Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence


Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2006 > October 2006 Decisions > G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : CONCURRING OPINION - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS:




G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : CONCURRING OPINION - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 174153 : October 25, 2006]

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.


ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.


ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.


ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.


BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights, Intervenors.


LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, Intervenors.


ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.


TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.


LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.


PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.


RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.


PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.


SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.


SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.


JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.


INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.


SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.


JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.


[G.R. NO. 174299 : October 25, 2006]

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondent.



CONCURRING OPINION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Vox populi vox Dei -- the voice of the people is the voice of God. Caution should be exercised in choosing one's battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to one's cause. In its original context, the complete version of this Latin phrase means exactly the opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It originated from a holy man, the monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, "nec audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit," meaning, "And those people should not be listened to who keep on saying, `The voice of the people is the voice of God,' since the riotousness of the crowd is always very close to madness."1 Perhaps, it is by providence that the true meaning of the Latin phrase is revealed upon petitioners and their allies - that they may reflect upon the sincerity and authenticity of their "people's initiative."

History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God. Wars were waged, despotism tolerated and oppressions justified - all these transpired as man boasted of God's imprimatur. Today, petitioners and their allies hum the same rallying call, convincing this Court that the people's initiative is the "voice of the people" and, therefore, the "voice of God." After a thorough consideration of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft of imitating the voice of God. It is against this kind of genius that the Court must guard itself.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to exercise the power of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed with this Court by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al., entitled "Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin, petitioners, v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents."2 The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325. On March 19, 1997, this Court rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners, holding that Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No. 6735), An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned." A majority of eight (8) Justices fully concurred with this ruling, while five (5) subscribed to the opposite view. One (1) opined that there is no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.

On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered their positions. One (1) filed an inhibition and the other one (1) joined the minority opinion. As a consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who participated in the deliberation, six (6) voted in favor of the majority opinion, while the other six (6) voted in favor of the minority opinion.3

A few months thereafter, or on September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed a similar case, entitled People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections4 on the ground that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed PIRMA's Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution "it appearing that that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of the Court in G.R. no. 127325 (Santiago v. COMELEC) promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997." Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no need to re-examine its ruling, as regards the issue of the sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735. Another Justice concurred, but on the different premise that the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for such re-examination. Five (5) Justice opined otherwise.

This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), have gathered signatures in support of the proposed amendments to the Constitution, which entail a change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.

(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.

(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby be amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.

(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.

(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.

(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.

Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The duty elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper right hand portion is the abstract of the proposed amendments, quoted as follows:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Article VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?
On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein petitioners, filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution.5 Five (5) days thereafter, they filed an Amended Petition alleging that they are filing the petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. They claimed that the signatures of registered voters appearing on the signature sheets, constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters, were verified by their respective city or municipal election officers.

Several organizations opposed the petition.6

In a Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the petition, citing as basis this Court's ruling in Santiago, permanently enjoining it "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system."

Hence, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that this Court set aside the COMELEC Resolution and direct the latter to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 4 x x x

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
I vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and grant the petition of Mar-len Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R. No. 174299. Here, petitioners pray that the COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners be required to show why they should not be punished for contempt7 of court for disregarding the permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago.

I
Respondent COMELEC did not act
with grave abuse of discretion

Without necessarily brushing aside the other important issues, I believe the resolution of the present petition hinges on this singular issue -- did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied Lambino, et al.'s petition for initiative to amend the Constitution on the basis of this Court's Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC?

In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are resolved, still, the ultimate yardstick is the attendance of "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the COMELEC.

Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.8

The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition for initiative on the basis of a case (Santiago) decided by this Court cannot, in any way, be characterized as "capricious or whimsical," "patent and gross," or "arbitrary and despotic." On the contrary, it was the most prudent course to take. It must be stressed that in Santiago, this Court permanently enjoins respondent COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted." It being a fact that Congress has not enacted a sufficient law, respondent COMELEC has no alternative but to adhere to Santiago. Otherwise, it is vulnerable to a citation for contempt. As succinctly stated by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (then Associate Justice) in his Separate Opinion in the subsequent case of PIRMA vs. COMELEC:9
x x x I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme. All courts, tribunals and administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are obliged to conform to its pronouncements. It has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. In other words, there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.10 As a warning to lower court judges who would not adhere to its rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,11 held:
Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.
Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition of Lambino, et al. for it merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago.

Significantly, in PIRMA vs. COMELEC,12 a unanimous Court implicitly recognized that its ruling in Santiago is the established doctrine and that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in invoking it, thus:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its resolution on June 10, 1997.
Indeed, I cannot characterize as a "grave abuse of discretion" the COMELEC's obedience and respect to the pronouncement of this Court in Santiago.

II
The doctrine of stare decisis
bars the re-examination of Santiago

It cannot be denied that in Santiago, a majority of the members of this Court or eight (8) Justices (as against five (5) Justices) concurred in declaring R.A. No. 6735 an insufficient law. When the motion for reconsideration was denied via an equally-divided Court or a 6-6 vote, it does not mean that the Decision was overturned. It only shows that the opposite view fails to muster enough votes to modify or reverse the majority ruling. Therefore, the original Decision was upheld.13 In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,14 this Court ruled that the denial of a motion or reconsideration signifies that the ground relied upon have been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or final order.

With Santiago being the only impediment to the instant petition for initiative, petitioners persistently stress that the doctrine of stare decisis does not bar its re-examination.

I am not convinced.

