December 2002 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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A.M. No. MTJ-02-1466 December 10, 2002 - CORAZON GUERRERO v. JUDGE MARCIAL M. DERAY:
EN BANC
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1466. December 10, 2002.]
CORAZON GUERRERO, Complainant, v. JUDGE MARCIAL M. DERAY, 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mallig-Quezon, Isabela, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated August 22, 2000, 1 Corazon Guerrero prays that appropriate administrative sanctions be meted against respondent Judge Marcial M. Deray for his alleged delay in the resolution of the preliminary examination in Criminal Case No. 1903, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rolando Guerrero." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The complainant is the legitimate spouse of the accused in the above-mentioned criminal case for rape, pending before the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mallig-Quezon, Isabela, presided by respondent Judge. The criminal complaint was filed on June 12, 1997. Accused was arrested and detained by the PNP-Quezon, Isabela Municipal Police on June 13, 1997. He was later transferred to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), Roxas, Isabela District Jail.
Complainant alleged that respondent judge conducted the preliminary examination and terminated the same as early as 1998. Up to the time of filing of the instant complaint, however, he has not resolved the criminal complaint. Meanwhile, Accused has been languishing in jail. She went several times to respondent’s court to inquire about the status of the case against her husband but she was advised that the resolution was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Inquiry therein, however, disclosed that no such resolution was ever received by it. Counsel for her accused husband filed several motions for the early resolution of the case or for the immediate release of the accused, but to no avail. Complainant contended that respondent’s inaction violates the rights of the accused to a speedy trial and disposition of the case and to due process.
In his Comment dated October 12, 2000, 2 respondent judge claimed that after the accused was arrested, his wife sought the intervention of some local officials and requested that the instant case be held in abeyance while they tried to negotiate for a compromise agreement with the private complainant which took some time. When accused failed to reach a settlement with the private complainant, respondent brought the records of the criminal case to his house for study. However, the record disappeared from his desk at home. He tried to look for the record and, after some time, he found it inside a sack full of old newspapers where his mother-in-law hid it. He immediately resolved the criminal complaint and attached a copy of the resolution to his Comment. He claimed that it was never his intention to delay the resolution of the case.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Subsequently, in our Resolution of February 12, 2001, 3 we noted the letter-complaint and required the parties to manifest within ten (10) days if they were willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
On March 29, 2001 complainant filed her Compliance 4 manifesting her willingness to have the case submitted for resolution based on the pleadings. On the other hand, respondent judge failed to submit his compliance.
In its report and recommendation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent guilty of delay in resolving the preliminary investigation and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), with warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings of the OCA. However, the recommended fine is not commensurate to the gravity of respondent’s misdeed.
Respondent maintains that he had already issued the resolution dated September 4, 2000 5 finding a prima facie case for Multiple Rape against accused. However, this does not inspire belief. Particularly damaging for respondent is the letter dated June 25, 2002 6 by the Information Officer of the Municipality of Quezon, Isabela addressed to the OCA, in response to a query as to the status of Criminal Case No. 1903. The letter discloses that to date — over five (5) years after the criminal complaint was filed with the 12th Municipal Trial Circuit Court on June 12, 1997 — no resolution on the preliminary examination has yet been issued. Meanwhile, Accused Rolando Guerrero, who has remained behind bars for five (5) years, has yet to be formally charged in a proper court.
The conduct of preliminary investigation by judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts is a non judicial function, which is an exception to their usual duties and their findings are subject to review by the Provincial Prosecutor concerned. 7 The performance of this non judicial or executive function, 8 however, does not place them beyond the disciplinary power of this Court for any act or omission in relation or as an incident to their task, which is only in addition to their judicial functions. 9 Thus, the Court has imposed disciplinary sanctions on judges for their ignorance or deliberate disregard of the laws on preliminary investigation. 10
In a litany of cases we have reminded members of the bench that the unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate. 11 Indeed, we have consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. 12
This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial, 13 which, as defined, is one" [c]onducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays." 14 The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of the accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. 15 It is likewise intended to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions. 16
Consistent, therefore, with an accused’s right to a speedy trial, respondent had the duty to promptly forward the case to the Provincial Prosecutor. 17 Indeed, Rule 112, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states in no uncertain terms that —
SEC. 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review. — Within ten (10) days after the preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit the resolution of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction for appropriate action. . . . .
