Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2002 > September 2002 Decisions > G.R. No. 126752 September 6, 2002 - TOMAS HUGO v. COURT OF APPEALS:

For review by certiorari is the decision 1 dated February 28, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14629, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. 31668, finding petitioner Tomas Hugo guilty of homicide. Also assailed is the CA’s resolution 2 dated September 25, 1996, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In an information dated May 3, 1988, the Iloilo City Prosecutor charged petitioner with murder allegedly committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on or about the 29th day of April, 1988, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, armed with a gun, conspiring and confederating with John Doe and Richard Doe, whose identities are still unknown, working together and helping one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, with a decided purpose to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally shoot, hit and wound Nestor Bastes with the said gun, with which the herein accused was provided at the time, thereby causing upon said Nestor Bastes injuries on vital parts of his body, which caused his death (a) few hours thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

When arraigned, petitioner with assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits of the case then commenced.

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses: eyewitness Jalyn Juanico; the victim’s widow, Paciencia Bastes; a police medico-legal officer, Dr. Jose J. Rafio; and a forensic chemist from the police crime laboratory, P/Lt. Zenaida Zinfuego.

Jalyn Juanico testified that at around 8:00 P.M., April 29, 1988, she was conversing with some friends at the Bankers Village 6 Road in Barangay Dungon-B, Iloilo City, when a shot suddenly rang out. 4 Jalyn did not pay any attention to it, thinking that it was just another firecracker exploding. 5 She had been hearing firecrackers going off all day. 6

Moments later, her uncle Nestor Bastes passed by walking towards his home. 7 He exchanged greetings with Jalyn and her group. 8 After a brief interval, petitioner Tomas Hugo with two companions passed by. Petitioner was toting a gun. 9 Jalyn, who was a former schoolmate of petitioner, 10 did not give much thought to his carrying a gun. She was unaware of any quarrel between petitioner and Nestor. 11 She just resumed her conversation with her friends.

Minutes after Nestor Bastes and petitioner with his companions passed by, Jalyn heard a second shot. Startled, she turned her head towards the direction of the shot. She saw petitioner standing beneath an electric lamp post, aiming a gun at a person some four and one-half meters away from him. 12 The unknown person then. fell flat on his face under the shadow of a jackfruit tree. 13 Petitioner and his two companions swiftly scampered away, with the former running towards the direction of his uncle’s home. 14

Since they could not immediately ascertain who the victim was, one of Jalyn’s friends, Marilou Juelar, 15 got a lamp. They saw that it was Nestor Bastes. Marilou immediately informed Nestor’s wife, Paciencia, about the shooting.

Paciencia rushed to the scene and with the help of neighbors brought Nestor to Mission Hospital. 16 Paciencia asked Nestor who shot him. The latter replied that it was Tomas Hugo and his two companions whose identities he did not know. 17 Nestor then exhorted her to take care of their children. 18 For lack of money, Nestor did not get any medical assistance from the staff of the Mission Hospital. 19 He was transferred to the Benito Lopez Hospital, but for lack of funds was likewise refused medical attention. 20 He was then brought to the Western Visayas Hospital where prompt medical care was given. However, it was too late. Nestor Bastes died 30 minutes later. 21

The following day, Dr. Jose J. Rafio, medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City Police Station, autopsied the victim. His findings showed that the victim sustained several contusions and abrasions, mainly on the face and neck, and one bullet wound in the head. 22 That wound proved fatal. 23

P/Lt. Zenaida Zinfuego, a forensic chemist from the crime laboratory at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City conducted a paraffin test on petitioner on May 2, 1988. He was found positive for powder burns on both hands. 24

To the charge of murder, petitioner interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that from 2:00 P.M. until past 8:00 P.M., April 29, 1988, he was at the Freedom Day celebrations held at Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City. 25 He claimed he was a member of the Barangay Sambag, Jaro, Iloilo City delegation, tasked with setting off the pyrotechnics during the affair. 26 After the program, he said he went home, had supper, and went to sleep. 27

Petitioner’s alibi was corroborated by the testimonies of his sister, Mercedita Abadan; 28 Alton Braña, 29 barangay captain of Dungon-B, Jaro, Iloilo City; and Emilio Blance, 30 barangay captain of Sambag, Jaro, Iloilo City. All claimed that petitioner never left Plazoleta Gay during the Freedom Day festivities.

