February 2003 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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A.M. No. MTJ-02-1427 February 27, 2003 - MODESTO MAGSUCANG v. ROLANDO V. BALGOS:
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1427. February 27, 2003.]
(Formerly OCA-IPI No. 01-1021-MTJ)
MODESTO MAGSUCANG, Complainant, v. JUDGE ROLANDO V. BALGOS, MTC, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated November 18, 2000 and addressed to the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, complainant Modesto Magsucang charged Judge Rolando Balgos, Presiding Judge, MTC, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, of bias and partiality, grave abuse of discretion, requiring excessive bail, and violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
It appears from the records that on May 10, 2000, a certain Pepito Lim, owner of the Ace Fishing Corporation, filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against complainant’s daughter, Rosalie Magsucang, allegedly for misappropriating cash amounting to P11,200, with grave abuse of confidence. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1593. Subsequently, respondent judge, before whom the preliminary investigation was conducted, issued a warrant of arrest. Bail was set at P30,000. On May 11, 2000, Rosalie was arrested. Complainant posted bail for his daughter from the proceeds of the sale of his banca and with money borrowed from friends.
Meanwhile, more cases for qualified theft were filed by Mr. Lim against Rosalie. These cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1634, and 1635. After preliminary investigations were conducted in these cases, corresponding warrants of arrest were issued by respondent judge. In Criminal Case No. 1635, bail was set at P24,000. Neither Modesto nor Rosalie had money to pay for bail so Rosalie remained incarcerated.
Complainant faults respondent judge for allegedly committing irregularities in the conduct of the preliminary investigation when respondent judge administered the oath to Pepito Lim and for having sent Rosalie to prison without the benefit of a hearing. According to complainant, when respondent judge issued several subpoenas on June 2, 2000, requiring Rosalie to file her counter-affidavit in Criminal Case Nos. 1608 to 1613, inclusive, he likewise committed grave abuse of discretion since he failed to consider that Rosalie was, at the time, locked in jail and incapable of defending herself in court. Lastly, complainant states that respondent judge violated applicable rules and regulation when he required excessive bail.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On November 10, 2000, the letter-complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator. On January 25, 2001, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo required respondent judge to file his comment.
In his comment, respondent maintained that the rules of procedure were followed in the filing of the criminal complaints against Rosalie Magsucang. Criminal Cases Nos. 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1634 and 1635, all for qualified theft, were filed against Rosalie after Criminal Case No. 1593. In all these later cases, Rosalie filed her counter-affidavit and that of her witness only after she was already arrested. There is, therefore, no truth to the complainant’s allegation that respondent judge acted pursuant to a conscious effort to defeat the bail posted in Criminal Case No. 1593. He added that Rosalie virtually disappeared after posting bail in Criminal Case No. 1593; she was only arrested after an intensive police effort to find her.
Respondent further declared that, excluding Criminal Cases Nos. 1634 and 1635, which were dismissed, he found probable cause to hold Rosalie Magsucang liable for eight (8) counts of qualified theft. The resolution and the records of the case have been transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Bacolod City for review.
The incumbent Court Administrator, Justice Presbitero Velasco, found respondent judge innocent of the charges contained in the letter-complaint, except the charge related to excessive bail. Justice Velasco recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that the respondent judge be fined in the amount of P2,000.
The parties were asked to manifest whether they agree to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings on record. Respondent agreed. Complainant did not respond and is deemed to have no objection thereto. We shall now resolve the issues raised in the complaint.
First, as to the charge that respondent judge acted with bias and partiality, we find that complainant failed to substantiate his claim. Other than the letter-complaint, no evidence was introduced clearly pointing to an act manifestly favoring private complainant Pepito Lim and injuring the rights of accused Rosalie Magsucang. In Araos v. Luna-Pison, 1 we held that the absence of any evidence showing that the respondent judge acted in bad faith, ill-will, or malice reduces the charges against him into a mere indictment. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. 2
Well to remember as investigating officer the respondent judge is given the latitude to determine if there exists probable cause that would warrant either the filing of the corresponding information or the outright dismissal of the case. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since it must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in a given case, its existence depends to a large degree on the findings or opinion of the judge conducting the investigation. Mere allegations in the complaint must be supported by evidence to prove that a judge has overstepped the parameters of his official prerogative. Here, we find that complainant has failed to present any evidence to corroborate his assertion that respondent judge is guilty of committing irregularities in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.cralaw : red
Section 3 (a) 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the complaint-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oaths. Said section likewise provides that it is the duty of the prosecutor or other government official to certify that he personally examined the affiants and he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. It is clear that respondent judge has performed his duty pursuant to existing rules.
A judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function no less than any other public officer. 4 The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. 5 The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 6 Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. 7 Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. 8
As to the charge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing six (6) subpoenas on June 2, 2000, we find the charge bereft of merit. There is nothing in the rules prohibiting respondent judge from issuing subpoenas to Rosalie requiring her to file her counter-affidavits to the complaints filed against her. In fact the respondent judge is bound to do so in the course of processing the complaints. The six (6) subpoenas correspond to the number of complaints filed against her.
As to the remaining charge, we agree with the OCA. Respondent judge required excessive bail in this case, i.e., Criminal Case No. 1635.
Section 9 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that in fixing the amount of bail in criminal cases, judges shall primarily consider the following factors: (a) financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) nature and circumstances of the offense; (c) penalty for the offense charged; (d) character and reputation of the accused; (e) age and health of the accused; (f) weight of the evidence against the accused; (g) probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h) forfeiture of other bail; (i) the fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j) pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
The amount of bail should be reasonable at all times. Excessive bail shall not be required. 9 In implementing this mandate, regard should be taken of the prisoner’s pecuniary circumstances. That which is reasonable bail to a man of wealth may be unreasonable to a poor man charged with a like offense. Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. 10 The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of defendant when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. 11
In this case, the respondent judge failed to consider that Rosalie Magsucang is illiterate, the daughter of a poor fisherman. She had very limited financial ability to post bail. In Criminal Case No. 1635, one of the nine cases that came after Criminal Case No. 1593, Rosalie Magsucang was accused of stealing only P4,300. Indeed, each of the ten (10) cases carried separate warrants of arrest, each with its own recommended amount of bail. In fixing the unreasonably excessive amount of bail at P24,000 in the last cited case, it is clear that the respondent judge disregarded the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court. In the same breath that Rosalie was told she could be bailed out, she was practically denied the means to do so. The excessive amount required could only mean that her provisional liberty would be beyond her reach. This is ironic, like categorically telling her that she could not avail of the right to bail. It appears respondent did not pay heed to the admonition that the court should not permit any act or omission which undermines public faith and confidence in the judiciary. 12
Coming now to the recommended penalty by the OCA, the amount of P2,000 does not appear to be commensurate with respondent’s infraction. Setting excessive bail evinces disregard of pertinent rules and regulations. Considering that bail involves a basic right of the accused, this Court finds that a higher penalty should be imposed. Thus, the fine should be set at P5,000 13 as more appropriate in view of the violation proved.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red
WHEREFORE, respondent Presiding Judge Rolando Balgos, MTC, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental is found liable for requiring excessive bail and is hereby FINED the amount of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
Let this decision be made a part of the personnel record of the respondent judge.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
It appears from the records that on May 10, 2000, a certain Pepito Lim, owner of the Ace Fishing Corporation, filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against complainant’s daughter, Rosalie Magsucang, allegedly for misappropriating cash amounting to P11,200, with grave abuse of confidence. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1593. Subsequently, respondent judge, before whom the preliminary investigation was conducted, issued a warrant of arrest. Bail was set at P30,000. On May 11, 2000, Rosalie was arrested. Complainant posted bail for his daughter from the proceeds of the sale of his banca and with money borrowed from friends.
Meanwhile, more cases for qualified theft were filed by Mr. Lim against Rosalie. These cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1634, and 1635. After preliminary investigations were conducted in these cases, corresponding warrants of arrest were issued by respondent judge. In Criminal Case No. 1635, bail was set at P24,000. Neither Modesto nor Rosalie had money to pay for bail so Rosalie remained incarcerated.
Complainant faults respondent judge for allegedly committing irregularities in the conduct of the preliminary investigation when respondent judge administered the oath to Pepito Lim and for having sent Rosalie to prison without the benefit of a hearing. According to complainant, when respondent judge issued several subpoenas on June 2, 2000, requiring Rosalie to file her counter-affidavit in Criminal Case Nos. 1608 to 1613, inclusive, he likewise committed grave abuse of discretion since he failed to consider that Rosalie was, at the time, locked in jail and incapable of defending herself in court. Lastly, complainant states that respondent judge violated applicable rules and regulation when he required excessive bail.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On November 10, 2000, the letter-complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator. On January 25, 2001, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo required respondent judge to file his comment.
In his comment, respondent maintained that the rules of procedure were followed in the filing of the criminal complaints against Rosalie Magsucang. Criminal Cases Nos. 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1634 and 1635, all for qualified theft, were filed against Rosalie after Criminal Case No. 1593. In all these later cases, Rosalie filed her counter-affidavit and that of her witness only after she was already arrested. There is, therefore, no truth to the complainant’s allegation that respondent judge acted pursuant to a conscious effort to defeat the bail posted in Criminal Case No. 1593. He added that Rosalie virtually disappeared after posting bail in Criminal Case No. 1593; she was only arrested after an intensive police effort to find her.
Respondent further declared that, excluding Criminal Cases Nos. 1634 and 1635, which were dismissed, he found probable cause to hold Rosalie Magsucang liable for eight (8) counts of qualified theft. The resolution and the records of the case have been transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Bacolod City for review.
The incumbent Court Administrator, Justice Presbitero Velasco, found respondent judge innocent of the charges contained in the letter-complaint, except the charge related to excessive bail. Justice Velasco recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that the respondent judge be fined in the amount of P2,000.
The parties were asked to manifest whether they agree to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings on record. Respondent agreed. Complainant did not respond and is deemed to have no objection thereto. We shall now resolve the issues raised in the complaint.
First, as to the charge that respondent judge acted with bias and partiality, we find that complainant failed to substantiate his claim. Other than the letter-complaint, no evidence was introduced clearly pointing to an act manifestly favoring private complainant Pepito Lim and injuring the rights of accused Rosalie Magsucang. In Araos v. Luna-Pison, 1 we held that the absence of any evidence showing that the respondent judge acted in bad faith, ill-will, or malice reduces the charges against him into a mere indictment. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. 2
Well to remember as investigating officer the respondent judge is given the latitude to determine if there exists probable cause that would warrant either the filing of the corresponding information or the outright dismissal of the case. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since it must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in a given case, its existence depends to a large degree on the findings or opinion of the judge conducting the investigation. Mere allegations in the complaint must be supported by evidence to prove that a judge has overstepped the parameters of his official prerogative. Here, we find that complainant has failed to present any evidence to corroborate his assertion that respondent judge is guilty of committing irregularities in the conduct of the preliminary investigation.cralaw : red
Section 3 (a) 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the complaint-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oaths. Said section likewise provides that it is the duty of the prosecutor or other government official to certify that he personally examined the affiants and he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. It is clear that respondent judge has performed his duty pursuant to existing rules.
A judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function no less than any other public officer. 4 The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. 5 The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 6 Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. 7 Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. 8
As to the charge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing six (6) subpoenas on June 2, 2000, we find the charge bereft of merit. There is nothing in the rules prohibiting respondent judge from issuing subpoenas to Rosalie requiring her to file her counter-affidavits to the complaints filed against her. In fact the respondent judge is bound to do so in the course of processing the complaints. The six (6) subpoenas correspond to the number of complaints filed against her.
As to the remaining charge, we agree with the OCA. Respondent judge required excessive bail in this case, i.e., Criminal Case No. 1635.
Section 9 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that in fixing the amount of bail in criminal cases, judges shall primarily consider the following factors: (a) financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) nature and circumstances of the offense; (c) penalty for the offense charged; (d) character and reputation of the accused; (e) age and health of the accused; (f) weight of the evidence against the accused; (g) probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h) forfeiture of other bail; (i) the fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j) pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
The amount of bail should be reasonable at all times. Excessive bail shall not be required. 9 In implementing this mandate, regard should be taken of the prisoner’s pecuniary circumstances. That which is reasonable bail to a man of wealth may be unreasonable to a poor man charged with a like offense. Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. 10 The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of defendant when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. 11
In this case, the respondent judge failed to consider that Rosalie Magsucang is illiterate, the daughter of a poor fisherman. She had very limited financial ability to post bail. In Criminal Case No. 1635, one of the nine cases that came after Criminal Case No. 1593, Rosalie Magsucang was accused of stealing only P4,300. Indeed, each of the ten (10) cases carried separate warrants of arrest, each with its own recommended amount of bail. In fixing the unreasonably excessive amount of bail at P24,000 in the last cited case, it is clear that the respondent judge disregarded the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court. In the same breath that Rosalie was told she could be bailed out, she was practically denied the means to do so. The excessive amount required could only mean that her provisional liberty would be beyond her reach. This is ironic, like categorically telling her that she could not avail of the right to bail. It appears respondent did not pay heed to the admonition that the court should not permit any act or omission which undermines public faith and confidence in the judiciary. 12
Coming now to the recommended penalty by the OCA, the amount of P2,000 does not appear to be commensurate with respondent’s infraction. Setting excessive bail evinces disregard of pertinent rules and regulations. Considering that bail involves a basic right of the accused, this Court finds that a higher penalty should be imposed. Thus, the fine should be set at P5,000 13 as more appropriate in view of the violation proved.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red
WHEREFORE, respondent Presiding Judge Rolando Balgos, MTC, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental is found liable for requiring excessive bail and is hereby FINED the amount of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
Let this decision be made a part of the personnel record of the respondent judge.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. A.M. No. RTJ-02-1677, February 28, 2002, p. 6.
2. Ang v. Judge Asis, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1590, January 15, 2002, p. 7.
3. SEC. 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.x x x
4. People v. Belaro, 307 SCRA 591, 600 (1999). See also Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Rules of Court.
5. People v. De Guzman, 229 SCRA 795, 799 (1994).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. ART. III, Sec. 13, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
10. De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 8 (1971).
11. Chu v. Dolalas, 260 SCRA 309, 315 (1996).
12. Cabañero v. Cañon, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1369, September 20, 2001, p. 5.
13. Id. at 6. But see Sec. 11 of Rule 140 as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, September 11, 2001, now in effect.
