for 2 May to 14 June 1985, it was established that the equipment leased was actually used for only 191 hours. Multiplying 191 hours by the rental rate of P540.00 per hour will amount to P103,140.00 which is petitioner’s correct rental obligation to respondent. Taking into account the construction materials worth P115,000.00 received by respondent from petitioner an overpayment of P12,000.00 more or less results. In the absence of any showing that the trial court failed to appreciate facts and circumstances of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, no compelling reason exists for this Court to impinge upon matters more appropriately within its province. 6 Consequently, we sustain the finding of the trial court that the evidence relied upon by petitioner is incomplete as it does not reflect the entire period of the lease agreement which, on the basis of respondent’s evidence, covered the period of 28 March to 12 July 1985.
Furthermore, estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. 7 This doctrine obtains in the present case. A statement of account for P376,350.18 covering the period above mentioned was received from respondent by petitioner with nary a protest from the latter. Neither did petitioner controvert the demand letter concerning the overdue account of P237,909.38; on the contrary, it asked for ample time to source funds to substantially settle the account.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 29 July 1994 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Makati dated 19 December 1990 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
On 19 December 1985 RICC through its Assistant Vice President for Finance Candelario S. Aller Jr. entered into an Agreement 1 with CEC where it confirmed petitioner’s account. As an off-setting arrangement respondent received from petitioner construction materials worth P115,000.00 thus reducing petitioner’s balance to P227,909.38.
A day before the execution of their Agreement, or on 18 December 1985, RICC paid CEC P10,000.00 in postdated checks which when deposited were dishonored. As a consequence the latter debited the amount to petitioner’s account of P227,909.38 thus increasing its balance to P237,909.38.
On 24 July 1986 Mariano R. Manaligod, Jr., General Manager of CEC, sent a letter of demand to petitioner through its Vice President for Finance regarding the latter’s overdue account of P237,909.38 and sought settlement thereof on or before 31 July 1986. In reply, petitioner requested for thirty (30) days to have enough time to look for funds to substantially settle its account.
Traversing the allegations of respondent, Candelario S. Aller Jr. declared that he signed the Agreement with the real intention of having proof of payment. In fact Baltazar Banlot, Vice President for Finance of petitioner, claimed that after deliberation and audit it appeared that petitioner overpaid respondent by P12,000.00 on the basis of the latter’s Equipment Daily Time Reports for 2 May to 14 June 1985 which reflected a total obligation of only P103,000.00. He claimed however that the Agreement was not approved by the Board and that he did not authorize Aller Jr. to sign thereon.
On rebuttal, Manaligod Jr. declared that petitioner had received a statement of account covering the period from 28 March to 12 July 1985 in the amount of P376,350.18 which it never questioned. From this amount P3,440.80, based on respondent’s account with petitioner and P30,000.00, representing payments made by the latter, were deducted thus leaving a balance of P342,909.38 as mentioned in the Agreement. chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary
On 19 December 1990 the trial court rendered judgment ordering petitioner to pay respondent: (a) P237,909.38 plus legal interest from 31 July 1986 until full payment; (b) P2,000.00 as litigation expenses; (c) 20% of the sum due and payable as attorney’s fees and, (d) cost of suit. 2 Its ruling is anchored on its finding that �
1. The Court finds the Agreement (EXHIBIT "A," EXHIBIT "I")between the parties valid and that it reflects the true intention of the parties. It must be emphasized that the same agreement was used by plaintiff as the basis for claiming defendant’s obligation of P237,909.38 and also used by defendant as the same basis for its alleged payment in full of its obligation to plaintiff. But while plaintiff treats the entire agreement as valid, defendant wants the court to treat that portion which treats of the offsetting of P115,000.00 as valid, whereas it considers the other terms and conditions as "onerous, illegal and want of prior consent and Board approval." This Court cannot agree to defendant’s contention. It must be stressed that defendant’s answer was not made under oath, and therefore, the genuineness and due execution of the agreement (EXHIBIT "A," EXHIBIT "I") which was the basis for plaintiff’s claim is deemed admitted (Section 8, Rule 8, Rules of Court). Such admission, under the principle of estoppel, is rendered conclusive upon defendant and cannot be denied or disproved as against plaintiff (Art. 1431, Civil Code). Either the agreement (EXHIBIT "A," EXHIBIT "I") is valid or void. It must be treated as a whole and not to be divided into parts and consider only those provisions which favor one party (in this case the defendant). Contracts must bind both contracting parties, its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them (Art. 1308, New Civil Code).
