March 1998 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 119172 March 25, 1998 - BELEN C. FIGUERRES v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119172. March 25, 1999.]
BELEN C. FIGUERRES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF ASSESSORS OF MANDALUYONG, CITY TREASURER OF MANDALUYONG, and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MANDALUYONG, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February 8, 1995, dismissing a prohibition suit brought by petitioner against respondent officials of the Municipality, now City, of Mandaluyong to prevent them from enforcing certain ordinances revising the schedule of fair market values of the various classes of real property in that municipality and the assessment levels applicable thereto.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Petitioner Belen C. Figuerres is the owner of a parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413305, and located at Amarillo Street, Barangay Mauway, City of Mandaluyong. In 1993, she received a notice of assessment, dated October 20, 1993, from the municipal assessor of the then Municipality of Mandaluyong, containing the following specifics:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
TYPE AREA BASE VALUE MARKET ASSESSMENT ASSESSED
PER SQ. M. VALUE LEVEL VALUE
Residential 530 sq. m. P2,500.00 P1,325,000.00 20 P265,000.00 1
The assessment, effective in the year 1994, was based on Ordinance Nos. 119 and 125, series of 1993, and Ordinance No. 135, series of 1994, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaluyong. Ordinance No. 119, series of 1993, which was promulgated on April 22, 1993, contains a schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in the municipality. 2 Ordinance No. 125, series of 1993, which was promulgated on November 11, 1993, on the other hand, fixes the assessment levels applicable to such classes of real property. 3 Finally, Ordinance No. 135, series of 1994, which was promulgated on February 24, 1994, amended Ordinance No. 119, �6 by providing that only one third (1/3) of the increase in the market values applicable to residential lands pursuant to the said ordinance shall be implemented in the years 1994, 1995, and 1996. 4
Petitioner brought a prohibition suit in the Court of Appeals against the Assessor, the Treasurer, and the Sangguniang Bayan to stop them from enforcing the ordinances in question on the ground that the ordinances were invalid for having been adopted allegedly without public hearings and prior publication or posting and without complying with the implementing rules yet to be issued by the Department of Finance. 5
In its decision, dated February 8, 1995, 6 the Court of Appeals threw out the petition. The appellate court said in part:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner’s claim that Ordinance Nos. 119, 125 and 135 are null and void since they were prepared without the approval and determination of the Department of Finance is without merit.
The approval and determination by the Department of Finance is not needed under the Local Government Code of 1991, since it is now the city council of Mandaluyong that is empowered to determine and approve the aforecited ordinances. Furthermore, contrary to the claim of petitioner that the Department of Finance "has not promulgated the necessary rules and regulations for the classification, appraisal and assessment of real property as prescribed by the 1991 Local Government Code," Department of Finance Local Assessment Regulation No. 1-92 dated October 6, 1992, which is addressed to provincial, city, and municipal assessors and others concerned with the proper implementation of Section 219 of R.A. No. 7160, provides for the rules relative to the conduct of general revisions of real property assessments pursuant to Sections 201 and 219 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Regarding petitioner’s claim that there is need for municipal ordinances to be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity, the same is also without merit.
Section 511 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that �
The secretary to the Sanggunian concerned shall transmit official copies of such ordinances to the chief executive officer of the Official Gazette within seven (7) days following the approval of the said ordinances for publication purposes. The Official Gazette may publish ordinances with penal sanctions for archival and reference purposes.
Thus, the posting and publication in the Official Gazette of ordinances with penal sanctions is not a prerequisite for their effectivity. This finds support in the case of Tañada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446), wherein the Supreme Court declared that municipal ordinances are covered by the Local Government Code.
Moreover, petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him as provided for under Section 187 of R.A. No. 7160, before filing the instant petition with this Court.
