San Juan De Dios Educ'l Foundation Employees Union v. San Juan De Dios
Educ'l Foundation Inc : 143341 : May 28, 2004 : J. Callejo Sr : Second Division
[G.R. NO. 143341 : May
SAN JUAN DE DIOS EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION EMPLOYEES
UNION-ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS; MA. CONSUELO MAQUILING, LEONARDO MARTINEZ,
ANDRES AYALA, VIRGINIA ARLANTE, ROGELIO BELMONTE,
MA. ELENA GARCIA and RODOLFO CALUCIN, JR., Petitioners, v. SAN JUAN DE DIOS
EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, INC. (HOSPITAL) and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53768, affirming with modification
the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
NCMB-NCR-NS-08-397-94 (NLRC-NCR-CC-000089-94); NLRC-NCR-00-09-07117-94 and
NLRC-NCR-09-06557-95 and its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
of the said decision.
San Juan de Dios Educational Foundation, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as the Foundation) is a domestic foundation operating as a college
and hospital with a two hundred bed capacity, complemented by four hundred
hospital personnel, more or less.
retains approximately seventy medical consultants specializing in various
fields of applied medicine and medical research.The Foundation rendered medical and nursing services to indigents
from Pasay City,
Las Pias, Paranaque, Muntinlupa and Cavite.2 cralawred
San Juan de Dios Educational Foundation Employees Union-Alliance
of Filipino Workers (hereinafter referred to as the Union),
is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file
employees in the Foundation.
Rodolfo Calucin, Jr., then Executive Secretary of the Union,
had been employed at the Foundation as a medical clerk for almost twelve
In a Letter dated January
14, 1994, the Foundation, through its Personnel Officer Teresita D.
Doringo, informed him that, per its records, he had incurred five (5) sets3 of tardiness for 1993, in addition to the two other sets he had incurred in the
year 1992, and that such tardiness had affected his efficiency.
He was required to explain, in writing,
within seventy-two hours from receipt of the letter, why his services should
not be terminated for gross and habitual
neglect of his duties, under Article 282 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.4 cralawred
Calucin, Jr. expressed surprise over Doringos directive.
In his reply, he claimed that he had already
served the maximum suspension of one week, from October
11 to 17, 1993, for his past tardiness.He furthered that he had not incurred tardiness for the past four
months. Moreover, his superior had given him a performance rating of FAIR, as of October 1993.5 cralawred
On July 27, 1994,
the Foundation, through then Acting Vice-President for Health Services Sister
Lourdes S. Sabidong, wrote Calucin, Jr. informing the latter that his
employment had been terminated as of the month of March for gross and habitual
neglect of duties under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code.6 cralawred
Calucin, Jr. filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal on August
1, 1994 before the National Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission.7 On the same date, the Union filed a Notice
of Strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB),
as NCMB NCR-NS-08-397-94 (certified as NLRC-NCR-CC-000089-94),
grounded on the
following: (a) illegal dismissal of Calucin, Jr., a union officer; (b)
discrimination; (c) union busting; (d) harsh enforcement of the companys code
of discipline; and, (e) violation of CBA provisions.8 Officers and employees who were also members of the Union
staged a strike.
The Foundation, through counsel, filed a motion for bill of
particulars, anent the basis of the notice of strike filed by the Union.