The trial court found the prosecution’s version credible, disbelieved petitioner’s alibi, and on December 29, 1992, convicted petitioner of homicide, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Tomas Hugo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide only and not murder as charged, and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day as minimum to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day, as maximum.

The accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Nestor Bastes the amount of P3,900.00 as actual expenses and P50,000.00 for the wrongful death of the deceased; P20,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED. 31

Petitioner interposed an appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 14629, to the Court of Appeals. However, on February 28, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the questioned decision is hereby AFFIRMED and the appeal by the accused-appellant is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 32

Petitioner then moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied.

Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN, IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, ON THE THEORY THAT, THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT ON MATTER(S) OF CREDIBILITY SHOULD BE GIVEN GREAT WEIGHT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDING JUDGE WHO CONVICTED THE ACCUSED WAS NOT THE SAME PRESIDING JUDGE WHO RECEIVED THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT ON THE TESTIMONY OF JALYN JUANICO, THE SOLE EYEWITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE TESTIMONY OF JALYN JUANICO IS FULL OF INCONSISTENCIES AND HIGHLY UNBELIEVABLE.

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT, THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING AND CORROBORATED BY DISINTERESTED WITNESSES. 33

Petitioner essentially raises the issue of credibility of the prosecution’s sole eyewitness and the propriety of the conviction of the petitioner penned by the trial judge who did not hear the case. Relevant are the following questions: (1) Was Jalyn Juanico a credible witness? (2) Was her testimony sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction? and (3) Was the conviction proper?

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals grievously erred when it relied on the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses in sustaining his conviction. He contends that since the judge (Hon. Cornelio Lazaro) who heard Jalyn Juanico testify was not the judge (Hon. Jose Abdullah) who penned the judgment of conviction, the appellate court should have carefully evaluated and weighed said testimony. He claims that the appellate court erred when it cursorily applied the rule that the assessment of credibility of witnesses is best left to the discretion of the trial court.

For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that petitioner’s claim lacks basis. It is not true, according to OSG, that the conflicting testimonies of witnesses were given only a mere cursory examination by the appellate court. The OSG insists that a perusal of the assailed decision will show that the court a quo complied with the constitutional requirement that the factual and legal bases of the decision be clearly and distinctly expressed therein.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

As a general rule, the trial court is in the best position to determine facts and to assess the credibility of witnesses as it is in a unique position to observe the witnesses’ deportment while testifying, an opportunity denied the appellate court. 34 Hence, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, 35 unless: (1) it is found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded; (2) some substantial fact or circumstance that could materially affect the disposition of the case was overlooked, misunderstood, or misinterpreted; or (3) the trial judge gravely abused his or her discretion. In the cases of Pinca, Cawaling, and Daraman, however, a further exception was made: the judge who penned the appealed decision was not the same one who presided over the trial and heard the witnesses testify. 36

In the instant case, Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro heard the prosecution’s principal witness Jalyn Juanico testify. Judge Lazaro retired and was replaced by Judge Jose G. Abdullah, who, relying on the transcripts of stenographic notes, penned the judgment of conviction. In our view, however, this fact would not significantly influence much less alter the outcome of the present case. The circumstances obtaining in the instant case are different from the cases of People v. Pinca, 37 People v. Cawaling, 38 and People v. Daraman. 39 In Pinca, there was a "scanty discussion in the assailed Decision" 40 on the credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence. As the decision was virtually bare of the judge’s findings and analysis, the Court could not rely upon said findings. Hence, we "thoroughly perused the transcripts of the witnesses’ testimonies and examined the other pieces of evidence on record." 41 In Cawaling and Daraman, this Court meticulously scrutinized the records of the cases to find if the conclusions of the judge, who penned the decision but did not have the opportunity to observe the witnesses and the manner in which they testified, were amply supported by the records. In both Cawaling and Daraman, we found no reason to differ from the conclusions of the trial judges who penned the decisions. The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. 42 For it does not follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision. 43 In the present case, Judge Abdullah relied upon the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis for his decision. The full record was available to him. As the decision shows, he thoroughly examined and analyzed the evidence before him and carefully calibrated the credibility of the witnesses with the seasoned perspective he had developed as a trial judge.

In this review, we have minutely scrutinized the assailed decision of the appellate court. We find it amply supported by the evidence on record. Despite petitioner’s insistence, there is no showing that the Court of Appeals, without considering the fact that there were two judges concerned below, merely applied the general rule that findings on the credibility of witnesses by the lower court are binding and conclusive upon the appellate courts. Note that the decision of the appellate court did not adopt in toto the findings of the trial judge. Instead, the Court of Appeals made its own findings, 44 from which it formulated its own conclusions. Petitioner presents no proof to support his allegation that the Court of Appeals merely cursorily examined the records. Absent such proof, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. 45

Appellant next assails the accuracy of Jalyn Juanico’s testimony. He claims that there is confusion on what Jalyn really saw. Did she see petitioner aim his gun at the victim before she heard the second shot or after she heard the second shot? How could she immediately recognize petitioner as the gunman, while failing to immediately recognize the victim, notwithstanding that both of them had passed by her some minutes before the incident?

After careful perusal of the testimony of Jalyn Juanico, we find her testimony more credible and much weightier than the mere alibi of petitioner. Moreover, her testimony was corroborated by the autopsy report, Exhibit "A" on record.

Additionally, a witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection of the minute details. Thus, even the most truthful of witnesses may err and often give confusing statements. 46 What is important is that Jalyn unwaveringly, forthrightly, and unequivocally declared that she heard a shot and saw petitioner aiming a gun at the victim, after which the latter fell on his face. Nor did Jalyn falter in identifying the gunman.

Jalyn’s inability to immediately recognize the victim is understandable. Note that she said that the victim fell under the dark shadow of a tree. We have held before that minor inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses do not demolish their credibility, but serve to enhance their truthfulness as they remove any suspicion that the testimony is rehearsed. 47 We likewise see no improper motive why Jalyn should falsely testify against petitioner. Absent any showing of an improper motive on her part, her testimony must be given full faith and credit. 48

Petitioner next claims that it was unnatural and contrary to human experience that Jalyn continued to converse with her friends even after she saw petitioner armed with a gun. He insists that this unnatural behavior only shows she could not be relied on as a witness. However, we have held before that there is no standard form of human response when one is confronted with a strange, frightful, or startling situation. Witnesses react differently depending upon their situation and state of mind. 49 Some may shout, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, and others may just carry on as usual. Hence, we find nothing strange in Jalyn’s reaction to the sight of petitioner carrying a gun, especially as she explained that she was not aware of any bad blood between petitioner and the victim. 50

Is Jalyn’s sole testimony sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction?

Criminals are convicted not on the number of witnesses against them but on the quality of the testimony given under oath. Even one witness will suffice provided he or she succeeds in convincing the court of the guilt of the accused with moral certainty. 51 The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, even of a charge of murder, if it is positive and credible. 52

Finally, appellant maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding his alibi. However, for alibi to serve as a ground for acquittal, the accused must establish that: (1) he was present in another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (2) it would thus be physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. 53 Physical impossibility in relation to alibi takes into consideration not only the geographical distance between the crime scene and the place where an accused maintains he was, but more importantly, the accessibility between the two points. 54 In this case, the trial court found and the appellate court affirmed that "it will only take fifteen minutes by public transport for a person to negotiate the adjacent barangays, Plazoleta Gay to Barangay Dungon-B or Sambag, Jaro. It takes only 5 minutes by a private vehicle passing through Diversion Road. So it was not physically impossible for the accused to be at Barangay Dungon-B, that evening of April 29, 1988." 55 In sum, we are constrained to conclude that petitioner’s defense of alibi is ineffectual and must fail.

A final word on the civil liability. The trial court awarded P3,900 in actual damages, though only P2,900 of the funeral expenses were properly supported by receipts. 56 The award of the extra P1,000 was allegedly for reasonable expenses for the wake. 57 That amount, however, is not supported by adequate evidence, and should not be included in the award. We must reduce the award of actual damages to only P2,900, because actual damages should be limited only to expenses duly substantiated by receipts. 58 The P50,000 indemnity ex delicto is awarded conformably with prevailing jurisprudence. The award of moral damages is mandatory and does not require proof other than the victim’s death, 59 but particularly so in this case where the widow, Paciencia Bastes, and the niece, Jalyn Juanico were presented as witnesses to the gruesome killing of the victim and the bereavement they suffered. However, the amount of moral damages should be increased to P50,000 in accordance with current case law. 60

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14629 finding petitioner TOMAS HUGO guilty of homicide and sentencing him to suffer eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to damages. Petitioner shall pay the heirs of Nestor Bastes P2,900 as actual damages, P50,000 as moral damages, and P50,000 as civil indemnity, together with the costs.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

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1. Rollo, pp. 51-60.

2. CA Rollo, p. 297.

3. Records, p. 1.

4. TSN, November 22, 1988, pp. 4-5.

5. Id. at 6.

6. Id. at 19.

7. Id. at 16.

8. Id. at 23.

9. Id. at 9-11, 17-19, 22-23, 31.

10. Id. at 9.

11. Id. at 24.

12. Id. at 7, 9-12, 26.

13. Id. at 34.

14. Id. at 27.

15. Sometimes spelled "Huelar" in the records.

16. TSN, July 12, 1988, p. 28.

17. Ibid. See also pp. 37-39.

18. TSN, November 22, 1988, p. 37.

19. Id. at 30.

20. Id. at 31.

21. Id. at 33-34.

22. Records, pp. 236-237.

23. TSN, July 12, 1988, p. 14.

24. Records, p. 241; TSN, February 7, 1989, pp. 3-4.

25. TSN, December 6, 1991, pp. 3-4.

26. Id. at 8.

27. Id. at 9-12.

28. TSN, August 29, 1991, pp. 4-9.

29. Id. at 18, 23-24.

30. TSN, December 5, 1991, pp. 8-11.

31. Records, pp. 446-447.

32. Rollo, p. 59.

33. Id. at 18-19.

34. People v. Araneta, 335 SCRA 1, 8 (2000); People v. Francisco, Et Al., 332 SCRA 305, 331 (2000).

35. People v. Barro, Sr., Et Al., 338 SCRA 312, 322 (2000).

36. People v. Pinca, 318 SCRA 270, 279-280 (1999), citing People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267, 294 (1998); People v. Daraman, 294 SCRA 27, 38 (1998).

37. 318 SCRA 270 (1999).

38. 293 SCRA 267 (1998).

39. 294 SCRA 27 (1998).

40. Supra, note 37 at 280.

41. Ibid.

42. People v. Yatco, G.R. No. 138388, March 19, 2002, p. 15, citing People v. Aspiras, 330 SCRA 479 (2000).

43. People v. Tuvilla, 259 SCRA 1, 7 (1996), citing People v. Peralta, 237 SCRA 218 (1994).

44. Rollo, pp. 53-57.

45. RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (m).

46. People v. Dimailig, 332 SCRA 340, 349 (2000), citing People v. Tidula, 292 SCRA 596, 614 (1998).

47. People v. Muyco, 331 SCRA 192, 199 (2000), citing People v. Fabrigas, 261 SCRA 436, 445 (1996).

48. People v. Gadin, Jr., 331 SCRA 345, 353 (2000), citing People v. Nava, 306 SCRA 15, 22 (1999); People v. Alfeche, 294 SCRA 352, 376 (1998).

49. Rivera v. Court of Appeals and People, 332 SCRA 416 (2000).

50. TSN, November 22, 1988, p. 24.

51. People v. Abubu, 322 SCRA 407, 413 (2000), citing People v. Sanchez, 313 SCRA 254, 268 (1999).

52. People v. Pascual, 331 SCRA 252, 262 (2000), citing People v. Salcedo, 273 SCRA 473, 495 (1997); People v. Asoy, 251 SCRA 682, 687-688, (1995).

53. People v. Listerio, 335 SCRA 40, 61-62 (2000), citing People v. Belaro, 307 SCRA 591, 606 (1999).

54. People v. Gomez, 332 SCRA 661, 668 (2000).

55. Records, p. 442.

56. Id. at 245-247.

57. Id. at 445.

58. People v. Go-Od, Et Al., 331 SCRA 612, 625 (2000), citing People v. Gutierrez, Jr., 302 SCRA 643, 666 (1999).

59. People v. Carillo, 333 SCRA 338, 353 (2000).

60. People v. Repollo, 331 SCRA 375, 387 (2000).