In fact, aside from filing an appeal to the Secretary of Justice as provided under Section 187 of R.A. No. 7160, the petitioner . . . could have appealed to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, the decision of which is in turn appealable to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals as provided under Sections 226 and 230 of the said law. According to current jurisprudence, administrative remedies must be exhausted before seeking judicial intervention. (Gonzales v. Secretary of Education, 5 SCRA 657). If a litigant goes to court without first pursuing the available administrative remedies, his action is considered premature and not yet ripe for judicial determination (Allied Brokerage Corporation v. Commissioner of Customs, 40 SCRA 555).
As the petitioner has not pursued the administrative remedies available to him, his petition for prohibition cannot prosper (Gonzales v. Provincial Auditor of Iloilo, 12 SCRA 711).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED. 7
Petitioner Figuerres assails the above decision. She contends that �
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN FINDING LACK OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ON THE PART OF HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS NOT REQUIRED BY LAW AND WOULD HAVE BEEN A USELESS FORMALITY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT STATED THAT THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG IS EMPOWERED TO DETERMINE AND APPROVE THE AFORECITED ORDINANCES WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE MANDATORY PUBLIC HEARINGS REQUIRED BY R.A. No. 7160.
3. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN STATING THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR PUBLICATION OF TAX ORDINANCES.
4. THERE IS NON COMPLIANCE BY PUBLIC RESPONDENTS OF ASSESSMENT REGULATION No. 1-92 DATED OCTOBER 6, 1992, EVEN IF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MENTIONED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SAID ASSESSMENT REGULATIONS. 8
On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong contends:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) the present case does not fall within any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies;
(2) apart from her bare allegations, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question;
(3) although an ordinance concerning the imposition of real property taxes is not required to be published in the Official Gazette in order to be valid, still the subject ordinances were disseminated before their effectivity in accordance with the relevant provisions of R.A. No. 7160; and
(4) the Municipality of Mandaluyong complied with the regulations of the Department of Finance in enacting the subject ordinances.chanrobles law library
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
In Lopez v. City of Manila, 9 we recently held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . Therefore, where a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts. . . .
With regard to questions on the legality of a tax ordinance, the remedies available to the taxpayer are provided under Sections 187, 226, and 252 of R.A. 7160.
Section 187 of R.A. 7160 provides, that the taxpayer may question the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance on appeal within thirty (30) days from effectivity thereof, to the Secretary of Justice. The petitioner after finding that his assessment is unjust, confiscatory, or excessive, may bring the case before the Secretary of Justice for questions of legality or constitutionality of the city ordinance.
Under Section 226 of R.A. 7160, an owner of real property who is not satisfied with the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals.
Should the taxpayer question the excessiveness of the amount of tax, he must first pay the amount due, in accordance with Section 252 of R.A. No. 7160. Then, he must request the annotation of the phrase "paid under protest" and accordingly appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals by filing a petition under oath together with copies of the tax declarations and affidavits or documents to support his appeal.
Although cases raising purely legal questions are excepted from the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may resort to the courts, in the case at bar, the legal questions raised by petitioner require, as will presently be shown, proof of facts for their resolution. Therefore, the petitioner’s action in the Court of Appeals was premature, and the appellate court correctly dismissed her action on the ground that she failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as above stated.
Petitioner argues that resort to the Secretary of Justice is not mandatory but only directory because R.A. No. 7160, �187 provides that "any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures" may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Precisely, the Secretary of Justice can take cognizance of a case involving the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances where, as in this case, there are factual issues involved.
There need be no fear that compliance with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies will unduly delay resort to the courts to the detriment of taxpayers. Although R.A. No. 7160, �187 provides that an appeal to the Secretary of Justice "shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein," it likewise requires the Secretary of Justice to "render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal," after which "the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
Public hearings on tax ordinance
Petitioner is right in contending that public hearings are required to be conducted prior to the enactment of an ordinance imposing real property taxes. R.A. No. 7160, �186 provides that an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges "shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose."cralaw virtua1aw library
However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, 10 although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment. In an analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, 11 it was alleged that the ordinance making it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not been submitted by the provincial board as required by ��2232-2233 of the Administrative Code. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court upon the theory that the ordinance in question was adopted without authority on the part of the municipality and was therefore unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause showing that said ordinance had been approved by the provincial board. Considering the provisions of law that it is the duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by the municipal councils of the different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the law has been complied with. We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary. 12
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner’s cause of action in the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. 13 Since petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality.