The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere translates "stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled."15 As used in our jurisprudence, it means that "once this Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same as in the earlier controversy."16

There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a good or bad one, but the doctrine is usually justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of stability and certainty in the law and also by notions of justice and fairness. Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of the Judicial Process stated:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. `If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.17
That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness may be appreciated by considering the observation of American philosopher William K. Frankena as to what constitutes injustice:
The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two similar individuals in similar circumstances and one of them is treated better or worse than the other. In this case, the cry of injustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group; and unless that agent or group can establish that there is some relevant dissimilarity after all between the individuals concerned and their circumstances, he or they will be guilty as charged.18
Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining and, if need be, overruling prior decisions, "It is x x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the current justices. This policy x x x `is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law.19 Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent faces a rightly onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to a number of factors, including the age of the precedent, the nature and extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with other related rules of law. Here, petitioners failed to discharge their task.

Santiago v. COMELEC was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more than nine (9) years ago. During that span of time, the Filipino people, specifically the law practitioners, law professors, law students, the entire judiciary and litigants have recognized this Court's Decision as a precedent. In fact, the Santiago doctrine was applied by this Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA. Even the legislature has relied on said Decision, thus, several bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress to cure the deficiency. I cannot fathom why it should be overturned or set aside merely on the basis of the petition of Lambino, et al. Indeed, this Court's conclusion in Santiago that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned remains a precedent and must be upheld.

III
The proposed constitutional changes constitute
revisions and not mere amendments

Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the means for its amendment and revision. Thus:
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1)
The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(2)
A Constitutional Convention.

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered votes, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as means by which the people can directly propose changes to the Constitution, were not provided for in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Thus, under these two (2) Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the distinction between an amendment and a revision, both being governed by a uniform process. This is not so under our present Constitution. The distinction between an amendment and a revision becomes crucial because only amendments are allowed under the system of people's initiative. Revisions are within the exclusive domain of Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members, or of a Constitutional Convention.

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section 2, Article XVII covers only amendments, thus:
The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is recognized.

MR. SUAREZ:
Thank you, Madam President.



May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:



The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.



This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.



xxx xxx xxx


MR. MAAMBONG:
Madam President, will the distinguished proponent of the amendment yield to a few questions?


MR. DAVIDE:
With pleasure, Madam President.


MR. MAAMBONG:
My first question, Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line I refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision?"


MR. DAVIDE:
No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision"


MR. MAAMBONG:
Thank you.20
Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is imperative to examine whether petitioners' proposed changes partake of the nature of amendments, not revisions.

The petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et al. sought to amend the following provisions of the 1987 Constitution: Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article VI (The Legislative Department); Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII (The Executive Department). It further includes Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) for the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government.

Succinctly, the proposals envision a change in the form of government, from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary; conversion of the present Congress of the Philippines to an Interim National Assembly; change in the terms of Members of Parliament; and the election of a Prime Minister who shall be vested with executive power.

Petitioners contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of amendments, hence, within the coverage of a "people's initiative."

I disagree.

The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, characterized an amendment and a revision to the Constitution as follows:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the document to determine how and to what extent they should be altered.21
Obviously, both "revision" and amendment" connote change; any distinction between the two must be based upon the degree of change contemplated. In Kelly v. Laing,22 the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following comparison of the two terms:
"Revision" and "amendment" have the common characteristics of working changes in the charter, and are sometimes used in exactly the same sense but there is an essential difference between them.

"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a redraft without obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or structure of the old. As applied to fundamental law, such as a constitution or charter, it suggests a convention to examine the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new instrument whether the desired changes from the old are few or many. Amendment implies continuance of the general plan and purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish its purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change, while amendment is a correction of detail.
Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a city's form of government may be accomplished by a process of "amendment," the cases which so hold seem to involve statutes which only distinguish between amendment and totally new charters.23 However, as in Maine law, where the statute authorizing the changes distinguishes between "charter amendment" and "charter revision," it has been held that "(a) change in the form of government of a home rule city may be made only by revision of the city charter, not by its amendment."24

In summary, it would seem that any major change in governmental form and scheme would probably be interpreted as a "revision" and should be achieved through the more thorough process of deliberation.

Although, at first glance, petitioners' proposed changes appear to cover isolated and specific provisions only, however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that the proposed changes will alter the very structure of our government and create multifarious ramifications. In other words, the proposed changes will have a "domino effect" or, more appropriately, "ripple effect" on other provisions of the Constitution.

At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the people to effect changes in the Constitution includes the power to amend any section in such a manner that the proposed change, if approved, would "be complete within itself, relate to one subject and not substantially affect any other section or article of the Constitution or require further amendments to the Constitution to accomplish its purpose."25 This is clearly not the case here.

Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government affects the well-enshrined doctrine of separation of powers of government, embodied in our Constitution, by providing for an Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches. In a Parliamentary form of government, the Executive Branch is to a certain degree, dependent on the direct or indirect support of the Parliament, as expressed through a "vote of confidence." To my mind, this doctrine of separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution, that any change affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a revision.

In McFadden vs. Jordan,26 the California Supreme Court ruled as follows:
It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose x x x. Consequently, if the scope of the proposed initiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention. x x x.
Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a mere amendment, but is in actuality a revision, as set forth in Adams v. Gunter27:
The proposal here to amend Section I of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of the government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on government.
Thirdly, the proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions rather than amendments, especially, with the inclusion of the following "omnibus provision":
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamnetary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions" which shall read, as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President, with the exceptions of Section 1,2,3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended x x x x x x and all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and numbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary system of government x x x x x x .
x x x x x x x x x
Section 4. (1) x x x