Defendant further contends that the agreement did not reflect the real intention of the parties. However, when plaintiff wrote defendant in its letter dated July 24, 1986 (EXHIBIT "F") that it be given thirty (30) days to substantially settle the same, clearly, at this point in time, defendant did not question its account with plaintiff, nor did it question the validity nor the contents of the Agreement (EXHIBIT "A," EXHIBIT "I"). This Court is not convinced that the Agreement (EXHIBIT "A," EXHIBIT "I") does not reflect the true intention of the parties. On the contrary, it does.
2. To the issue that defendant has fully paid its obligation to plaintiff by way of offset for the P115,000.00 construction materials received by plaintiff, this Court finds the contention of defendant without basis in fact. Defendant’s presentation of evidence (EXHIBITS "2," "2-A" up to "2-Z") merely consists of daily time reports of plaintiff consisting of 191 hours only, the period May 2, 1985 to June 14, 1985 and does not reflect the entire period of the lease agreement (EXHIBIT "L"), while plaintiff accurately reflects in Exhibits "I," "J," "K" and its submarkings the entire period, covered by the lease agreement (EXHIBIT "L"), which is from March 28, 1985 to July 12, 1985 and correctly states the amount due plaintiff from defendant in the amount of P376,350.18. 3
On 29 July 1994 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4
Petitioner imputes the following errors to respondent court: (1) in not holding that, insofar as it fixed petitioner’s alleged obligation to respondent at P342,909.38, the Agreement is unenforceable for being in the nature of an unauthorized contract; and, (2) in not holding that petitioner’s obligation to respondent had been fully paid and that petitioner even overpaid respondent by P12,000.00.
As regards the first error, petitioner asserts that the Agreement is unenforceable for having been executed by Candelario S. Aller Jr. without authority.
Significantly, in the proceedings before respondent Court of Appeals, petitioner assigned a lone error allegedly committed by the trial court, i.e., full payment, if not overpayment by P12,000.00, of the obligation referred to in the second issue raised in the petition therein. Quite obviously, having limited itself to that particular issue to the exclusion of any other, petitioner can no longer be permitted to assail the finding of the trial court on the validity of the Agreement. 5
As regards the factual issue on the correctness of the amount of petitioner’s obligation, or whether it has been fully paid, petitioner insists that from a perusal of Exhs. "2," "2-A" to "2-Z" all of which refer to respondent’s Equipment Daily Time Reports for 2 May to 14 June 1985, it was established that the equipment leased was actually used for only 191 hours. Multiplying 191 hours by the rental rate of P540.00 per hour will amount to P103,140.00 which is petitioner’s correct rental obligation to respondent. Taking into account the construction materials worth P115,000.00 received by respondent from petitioner an overpayment of P12,000.00 more or less results. In the absence of any showing that the trial court failed to appreciate facts and circumstances of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, no compelling reason exists for this Court to impinge upon matters more appropriately within its province. 6 Consequently, we sustain the finding of the trial court that the evidence relied upon by petitioner is incomplete as it does not reflect the entire period of the lease agreement which, on the basis of respondent’s evidence, covered the period of 28 March to 12 July 1985.
Furthermore, estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. 7 This doctrine obtains in the present case. A statement of account for P376,350.18 covering the period above mentioned was received from respondent by petitioner with nary a protest from the latter. Neither did petitioner controvert the demand letter concerning the overdue account of P237,909.38; on the contrary, it asked for ample time to source funds to substantially settle the account.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 29 July 1994 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Makati dated 19 December 1990 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Exh. "A," Records, pp. 5-6.
2. Decision penned by Judge Ignacio M. Capulong, NCJR RTC - Br. 134, Makati, Metro Manila, Rollo, p. 25.
3. Rollo, p. 24.
4. Decision penned by Justice Serafin V. C. Guingona, concurred in by Justices Gloria C. Paras and Eubulo G. Verzola; Rollo, p. 38.
5. See Compañia Maritima v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50900, 9 April 1985, 135 SCRA 593.
6. People v. Caras, G.R. No. 112731, 18 July 1994, 234 SCRA 199.
7. Panay Electric Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81939, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 500.
