G.R. No. 128609 : January 29, 2004 - DOUGLAS F. ANAMA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, SPS. TOMAS CO & SATURNINA BARIA and REGISTER OF DEEDS, METRO MANILA, DISTRICT II, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 128609 : January
DOUGLAS F. ANAMA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, SPS. TOMAS CO & SATURNINA BARIA and REGISTER OF
DEEDS, METRO MANILA, DISTRICT II, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
On March 24, 1973, petitioner Douglas Anama and private
respondent Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) entered into an agreement
denominated as a Contract to Buy1 whereby the latter agreed to sell to the former a parcel of land, together
with the improvements thereon.2 The
property was previously owned by petitioners parents, who mortgaged it to
respondent Bank. Upon their failure to pay the loan extended to them by PSBank,
the latter foreclosed on the property.
The salient provisions of the Contract to Buy are as
1.The BUYER shall purchase the property
mentioned in the First Whereas Clause hereof and shall pay the sum of PESOS:
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND (P135,000.00),
2.The BUYER shall pay to the SELLER the amount
of PESOS: THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) payable as follows:
(a) P5,000.00 upon signing of this
(b) P5,000.00 on or before April 12,
(c) P20,000.00 on or before April 30,
which all amounts
shall be credited to the total purchase price mentioned in Paragraph No. 1
hereof upon execution of the necessary formal deed or deeds of conveyance.
3.The BUYER shall apply from the SELLER a real
estate mortgage loan in the sum of PESOS: ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND
Philippine Currency, and the proceeds of this loan shall be used
exclusively to pay the balance of the purchase price of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE
THOUSAND (P135,000.00) PESOS; Provided, that the loan application shall be
processed, subject to existing Central Bank circulars, rules, regulations and
policies of the SELLER;
5.Should the BUYER fail to comply with any of
the terms and conditions herein set forth or fail to pay any of the amounts
mentioned in Paragraph No. 2 hereof, any and all amounts paid by the BUYER,
pursuant to this Agreement, shall be forfeited automatically in favor of the
SELLER without any need of demand or notice; Provided, However, that the SELLER
hereby reserves the right to demand full payment of the agreed total purchase
price instead of electing forfeiture and rescission, in which case, the balance
of the purchase price shall bear interest from May 1, 1973 at the rate of one
(1%) percent per month until fully paid;. .. 3
Petitioner was able to pay the first and second installments on
March 24, 1973 and April 13, 1973, respectively. However, when the third
installment in the amount of P20,000.00 became due, petitioner failed to pay
In a handwritten letter4 dated
July 5, 1974, petitioners father, Felix Anama, asked respondent Bank for an
extension of time to pay the balance and offered to make a deposit of P3,000.00
on the same savings account as a sign of good faith.
On February 22, 1975, petitioner paid respondent Bank the amount
On May 31, 1976, petitioner sent a letter to the Bank through Mr.
Juanito dela Cruz, then the Vice-President of PSBank, promising to pay the
balance in the sum of P20,000.00 on or before August 3, 1976.5
Subsequently, on November 25, 1976, petitioner again paid PSBank
the sum of P15,208.34. This payment, as well as that of February 22, 1975, was
taken from the account of petitioners father Felix, who allegedly assigned his
savings account under AC #11-200781-4 in favor of PSBank by means of withdrawal
slips. Respondent Bank issued official receipts (Nos. 130561 and 148693) 6 indicating that these payments covered penalty/interest charges for the delay
in the payment of the third installment.
On September 9, 1977, the Bank executed an Affidavit of
Cancellation rescinding the contract.7 Petitioner was then advised to vacate the premises. In addition, respondent
Bank forfeited the payments made by petitioner, which were applied as rentals
for the use of the property.8
Petitioner opposed the rescission of the Contract to Buy in
a letter addressed to Mr. Juanito dela Cruz, then General Manager of PSBank
dated October 6, 1977.9 Petitioner wrote that he was led to believe that the Bank treated the deposits
he made as payments on the Contract to Buy.
On November 6, 1978, PSBank sold the property to private respondent
spouses Tomas Co and Saturnina Baria,10 in
whose favor Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1423911 was subsequently issued.