(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the Interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution, consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
The above provisions will necessarily result in a "ripple effect" on the other provisions of the Constitution to make them conform to the qualities of unicameral-parliamentary form of government. With one sweeping stroke, these proposed provisions automatically revise some provisions of the Constitution. In McFadden, the same practice was considered by the Court to be in the nature of substantial revision, necessitating a constitutional convention. I quote the pertinent portion of its ruling, thus:
There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and many articles and sections of our present Constitution which would be affected, replaced or repealed. It purports only to add one new article but its framers found it necessary to include the omnibus provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that "If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution is in conflict with any of the provisions of this article, such section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such conflict hereby repealed. x x x Consequently, if the scope of the proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure become law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention.28
Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere amendments which will only affect the Articles or Sections sought to be changed. Rather, they are in the nature of revisions which will affect considerable portions of the Constitution resulting in the alteration of our form of government. The proposed changes cannot be taken in isolation since these are connected or "interlocked" with the other provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly, it has been held that: "If the changes attempted are so sweeping that it is necessary to include the provisions interlocking them, then it is plain that the plan would constitute a recasting of the whole Constitution and this, we think, it was intended to be accomplished only by a convention under Section 2 which has not yet been disturbed."29

I therefore conclude that since the proposed changes partake of the nature of a revision of the Constitution, then they cannot be the subject of an initiative. On this matter, Father Bernas expressed this insight:
But why limit initiative and referendum to simple amendments? The answer, which one can easily glean from the rather long deliberation on initiative and referendum in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is practicality. In other words, who is to formulate the revision or how is it to be formulated? Revision, as concretely being proposed now, is nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional structure. Who were involved in formulating the structure? What debates ensued? What records are there for future use in interpreting the provisions which may be found to be unclear?

In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional Convention, decisions are reached after much purifying debate. And while the deliberations proceed, the public has the opportunity to get involved. It is only after the work of an authorized body has been completed that it is presented to the electorate for final judgment. Careful debate is important because the electorate tends to accept what is presented to it even sight unseen.30]

IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the
People's initiative


Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This means that an enabling law is imperative for its implementation. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6735 in order to breathe life into this constitutional provision. However, as previously narrated, this Court struck the law in Santiago for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

The passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of R.A. No. 6735. Congress neither amended it nor passed a new law to supply its deficiencies.

Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360-degree turn, enumerating three (3) justifications why R.A. No. 6735 must be considered a sufficient law, thus:
1) The text of R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to the right of people to initiate changes to the Constitution;

2) The legislative history of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as instrument to implement the people's initiative; and

3) The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. No. 6735 demonstrate the legislative intent to use it as instrument to implement people's initiative.
I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.

A thorough reading of R.A. No. 6735 leads to the conclusion that it covers only initiatives on national and local legislation. Its references to initiatives on the Constitution are few, isolated and misplaced. Unlike in the initiatives on national and local legislation, where R.A. No. 6735 provides a detailed, logical, and exhaustive enumeration on their implementation,31 however, as regards initiative on the Constitution, the law merely:
(a)
mentions the word "Constitution" in Section 2;32


(b)
defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3;33


(c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people;34


(d)
reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition;35 and


(e)
provides the date for the effectivity of the approved proposition.36
In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative on the Constitution may be accomplished. This is not the enabling law contemplated by the Constitution. As pointed out by oppositor-intervenor Alternative Law Groups Inc., since the promulgation of the Decision in Santiago, various bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress providing for a complete and adequate process for people's initiative, such as:
  • Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall be registered voters;

  • A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part thereof sought to be amended and the proposed amendment;

  • The manner of initiation - in a congressional district through a petition by any individual, group, political party or coalition with members in the congressional district;

  • The language used: the petition should be printed in English and translated in the local language;

  • Signature stations to be provided for;

  • Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting, that is, after the signatures shall have been verified by the Commission, the verified signatures shall be posted for at least thirty days in the respective municipal and city halls where the signatures were obtained;

  • Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any protest as to the authenticity of the signatures to be filed with the COMELEC and decided within sixty (60) days from the filing of said protest.
None of the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No. 6735, thus, demonstrating its incompleteness and inadequacy.

V
Petitioners are not Proper Parties to
File the Petition for Initiative

VI
The Petition for Initiative Filed with the
COMELEC Does not Comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. No.
6735


I shall discuss the above issues together since they are interrelated and inseparable. The determination of whether petitioners are proper parties to file the petition for initiative in behalf of the alleged 6.3 million voters will require an examination of whether they have complied with the provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

To reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. (Underscoring supplied)
The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and categorical. For a people's initiative to prosper, the following requisites must be present:
  1. It is "the people" themselves who must "directly propose" "amendments" to the Constitution;

  2. The proposed amendments must be contained in "a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters;" and

  3. The required minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters "must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters" of "every legislative district."
In this case, however, the above requisites are not present.

The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners Lambino and Aumentado, two registered voters. As shown in the "Verification/Certification with Affidavit of Non-Forum Shopping" contained in their petition, they alleged under oath that they have caused the preparation of the petition in their personal capacity as registered voters "and as representatives" of the supposed 6.3 million registered voters. This goes to show that the questioned petition was not initiated directly by the 6.3 million people who allegedly comprised at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, as required by Section 2. Moreover, nowhere in the petition itself could be found the signatures of the 6.3 million registered voters. Only the signatures of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado were affixed therein "as representatives" of those 6.3 million people. Certainly, that is not the petition for people's initiative contemplated by the Constitution.

Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file the petition "as representatives" of the alleged 6.3 million registered voters. Such act of representation is constitutionally proscribed. To repeat, Section 2 strictly requires that amendments to the Constitution shall be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters." Obviously, the phrase "directly proposed by the people" excludes any person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of the total number of registered voters. The Constitution has bestowed upon the people the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Such right cannot be usurped by anyone under the guise of being the people's representative. Simply put, Section 2 does not recognize acts of representation. For it is only "the people" (comprising the minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein) who are the proper parties to initiate a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. Verily, the petition filed with the COMELEC by herein petitioners Lambino and Aumentado is not a people's initiative. Necessarily, it must fail.