The Union specified
the following as its basis for the said notice:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
dismissal of Rodolfo Calucin, Jr., executive secretary of the Union;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
arising from the favorable actions of the Foundation to Editha H. Unlao who was
not dismissed despite incurring similar number of absences as Calucin;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
busting arising from contracting out regular services performed by union
members, forcing Rodolfo Cachuela, an active union member, to resign for no
apparent reason; forced resignation from the union by Francis Rellevo, Nestor
Centeno, Nemia Abregoso and Grace Isidro upon the insistence of the sisters who
recruited them to work at the Foundation; harsh enforcement of the company code
of discipline motivated by the desire to persecute militant union members
especially on Fe Calucin (for being a wife of Rodolfo Calucin, [Jr.] a union
Joan Balucos (assigned heavy workload),
Edgar Bas (saddled with extra
suspending employees who became pregnant before marriage for five to
seven months even after getting married or until delivery;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(d) violation of
the CBA arising from the non-observance of friendly negotiations before
enforcing management actions, refusal to activate grievance committee, refusal
or failure to continue recreational activities.9 cralawred
On August 26, 1994,
then Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary Ma. Nieves R. Confesor
issued an Order10 certifying the case to the NLRC,
directing the striking employees to go to work, and directing the Foundation to
accept all employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
Per the return of Sheriff Alfredo C. Antonio, copies of the order
were served on the officers and striking members of the Union
and its counsel.11 cralawred
Nevertheless, the officers and striking members of the Union
defied the order of the DOLE and continued with their strike.
In the meantime, the Foundation filed a petition before the NCMB
to declare the strike illegal.
petition was certified to the NLRC and was re-docketed as NLRC Case No.
The Foundation alleged
therein that the Union and its officers committed
prohibited acts during the strike staged on August
26 to 31, 1994.12 cralawred
Since the members of the Union had not
heeded the Return-To-Work Order (RTWO),
the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(SOLE) issued another RTWO on August
29, 1994.13 cralawred
The Foundation and the Union entered into an agreement on August
30, 1994, on the following matters: (a) the propriety and legality of the
dismissal of Calucin, Jr. and the hiring of agency employees shall be submitted
to a voluntary arbitrator chosen by the parties in accordance with the CBA; (b)
the Union shall lift its picket line immediately after the signing of the
agreement and report to work not later than August 31, 1994, except for
Calucin, Jr.; (c) the Foundation would waive any legal action relating to the
illegal strike and the illegal acts committed by the officers and members of
the Union.14 cralawred
In a Letter15 dated August 31, 1994, the Union,
through its President, Ma. Consuelo P. Maquiling, informed the Foundation that
the night-shift duty (10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.)
would be reporting back to work.
she requested that those whose duties fell on the 6:00
a.m. to 2:00 p.m., 8:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m., and the 2:00 p.m. to 10 p.m.
shifts, be required to return to work on September
1, 1994, considering that they had been in the picket line for the
past few days.
The Foundation denied the Unions request.
The twenty-seven employees who worked the said shifts were not allowed to go
back to work.
In response to the
manifestations and motions filed by the Union, the SOLE,
on September 14 and 21 of 1994, ordered the Foundation to accept the said
employees. The Foundation refused.
On October 5, 1994,
the SOLE issued an Order16 directing the Foundation to comply with her September 14 and 21, 1994
directives. The dispositive portion of the order reads:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the San Juan de Dios Hospital, Inc.
is strictly enjoined to fully and faithfully comply with the return-to-work
Orders dated 14 and 21 September 1994.
More specifically, the Hospital is ordered
to accept back to work the employees who were scheduled to report for work on 31
August 1994 and belonging to the 2:00
10:00 and 3:00 11:00 p.m.
shifts without any condition or qualification under the same terms prevailing
prior to the strike.
Sheriff Alfredo C. Antonio, this Department, is hereby directed to
implement this Order without further delay.
If necessary, he may seek the assistance of the Pasay City Philippine
National Police which is hereby deputized to assist in the peaceful and orderly
implementation of this Order.
The Foundation filed a petition with this Court assailing the October
5, 1994 Order of the SOLE.