Despite the sale to respondent spouses, the Bank on February 15,
1980, even prevented petitioner from making withdrawals from his fathers
account since the deposits were purportedly treated as payments under the
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig against PSBank, spouses Baria and Co, and
the Register of Deeds for Metro Manila, District II (Pasig, Metro Manila) for
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate
of Title, and Specific Performance with Damages.13
After trial, the RTC issued an Order dated March 31, 1989
requiring the parties to file their respective memoranda:
The parties are given a period of thirty (30) days FROM THE
COMPLETION OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS of stenographic notes taken in the proceedings to
file their simultaneous memoranda, furnishing each other copy of their respective
memorandum and all of them are given a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the respective memorandum to file a reply-memorandum. THEREAFTER, the case
shall be deemed submitted for decision.14
On August 27, 1990, the RTC directed the completion of the
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) :
Considering that the above-entitled case is now considered
submitted for decision BUT CANNOT be decided with the absence of some
transcripts of stenographic notes, stenographer Miss Celis P. Claravall of this
branch is hereby ordered within thirty (30) days from today within which to
submit her transcripts of the hearings held on January 30, 1987, July 10, 1987
and September 27, 1988.15
On June 19, 1991, the RTC noted a Motion for Early Resolution filed
by respondent Bank. It attributed the delay in the resolution of the case to
the incomplete transcript:
Submitted for Resolution is the Motion for Early Resolution filed
by defendant Philippine Savings Bank.
It appears on record that the Court issued an Order dated August
27, 1990 to submit the lacking transcripts as the case COULD NOT BE decided
without these transcripts. It is to be noted that this is an inherited case and
before this Presiding Judge assumed office, the stenographic notes taken during
the proceedings before his assumption have not been completed and submitted. It
is only after his assumption that stenographers concerned were directed to
complete and submit their transcripts and at present, only one (1) stenographer
have (sic) not yet completed and submitted her transcripts. Although, the Court
noted the herein motion, it is already in the process of resolving the merits
of the case and a decision shall be rendered in due time.16
The incomplete TSN notwithstanding, the
RTC on August 21, 1991 rendered a Decision 17 in favor of respondent Bank. It held that the Banks rescission of the
contract was justified since petitioner failed to meet the terms of the Contract
On September 12, 1991, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to which
the RTC gave due course on October 8, 1991. The records of the case, however,
could not be transmitted to the Court of Appeals because the transcript of
January 30, 1987, covering the cross-examination of Atty. Raul Totaes, witness
for respondent Bank, could not be produced.
The stenographer who took down the testimony had already resigned and
migrated to Australia.
Thus, on February 17, 1992 the RTC issued an Order inviting
the parties to a conference to discuss the missing portion of the TSN:
In an Order dated October 8, 1991, the Notice of Appeal filed by
plaintiff was given due course and the records of the case ordered elevated to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
However, the records could not be transmitted to the appellate
court because of the unavailability of the transcript of stenographic notes
taken on January 30, 1987. The records show that the Stenographer who took the
stenographic notes failed to submit the transcripts and who is now abroad,
residing permanently in Australia.
WHEREFORE, the Court is constrained to invite the parties for a
conference on the matter on March 6, 1992 at 9:00 oclock in the morning.
Notify counsel for all parties.18
On the day of the conference, the parties agreed to the retaking
of the testimony of Atty. Totaes on June 2, 1992.
On August 14, 1992,
Petitioner, after receiving a copy of the TSN
of Atty. Totaes retaken testimony, submitted his Memorandum in
compliance with the previous RTC Order dated March 31, 1989. On the same
date, he submitted a position paper claiming that the courts decision was null
and void. Petitioner argued that he was not permitted to submit his memorandum
and was, therefore, deprived of due process.
In its Order dated September 30, 1992, the RTC declined to
rule on the question of due process. It held that the issue was beyond its
competence in light of the approval of petitioners notice of appeal:
All the incidents initiated by plaintiff after the retaking of the
testimony on cross-examination of Raul Totaes seeking the reversal of the
decision and/ or rendition of new decision would be outside the competence of
this Court at this point in time. Suffice it to say, the Court had approved the
notice of appeal of plaintiff which was filed within the reglamentary (sic)
period. The only reason why the records have not been elevated to the Court of
Appeals is on account of the said missing transcripts, which was finally
retaken. There is therefore no more legal obstacle to the elevation of the
records to the appellate court. All issues which plaintiff seeks to dispute and
the errors it is assigning can be properly addressed to the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and in conformance to the
Order of October 8, 1992, let the entire records of the case together with all
the evidence, oral and documentary, be elevated to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate proceedings on appeal.
On June 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for
the failure of petitioner to make an assignment of errors in his Appellants
Brief. The Court of Appeals likewise held that petitioner was not denied
due process when the RTC rendered its decision without his memorandum because:
It is our opinion that closing oral arguments of counsels and
submission of memorandum are not essential parts of the trial process for their
only province is to enlighten the court about the partys position and the
evidence supporting it. The rule quoted above does not make it mandatory for a
trial court to allow arguments or the filing of memoranda. Although they may in
some instances be desirable they are not however indispensable so that their
absence does not fatally impair the validity of the proceedings and the
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
prompting him to seek relief before this Court.
Petitioner initially faults the Court of Appeals for dismissing
his appeal on the ground that his appellants brief did not contain an
assignment of errors.
The contention has merit. In Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court
of Industrial Relations, 21 this Court admitted a petition for certiorari notwithstanding the absence
of an assignment of errors since the petition had substantially complied with the requirement of the Rules of Court:
Want of specific assignment of errors in appellants brief (LEA),
is one of the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal under Section 1(f),
52, of the Rules of Court. This ground proved fatal in several cases for where
no assignment of errors is made, no question may be considered by the appellate
court (Section 5, Rule 53, now Section 7, Rule 51, Rules of Court). Substantial
compliance with the requirements is however sufficient. The underlying reason
for the rule is to point out to the court the specific part of the appealed
judgment which the appellant seeks to controvert.
The assignment of errors embodied in LEAs petition for certiorari,
the statement of the issues in its amended petition and the clear discussion of
the points in issue in its brief have accomplished the task of informing this
Court which part of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is sought
to be reviewed. LEAs appeal in L-18681 ought not therefore to be dismissed, as
urged by LUZON, merely for the so-called lack of an assignment of errors in
LEAs brief. Pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be construed
liberally, in order that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove
their respective claims, and that a possible denial of substantial justice, due
to legal technicalities, may be avoided.22
In the present case, the Appellants Brief contains an
enumeration of Appellants Arguments, followed by an extensive
discussion pointing to evidence to support petitioners theory that he had paid
respondent Bank the third installment and that the Bank had waived its right to
rescind the contract. Preceding that is a lengthy exposition explaining why the
Decision of the RTC was void for failure to observe due process. These
portions of the brief fulfill the purpose of an assignment of errors for it
sufficiently informs the appellate court of the alleged errors committed by the
trial court in its decision, including the manner of its rendition.
Although the brief of the appellant is not a literal compliance
with the rules of the court, nor is it a work of art from a professional point
of view, still, this Court held in Santos v. Rivera,23 we do not believe the departure from the prescribed practice has been so
radical as to call for a dismissal of the case.24
Petitioner maintains that he was denied due process when the
trial court proceeded to decide the case, first, without the judge taking down
notes and, second, without waiting for his memorandum.
Petitioner claims that during the retaking on June 2, 1992 of
Atty. Totaes testimony, Judge Alfredo C. Flores, Presiding Judge of the RTC,
uttered statements confirming that he was unaware of the contents of the
original testimony taken on January 30, 1987:
There is no problem on the records that is now
existing it is only on the transcripts, the records that was not transcribed,
thats the problem, so how can we solve that.
We did as far as this existing t.s.n. which
are certified original testimony of the witness, we will adopt.. .
It is adopted, it is there, because if that is
your position, if you will require that to be adopted and as you said it is not
adopted, then he can cover many points you are implying that the counsel should
adopt that so that he can limit.. .
Because, your honor,
according to the last proceedings on record, that counsel has no further
The former direct
examination, he can ask other matters, then if they were already taken up then
you can object. You are opening the gates on new matters, the problem here is
just to reproduce the testimony of this witness on cross-examination that were
not transcribed, how can we do that, nobody can say, thats why. .. 25
Petitioner theorizes that when Judge Flores declared that nobody
can say what the missing transcript were all about, he in effect admitted that
he was ignorant of the material aspects of the testimony and that he failed to
take down his own notes purportedly in contravention of this Courts directive
in Balagot v. Opinion:26
The period within which to decide a case should be reckoned from
the date a case was submitted for decision. A delay on the transcription of
stenographic notes cannot be considered a valid reason for the delay in
rendering judgment in a case. Precisely, judges are directed to take down
notes of salient portions of the hearing and proceed in the preparation of
decisions without waiting for the transcript of stenographic notes.