Cororarilly, the plea that this Court should "hear" and "heed" "the people's voice" is baseless and misleading. There is no people's voice to be heard and heeded as this petition for initiative is not truly theirs, but only of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado and their allies.

VII
The issues at bar are not political questions.

Lambino and Aumentado, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, vehemently argue that: (1) "[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six million registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for initiative is a purely political question;" and (2) "[t]he power to propose amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments under the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit of a political question."

The "political question doctrine" was first enunciated by the US Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden.37 Faced with the difficult question of whether the Supreme Court was the appropriate institution to define the substantive content of republicanism, the US Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Roger B. Taney, concluded that "the sovereignty in every State resides in the people, as to how and whether they exercised it, was under the circumstances of the case, a political question to be settled by the political power." In other words, the responsibility of settling certain constitutional questions was left to the legislative and executive branches of the government.

The Luther case arose from the so-called "Dorr Rebellion" in the State of Rhode Island. Due to increased migration brought about by the Industrial Revolution, the urban population of Rhode Island increased. However, under the 1663 Royal Charter which served as the State Constitution, voting rights were largely limited to residents of the rural districts. This severe mal-apportionment of suffrage rights led to the "Dorr Rebellion." Despairing of obtaining remedies for their disenfranchisement from the state government, suffrage reformers invoked their rights under the American Declaration of Independence to "alter or abolish" the government and to institute a new one. The reformers proceeded to call for and hold an extralegal constitutional convention, drafted a new State Constitution, submitted the document for popular ratification, and held elections under it. The State government, however, refused to cede power, leading to an anomalous situation in that for a few months in 1842, there were two opposing state governments contending for legitimacy and possession of state of offices.

The Rhode Island militia, under the authority of martial law, entered and searched the house of Martin Luther, a Dorr supporter. He brought suit against Luther Borden, a militiaman. Before the US Supreme Court, Luther's counsel argued that since the State's archaic Constitution prevented a fair and peaceful address of grievances through democratic processes, the people of Rhode Island had instead chosen to exercise their inherent right in popular sovereignty of replacing what they saw as an oppressive government. The US Supreme Court deemed the controversy as non-justiciable and inappropriate for judicial resolution.

In Colgrove v. Green,38 Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the phrase "political thicket" to describe situations where Federal courts should not intervene in political questions which they have neither the competence nor the commission to decide. In Colgrove, the US Supreme Court, with a narrow 4-3 vote branded the apportionment of legislative districts in Illinois "as a political question and that the invalidation of the districts might, in requiring statewide elections, create an evil greater than that sought to be remedied."

While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurter's "political thicket," nonetheless, it has sought to come up with a definition of the term "political question." Thus, in Vera v. Avelino,39 this Court ruled that properly, political questions are "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." In Tada and Macapagal v. Cuenco,40 the Court held that the term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In Aquino v. Enrile,41 this Court adopted the following guidelines laid down in Baker v. Carr42 in determining whether a question before it is political, rather than judicial in nature, to wit:
1)
there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or


2)
there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or


3)
there is the sheer impossibility of deciding the matter without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or


4)
there is the sheer impossibility of the Court's undertaking an independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due the coordinate branches of government; or


5)
there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or


6)
there exists the potentiality of embarrassment arising from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues raised before this Court. Accordingly, the issues are justiciable. What is at stake here is the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised before this Court are political in nature, it is not precluded from resolving them under its expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, following Daza v. Singson.43 As pointed out in Marcos v. Manglapus,44 the present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial power which the Court, under previous charters, would have normally and ordinarily left to the political departments to decide.

CONCLUSION

In fine, considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view that the so-called people's initiative to amend our Constitution from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary is actually not an initiative of the people, but an initiative of some of our politicians. It has not been shown by petitioners, during the oral arguments in this case, that the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures understood what they signed. In fact, petitioners admitted that the Constitutional provisions sought to be amended and the proposed amendments were not explained to all those registered voters. Indeed, there will be no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether they really understood what petitioners and their group asked them to sign.

Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary.45 The Court then ruled that "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect," although it had notice that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified by the people in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The Court concluded, among others, that the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies "was and is null and void ab initio." That was during martial law when perhaps majority of the justices were scared of the dictator. Luckily at present, we are not under a martial law regime. There is, therefore, no reason why this Court should allow itself to be used as a legitimizing authority by the so-called people's initiative for those who want to perpetuate themselves in power.

At this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing wrong with our present government structure. Consequent1y, we must not change it. America has a presidential type of government. Yet, it thrives ideally and has become a super power. It is then safe to conclude that what we should change are some of the people running the government, NOT the SYSTEM.

According to petitioners, the proposed amendment would effect a more efficient, more economical and more responsive government.

Is there hope that a new breed of politicians, more qualified and capable, may be elected as members and leaders of the unicameral-parliament? Or will the present members of the Lower House continue to hold their respective positions with limitless terms?

Will the new government be more responsive to the needs of the poor and the marginalized? Will it be able to provide homes for the homeless, food for the hungry, jobs for the jobless and protection for the weak?

This is a defining moment in our history. The issue posed before us is crucial with transcendental significance. And history will judge us on how we resolve this issue - shall we allow the revision of our Constitution, of which we are duty bound to guard and revere, on the basis of a doubtful people's initiative?

Amending the Constitution involving a change of government system or structure is a herculean task affecting the entire Filipino people and the future generations. Let us, therefore, entrust this duty to more knowledgeable people elected as members of a Constitutional Convention.

Yes, the voice of the people is the voice of God. But under the circumstances in this case, the voice of God is not audible.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174299.

Endnotes:


1 Works, Letter 164.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases_%28P%E2%80%93Z%29#endnote_ODoQ.

2 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

3 Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.

4 G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997. Joining PIRMA as petitioners were its founding members, spouses Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa.

5 Entitled "In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a People's Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary System."

