July 2004 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan : 152259 : July 29, 2004 : J. Tinga : En Banc : Separate Opinion

EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 152259. July 29, 2004]

ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, Petitioner, v. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

SEPARATE OPINION

TINGA, J.:

I concur in the result of the ponencia and the proposition that Section 5 of the Anti-Plunder Law is constitutional. The validity of the provision has been passed upon by the Court before in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.¹ I also agree with the ponencias reiteration of the ruling in Estrada that Section 5 is receptive to the basic principle in statutory construction that words should be construed in their ordinary and usual meaning.² cralawred

However, with all due respect, I raise serious objections to the ponencias holding that the so-called void for vagueness doctrine has special application only to free speechcases,³ andthe undeclared proposition that penal

laws may not be stricken down on the ground of ambiguity.⁴ I am aware that the assertions rely upon the separate opinions of the herein ponente ⁵ and Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza⁶ in Estrada. I am also aware that the critical portion of Mr. Justice Mendozas separate opinion in Estrada was cited with approval by Mr. Justice Bellosillos ponencia therein.⁷

The incontrovertible reality though is that the majoritys pronouncement in Estrada that penal statutes cannot be challenged on vagueness grounds did not form part of the ratio decidendi. The ratio, in the words of Justice Bellosillo, was: as it is written, thePlunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation,⁸ and thus the law does not suffer from unconstitutionality. The discussion on the vagueness aspect was not decisive of the main issue and, therefore, clearly obiter dictum.I submit that it is erroneous to resolve the present petition on the basis of that dictum in Estrada.

As the obiter dictum in Estrada is needlessly made a ratio in the present case, the ponencia herein has even unwittingly elevated to doctrinal level the proposition that the constitutionality of penal laws cannot be challenged on the ground of vagueness.I humbly submit that the stance is flawed and contrary to fundamental principles of due process.

The Bill of Rights occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law.⁹ It is thus sacrosanct in this jurisdiction that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.¹⁰

A challenge to a penal statute premised on the argument that the law is vague is a proper invocation of the due process clause. A statute that lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violatesthedue process clause,forfailureto

accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid.¹¹ As held by the Court in People v. Dela Piedra:¹²

Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. A criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions, is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.¹³

It should also be reckoned that the Bill of Rights likewise guarantees that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law,¹⁴ and that the accused enjoys the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her.¹⁵ The Bill of Rights ensures the fullest measure of protection to an accused. If a particular mode of constitutional challenge, such as one predicated on the void for vagueness doctrine, is available to an ordinary person deprived of property or means of expression, then more so should it be accessible to one who is in jeopardy of being deprived of liberty or of life.¹⁶

Vagueness and Overbreadth Are DistinctConcepts

A fundamental flaw, to my mind, in the analysis employed by the ponencia and some of the separate opinions in Estrada is the notion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are the same and should be accorded similar treatment. This is erroneous.

Mr. Justice Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in Estrada, offers a correct distinction between vagueness and overbreadth:

A view has been proferred that vagueness and overbreadthdoctrines are not applicable to penal laws.These two concepts, while related, are distinct from each other. On one hand, the doctrine of overbreadth applies generally to statutes that infringe upon freedom of speech. On the other hand, the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to criminal laws, not merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional right. (not merely those that regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional rights.) The fact that a particular criminal statute does not infringe upon free speech does not mean that a facial challenge to the statute on vagueness grounds cannot succeed.¹⁷

This view should be sustained, especially in light of the fact that the void for vagueness doctrine has long been sanctioned as a means to invalidate penal statutes.

Void For Vagueness Invalidation of Penal Statutes has Long-Standing Jurisprudential History

As early as 1926, the United States Supreme Court held in Connally v. General Construction Co., thus: ¹⁸

That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well- recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.

Thus in Connally, a statute prescribing penalties for violation of an eight-hour workday law was voided, presenting as it did, a double uncertainty, fatal to its validity as a criminal statute.¹⁹

In Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey,²⁰ a challenge was posed to a statute defining a gangster and prescribing appropriate penalties, for being void for vagueness. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the definition of a gang under the statute was vague, and the statute void for vagueness. It was of no moment that the information against the accused described the offense with particularity.

If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to the due process clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be charged would not serve to validate it. (United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221; Czarra v. Board of Medical Supervisors, 25 App.D.C. 443, 453.) It is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression. (See Stromberg v. .California, 283 U.S. 359, 368, 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 73 A.L. R. 1484; Lovell v. .Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666.) No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.²¹ (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

In Bouie v. City of Columbia,²² civil rights protesters were charged with violating a criminal trespass statuteproscribing entry upon the lands of another after notice prohibiting such entry. A state court construed the statute as applicable to the act of remaining on the premises of another after receiving notice to leave. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, applying again the void for vagueness doctrine. Said Court admitted that typical applications of the principle, the uncertainty as to the statute's prohibition resulted from vague or overbroad language in the statute itself.²³ Yet the Court noted that [t]here can be no doubt that a deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not only from vague statutory language but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language.²⁴ Accordingly, the Court overturned the convictions, holding that "the crime for which [they] were convicted was not enumerated in the statute at the time of their conduct, thus denying the accused due process of law.²⁵

In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,²⁶ a statute penalizing vagrancy was voided by the U.S. Supreme Court, again for being vague:

This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," (United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 ), and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions (Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 ) . ²⁷

Kolender v. Lawson ²⁸ involves another affirmation of the well-established doctrine. There, the US Supreme Court invalidated a loitering statute requiring a loiterer to produce credible and reliable identification when requested by a peace officer. It elucidated:

Although the doctrine focuses on both actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcements. Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors and juries to pursue their personal predilections.²⁹

In the fairly recent case of City of Chicago v. Morales,³⁰ the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling invalidating as void for vagueness an ordinance prohibiting criminal street gang members from loitering in public places, as well as the conviction based on the invalidated ordinance. The US Court again asserted:

For it is clear that the vagueness of this enactment makes a facial challenge appropriate. This is not an ordinance that "simply regulates business behavior and contains a scienter requirement." (See Hoffman Estatesv. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.

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