Furthermore, we have already ruled that with or without the transcribed
stenographic notes, the 90 day period for deciding cases should be adhered to.27
Petitioner has taken Judge Flores statements out of context. The
Judges utterances should be interpreted in light of the purpose for which the
retaking of Atty. Totaes testimony was conducted, which was merely to
complete the transcript so it may be elevated to the Court of Appeals. Thus,
when Judge Flores said that nobody can say, he was merely emphasizing that
the counsels questions and the witness answers cannot be reproduced verbatim.
The questioned remarks of the Judge cannot definitely be taken to
mean that he did not know what took place at the earlier proceeding. At the
very least, Judge Flores would have some notion of the facts yielded by the
cross-examination. The Rules of Court establishes an order in the examination
of a witness. That order, quite logically, prescribes that the witness
cross-examination by the opponent be preceded by a direct examination of the
proponent.28 The Rules further define the purpose and extent of the cross-examination. The
witness may be cross-examined only as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, as well as all important facts bearing
upon the issue.29
In this case, Atty. Totaes testified on direct examination on
the contents of the Contract to Buy and the effect of the Banks
acceptance of the payments made by petitioner on February 22, 1975 and November
25, 1976. The transcript of his testimony formed part of the record. Naturally,
the Judge would have an idea of what was taken up on the succeeding cross-examination,
which under the Rules could only be matters stated in the direct examination,
or connected therewith, or important facts bearing upon the issue of
rescission. More importantly, Judge Flores himself heard the cross-examination
of Atty. Totaes. It cannot be successfully argued, therefore, that the Judge
was completely ignorant of what transpired during that part of the trial.
Petitioner also misconstrues this Courts ruling in Balagot,
supra. The gist of that ruling, echoed in numerous cases,30 is that a judge cannot plead the lack of the TSN to excuse delay in the
rendition of judgment. Thus, judges are advised to take down notes during the
trial. Balagot and similar cases did not make note-taking mandatory upon
judges, who may, at their own risk, choose not to take down notes. In the event
the stenographic notes are not transcribed and, as a result, the judge incurs
delay in rendering judgment, he faces administrative sanction - not for failure
to take down notes but for delay in the rendition of judgment.
Petitioner also claims that by deciding the case without his
memorandum, the trial court did not afford him the opportunity to argue his
case and thus denied him due process. He stresses that it was Judge Flores
himself who issued the Order instructing the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from the completion of the
Petitioners argument has no basis. The 1964 Rules of Court, the
procedure then applicable, did not require the filing of memoranda. Rule 30
SECTION 1. Order of trial. - Subject to the provisions of
section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the judge, for special reasons, otherwise
directs, the order of trial shall be as follows:
(g) When the evidence is concluded, unless the parties agreed to
submit the case without argument, the plaintiff or his counsel may make the
opening argument, the defendant, the third-party defendant, and fourth, etc.,
party, or their respective counsel, may follow successively, and the plaintiff
or his counsel may conclude the argument. Two counsel may, if desired, be
heard, upon each side, but in the order herein prescribed.
Administrative Circular No. 28 dated July 3, 1989 on the
submission of memoranda describes the nature of the requirement. As a general
rule, it states, the submission of memoranda is not mandatory or required as
a matter of course but shall be left to the sound discretion of the court. A
memorandum may not be filed unless required or allowed by the court.
Even under the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, the
requirement to file memoranda is likewise optional upon the trial court. Rule
30 on trials states:
SEC 5. Order of trial. - Subject to the provisions of
section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court, for special reasons otherwise
directs, the trial shall proceed as follows:
(g) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision, unless the court directs the parties to argue or to
submit their respective memoranda or any further pleadings.
The rationale for the foregoing rules is that a memorandum is
merely a device to help the court in rendering its decision, the primary basis
of which should be the evidence presented. Thus, in the case of Sps.
Montecer v. Court of Appeals, 31 this Court held that the CFI may not dismiss the appeal of the petitioner
solely on the basis of the partys failure to file his memorandum because:
Non-submission of memoranda is not part of the trial nor is the
memorandum itself essential, much less indispensable pleading before a case may
be submitted for decision. As it is merely intended to aid the court in the
rendition of the decision in accordance with law and evidence - which even in
its absence the court can do on the basis of the judges personal notes and the
records of the case - non-submission thereof has invariably been considered a
waiver of the privilege.32
In support of his contention that a memorandum is required,
petitioner cites the work of Supreme Court Justice Jose Y. Feria (Ret.) stating
that, under the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:
Oral Argument is no longer a matter of right after the
admission of evidence. The court has the discretion to direct the parties to
argue orally or to submit memoranda.33
Petitioners argument is grounded on a gross misreading of the
What Justice Feria
clearly refers to as no longer a matter of right under the 1997 Revised Rules
on Civil Procedure is the hearing of oral arguments, not the filing of
It is true that Judge Flores himself asked the parties to submit
their respective memoranda. Nevertheless, the rendition of judgment despite the
absence thereof does not constitute a denial of due process. Since, whether
under the old or new Rules on Civil Procedure, it is in the courts discretion
to order the parties to submit memoranda, it is also within its discretion to
revoke such order. Thus, there is nothing unusual in the action of the trial
court. Perhaps, Judge Flores realized that he had a sufficient grasp of the
evidence and the issues to enable him to resolve the case, rendering the
memoranda unnecessary. In such case, the trial court is simply deemed to have
dispensed with the memoranda that it had previously required.
The essence of due process is a reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit evidence in support of ones defense. What the law proscribes,
therefore, is the lack of opportunity to be heard.34 As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due
course, he would have no reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be
heard that makes up the essence of due process.35 It
is beyond dispute that petitioner participated in the trial. He was able to
adduce evidence in his behalf and given the opportunity to refute those of
private respondents. Clearly, petitioner cannot complain that he was deprived
of due process.
Under the Contract to Buy, petitioner was supposed to pay
respondent Bank the amount of P20,000.00 covering the third installment on or
before April 30, 1973. Petitioner was not able to pay said amount on the date
stipulated. However, he made payments in the amount of P17,500.00 on February
22, 1975 and P15,208.34 on November 25, 1976. On the face of the official
receipts covering these amounts appear the words penalties/interest charges.
Petitioner insists, though, that he made arrangements with the lawyers of the
bank that these words were to be considered mere typographical errors and
that the amounts reflected as payments covering the third installment.
The amounts covered by the subject receipts cannot be considered
payments for the third installment. The contract states that where the Bank
exercises the right to demand full payment of the agreed total purchase price,
the balance of the purchase price shall bear interest from May 1, 1973 at the
rate of one percent (1%) per month until fully paid. As petitioner failed to
pay the third installment, petitioner was liable to pay respondent Bank such
interest. The accumulated interest from 1 May 1973 to 22 February 1975 amounted
to P26,250.00 or much more than what petitioner paid on the latter date. It may
be safely assumed, therefore, that respondent Bank first applied the payments
represented by the subject receipts to the interest due. Under Article 1253 of
the New Civil Code, if the debt produces interest, payment of the principal
shall not be deemed to have been made until the interests have been covered.
Petitioner has not, other than by his bare and self-serving
allegations, established that the receipts were issued for payments
constituting the third installment. In a letter dated May 31, 1976,
petitioners father even offered to pay respondent Bank the balance of
P20,000.00 on or before August 31, 1976. If it is true that the payment of
P17,500.00 made on February 22, 1975 (per Official Receipt No. 130561) covered
part of the installment, then only the remaining balance of P2,500.00 was due
respondent Bank. Yet petitioner still offered to pay the entire amount of
P20,000.00 after allegedly having made the P17,500.00 payment to cover part of
the third installment.
Petitioner also claims that he had an agreement with the Banks
lawyers that the deposits made by petitioners father in his account were to be
considered as payments in satisfaction of the third installment. Petitioner,
however, has not proven by a preponderance of evidence that he and the Bank had
agreed to resort to a debit memo scheme to pay the sum due.
As petitioner failed to pay the third installment, respondent was
entitled to rescind the Contract to Buy. The contract provides the Bank
two options in the event that petitioner fails to pay any of the installments.
This was either (1) to rescind the contract outright and forfeit all amounts
paid by the petitioner, or (2) to demand the satisfaction of the contract and
insist on the full payment of the total price. After petitioner repeatedly
failed to pay the third installment, the Bank again chose to exercise the first
Petitioner submits, though, that the bank waived its right to
rescind since it allowed petitioner-extensions to pay the third installment. In
support of his contention, petitioner invokes Pilipinas Bank v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,36 where this Court held that an unmistakable intention to relinquish the
right of rescission exists where the injured party grants numerous extensions
to the other party to the contract.
Assuming that the Bank indeed granted petitioner extensions to
pay the last installment, such grants did not preclude rescission of the
contract. Failure on the part of petitioner to pay within the extension granted
constituted delay and, therefore, another breach of the contract, again giving
rise to respondent Banks right to rescind.
Viewed in another light, the Contract to Buy is actually a
contract to sell whereby the vendor reserves ownership of the property and is
not to pass until full payment. Such payments as a positive suspensive
condition, the failure of which is not a breach but simply an event that
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding
force.37 Since ownership of the subject property was not to pass to petitioner until
full payment of the purchase price, his failure to pay on the date stipulated,
or in the extension granted, prevented the obligation for the Bank to pass
title to the property to him from arising.38 Be
it noted that as of April 30, 1973 which was the deadline for the last
installment, the balance of the principal stood at P125,000.00.
However viewed, respondent Bank could validly sell the property
to respondent spouses. The right of respondent Bank to sell the property being
unequivocal, petitioners claims of bad faith on the part of respondent spouses
have been rendered irrelevant.
petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, andCallejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., no part.
1 Exhibit A. Also Exhibit 1.
2 The property with an area of 527.5 sq. m., is located at 114 R. Lagmay St., San
Juan, Metro Manila, and is covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. 301276 in
the name of respondent Bank.
7 Exhibit E. Also Exhibit 7.
13 Docketed as Civil Case No. 44940.
14 Records, Vol. II, p. 212.
15 Records, Vol. II, p. 218.
16 Records, Vol. II, p. 221.
17 Records, Vol. II, pp. 235-236. The
dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
Verily, the plaintiff
is bereft of any legal or equitable right to compel the conveyance in his favor
by the defendant Bank of the realty in dispute. A fortiori, the sale in favor
of the Spouses Saturnina Baria and Tomas Co cannot be nullified. Necessarily,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14329 of the Registry of Deeds of Metro
Manila, District II must be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of
all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
plaintiffs complaint, with costs.
For lack of
sufficient and factual basis, all counterclaims are likewise dismissed.
18 Records, Vol. II, p. 241.
19 Records, Vol. II, pp. 413 - 414.
20 CA Rollo, p. 317. The CA decision was
penned by Justice Hilarion L. Aquino with Justices Jainal B. Rasul and Hector
L. Hofilea, concurring.
21 122 Phil. 1037 (1965).
25 TSN, p. 4, June 2, 1992. Underscoring supplied.
26 A.M. No. MTJ-90-439, March 20, 1991, 195 SCRA 429.
27 Id., at 432. Underscoring supplied.
28 RULES OF COURT, rule 132, sec. 4 (a) and (b).
30 E.g., Re: Problem of Delays in
Cases before the Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC,
November 28, 2001, 370
SCRA 658; Castillo v. Cortes, A.M.
No. RTJ-93-1082, July 25,1994, 234 SCRA 398; Tauro v. Colet, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1434,
April 29, 1999, 306 SCRA 340;
Celino v. Abrogar, A.M. No. RTJ-95-1317,
June 27, 1995, 245 SCRA 304; Re:
Judge Danilo M. Tenerife, A.M. No. 94-5-42-MTC,
March 20, 1996, 255 SCRA
32 Cases Submitted for Decision
before Retired Judge Maximo A. Sevellano, Jr., RTC - Br, 53, Manila, A.M. No. 99-7-250-RTC,
April 5, 2000, 329 SCRA 637, citing Salvador v. Salamanca, A.M. No. R-177-MTJ, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 276.
36 No. L-67881, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 546.
37 See Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Maritime Building Co., Inc., No.
L-25885, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 93, citing Manuel v. Rodriguez, 109 Phil. 1(1960). Also
Rillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125347,
June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA
38 See Padilla v. Paredes, G.R.
No. 128474, March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 434.
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