In the case at bar, respondent judge cannot deny that he failed to act on the preliminary examination for more than five (5) years. Worse, as early as August 2000 — over three (3) years after accused was arrested — complainant filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, where the same was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. Br. 23-31, 18 because of respondent’s inaction on the rape case.
As has been often said, delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions on them. 19 Appellate magistrates and judges alike, being paradigms of justice, have been exhorted time and again to dispose of the court’s business promptly and to decide cases within the required periods. 20 Delay not only results in undermining the people’s faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is anticipated and expected; it also reinforces in the mind of the litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly. 21
Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct state:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Rule 1.02. — A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Rule 3.05. — A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Likewise, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 states, inter alia, that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so. . . . .chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The reason proffered by respondent to justify his extreme tardiness in acting on the preliminary examination is not novel and is, at best, a lame excuse. Owing to the nature of his role as a dispenser of justice, respondent ought to know that bringing case records home and, worse, leaving them on top of his desk is a serious breach of professional responsibility. Judges, by the very delicate nature of their functions, should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties. 22 A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. 23 Furthermore, as administrator of his court, a judge should adopt a system of record management and organize his docket in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business. 24 The temporary loss of the records, as in this case, indicates gross negligence on his part.25cralaw:red
Respondent judge’s tardiness and negligence, however, are not the only misdeeds which warrant our corrective intervention in this case.
The fact that respondent judge failed to comply with the Resolution dated February 12, 2001, requiring him to manifest if he was willing to have the case submitted on the basis of the pleadings filed, with no explanation as to why he failed to do so, is not lost upon us. It is hardly necessary to remind respondent that judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals, much more the Highest Tribunal of the land from which all other courts should take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. 26 If at all, this omission not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in respondent’s character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders and directives which is only too deserving of reproof.
Thus, in one case, 27 the failure of respondent judge to comply with the show-cause resolutions of the Court was deemed "grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office." In Alonto-Frayna v. Astih, 28 we further held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of this Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination. It is gross misconduct and even outright disrespect for this Court for respondent to exhibit indifference to the resolutions requiring him to comment on the accusations contained in the complaint against him.
In other words indifference or defiance to the Court’s orders or resolutions may be punished with dismissal, suspension or fine as warranted by the circumstances. 29 In the cases cited above, the respondents judges were dismissed from the service.
Lastly, the records also disclose that respondent judge has the predilection for making false representations to suit his ends. Nowhere is this more evident than in his Comment, where he claimed to have issued a resolution on September 4, 2000 on the preliminary examination and attached therein a signed carbon copy of said document. 30 However, it appears that respondent judge omitted to transmit the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office for appropriate action. Particularly revealing in this regard is the letter dated February 14, 2001 31 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela to Atty. Jerson E. Angog, Public Attorney II-OIC, Roxas, Isabela, which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We received on February 9, 2001 your Motion for Early Resolution of Criminal Case No. 1905 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Rolando Guerrero" for Rape.
We regret to inform you that we could not act on your motion because the records of the preliminary investigation of this case has not yet been remanded to this office by the Investigating Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mallig-Quezon, Isabela.
I would advise you to follow up this matter with the Investigating Court in Mallig, Isabela.
This lapse cannot be considered a mere oversight. On the contrary, it shows that respondent deliberately delayed the transmittal of the records for less than noble considerations: Indeed, there is evidence on record which more than hints at the distinct possibility thereof. Respondent himself, in his Comment, declared that —
. . . After the accused was arrested, the wife of the accused sought the intervention of some local officials and requested that the instant case be held in abeyance while they are trying to come to terms with complainant, and this took some time. When the accused failed to talk matters with the complainant, the undersigned sometime in the later part of 1998 brought the record home to make the necessary resolution . . .
Needless to state, the fact that the criminal case is still pending and has remained unresolved even as this administrative complaint against him is pending is a mute but eloquent testimonial of his perfidy. Suffice it to state in this regard that" [m]aking false statements is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly justice, he must therefore be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow." 32
The penalty for gross inefficiency and negligence in the management of the records in an errant magistrate’s office ranges from reprimand and admonition, 33 suspension without pay, 34 to removal from office 35 and/or a fine. 36 In this case, we deem it necessary to impose upon respondent judge stiffer sanctions than that recommended by the OCA. If the failure of a judge to dispose of even just one case constitutes gross inefficiency 37 and his failure to do so within the reglementary period constitutes a gross dereliction of duty, 38 how much more the delay of over five (5) years in resolving the preliminary examination in a criminal case? Such misconduct is aggravated by his lack of candor and his callous disregard of this Court’s directive requiring him to manifest his willingness to have the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. 39
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Marcial M. Deray is found GUILTY of gross incompetence and inefficiency, gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Accordingly, he is DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, and his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, are FORFEITED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
The complainant is the legitimate spouse of the accused in the above-mentioned criminal case for rape, pending before the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mallig-Quezon, Isabela, presided by respondent Judge. The criminal complaint was filed on June 12, 1997. Accused was arrested and detained by the PNP-Quezon, Isabela Municipal Police on June 13, 1997. He was later transferred to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), Roxas, Isabela District Jail.