The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 117226. In the meantime, the
Foundation allowed the payroll reinstatement of the twenty-seven (27)
employees, effective only on October
10, 1994, subject to the outcome of its petition filed with this
Court in G.R. No. 117226. The Union agreed with this
On March 27, 1995,
the Court, issued a Resolution,18 ruling that the SOLE did not act with grave abuse of discretion and affirmed
her October 5, 1994
The decretal portion of the
resolution reads, viz:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, finding that the public respondent has not committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated October
5, 1994, the same is hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order is hereby
However, the Court held that, by voluntarily reinstating the
striking employees in the payroll after they were deemed to have lost their
employment status, the Foundation can no longer rely on the ruling in St. Scholasticas College v. Torres,19 where it was held that employees who refused to go to work after the issuance
of a return-to-work order were deemed to have abandoned their employment. The
Court also made it clear that the reinstatement of the affected employees was
only to maintain the status quo until
the final determination of the pivotal issues were submitted before the NLRC.20 cralawred
In the meantime, the Foundation accepted the twenty-seven
employees, subject to the resolution of its motion for reconsideration.21 The Court denied the said motion on March
Foundation refused to give the twenty-seven employees the equivalent of their
salaries for the period they were refused reinstatement.
This prompted the employees, through the Union,
to file a complaint against the Foundation before the NLRC, docketed as
On motion of the parties, NCMB-NCR-NS-08-397-94
(NLRC-NCR-CC-000089-94); NLRC-NCR-00-09-07117-94 and NLRC-NCR-09-06557-95 were
In its position paper, the Union alleged
that the Foundation was guilty of (a) illegal dismissal of Union officers; (b)
discrimination; and, (c) union-busting.
It also alleged that its strike was legal and was conducted in a
peaceful and orderly manner.
On February 9, 1999,
the NLRC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which is herein
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission rules as follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
(a) The Petition
to declare the strike illegal is hereby granted, and the following officers of
the union are deemed to have lost their employment status, to wit:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
O. Martinez -Vice-President,
Belmonte -P. R. O.
Elena Garcia -P. R. O.
dismissal of Rodolfo Calucin [Jr.] is declared valid and all charges of the
union of unfair labor practice are likewise dismissed for lack of merit;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
complaint for payment of the money claims of the 27 employees subject of the
third captioned case is dismissed for lack of merit.23 cralawred
The Commission held that the strike staged by the Union
from August 26, 1994 to August
31, 1994 was, at its inception, legal and peaceful. However, the
striking employees defiance of the August
26, 1994 RTWO of the SOLE rendered the strike illegal.
Consequently, under Article 264 (a)
paragraph 2 of the Labor Code,24 the officers and members of the Union who refused to
return to work after the issuance of the certification/RTWO were deemed to have
lost their employment status.
also held that considering that the Union members did not know the consequences
of their refusal to return to work, only the ranking officers of the Union, i.e.,
the president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer and PROs, should be deemed
to have lost their employment status.
The NLRC dismissed the claim of unfair labor practice arising
from the illegal dismissal of Rogelio Calucin, Jr.It ruled that Calucin, Jr.s dismissal was based on his continued
tardiness for the year 1992 to 1993, which affected his efficiency as reflected
by his performance rating and, therefore, sanctioned by Article 282(b) of the
The NLRC found that the Unions claim of discrimination amounting
to unfair labor practice was unsubstantiated, particularly on the following
matters: a) the treatment in the tardiness of union and non-union members; b)
the meal break of dietary personnel; c) the hazard pay of midwives; d) the
dismissal of Cachuela; and, e) the forced resignation of Francisco Rellevo,
Nestor Centeno, Nemia Abregoso and Grace Isidro from the Union. It also found
the explanation of the Foundation meritorious.
The Commission also ruled in favor of the Foundation on the Unions
claim of the harsh enforcement of the Company Code of Discipline on Fe Calucin,
Joan Balucos, Edgar Bas, Victor Estuya, the suspension of unmarried pregnant
women, and the charge of violation of the CBA for failure to activate the
grievance committee. However, the Commission found the Foundations refusal to
continue to sustain the recreational activities of the Union invalid.
As regards the Foundations refusal to pay the money claims of
the twenty-seven employees, the NLRC ruled that the same was sanctioned by law,
considering that the aforesaid employees refused to return to work even after
the SOLE already issued a RTWO effective August
31, 1994.25 cralawred
The Union filed a motion for
reconsideration from the said decision.