6 Among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr., Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osme III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada, Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas, and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong.

7 "Grounds for contempt

3. From the time the so-called People's Initiative (hereafter PI) now subject of Lambino v. Comelec, was initiated, respondents did nothing to stop what was clearly lawless, and even arguably winked at, as it were, if not condoned and allowed, the waste and misuse of its personnel, time, facilities and resources on an enterprise that had no legal basis and in fact was permanently enjoined by this Honorable Court in 1997. Seemingly mesmerized, it is time to disenthrall them.

3.1. For instance, undersigned counsel happened to be in the Senate on August 29, 2006 (on other business) when respondent Chair sought to be stopped by the body from commenting on PI out of prudential considerations, could not be restrained. On contentious issues, he volunteered that Sigaw ng Bayan would not cheat in Makati as it was the opposition territory and that the fact that out of 43,405 signatures, only 7,186 were found authentic in one Makati District, to him, showed the "efficiency" of Comelec personnel. He could not appreciate 1) that Sigaw had no choice but to get the constitutionality-required 3% in every district, [Const., Art. VII, Sec. 2] friendly or otherwise, including administration critics' turfs, and 2) that falsus in 36,319 (93.30%) falsus in omnibus, in an exercise that could never be free, orderly, honest and credible, another constitutional requirement. [Nothing has been heard about probing and prosecuting the falsifiers.]

x x x x x x x x x

3.2. It was excessively obvious to undersigned and other observers that respondent Chairman, straining at the leash, was lawyering for Sigaw ng Bayan in the Senate! It was discomfiting that he would gloss over the seeming wholesale falsification of 96.30% of the signatures in an exercise with no credibility! Even had he been asked, he should have pled to be excused from answering as the matter could come up before the Comelec for an official collegial position (different from conceding that it is enjoined).

x x x x x x x x x

4. Respondents Commissioners Borra and Romeo A. Brawner, for their part, even issued widely-publicized written directives to the field, [Annex C, as to Commissioner Brawner; that as to Commissioner Borra will follow.] while the Commission itself was trying to be careful not to be explicit in what it was abetting implicitly, in hypocritical defiance of the injunction of 1997.

8Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72424, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 246.

9Supra.

10Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 59; Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.

11 56 O.G. 3546 cited in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI), id.

12Supra.

13 Separate Opinion of Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.

14 G.R. No. 109645, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 234.

15Philippine National Bank v. Palma, G.R. No. 157279, August 9, 2005, 466 CSRA 307, citing Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary (1988), 3rd ed. (citing Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397, [1947]).

16Id., citing Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 303, citing Government v. Jalandoni, No. 837-R, August 30, 1947, 44 O.G. 1840.

17 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1921), pp. 33-34.

18 William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc.,) 1973, p. 49.

19Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296.

20 July 9, 1986. Records of the Constitutional Commission, No. 26.

21 Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 1996 Ed., p. 1161.

22 242 N. W. 891 259 Mich 212.

23State v. Orange [Tex. x. Civ. App.] 300 SW 2d 705, People v. Perkins 137, p. 55.

24City of Midland v. Arbury 38 Mich. App. 771, 197 N.W. 2d 134.

25Adams v. Gunter Fla, 238 So. 2d 824.

26 196 P.2d 787.

27Adams v. Gunter Fla. 238 So.2d 824.

28Mc Fadden v. Jordan, supra.

29Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So.2d 501, p. 505 (Fla. 1958).

30 Joaquin Bernas, Sounding Board: AMENDMENT OR REVISION, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 25, 2006.

31 See Sections 8-12 for national initiative and referendum, and sections 13-19 for local initiative and referendum.

32 Section 2. Statement of Policy. - The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

33 Section 3. Definition of terms.-

x x x

a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;

x x x

34 See Section 3(e).

35 Section 5 (b) - A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.

x x x

36 Section 9 (b) - The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

37 7 How (48 US) 1 (1849).

38 328 US 549 (1946).

39 77 Phil. 192 (1946).

40 103 Phi. 1051 (1957).

41 G.R. No. 35546, September 17, 1974, 50 SCRA 559.

42 369 US 186 (1962).

43 G.R. No. 85344, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 496.

44 G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668.

45 Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165, L-36236, and L-36283, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30.



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October-2006 Jurisprudence                 

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - AZCUNA, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : DISSENTING OPINION - CHICO-NAZARIO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION - CALLEJO, SR., J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : DISSENTING OPINION - CORONA, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION - PANGANIBAN, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - QUISUMBING, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : CONCURRING OPINION - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - TINGA, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - VELASCO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : DISSENTING OPINION - PUNO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • A.C. No. 6678 - JOCELYN A. SAQUING v. ATTY. NOEL A. MORA

  • A.C. No. 6973 - ROBERT FRANCIS F. MARONILLA, ET AL. v. ATTYS. EFREN N. JORDA, ET AL.

  • A.M. No. 06-4-220-RTC - Re: report on the judicial audit conducted in the Regional Trial Court

  • A.M. No. P-01-1523 - Carmelita Chiong v. Sherwin Baloloy

  • A.M. No. P-05-2063 - Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Angelina Casareno-Rillorta, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), SusanLiggayu, Clerk III, and Virginia A. Manuel, Court Stenographer, Branch 21, all of the Regional Trial Court, Santia

  • A.M. No. P-05-2099 - Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2154-P - BRIMEL BAUTISTA v. CLERK OF COURT ABELARDO B. ORQUE, JR.

  • A.M. No. P-06-2261 - ELPIDIO SY v. EDGAR ESPONILLA, ET AL.