Complainant alleged that respondent judge conducted the preliminary examination and terminated the same as early as 1998. Up to the time of filing of the instant complaint, however, he has not resolved the criminal complaint. Meanwhile, Accused has been languishing in jail. She went several times to respondent’s court to inquire about the status of the case against her husband but she was advised that the resolution was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Inquiry therein, however, disclosed that no such resolution was ever received by it. Counsel for her accused husband filed several motions for the early resolution of the case or for the immediate release of the accused, but to no avail. Complainant contended that respondent’s inaction violates the rights of the accused to a speedy trial and disposition of the case and to due process.
In his Comment dated October 12, 2000, 2 respondent judge claimed that after the accused was arrested, his wife sought the intervention of some local officials and requested that the instant case be held in abeyance while they tried to negotiate for a compromise agreement with the private complainant which took some time. When accused failed to reach a settlement with the private complainant, respondent brought the records of the criminal case to his house for study. However, the record disappeared from his desk at home. He tried to look for the record and, after some time, he found it inside a sack full of old newspapers where his mother-in-law hid it. He immediately resolved the criminal complaint and attached a copy of the resolution to his Comment. He claimed that it was never his intention to delay the resolution of the case.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Subsequently, in our Resolution of February 12, 2001, 3 we noted the letter-complaint and required the parties to manifest within ten (10) days if they were willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
On March 29, 2001 complainant filed her Compliance 4 manifesting her willingness to have the case submitted for resolution based on the pleadings. On the other hand, respondent judge failed to submit his compliance.
In its report and recommendation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent guilty of delay in resolving the preliminary investigation and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), with warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings of the OCA. However, the recommended fine is not commensurate to the gravity of respondent’s misdeed.
Respondent maintains that he had already issued the resolution dated September 4, 2000 5 finding a prima facie case for Multiple Rape against accused. However, this does not inspire belief. Particularly damaging for respondent is the letter dated June 25, 2002 6 by the Information Officer of the Municipality of Quezon, Isabela addressed to the OCA, in response to a query as to the status of Criminal Case No. 1903. The letter discloses that to date — over five (5) years after the criminal complaint was filed with the 12th Municipal Trial Circuit Court on June 12, 1997 — no resolution on the preliminary examination has yet been issued. Meanwhile, Accused Rolando Guerrero, who has remained behind bars for five (5) years, has yet to be formally charged in a proper court.
The conduct of preliminary investigation by judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts is a non judicial function, which is an exception to their usual duties and their findings are subject to review by the Provincial Prosecutor concerned. 7 The performance of this non judicial or executive function, 8 however, does not place them beyond the disciplinary power of this Court for any act or omission in relation or as an incident to their task, which is only in addition to their judicial functions. 9 Thus, the Court has imposed disciplinary sanctions on judges for their ignorance or deliberate disregard of the laws on preliminary investigation. 10
In a litany of cases we have reminded members of the bench that the unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate. 11 Indeed, we have consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. 12
This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial, 13 which, as defined, is one" [c]onducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays." 14 The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of the accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. 15 It is likewise intended to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions. 16
Consistent, therefore, with an accused’s right to a speedy trial, respondent had the duty to promptly forward the case to the Provincial Prosecutor. 17 Indeed, Rule 112, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states in no uncertain terms that —
SEC. 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review. — Within ten (10) days after the preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit the resolution of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction for appropriate action. . . . .
In the case at bar, respondent judge cannot deny that he failed to act on the preliminary examination for more than five (5) years. Worse, as early as August 2000 — over three (3) years after accused was arrested — complainant filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, where the same was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. Br. 23-31, 18 because of respondent’s inaction on the rape case.