The NLRC denied the motion on April
30, 1999.26 cralawred
On June 18, 1999,
the Union, represented by its president, Ma. Consuelo
Maquiling, filed an Amended Notice of Strike27 before the NCMB, docketed as NCMB-06-221-99, citing the following as grounds
therefor: (a) bargaining deadlock on economic issues, arising from
disagreements in wage increase, signing bonus, meal allowance, uniform allowance,
hospital uniform, hazard pay, longevity pay, and retirement pay; (b) bargaining
deadlock on non-economic issues arising from union shop; and, (c) unfair labor
practice arising from discrimination and contracting out of jobs performed by
Dissatisfied with the decision and resolution of the NLRC, the Union
and its officers filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on
July 16, 1999, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 53768 alleging as follows:
RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN RULING FOR THE VALIDITY OF SERVICE OF THE CERTIFICATION ORDER OF
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT DATED AUGUST
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING PETITIONER-UNIONS STRIKE ILLEGAL WITH THE EXTREME
SANCTION OF THE LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE FIVE
(5) INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS NAMED IN THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED CASE.
RESPONDENT NLRC TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE
LAW, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY AND WITH MANIFEST
PARTIALITY IN ADJUDGING THE TERMINATION OF PETITIONER CALUCIN [JR.] FROM
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING ALL CHARGES OF PETITIONER-UNION OF UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE AGAINST THE RESPONDENT FOUNDATION IN UTTER DISREGARD OF SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
RESPONDENT NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION OR ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MONEY CLAIMS OF
THE TWENTY-SEVEN (27) STRIKING EMPLOYEE-UNION MEMBERS FOR PAYMENT OF THEIR
WITHHELD SALARIES FOR THE PERIODS SEPTEMBER 2, 1994 OCTOBER 9, 1994 AND APRIL
6, 1995 JUNE 30, 1995.28 cralawred
The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution directing the
respondents to file their Comment on the Petition.
In the meantime, the Foundation and the Union
executed a new CBA.
conditions for its approval was that the termination of the Union officers as
adjudged by the NLRC would not be enforced.
However, the Foundation reneged on this agreement and terminated the
services of the Union officers immediately after the new CBA was signed and
approved on August 12, 1999.29 cralawred
On November 25, 1999,
the CA rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 53768, partially granting the
petition, in that the money claims of the twenty-seven employees were
The decretal portion of the
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is partially granted and the
assailed Decision released on February 9, 1994 and the Order promulgated on
April 30, 1994 are hereby MODIFIED
in the sense that the complaint for the payment of the money claims of the 27
employees are granted and private respondent is hereby ordered to pay
the money claims of the twenty-seven (27) employees for the period covering
September 2, 1994 to October 9, 1994 and April 6, 1995 to June 30, 1995 while the
rest of the assailed decision is affirmed
in all other respects.
as to cost.30 cralawred
The CA held that there was a valid service of the August
26, 1994 RTWO of the SOLE on the petitioners and their counsel,
Atty. Alfredo Bentulan, as gleaned from the report of Sheriff Alfredo C.
It also ruled that for the
Union officers and members failure to return to work as ordered, the strike
was rendered illegal. Consequently, the said union officers and members were
deemed to have lost their employment status.
The CA ruled that the petitioners failed to prove the allegation
of unfair labor practice ascribed to the Foundation.It also declared that the evidence on record shows that Calucin,
Jr. was dismissed for gross and habitual neglect of duties for his continued
tardiness and inefficiency.
However, the appellate court ruled that the August
30, 1994 Letter of the petitioner, Ma. Consuelo Maquiling requesting
that the 2:00-10:00 p.m. and 3:00-11:00
p.m. shifts be made to report on September
1, 1994 was justified; hence, the refusal of the respondent
Foundation to pay the money claims of the twenty-seven employees was unjust and
Dissatisfied, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the CA.
part, the respondent Foundation filed a partial motion for reconsideration of
the decision, on the grant of the money claims of the twenty-seven
11, 2000, the appellate court resolved to deny both motions.31
On June 23, 2000,
the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the decision and resolution of the CA, on
the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS AN EFFECTIVE AND VALID SERVICE OF THE AUGUST
26, 1994 CERTIFICATION ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONER-UNION[S] STRIKE ILLEGAL WITH THE SUPREME PENALTY
OF THE LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE SIX (6) INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS WHICH
WAS TAINTED WITH BAD FAITH OR MALICE COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT FOUNDATION;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CHARGES OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE AGAINST THE RESPONDENT
FOUNDATION IN THE PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON THE SAID CHARGES ON
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION TAINTED PETITIONER CALUCINS
TERMINATION FROM EMPLOYMENT.32 cralawred
The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not
the petitioners were validly served with copies of the return to work order of
the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment; (b) whether or not the
strike staged by the officers and members of the Union was illegal; (c) whether
the petitioner Unions officers were legally dismissed; and, (d) whether or not
the respondent Foundation committed an unfair labor practice when it terminated
the employment of petitioner Calucin, Jr.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, we must stress that only errors of law are
generally reviewed by this Court in Petitions for Review on Certiorari of CA
decisions.33 Questions of fact are not entertained.34 After all, this Court is not a trier of facts and, in labor cases, this
doctrine applies with greater force. Factual questions are for labor tribunals
to resolve.35 The findings of fact of quasi-judicial
bodies like the NLRC, are accorded with respect, even finality, if supported by
passed upon and upheld by the Court of Appeals, they are binding and conclusive
upon the Supreme Court and will not normally be disturbed.36 cralawred
Even then, we have meticulously reviewed the records and find no
reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals on the merits of the
On the first, second, and third issues, the petitioners assert
that the respondent Foundation failed to prove that the petitioners and their
counsel were served with copies of the August 26, 1994 Return-to-Work Order
issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment and that, consequently, they
could not have defied the same.
they insist they were illegally dismissed by the respondent Foundation.
We do not agree.
return of Sheriff Alfredo C. Antonio irrefragably shows that copies of the
Order were served on the striking employees and the petitioners.
As gleaned from the Sheriffs Return, viz:
On 26 August 1994,
the undersigned served copies of the Order issued in the above captioned case
to both parties.
The Hospital thru
Counsel received a copy of the Order on 26
On the other
hand, the striking employees of the Hospital refused to acknowledge receipt of
the copies of the said Order necessitating the distribution of the same to the
striking workers at the picket line.37 cralawred
A copy of the Order was served to Consuelo Maquiling at exactly
of 26 August 1994 but
refused to receive officially.
eight (8) copies of the Order was (sic) distributed by the undersigned to the
officers and members of the striking workers.38 cralawred
A copy of the order was also served on the petitioners counsel,
Atty. Alfredo Bentulan, but the latter refused to receive the same.
This can be gleaned from the following
notation made by the sheriff:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
Served at his office at 11:05 a.m.
of 27 August 1994 but his
staff refused to receive the Order.
copy of the order was left by the undersigned to his staff.39 cralawred
It bears stressing that the sheriffs report is an official
statement by him of his acts under the writs and processes issued by the court
in obedience to its directive and in conformity with law.40 In the absence of contrary evidence, a presumption exists that a sheriff has
regularly performed his official duty.41 To controvert the presumption arising therefrom, there must be clear and
convincing evidence.42 In this case, the petitioners failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption.
denial by the petitioners of receiving copies of the order will not suffice.
The petitioners bare denial is even belied by their admission in
their position paper before the NLRC and their motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the NLRC, that while the sheriff served copies of the order on
them, they refused to receive the same because they thought it was a fake
order. In such case, it behooved the petitioners to verify its validity from
the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. They failed to do so. The
petitioners cannot, thus, feign ignorance of the said order.