  • A.M. No. P-06-2262 - ANGELO C. GUERRERO v. ANTONIO O. MENDOZA

  • A.M. No. RTJ-03-1809 and Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1643-RTJ - BUSILAC BUILDERS, INC., ET AL. v. JUDGE CHARLES A. AGUILAR

  • A.M. No. RTJ-06-1997 - ATTY. JESUS R. DE VEGA v. JUDGE FATIMA G. ASDALA

  • A.M. No. RTJ-06-2024 - TIRSO P. MARIANO v. JUDGE ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 128766 - DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC. v. DOMINADOR JOSE y NAGANO, ET AL.

  • G.R. NOS. 117622-23 - FRANCISCO MOTORS CORP. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 129165 - SPOUSES RODRIGO COLOSO, ET AL. v. HON. SECRETARY ERNESTO V. GARILAO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 129318 - DIRECTOR CELSO PASCUAL v. HON. ORLANDO D. BELTRAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 132955 - ORLANDO VILLANUEVA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 136415 - VIRGILIO P. CEZAR v. HON. HELEN RICAFORT-BAUTISTA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 138463 - HEIRS OF CIPRIANO REYES, ET AL. v. JOSE CALUMPANG, ET AL.

  • G.R. NOS. 138701-02 - SPOUSES ROQUE YU, SR., ET AL. v. BASILIO G. MAGNO CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 140138 - SPS. ANGEL L. SADANG, ET AL. v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 140288 - ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE., LTD. v. GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC.

  • G.R. No. 142601 - NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 141528 - OSCAR P. MALLION v. EDITHA ALCANTARA

  • G.R. No. 143562 - CATALINA L. SANTOS, ET AL. v. PARAÑAQUE KINGS ENTERPRISES, INC.

  • G.R. No. 146313 - FLORENCIO ORENDAIN v. BF HOMES, INC.

  • G.R. No. 146848 - GMA NETWORK, INC., ET AL. v. JESUS G. BUSTOS, M.D., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 147640 and G.R. NO. 147762 - JOWETT K. GOLANGCO v. ATTY. JONE B. FUNG

  • G.R. No. 148261 - NENUCA A. VELEZ v. SHANGRI-LA'S EDSA PLAZA HOTEL, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 149429 - HADJI MAHMUD L. JAMMANG, ET AL. v. TAKAHASHI TRADING CO., LTD., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 149468 - MARIE IOLE NACUA-JAO v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 149723 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD

  • G.R. No. 150135 - SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA, ET AL. v. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 150642 - BENJAMIN G. NAVALTA v. MARCELO S. MULI

  • G.R. No. 151322 - MARIO L. COPUYOC v. ERLINDA DE SOLA

  • G.R. No. 150756 - EDUARDO LEYSON, ET AL. v. PEDRO LAWA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 152921 - RUBEN S. SIA v. ERLINDA M. VILLANUEVA

  • G.R. No. 153144 - VMC RURAL ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE, INC. v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 153206 - ONG ENG KIAM v. LUCITA G. ONG

  • G.R. No. 154284 - BIBIANA FARMS & MILLS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. NOS. 153760-61 - titlexxx

  • G.R. No. 154532 - PETRON CORPORATION, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156304 - ANACLETO R. MENESES, ET AL. v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156536 - JOSEPH CUA v. GLORIA A. VARGAS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156761 - LADY LYDIA CORNISTA-DOMINGO, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156956 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEL MONTE MOTORS, INC.

  • G.R. No. 156965 - FROILAN DE GUZMAN, ET AL. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156132 - CITIBANK, N.A. (FORMERLY FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK) v. MODESTA R. SABENIANO

  • G.R. No. 157972 - HRS. OF SPS. LUCIANO, ET AL. v. HON. JESUS V. QUITAIN, ET AL.

  • G.R. NOS. 158190-91 & G.R. NOS. 158276 and 158283- NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 158290 - ILARION M. HENARES, JR., ET AL. v. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 158840 - PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. SPS. CESAR VILLAR, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 158620 - DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL. v. MARIANO SALDIVAR, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159268 - BALAGTAS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159098 - SPS. HENRY and ROSARIO UY v. HON. JUDGE ARSENIO P. ADRIANO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159593 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 159659 - RUBEN S. SIA, ET AL. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159862 - HERMONIAS L. LIGANZA v. RBL SHIPYARD CORPORATION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159810 - ESTATE OF EDWARD MILLER GRIMM v. ESTATE OF CHARLES PARSONS AND PATRICK C. PARSONS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 160061 - ENGINEER LEONARDO C. LEYALEY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 160195 - CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. FLORELIO U. MANZANO

  • G.R. No. 160528 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

  • G.R. No. 160832 - THE HEIRS OF EMILIO SANTIOQUE v. THE HEIRS OF EMILIO CALMA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 160895 - JOSE R. MARTINEZ v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 162342 - JAIME H. BALLAO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 162442 - MANUEL REFUERZO, ET AL. v. HEIRS OF THE LATE FRANCISCO REFUERZO, SR.

  • G.R. No. 162775 - INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION (IBC) v. NOEMI B. AMARILLA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 162839 - INNODATA PHILIPPINES, INC. v. JOCELYN L. QUEJADA-LOPEZ, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 163915 - ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COMFAC CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 164049 - NS TRANSPORT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NSTEA), ET AL. v. NS TRANSPORT SERVICES, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 164375 - RODOLFO PAREDES, ET AL. v. ERNESTO VERANO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 164605 - CATERPILLAR, INC. v. MANOLO P. SAMSON

  • G.R. No. 165027 - PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 165757 - GALAXIE STEEL WORKERS UNION (GSWU-NAFLU-KMU), ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 165793 - ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 166281 - JESUS ANGELES, ET AL. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 166901 - ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. v. HON. HELEN BAUTISTA-RICAFORT, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 166401 and G.R. NOS. 158660-67 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO BON

  • G.R. No. 167003 - PANFILO A. ABAIGAR v. JESUS A. ABAIGAR

  • G.R. No. 167071 - RUDY S. AMPELOQUIO, SR. v. ROMEO NAPIZA

  • G.R. No. 167084 - MONINA PUCAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 167146 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATION, INC.