As has been often said, delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions on them. 19 Appellate magistrates and judges alike, being paradigms of justice, have been exhorted time and again to dispose of the court’s business promptly and to decide cases within the required periods. 20 Delay not only results in undermining the people’s faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is anticipated and expected; it also reinforces in the mind of the litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly. 21
Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct state:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Rule 1.02. — A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Rule 3.05. — A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Likewise, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 states, inter alia, that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so. . . . .chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The reason proffered by respondent to justify his extreme tardiness in acting on the preliminary examination is not novel and is, at best, a lame excuse. Owing to the nature of his role as a dispenser of justice, respondent ought to know that bringing case records home and, worse, leaving them on top of his desk is a serious breach of professional responsibility. Judges, by the very delicate nature of their functions, should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties. 22 A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. 23 Furthermore, as administrator of his court, a judge should adopt a system of record management and organize his docket in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business. 24 The temporary loss of the records, as in this case, indicates gross negligence on his part.25cralaw:red
Respondent judge’s tardiness and negligence, however, are not the only misdeeds which warrant our corrective intervention in this case.
The fact that respondent judge failed to comply with the Resolution dated February 12, 2001, requiring him to manifest if he was willing to have the case submitted on the basis of the pleadings filed, with no explanation as to why he failed to do so, is not lost upon us. It is hardly necessary to remind respondent that judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals, much more the Highest Tribunal of the land from which all other courts should take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. 26 If at all, this omission not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in respondent’s character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders and directives which is only too deserving of reproof.
Thus, in one case, 27 the failure of respondent judge to comply with the show-cause resolutions of the Court was deemed "grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office." In Alonto-Frayna v. Astih, 28 we further held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of this Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination. It is gross misconduct and even outright disrespect for this Court for respondent to exhibit indifference to the resolutions requiring him to comment on the accusations contained in the complaint against him.
In other words indifference or defiance to the Court’s orders or resolutions may be punished with dismissal, suspension or fine as warranted by the circumstances. 29 In the cases cited above, the respondents judges were dismissed from the service.
Lastly, the records also disclose that respondent judge has the predilection for making false representations to suit his ends. Nowhere is this more evident than in his Comment, where he claimed to have issued a resolution on September 4, 2000 on the preliminary examination and attached therein a signed carbon copy of said document. 30 However, it appears that respondent judge omitted to transmit the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office for appropriate action. Particularly revealing in this regard is the letter dated February 14, 2001 31 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela to Atty. Jerson E. Angog, Public Attorney II-OIC, Roxas, Isabela, which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We received on February 9, 2001 your Motion for Early Resolution of Criminal Case No. 1905 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Rolando Guerrero" for Rape.
We regret to inform you that we could not act on your motion because the records of the preliminary investigation of this case has not yet been remanded to this office by the Investigating Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mallig-Quezon, Isabela.
I would advise you to follow up this matter with the Investigating Court in Mallig, Isabela.
x x x
This lapse cannot be considered a mere oversight. On the contrary, it shows that respondent deliberately delayed the transmittal of the records for less than noble considerations: Indeed, there is evidence on record which more than hints at the distinct possibility thereof. Respondent himself, in his Comment, declared that —
. . . After the accused was arrested, the wife of the accused sought the intervention of some local officials and requested that the instant case be held in abeyance while they are trying to come to terms with complainant, and this took some time. When the accused failed to talk matters with the complainant, the undersigned sometime in the later part of 1998 brought the record home to make the necessary resolution . . .
Needless to state, the fact that the criminal case is still pending and has remained unresolved even as this administrative complaint against him is pending is a mute but eloquent testimonial of his perfidy. Suffice it to state in this regard that" [m]aking false statements is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly justice, he must therefore be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow." 32
The penalty for gross inefficiency and negligence in the management of the records in an errant magistrate’s office ranges from reprimand and admonition, 33 suspension without pay, 34 to removal from office 35 and/or a fine. 36 In this case, we deem it necessary to impose upon respondent judge stiffer sanctions than that recommended by the OCA. If the failure of a judge to dispose of even just one case constitutes gross inefficiency 37 and his failure to do so within the reglementary period constitutes a gross dereliction of duty, 38 how much more the delay of over five (5) years in resolving the preliminary examination in a criminal case? Such misconduct is aggravated by his lack of candor and his callous disregard of this Court’s directive requiring him to manifest his willingness to have the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. 39
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Marcial M. Deray is found GUILTY of gross incompetence and inefficiency, gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Accordingly, he is DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, and his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, are FORFEITED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, p. 13.
2. Ibid., p. 5.
3. Id., p. 20.
4. Id., p. 22.
5. Rollo, pp. 8-10.
6. Ibid., p. 30.
7. Sangguniang Bayan of Batac, Ilocos Norte v. Albano, 260 SCRA 561 [1996]; Balogapo v. Duquillo, 238 SCRA 645,652 [1994]
8. People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788 [1990]; Lim v. Felix, 194 SCRA 292 [1991].
9. Sandoval v. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611, 621 [1996].
10. See Ancog v. Tan, 227 SCRA 137 [1993]; Balagapo v. Duquilla, supra.
11. Dysico v. Dacumos, 262 SCRA 275 [1996]; Re: Report on the Audit and Inventory of Cases in RTC, Branch 55, Alaminos, Pangasinan, 262 SCRA 555 [1996]; Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branches 61, 134 and 147, Makati, Metro Manila, 248 SCRA 5 [1995]; Re: Query of Judge Danilo M. Tenerife, 255 SCRA 184 [1996]; Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of the Records of Cases in MTCC, Br. 2, Batangas City, 248 SCRA 36 [1995]; Bentulan v. Dumatol, 233 SCRA 168 [1994]; Re: Letter of Mr. Octavio Kalalo, 231 SCRA 403 [1993]; Longboan v. Polig, 186 SCRA 556 [1990].
12. Abarquez v. Rebosura, 285 SCRA 109 [1998], citing Bendesula v. Laya, 58 SCRA 16 [1974] and Castro v. Malazo, 99 SCRA 164 [1980].
13. Section 14[2], Article III, Constitution.
14. Canson v. Garchitorena, 311 SCRA 268, 283 [1999], citing Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773 [1996]; Flores v. People, 61 SCRA 331 [1974].
15. Dacanay v. People, 240 SCRA 490 [1995].
16 . Dacanay v. People, supra, citing Shepherd v. U.S., 163 F. 2d 974 [1947].
17. Surigao Citizen’s Movement For Good Government v. Coro, 262 SCRA 285 [1996].
18. Rollo, pp. 35-36.
19. Maquiron v. Lopez, 359 SCRA 40, 42 [2001], citing Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC, Brs. 29, 56 & 57, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, 316 SCRA 272 (1998]; Monfort Hermanos Agricultural Development v. Ramirez, 355 SCRA 477, 482 [2001], citing Sanchez v. Vestil, 297 SCRA 679 [1998], citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Butolid, 293 SCRA 589 [1998]; See also Grefaldeo v. Judge Lacson, 293 SCRA 524 [1998].
20. Sy Bang v. Mendez, supra, citing Rule 3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct.
21. Ibid., p. 90.
22. Ong v. Rosales, 325 SCRA 689, 692 [2000], citing Galvez v. Eduardo, 252 SCRA 570, 574 [1996].
23. Beso v. Daguman, 323 SCRA 566 [2000].
24. Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Brs. 87 and 98, Quezon City, 338 SCRA 141 [2000].
25. Tolentino v. Cabral, 329 SCRA 1 [2000].
26. Josep v. Abarquez, 261 SCRA 629 [1996].
27. Davila v. Generoso, 336 SCRA 576, 580 [2000].
28. 300 SCRA 199, 202-203 [1998].
29. Pineda E.L., Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1999 ed., p. 423.
30. Rollo, pp. 8-10.
31 Ibid., p. 27.
32. Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, 344 SCRA 519, 542-543, [2000], citing BPI v. Generoso, 249 SCRA 477 [1995], citing Castillo v. Cortez, 234 SCRA 398 [1994].
33. Cui v. Madayog, 245 SCRA 1 [1995].
34. Dysico v. Dacumos, supra, p. 284.
35. Guintu v. Lucero, 261 SCRA 1, 9 [1996]; Report on Audit and Physical Inventory of the Records and Cases in RTC, Branch 120, Kalookan City, 238 SCRA 238 [1994]; Ng v. Ulibari, supra; See also Stern, Is Judicial Discipline in New York a Threat to Judicial Independence?, 7 Pace L. Rev. 291, 303-45 [1987].
36. Perez v. Concepcion, 321 SCRA 284 [1999].
37. Report on the Spot Judicial Audit Conducted on the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 40, Quezon City, 331 SCRA 327 [2000].
38. Gallego v. Doronila, 334 SCRA 339 [2000].
39. Zarate v. Balderian, 329 SCRA 558 [2000].