Despite the receipt of an order from then SOLE to return to their
respective jobs, the Union officers and members refused to do so and defied the
Consequently, then, the strike
staged by the Union is a prohibited activity under Article
264 of the Labor Code. Hence, the dismissal of its officers is in order.43 The respondent Foundation was, thus, justified in terminating the employment of
the petitioner Unions officers.
On the last issue, the petitioners failed to prove their claim
that the respondent Foundation committed unfair labor practices and
discrimination of its employees. We agree with the following discerning
findings and encompassing disquisitions of the Court of Appeals on this issue:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
However, the records of this case do not show any hint that
Calucins [Jr.s] dismissal is due to his trade union activities.
On the other hand, per findings of the
public respondent, the Foundation was able to support with documents how
Calucin [Jr.] declared himself irrelevant in the Foundation through his
tardiness and shallow excuses such as fetching the water, cooking breakfast,
seeing to it that his kids took breakfast before going to school, preparing
packed lunch for himself and even the diversions from the usual route of
jeepneys that he rode in on these days that he was absent are all lame excuses
that amount to lack of interest in his work.
His lackluster work attitude reached his highest point when he filed for
a leave of absence of three months to join his brothers business venture.
Furthermore, it is not true that his
attendance improved in 1993 because the records show that in 1993, his
tardiness worsened to the point that his repeated tardiness went beyond the
maximum contemplated in the Foundations Code of Discipline.
For the foregoing reasons, Calucin, Jr.s dismissal is valid.
(Meralco Workers Union v. Meralco, G.R. No. L-11896, May 29,
1959; Laguna Transportation Employees Union v. Laguna Transport Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-23266, April
25, 1968; Cando v. NLRC, G.R. [No.] 91344, September
The rest of the charges on discrimination amounting to unfair labor
practice acts specifically those affecting the alleged tardiness of Edith
Unlao, the meal breaks of the dietary personnel, hazard pay for midwives, the
salary of Carmen Herrera including hiring through agency, the resignation of
Cachuela, Francisco Rellevo, Nestor Centeno, Nemia Abregoso and Grace Isidro
are all dismissed on the ground that the explanation of the Foundation per
records of this case were found to be meritorious.
The same holds true as regard the charges of unfair labor practice
through alleged harsh enforcement of the Code of Discipline, affecting Fe
Calucin, Joan Balucos, Edgar Bas, Victor Estuya and the suspension of unmarried
pregnant women; including the alleged violation of CBA provisions such as
paying employees through BPI, refusal to activate grievance committee and
failure to maintain recreational activities.
The Foundation was able to explain and exculpate itself from the
charges of unfair labor practice and discrimination as shown in their written
replies to these charges which are all in the records of this case.
Consequently, all the charges of unfair
labor practice acts are dismissed.
Thus, in the case of Castillo v. NLRC, et al., L-104319, June
17, 1999, the Supreme Court ruled:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
As earlier pointed out, findings of the NLRC are practically
conclusive on this Court.
It is only
when the NLRCs findings are bereft of any substantial support from the records
that the Court may step in and proceed to make its own independent evaluation
of the facts.
The Court has found
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53768 is
Costs against the petitioners.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman),
Austria-Martinez, and TINGA, JJ., concur.
J., on official leave.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with Associate Justices Ramon
A. Barcelona (retired) and Demetrio G. Demetria, concurring. Promulgated on November
25, 1999, Rollo pp. 315-334.
3 Equivalent to twenty (20) times.
4 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, p. 89.
8 Annex D, Petition; Rollo, p. 103.
9 Annex E; Id.;
15 Annex I, Petition; Rollo, p. 113.
24 ART. 264. (a)
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of
jurisdiction by the President or Secretary or after certification or submission
of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of
cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
29 The new CBA covered the period from February
20, 1996 up to February 19,
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