  • G.R. No. 167213 - DARREL CORDERO, ET AL. v. F.S. MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 167502 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PABLO CUDAL

  • G.R. No. 167892 - ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC. v. ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES UNION

  • G.R. No. 167866 - PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED, ET AL. v. PEPE B. PAGDANGANAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 168362 - FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY - DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION (FEU-NRMF), ET AL. v. FEU-NRMF EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS (FEU-NRMFEA-AFW), ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 168773 - ELIZA ABUAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 168943 - IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169328 - JULIAN A. ALZAGA, ET AL. v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169098 - MANUEL BAVIERA v. ROLANDO B. ZOLETA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169430 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY BIDOC y ROQUE

  • G.R. No. 169432 and Formerly G.R. No. 145508 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO TAAN @ "Bebot" CORONA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169652 - ASIAN INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, INC. (AIMS) v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169898 - SPOUSES ANITA AND HONORIO AGUIRRE v. HEIRS OF LUCAS VILLANUEVA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 170453 and G.R. NO. 170518 - NESTOR A. BERNARDINO, ET AL. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 171392 - RUPERTO SULDAO v. CIMECH SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION, INC., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 170473 and Formerly G.R. No. 146283 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNIE TEODORO y CAPARAS

  • G.R. No. 171821 - DANILO "DAN" FERNANDEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 171449 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE D. LARA @ JOSE KALBO

  • G.R. No. 172062 - LORENZO MA. D.G. AGUILAR v. BURGER MACHINE HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 172116 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGER VILLANUEVA

  • G.R. NO. 172401 - CARLOS G. AZUL v. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK

  • G.R. No. 172175 - SPS. EXPEDITO ZEPEDA AND ALICE D. ZEPEDA v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 173253 - DR. RENATO S. MU EZ v. PABLITO L. JOMO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 174340, G.R. NO. 174318 and G.R. NO. 174177 - CAMILO L. SABIO v. RICHARD GORDON, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - AZCUNA, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : DISSENTING OPINION - CHICO-NAZARIO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION - CALLEJO, SR., J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : DISSENTING OPINION - CORONA, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION - PANGANIBAN, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - QUISUMBING, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : CONCURRING OPINION - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - TINGA, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - VELASCO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : DISSENTING OPINION - PUNO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • A.C. No. 6678 - JOCELYN A. SAQUING v. ATTY. NOEL A. MORA

  • A.C. No. 6973 - ROBERT FRANCIS F. MARONILLA, ET AL. v. ATTYS. EFREN N. JORDA, ET AL.

  • A.M. No. 06-4-220-RTC - Re: report on the judicial audit conducted in the Regional Trial Court

  • A.M. No. P-01-1523 - Carmelita Chiong v. Sherwin Baloloy

  • A.M. No. P-05-2063 - Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Angelina Casareno-Rillorta, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), SusanLiggayu, Clerk III, and Virginia A. Manuel, Court Stenographer, Branch 21, all of the Regional Trial Court, Santia

  • A.M. No. P-05-2099 - Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2154-P - BRIMEL BAUTISTA v. CLERK OF COURT ABELARDO B. ORQUE, JR.

  • A.M. No. P-06-2261 - ELPIDIO SY v. EDGAR ESPONILLA, ET AL.

  • A.M. No. P-06-2262 - ANGELO C. GUERRERO v. ANTONIO O. MENDOZA

  • A.M. No. RTJ-03-1809 and Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1643-RTJ - BUSILAC BUILDERS, INC., ET AL. v. JUDGE CHARLES A. AGUILAR

  • A.M. No. RTJ-06-1997 - ATTY. JESUS R. DE VEGA v. JUDGE FATIMA G. ASDALA

  • A.M. No. RTJ-06-2024 - TIRSO P. MARIANO v. JUDGE ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 128766 - DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC. v. DOMINADOR JOSE y NAGANO, ET AL.

  • G.R. NOS. 117622-23 - FRANCISCO MOTORS CORP. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 129165 - SPOUSES RODRIGO COLOSO, ET AL. v. HON. SECRETARY ERNESTO V. GARILAO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 129318 - DIRECTOR CELSO PASCUAL v. HON. ORLANDO D. BELTRAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 132955 - ORLANDO VILLANUEVA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 136415 - VIRGILIO P. CEZAR v. HON. HELEN RICAFORT-BAUTISTA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 138463 - HEIRS OF CIPRIANO REYES, ET AL. v. JOSE CALUMPANG, ET AL.

  • G.R. NOS. 138701-02 - SPOUSES ROQUE YU, SR., ET AL. v. BASILIO G. MAGNO CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 140138 - SPS. ANGEL L. SADANG, ET AL. v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 140288 - ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE., LTD. v. GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC.

  • G.R. No. 142601 - NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 141528 - OSCAR P. MALLION v. EDITHA ALCANTARA

  • G.R. No. 143562 - CATALINA L. SANTOS, ET AL. v. PARAÑAQUE KINGS ENTERPRISES, INC.

  • G.R. No. 146313 - FLORENCIO ORENDAIN v. BF HOMES, INC.