Publication and posting of schedule of fair market values
Petitioner is also right that publication or posting of the proposed schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in a local government unit is required pursuant to R.A. No. 7160, �212 which in part states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . . The schedule of fair market values shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, city, or municipality concerned, or in the absence thereof, shall be posted in the provincial capitol, city or municipal hall and in two other conspicuous public places therein.
In Ty v. Trampe, 14 it was held that, if the local government unit is part of Metro Manila, the abovequoted portion of �212 must be understood to refer to the schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in the district to which the city or municipality belongs, as prepared jointly by the local assessors concerned.
In addition, an ordinance imposing real property taxes (such as Ordinance Nos. 119 and 135) must be posted or published as required by R.A. No. 7160, �188 which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. � Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation: Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places.
Hence, after the proposed schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in a local government unit within Metro Manila, as prepared jointly by the local assessors of the district to which the city or municipality belongs, has been published or posted in accordance with �212 of R.A. No. 7160 and enacted into ordinances by the sanggunians of the municipalities and cities concerned, the ordinances containing the schedule of fair market values must themselves be published or posted in the manner provided by �188 of R.A. No. 7160.
With respect to ordinances which fix the assessment levels (such as Ordinance No. 125), being in the nature of a tax ordinance, �188 likewise applies. Moreover, as Ordinance No. 125, �7 provides for a penal sanction for violations thereof by means of a fine of not less than P1,000.00 nor more than P5,000.00, or imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months, or both, in the discretion of the court, not only �188 but �511(a) also must be observed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Ordinances with penal sanctions shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial capitol, city, municipal or barangay hall, as the case may be, for a minimum period of three (3) consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published in a newspaper of general circulation, where available, within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, except in the case of barangay ordinances. Unless otherwise provided therein, said ordinances shall take effect on the day following its publication, or at the end of the period of posting, whichever occurs later.
In view of ��188 and 511(a) of R.A. No. 7160, an ordinance fixing the assessment levels applicable to the different classes of real property in a local government unit and imposing penal sanctions for violations thereof (such as Ordinance No. 125) should be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation, where available, within ten (10) days of its approval, and posted in at least two (2) prominent places in the provincial capitol, city, municipal, or barangay hall for a minimum of three (3) consecutive weeks.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Apart from her allegations, petitioner has not presented any evidence to show that the subject ordinances were not disseminated in accordance with these provisions of R.A. No. 7160. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong presented a certificate, dated November 12, 1993, of Williard S. Wong, Sanggunian Secretary of the Municipality of Mandaluyong that "Ordinance No. 125, S-1993 . . . has been posted in accordance with �59(b) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991." 15 Thus, considering the presumption of validity in favor of the ordinances and the failure of petitioner to rebut such presumption, we are constrained to dismiss the petition in this case.
Compliance with regulations issued by the
Department of Finance
Also without merit is the contention of petitioner that Ordinance No. 119 and Ordinance No. 135 are void for not having been enacted in accordance with Local Assessment Regulation No. 1-92, dated October 6, 1992, of the Department of Finance, which provides guidelines for the preparation of proposed schedules of fair market values of the different classes of real property in a local government unit, such as time tables for obtaining information from owners of affected lands and buildings regarding the value thereof. As in the case of the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances and revenue measures, however, petitioner has not shown that the ordinances in this case were not enacted in accordance with the applicable regulations of the Department of Finance. The Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that, although the regulations are merely directory, it has complied with them. 16 Hence, in the absence of proof that the ordinances were not enacted in accordance with such regulations, said ordinances must be presumed to have been enacted in accordance with such regulations.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawnad
Bellosillo, Puno, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
Petitioner Belen C. Figuerres is the owner of a parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413305, and located at Amarillo Street, Barangay Mauway, City of Mandaluyong. In 1993, she received a notice of assessment, dated October 20, 1993, from the municipal assessor of the then Municipality of Mandaluyong, containing the following specifics:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
TYPE AREA BASE VALUE MARKET ASSESSMENT ASSESSED
PER SQ. M. VALUE LEVEL VALUE
Residential 530 sq. m. P2,500.00 P1,325,000.00 20 P265,000.00 1
The assessment, effective in the year 1994, was based on Ordinance Nos. 119 and 125, series of 1993, and Ordinance No. 135, series of 1994, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaluyong. Ordinance No. 119, series of 1993, which was promulgated on April 22, 1993, contains a schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in the municipality. 2 Ordinance No. 125, series of 1993, which was promulgated on November 11, 1993, on the other hand, fixes the assessment levels applicable to such classes of real property. 3 Finally, Ordinance No. 135, series of 1994, which was promulgated on February 24, 1994, amended Ordinance No. 119, �6 by providing that only one third (1/3) of the increase in the market values applicable to residential lands pursuant to the said ordinance shall be implemented in the years 1994, 1995, and 1996. 4
Petitioner brought a prohibition suit in the Court of Appeals against the Assessor, the Treasurer, and the Sangguniang Bayan to stop them from enforcing the ordinances in question on the ground that the ordinances were invalid for having been adopted allegedly without public hearings and prior publication or posting and without complying with the implementing rules yet to be issued by the Department of Finance. 5
In its decision, dated February 8, 1995, 6 the Court of Appeals threw out the petition. The appellate court said in part:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner’s claim that Ordinance Nos. 119, 125 and 135 are null and void since they were prepared without the approval and determination of the Department of Finance is without merit.
The approval and determination by the Department of Finance is not needed under the Local Government Code of 1991, since it is now the city council of Mandaluyong that is empowered to determine and approve the aforecited ordinances. Furthermore, contrary to the claim of petitioner that the Department of Finance "has not promulgated the necessary rules and regulations for the classification, appraisal and assessment of real property as prescribed by the 1991 Local Government Code," Department of Finance Local Assessment Regulation No. 1-92 dated October 6, 1992, which is addressed to provincial, city, and municipal assessors and others concerned with the proper implementation of Section 219 of R.A. No. 7160, provides for the rules relative to the conduct of general revisions of real property assessments pursuant to Sections 201 and 219 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Regarding petitioner’s claim that there is need for municipal ordinances to be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity, the same is also without merit.
Section 511 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that �
x x x
The secretary to the Sanggunian concerned shall transmit official copies of such ordinances to the chief executive officer of the Official Gazette within seven (7) days following the approval of the said ordinances for publication purposes. The Official Gazette may publish ordinances with penal sanctions for archival and reference purposes.
Thus, the posting and publication in the Official Gazette of ordinances with penal sanctions is not a prerequisite for their effectivity. This finds support in the case of Tañada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446), wherein the Supreme Court declared that municipal ordinances are covered by the Local Government Code.
Moreover, petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him as provided for under Section 187 of R.A. No. 7160, before filing the instant petition with this Court.
x x x
In fact, aside from filing an appeal to the Secretary of Justice as provided under Section 187 of R.A. No. 7160, the petitioner . . . could have appealed to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, the decision of which is in turn appealable to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals as provided under Sections 226 and 230 of the said law. According to current jurisprudence, administrative remedies must be exhausted before seeking judicial intervention. (Gonzales v. Secretary of Education, 5 SCRA 657). If a litigant goes to court without first pursuing the available administrative remedies, his action is considered premature and not yet ripe for judicial determination (Allied Brokerage Corporation v. Commissioner of Customs, 40 SCRA 555).
As the petitioner has not pursued the administrative remedies available to him, his petition for prohibition cannot prosper (Gonzales v. Provincial Auditor of Iloilo, 12 SCRA 711).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED. 7
Petitioner Figuerres assails the above decision. She contends that �
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN FINDING LACK OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ON THE PART OF HEREIN PETITIONER WHEN UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS NOT REQUIRED BY LAW AND WOULD HAVE BEEN A USELESS FORMALITY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT STATED THAT THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG IS EMPOWERED TO DETERMINE AND APPROVE THE AFORECITED ORDINANCES WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE MANDATORY PUBLIC HEARINGS REQUIRED BY R.A. No. 7160.
3. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN STATING THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR PUBLICATION OF TAX ORDINANCES.
4. THERE IS NON COMPLIANCE BY PUBLIC RESPONDENTS OF ASSESSMENT REGULATION No. 1-92 DATED OCTOBER 6, 1992, EVEN IF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MENTIONED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SAID ASSESSMENT REGULATIONS. 8
On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong contends:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) the present case does not fall within any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies;
(2) apart from her bare allegations, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question;
(3) although an ordinance concerning the imposition of real property taxes is not required to be published in the Official Gazette in order to be valid, still the subject ordinances were disseminated before their effectivity in accordance with the relevant provisions of R.A. No. 7160; and
(4) the Municipality of Mandaluyong complied with the regulations of the Department of Finance in enacting the subject ordinances.chanrobles law library
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
In Lopez v. City of Manila, 9 we recently held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . Therefore, where a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts. . . .
With regard to questions on the legality of a tax ordinance, the remedies available to the taxpayer are provided under Sections 187, 226, and 252 of R.A. 7160.
Section 187 of R.A. 7160 provides, that the taxpayer may question the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance on appeal within thirty (30) days from effectivity thereof, to the Secretary of Justice. The petitioner after finding that his assessment is unjust, confiscatory, or excessive, may bring the case before the Secretary of Justice for questions of legality or constitutionality of the city ordinance.
Under Section 226 of R.A. 7160, an owner of real property who is not satisfied with the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals.
Should the taxpayer question the excessiveness of the amount of tax, he must first pay the amount due, in accordance with Section 252 of R.A. No. 7160. Then, he must request the annotation of the phrase "paid under protest" and accordingly appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals by filing a petition under oath together with copies of the tax declarations and affidavits or documents to support his appeal.
Although cases raising purely legal questions are excepted from the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may resort to the courts, in the case at bar, the legal questions raised by petitioner require, as will presently be shown, proof of facts for their resolution. Therefore, the petitioner’s action in the Court of Appeals was premature, and the appellate court correctly dismissed her action on the ground that she failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as above stated.
Petitioner argues that resort to the Secretary of Justice is not mandatory but only directory because R.A. No. 7160, �187 provides that "any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures" may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Precisely, the Secretary of Justice can take cognizance of a case involving the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances where, as in this case, there are factual issues involved.
There need be no fear that compliance with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies will unduly delay resort to the courts to the detriment of taxpayers. Although R.A. No. 7160, �187 provides that an appeal to the Secretary of Justice "shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein," it likewise requires the Secretary of Justice to "render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal," after which "the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
Public hearings on tax ordinance
Petitioner is right in contending that public hearings are required to be conducted prior to the enactment of an ordinance imposing real property taxes. R.A. No. 7160, �186 provides that an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges "shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose."cralaw virtua1aw library
However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, 10 although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment. In an analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, 11 it was alleged that the ordinance making it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not been submitted by the provincial board as required by ��2232-2233 of the Administrative Code. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court upon the theory that the ordinance in question was adopted without authority on the part of the municipality and was therefore unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause showing that said ordinance had been approved by the provincial board. Considering the provisions of law that it is the duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by the municipal councils of the different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the law has been complied with. We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary. 12
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner’s cause of action in the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. 13 Since petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality.
Publication and posting of schedule of fair market values
Petitioner is also right that publication or posting of the proposed schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in a local government unit is required pursuant to R.A. No. 7160, �212 which in part states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . . The schedule of fair market values shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, city, or municipality concerned, or in the absence thereof, shall be posted in the provincial capitol, city or municipal hall and in two other conspicuous public places therein.
In Ty v. Trampe, 14 it was held that, if the local government unit is part of Metro Manila, the abovequoted portion of �212 must be understood to refer to the schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in the district to which the city or municipality belongs, as prepared jointly by the local assessors concerned.
In addition, an ordinance imposing real property taxes (such as Ordinance Nos. 119 and 135) must be posted or published as required by R.A. No. 7160, �188 which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. � Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation: Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places.
Hence, after the proposed schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in a local government unit within Metro Manila, as prepared jointly by the local assessors of the district to which the city or municipality belongs, has been published or posted in accordance with �212 of R.A. No. 7160 and enacted into ordinances by the sanggunians of the municipalities and cities concerned, the ordinances containing the schedule of fair market values must themselves be published or posted in the manner provided by �188 of R.A. No. 7160.
With respect to ordinances which fix the assessment levels (such as Ordinance No. 125), being in the nature of a tax ordinance, �188 likewise applies. Moreover, as Ordinance No. 125, �7 provides for a penal sanction for violations thereof by means of a fine of not less than P1,000.00 nor more than P5,000.00, or imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months, or both, in the discretion of the court, not only �188 but �511(a) also must be observed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Ordinances with penal sanctions shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial capitol, city, municipal or barangay hall, as the case may be, for a minimum period of three (3) consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published in a newspaper of general circulation, where available, within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, except in the case of barangay ordinances. Unless otherwise provided therein, said ordinances shall take effect on the day following its publication, or at the end of the period of posting, whichever occurs later.
In view of ��188 and 511(a) of R.A. No. 7160, an ordinance fixing the assessment levels applicable to the different classes of real property in a local government unit and imposing penal sanctions for violations thereof (such as Ordinance No. 125) should be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation, where available, within ten (10) days of its approval, and posted in at least two (2) prominent places in the provincial capitol, city, municipal, or barangay hall for a minimum of three (3) consecutive weeks.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Apart from her allegations, petitioner has not presented any evidence to show that the subject ordinances were not disseminated in accordance with these provisions of R.A. No. 7160. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong presented a certificate, dated November 12, 1993, of Williard S. Wong, Sanggunian Secretary of the Municipality of Mandaluyong that "Ordinance No. 125, S-1993 . . . has been posted in accordance with �59(b) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991." 15 Thus, considering the presumption of validity in favor of the ordinances and the failure of petitioner to rebut such presumption, we are constrained to dismiss the petition in this case.
Compliance with regulations issued by the
Department of Finance
Also without merit is the contention of petitioner that Ordinance No. 119 and Ordinance No. 135 are void for not having been enacted in accordance with Local Assessment Regulation No. 1-92, dated October 6, 1992, of the Department of Finance, which provides guidelines for the preparation of proposed schedules of fair market values of the different classes of real property in a local government unit, such as time tables for obtaining information from owners of affected lands and buildings regarding the value thereof. As in the case of the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances and revenue measures, however, petitioner has not shown that the ordinances in this case were not enacted in accordance with the applicable regulations of the Department of Finance. The Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that, although the regulations are merely directory, it has complied with them. 16 Hence, in the absence of proof that the ordinances were not enacted in accordance with such regulations, said ordinances must be presumed to have been enacted in accordance with such regulations.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawnad
Bellosillo, Puno, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. CA Rollo, p. 56.
2. Id., pp. 21-48.
3. Id., pp. 16-19.
4. Id., p. 51.
5. CA Rollo, pp. 1-15.
6. Per Associate Justice Jorge S. Imperial and concurred in by Associate Justices Pacita Cañizares-Nye and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.
7. Rollo, pp. 21-24.
8. Rollo, pp. 5-6.
9. G.R. No. 127139, Feb. 19, 1999.
10. Rejoinder, Rollo, p. 68.
11. 34 Phil. 825 (1916).
12. Id. at 826.
13. Industrial Finance Corporation v. Tobias, 78 SCRA 28 (1977).
14. 250 SCRA 500, 516-517 (1995).
15. CA Rollo, p. 20.
16. Rejoinder, Rollo, p. 68.