  • G.R. No. 146848 - GMA NETWORK, INC., ET AL. v. JESUS G. BUSTOS, M.D., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 147640 and G.R. NO. 147762 - JOWETT K. GOLANGCO v. ATTY. JONE B. FUNG

  • G.R. No. 148261 - NENUCA A. VELEZ v. SHANGRI-LA'S EDSA PLAZA HOTEL, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 149429 - HADJI MAHMUD L. JAMMANG, ET AL. v. TAKAHASHI TRADING CO., LTD., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 149468 - MARIE IOLE NACUA-JAO v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 149723 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD

  • G.R. No. 150135 - SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA, ET AL. v. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 150642 - BENJAMIN G. NAVALTA v. MARCELO S. MULI

  • G.R. No. 151322 - MARIO L. COPUYOC v. ERLINDA DE SOLA

  • G.R. No. 150756 - EDUARDO LEYSON, ET AL. v. PEDRO LAWA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 152921 - RUBEN S. SIA v. ERLINDA M. VILLANUEVA

  • G.R. No. 153144 - VMC RURAL ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE, INC. v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 153206 - ONG ENG KIAM v. LUCITA G. ONG

  • G.R. No. 154284 - BIBIANA FARMS & MILLS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. NOS. 153760-61 - titlexxx

  • G.R. No. 154532 - PETRON CORPORATION, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156304 - ANACLETO R. MENESES, ET AL. v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156536 - JOSEPH CUA v. GLORIA A. VARGAS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156761 - LADY LYDIA CORNISTA-DOMINGO, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156956 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEL MONTE MOTORS, INC.

  • G.R. No. 156965 - FROILAN DE GUZMAN, ET AL. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156132 - CITIBANK, N.A. (FORMERLY FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK) v. MODESTA R. SABENIANO

  • G.R. No. 157972 - HRS. OF SPS. LUCIANO, ET AL. v. HON. JESUS V. QUITAIN, ET AL.

  • G.R. NOS. 158190-91 & G.R. NOS. 158276 and 158283- NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 158290 - ILARION M. HENARES, JR., ET AL. v. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 158840 - PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. SPS. CESAR VILLAR, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 158620 - DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL. v. MARIANO SALDIVAR, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159268 - BALAGTAS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159098 - SPS. HENRY and ROSARIO UY v. HON. JUDGE ARSENIO P. ADRIANO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159593 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 159659 - RUBEN S. SIA, ET AL. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159862 - HERMONIAS L. LIGANZA v. RBL SHIPYARD CORPORATION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159810 - ESTATE OF EDWARD MILLER GRIMM v. ESTATE OF CHARLES PARSONS AND PATRICK C. PARSONS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 160061 - ENGINEER LEONARDO C. LEYALEY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 160195 - CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. FLORELIO U. MANZANO

  • G.R. No. 160528 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

  • G.R. No. 160832 - THE HEIRS OF EMILIO SANTIOQUE v. THE HEIRS OF EMILIO CALMA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 160895 - JOSE R. MARTINEZ v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 162342 - JAIME H. BALLAO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 162442 - MANUEL REFUERZO, ET AL. v. HEIRS OF THE LATE FRANCISCO REFUERZO, SR.

  • G.R. No. 162775 - INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION (IBC) v. NOEMI B. AMARILLA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 162839 - INNODATA PHILIPPINES, INC. v. JOCELYN L. QUEJADA-LOPEZ, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 163915 - ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COMFAC CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 164049 - NS TRANSPORT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NSTEA), ET AL. v. NS TRANSPORT SERVICES, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 164375 - RODOLFO PAREDES, ET AL. v. ERNESTO VERANO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 164605 - CATERPILLAR, INC. v. MANOLO P. SAMSON

  • G.R. No. 165027 - PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 165757 - GALAXIE STEEL WORKERS UNION (GSWU-NAFLU-KMU), ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 165793 - ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 166281 - JESUS ANGELES, ET AL. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 166901 - ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. v. HON. HELEN BAUTISTA-RICAFORT, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 166401 and G.R. NOS. 158660-67 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO BON

  • G.R. No. 167003 - PANFILO A. ABAIGAR v. JESUS A. ABAIGAR

  • G.R. No. 167071 - RUDY S. AMPELOQUIO, SR. v. ROMEO NAPIZA

  • G.R. No. 167084 - MONINA PUCAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 167146 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATION, INC.

  • G.R. No. 167213 - DARREL CORDERO, ET AL. v. F.S. MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 167502 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PABLO CUDAL

  • G.R. No. 167892 - ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC. v. ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES UNION

  • G.R. No. 167866 - PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED, ET AL. v. PEPE B. PAGDANGANAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 168362 - FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY - DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION (FEU-NRMF), ET AL. v. FEU-NRMF EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS (FEU-NRMFEA-AFW), ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 168773 - ELIZA ABUAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 168943 - IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169328 - JULIAN A. ALZAGA, ET AL. v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169098 - MANUEL BAVIERA v. ROLANDO B. ZOLETA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169430 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY BIDOC y ROQUE

  • G.R. No. 169432 and Formerly G.R. No. 145508 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO TAAN @ "Bebot" CORONA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169652 - ASIAN INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, INC. (AIMS) v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169898 - SPOUSES ANITA AND HONORIO AGUIRRE v. HEIRS OF LUCAS VILLANUEVA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 170453 and G.R. NO. 170518 - NESTOR A. BERNARDINO, ET AL. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 171392 - RUPERTO SULDAO v. CIMECH SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION, INC., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 170473 and Formerly G.R. No. 146283 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNIE TEODORO y CAPARAS

  • G.R. No. 171821 - DANILO "DAN" FERNANDEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 171449 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE D. LARA @ JOSE KALBO

  • G.R. No. 172062 - LORENZO MA. D.G. AGUILAR v. BURGER MACHINE HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 172116 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGER VILLANUEVA

  • G.R. NO. 172401 - CARLOS G. AZUL v. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK

  • G.R. No. 172175 - SPS. EXPEDITO ZEPEDA AND ALICE D. ZEPEDA v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 173253 - DR. RENATO S. MU EZ v. PABLITO L. JOMO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 174340, G.R. NO. 174318 and G.R. NO. 174177 - CAMILO L. SABIO v. RICHARD GORDON, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS