Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence


Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2006 > October 2006 Decisions > G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : DISSENTING OPINION - PUNO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS:




G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : DISSENTING OPINION - PUNO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 174153 : October 25, 2006]

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.


ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.


ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.


ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.


BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights, Intervenors.


LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, Intervenors.


ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.


TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.


LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.


PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.


RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.


PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.


SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.


SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.


JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.


INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.


SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.


JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.


[G.R. NO. 174299 : October 25, 2006]

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondent.

"It is a Constitution we are expounding..."1
- Chief Justice John Marshall


DISSENTING OPINION

PUNO, J.:



The petition at bar is not a fight over molehills. At the crux of the controversy is the critical understanding of the first and foremost of our constitutional principles -- "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."2 Constitutionalism dictates that this creed must be respected with deeds; our belief in its validity must be backed by behavior.

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus to set aside the resolution of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures thereon, and praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to set the date of the plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendments to the Constitution in accordance with Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

First, a flashback of the proceedings of yesteryears. In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to exercise the sovereign people's power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Its founding member, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, filed with the COMELEC on December 6, 1996, a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (Delfin Petition). It proposed to amend Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution by deleting the provisions on the term limits for all elective officials.

The Delfin Petition stated that the Petition for Initiative would first be submitted to the people and would be formally filed with the COMELEC after it is signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters in the country. It thus sought the assistance of the COMELEC in gathering the required signatures by fixing the dates and time therefor and setting up signature stations on the assigned dates and time. The petition prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order (1) fixing the dates and time for signature gathering all over the country; (2) causing the publication of said Order and the petition for initiative in newspapers of general and local circulation; and, (3) instructing the municipal election registrars in all the regions of the Philippines to assist petitioner and the volunteers in establishing signing stations on the dates and time designated for the purpose.

The COMELEC conducted a hearing on the Delfin Petition.

On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition before this Court, seeking to restrain the COMELEC from further considering the Delfin Petition. They impleaded as respondents the COMELEC, Delfin, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (Pedrosas) in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) which was likewise engaged in signature gathering to support an initiative to amend the Constitution. They argued that the constitutional provision on people's initiative may only be implemented by a law passed by Congress; that no such law has yet been enacted by Congress; that Republic Act No. 6735 relied upon by Delfin does not cover the initiative to amend the Constitution; and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, the implementing rules adopted by the COMELEC on the conduct of initiative, was ultra vires insofar as the initiative to amend the Constitution was concerned. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325, entitled Santiago v. Commission on Elections.3

Pending resolution of the case, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition and the Pedrosas from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.

On March 19, 1997, the Court rendered its decision on the petition for prohibition. The Court ruled that the constitutional provision granting the people the power to directly amend the Constitution through initiative is not self-executory. An enabling law is necessary to implement the exercise of the people's right. Examining the provisions of R.A. 6735, a majority of eight (8) members of the Court held that said law was "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned,"4 and thus voided portions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It was also held that even if R.A. 6735 sufficiently covered the initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was valid, the Delfin Petition should still be dismissed as it was not the proper initiatory pleading contemplated by law. Under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition did not contain signatures of the required number of voters. The decision stated:
CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.5
Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, then Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (ponente), Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, and Associate Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres, fully concurred in the majority opinion.

While all the members of the Court who participated in the deliberation6 agreed that the Delfin Petition should be dismissed for lack of the required signatures, five (5) members, namely, Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban, held that R.A. 6735 was sufficient and adequate to implement the people's right to amend the Constitution through initiative, and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 validly provided the details for the actual exercise of such right. Justice Jose C. Vitug, on the other hand, opined that the Court should confine itself to resolving the issue of whether the Delfin Petition sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law on initiative, and there was no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. 6735.

The COMELEC, Delfin and the Pedrosas filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Court's decision.

After deliberating on the motions for reconsideration, six (6)7 of the eight (8) majority members maintained their position that R.A. 6735 was inadequate to implement the provision on the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Justice Torres filed an inhibition, while Justice Hermosisima submitted a Separate Opinion adopting the position of the minority that R.A. 6735 sufficiently covers the initiative to amend the Constitution. Hence, of the thirteen (13) members of the Court who participated in the deliberation, six (6) members, namely, Chief Justice Narvasa and Associate Justices Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six (6) members, namely, Associate Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the same. Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication. The motions for reconsideration were therefore denied for lack of sufficient votes to modify or reverse the decision of March 19, 1997.8

On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition was supported by around five (5) million signatures in compliance with R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the COMELEC, among others: (1) cause the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; (2) order all election officers to verify the signatures collected in support of the petition and submit these to the Commission; and (3) set the holding of a plebiscite where the following proposition would be submitted to the people for ratification:
Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President the chance to be reelected for another term, similarly with the Vice-President, so that both the highest officials of the land can serve for two consecutive terms of six years each, and also to lift the term limits for all other elective government officials, thus giving Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending for that purpose, Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of Article X, respectively?
The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent restraining order issued by the Court in Santiago v. COMELEC.

PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to set aside the COMELEC Resolution dismissing its petition for initiative. PIRMA argued that the Court's decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling was not definitive based on the deadlocked voting on the motions for reconsideration, and because there was no identity of parties and subject matter between the two petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court to reexamine its ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC.

The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated September 23, 1997. It explained:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second issue posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J., agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second issue since the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was a need for such a re-examination x x x x9
In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice Bellosillo stated that the PIRMA petition was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

Now, almost a decade later, another group, Sigaw ng Bayan, seeks to utilize anew the system of initiative to amend the Constitution, this time to change the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary system.

Let us look at the facts of the petition at bar with clear eyes.

On February 15, 2006, Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), embarked on a nationwide drive to gather signatures to support the move to adopt the parliamentary form of government in the country through charter change. They proposed to amend the Constitution as follows:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.

(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.

(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.

Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided, however, that any all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."

Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.

(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.

(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.

(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.

Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the incumbent President."

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.10
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, on the upper portions of which were written the abstract of the proposed amendments, to wit:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift from one system to another?
The signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated non-government organizations and volunteers of Sigaw ng Bayan, as well as to the local officials. Copies of the draft petition for initiative containing the proposition were also circulated to the local officials and multi-sectoral groups.

Sigaw ng Bayan alleged that it also held barangay assemblies which culminated on March 24, 25 and 26, 2006, to inform the people and explain to them the proposed amendments to the Constitution. Thereafter, they circulated the signature sheets for signing.

The signature sheets were then submitted to the local election officers for verification based on the voters' registration record. Upon completion of the verification process, the respective local election officers issued certifications to attest that the signature sheets have been verified. The verified signature sheets were subsequently transmitted to the office of Sigaw ng Bayan for the counting of the signatures.

On August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution entitled "In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a People's Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary System." They filed an Amended Petition on August 30, 2006 to reflect the text of the proposed amendment that was actually presented to the people. They alleged that they were filing the petition in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. Petitioners appended to the petition signature sheets bearing the signatures of registered voters which they claimed to have been verified by the respective city or municipal election officers, and allegedly constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.

As basis for the filing of their petition for initiative, petitioners averred that Section 5 (b) and (c), together with Section 7 of R.A. 6735, provide sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise of the power. Hence, petitioners prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order:
  1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;

  2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation; and

  3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the Certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective oppositions to the petition for initiative, among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Senators Sergio Osme III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas; Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong.

On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the Petition for Initiative. It cited this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC11 permanently enjoining the Commission from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

Forthwith, petitioners filed with this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus praying that the Court set aside the August 31, 2006 resolution of the COMELEC, direct respondent COMELEC to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, and set the date of the plebiscite. They state the following grounds in support of the petition:
I.

The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of, and to give due course to the petition for initiative, because the cited Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 cannot be considered the majority opinion of the Supreme Court en banc, considering that upon its reconsideration and final voting on 10 June 1997, no majority vote was secured to declare Republic Act No. 6735 as inadequate, incomplete and insufficient in standard.

II.

The 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, Republic Act No. 8189 and existing appropriation of the COMELEC provide for sufficient details and authority for the exercise of people's initiative, thus, existing laws taken together are adequate and complete.

III.

The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take cognizance of, and in refusing to give due course to the petition for initiative, thereby violating an express constitutional mandate and disregarding and contravening the will of the people.
A.

Assuming in arguendo that there is no enabling law, respondent COMELEC cannot ignore the will of the sovereign people and must accordingly act on the petition for initiative.
1.

The framers of the Constitution intended to give the people the power to propose amendments and the people themselves are now giving vibrant life to this constitutional provision.

2.

Prior to the questioned Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997, the right of the people to exercise the sovereign power of initiative and recall has been invariably upheld.

3.

The exercise of the initiative to propose amendments is a political question which shall be determined solely by the sovereign people.

4.

By signing the signature sheets attached to the petition for initiative duly verified by the election officers, the people have chosen to perform this sacred exercise of their sovereign power.
B.

The Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 is not applicable to the instant petition for initiative filed by the petitioners.

C.

The permanent injunction issued in Santiago vs. COMELEC only applies to the Delfin petition.
1.

It is the dispositive portion of the decision and not other statements in the body of the decision that governs the rights in controversy.
IV.

The Honorable public respondent failed or neglected to act or perform a duty mandated by law.
A.

The ministerial duty of the COMELEC is to set the initiative for plebiscite.12
The oppositors-intervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, and Dr. Reginald Pamugas; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osme III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; and Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong moved to intervene in this case and filed their respective Oppositions/Comments-in-Intervention.

The Philippine Constitution Association, Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino; and the Senate of the Philippines, represented by Senate President Manuel Villar, Jr., also filed their respective motions for intervention and Comments-in-Intervention.

The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc., Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya, Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization, and Victorino F. Balais likewise moved to intervene and submitted to the Court a Petition-in-Intervention. All interventions and oppositions were granted by the Court.

The oppositors-intervenors essentially submit that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the petition for initiative as it merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC as affirmed in the case of PIRMA v. COMELEC, based on the principle of stare decisis; that there is no sufficient law providing for the authority and the details for the exercise of people's initiative to amend the Constitution; that the proposed changes to the Constitution are actually revisions, not mere amendments; that the petition for initiative does not meet the required number of signatories under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; that it was not shown that the people have been informed of the proposed amendments as there was disparity between the proposal presented to them and the proposed amendments attached to the petition for initiative, if indeed there was; that the verification process was done ex parte, thus rendering dubious the signatures attached to the petition for initiative; and that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal capacity to represent the signatories in the petition for initiative.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in compliance with the Court's resolution of September 5, 2006, filed its Comment to the petition. Affirming the position of the petitioners, the OSG prayed that the Court grant the petition at bar and render judgment: (1) declaring R.A. 6735 as adequate to cover or as reasonably sufficient to implement the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and as having provided sufficient standards for subordinate legislation; (2) declaring as valid the provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; (3) setting aside the assailed resolution of the COMELEC for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, (4) directing the COMELEC to grant the petition for initiative and set the corresponding plebiscite pursuant to R.A. 6735, COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and other pertinent election laws and regulations.

The COMELEC filed its own Comment stating that its resolution denying the petition for initiative is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Santiago v. COMELEC which declared that R.A. 6735 does not adequately implement the constitutional provision on initiative to amend the Constitution. It invoked the permanent injunction issued by the Court against the COMELEC from taking cognizance of petitions for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a valid enabling law shall have been passed by Congress. It asserted that the permanent injunction covers not only the Delfin Petition, but also all other petitions involving constitutional initiatives.

On September 26, 2006, the Court heard the case. The parties were required to argue on the following issues:13
  1. Whether petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition in behalf of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend the Constitution.

  2. Whether the Petitions for Initiative filed before the Commission on Elections complied with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

  3. Whether the Court's decision in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997) bars the present petition.

  4. Whether the Court should re-examine the ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that there is no sufficient law implementing or authorizing the exercise of people's initiative to amend the Constitution.

  5. Assuming R.A. 6735 is sufficient, whether the Petitions for Initiative filed with the COMELEC have complied with its provisions.

    5.1
    Whether the said petitions are sufficient in form and substance.


    5.2
    Whether the proposed changes embrace more than one subject matter.

  6. Whether the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution.

    6.1
    Whether the proposed changes are the proper subject of an initiative.

  7. Whether the exercise of an initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is a political question to be determined solely by the sovereign people.

  8. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Petitions for Initiative filed before it.
With humility, I offer the following views to these issues as profiled:
I

Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition in behalf of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend the Constitution.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are not the proper parties to file the instant petition as they were not authorized by the signatories in the petition for initiative.

The argument deserves scant attention. The Constitution requires that the petition for initiative should be filed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. The petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado before the COMELEC was accompanied by voluminous signature sheets which prima facie show the intent of the signatories to support the filing of said petition. Stated above their signatures in the signature sheets is the following:
x x x My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.14
There is thus no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute separate documents to authorize petitioners to file the petition for initiative in their behalf.

Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and Aumentado to file the petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may file a petition for certiorari and mandamus. Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 65 read:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.--When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.--When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal, board or officer may file a petition for certiorari or mandamus before the appropriate court. Certainly, Lambino and Aumentado, as among the proponents of the petition for initiative dismissed by the COMELEC, have the standing to file the petition at bar.
II

The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination of Santiago.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts.15Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation."16 As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable;" (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."17

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution.18 According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts."19Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected."20 Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent."21 He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."22

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars.23 The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command.24 Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis -- constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.25Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided."26 In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it."27In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself."28 This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons,29viz: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where30 (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases.31 The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education32 which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's33 "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,34 we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,35 we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.36

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey.37 It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.

Following these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis rule should not bar the reexamination of Santiago. On the factor of intolerability, the six (6) justices in Santiago held R.A. 6735 to be insufficient as it provided no standard to guide COMELEC in issuing its implementing rules. The Santiago ruling that R.A. 6735 is insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional is an intolerable aberration, the only one of its kind in our planet. It improperly assails the ability of legislators to write laws. It usurps the exclusive right of legislators to determine how far laws implementing constitutional mandates should be crafted. It is elementary that courts cannot dictate on Congress the style of writing good laws, anymore than Congress can tell courts how to write literate decisions. The doctrine of separation of powers forbids this Court to invade the exclusive lawmaking domain of Congress for courts can construe laws but cannot construct them. The end result of the ruling of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient is intolerable for it rendered lifeless the sovereign right of the people to amend the Constitution via an initiative.

On the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in Santiago did not induce any expectation from the people. On the contrary, the ruling smothered the hope of the people that they could amend the Constitution by direct action. Moreover, reliance is a non-factor in the case at bar for it is more appropriate to consider in decisions involving contracts where private rights are adjudicated. The case at bar involves no private rights but the sovereignty of the people.

On the factor of changes in law and in facts, certain realities on ground cannot be blinked away. The urgent need to adjust certain provisions of the 1987 Constitution to enable the country to compete in the new millennium is given. The only point of contention is the mode to effect the change - - - whether through constituent assembly, constitutional convention or people's initiative. Petitioners claim that they have gathered over six (6) million registered voters who want to amend the Constitution through people's initiative and that their signatures have been verified by registrars of the COMELEC. The six (6) justices who ruled that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement the direct right of the people to amend the Constitution through an initiative cannot waylay the will of 6.3 million people who are the bearers of our sovereignty and from whom all government authority emanates. New developments in our internal and external social, economic, and political settings demand the reexamination of the Santiago case. The stare decisis rule is no reason for this Court to allow the people to step into the future with a blindfold.
III

A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is sufficient to implement the people's initiative.
Let us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution allowing amendments to the Constitution to be directly proposed by the people through initiative.

When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are counseled to give life to the intent of legislators. In enacting R.A. 6735, it is daylight luminous that Congress intended the said law to implement the right of the people, thru initiative, to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action. This all-important intent is palpable from the following:

First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to the right of the people to initiate changes to the Constitution:

The policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
It defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people."

It provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution, viz:
(1) That "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein;"38 and

(2) That "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter."39
It fixes the effectivity date of the amendment under Section 9(b) which provides that "(t)he proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite."

Second. The legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as the instrument to implement people's initiative. No less than former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., the ponente in Santiago, concedes:40
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17 x x x x The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
Third. The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. 6735 similarly demonstrate beyond doubt this intent. In his sponsorship remarks, the late Senator Raul Roco (then a Member of the House of Representatives) emphasized the intent to make initiative as a mode whereby the people can propose amendments to the Constitution. We quote his relevant remarks:41
SPONSORSHIP REMAKRS OF REP. ROCO

MR. ROCO. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the committee, we wish to speak in support of House Bill No. 497, entitled: INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT OF 1987, which later on may be called Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989.

As a background, we want to point out the constitutional basis of this particular bill. The grant of plenary legislative power upon the Philippine Congress by the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, Mr. Speaker, was based on the principle that any power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress unless the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere. This was a citation from Vera vs. Avelino (1946).

The presidential system introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw the application of the principle of separation of powers. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle remained applicable, Amendment 6 or the 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution ensured presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.

Our constitutional history saw the shifting and sharing of legislative power between the legislature and the executive.

Transcending such changes in the exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine Constitution that he Philippines is a Republican State where sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

In a Republic, Mr. Speaker, the power to govern is vested in its citizens participating through the right of suffrage and indicating thereby their choice of lawmakers.

Under the 1987 Constitution, lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress. However, to institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution, there is a practical recognition of what we refer to as people's sovereign power. This is the recognition of a system of initiative and referendum.

Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, and I quote:
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, under the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have plenary powers. There is a reserved legislative power given to the people expressly.

Section 32, the implementing provision of the same article of the Constitution provides, and I quote:
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, or which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, in Section 1 of Article VI which describes legislative power, there are reserved powers given to the people. In Section 32, we are specifically told to pass at the soonest possible time a bill on referendum and initiative. We are specifically mandated to share the legislative powers of Congress with the people.

Of course, another applicable provision in the Constitution is Section 2, Article XVII, Mr. Speaker. Under the provision on amending the Constitution, the section reads, and I quote:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
We in Congress therefore, Mr. Speaker, are charged with the duty to implement the exercise by the people of the right of initiative and referendum.

House Bill No. 21505, as reported out by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms last December 14, 1988, Mr. Speaker, is the response to such a constitutional duty.

Mr. Speaker, if only to allay apprehensions, allow me to show where initiative and referendum under Philippine law has occurred.

Mr. Speaker, the system of initiative and referendum is not new. In a very limited extent, the system is provided for in our Local Government Code today. On initiative, for instance, Section 99 of the said code vests in the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative processes, to hold plebiscites and to hear reports of the sangguniang barangay. There are variations of initiative and referendum. The barangay assembly is composed of all persons who have been actual residents of the barangay for at least six months, who are at least 15 years of age and citizens of the Philippines. The holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum is also provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.

Mr. Speaker, for brevity I will not read the pertinent quotations but will just submit the same to the Secretary to be incorporated as part of my speech.

To continue, Mr. Speaker these same principles are extensively applied by the Local Government Code as it is now mandated by the 1987 Constitution.

In other jurisdictions, Mr. Speaker, we have ample examples of initiative and referendum similar to what is now contained in House Bill No. 21505. As in the 1987 Constitutions and House Bill No. 21505, the various constitutions of the states in the United States recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any statute or to reject any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These states are Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusetts, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and practically all other states.

In certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and referendum applies is also without ay limitation, except for emergency measures, which is likewise incorporated in Section 7(b) of House Bill No. 21505.

The procedure provided by the House bill - from the filing of the petition, the requirement of a certain percentage of supporters to present a proposition to submission to electors - is substantially similar to those of many American laws. Mr. Speaker, those among us who may have been in the United States, particularly in California, during election time or last November during the election would have noticed different propositions posted in the city walls. They were propositions submitted by the people for incorporation during the voting. These were in the nature of initiative, Mr. Speaker.

Although an infant then in Philippine political structure, initiative and referendum is a tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and House Bill No. 21505 through the various consolidated bills is patterned after American experience in a great respect.

What does the bill essentially say, Mr. Speaker? Allow me to try to bring our colleagues slowly through the bill. The bill has basically only 12 sections. The constitutional Commissioners, Mr. Speaker, saw this system of initiative and referendum as an instrument which can be used should the legislature show itself indifferent to the needs of the people. That is why, Mr. Speaker, it may be timely, since we seem to be amply criticized, as regards our responsiveness, to pass this bill on referendum and initiative now. While indifference would not be an appropriate term to use at this time, and surely it is not the case although we are so criticized, one must note that it is a felt necessity of our times that laws need to be proposed and adopted at the soonest possible time to spur economic development, safeguard individual rights and liberties, and share governmental power with the people.

With the legislative powers of the President gone, we alone, together with the Senators when they are minded to agree with us, are left with the burden of enacting the needed legislation.

Let me now bring our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to the process advocated by the bill.

First, initiative and referendum, Mr. Speaker, is defined. Initiative essentially is what the term connotes. It means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit fore the consideration and voting of the general electorate a bill or a piece of legislation.

Under House Bill No. 21505, there are three kinds of initiative. One is an initiative to amend the Constitution. This can occur once every five years. Another is an initiative to amend statutes that we may have approved. Had this bill been an existing law, Mr. Speaker, it is most likely that an overwhelming majority of the barangays in the Philippines would have approved by initiative the matter of direct voting.

The third mode of initiative, Mr. Speaker, refers to a petition proposing to enact regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay laws or ordinances. It comes from the people and it must be submitted directly to the electorate. The bill gives a definite procedure and allows the COMELEC to define rules and regulations to give teeth to the power of initiative.

On the other hand, referendum, Mr. Speaker, is the power of the people to approve or reject something that Congress has already approved.

For instance, Mr. Speaker, when we divide the municipalities or the barangays into two or three, we must first get the consent of the people affected through plebiscite or referendum.

Referendum is a mode of plebiscite, Mr. Speaker. However, referendum can also be petitioned by the people if, for instance, they do not life the bill on direct elections and it is approved subsequently by the Senate. If this bill had already become a law, then the people could petition that a referendum be conducted so that the acts of Congress can be appropriately approved or rebuffed.

The initial stage, Mr. Speaker, is what we call the petition. As envisioned in the bill, the initiative comes from the people, from registered voters of the country, by presenting a proposition so that the people can then submit a petition, which is a piece of paper that contains the proposition. The proposition in the example I have been citing is whether there should be direct elections during the barangay elections. So the petition must be filed in the appropriate agency and the proposition must be clear stated. It can be tedious but that is how an effort to have direct democracy operates.

Section 4 of the bill gives requirements, Mr. Speaker. It will not be all that easy to have referendum or initiative petitioned by the people. Under Section 4 of the committee report, we are given certain limitations. For instance, to exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least 10 percent of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3 percent of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition. These numbers, Mr. Speaker, are not taken from the air. They are mandated by the Constitution. There must be a requirement of 10 percent for ordinary laws and 3 percent representing all districts. The same requirement is mutatis mutandis or appropriately modified and applied to the different sections. So if it is, for instance, a petition on initiative or referendum for a barangay, there is a 10 percent or a certain number required of the voters of the barangay. If it is for a district, there is also a certain number required of all towns of the district that must seek the petition. If it is for a province then again a certain percentage of the provincial electors is required. All these are based with reference to the constitutional mandate.

The conduct of the initiative and referendum shall be supervised and shall be upon the call of the Commission on Elections. However, within a period of 30 days from receipt of the petition, the COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same and set the date of the referendum which shall not be earlier than 45 days but not later than 90 days from the determination by the commission of the sufficiency of the petition. Why is this so, Mr. Speaker? The petition must first be determined by the commission as to its sufficiency because our Constitution requires that no bill can be approved unless it contains one subject matter. It is conceivable that in the fervor of an initiative or referendum, Mr. Speaker, there may be more than two topics sought to be approved and that cannot be allowed. In fact, that is one of the prohibitions under this referendum and initiative bill. When a matter under initiative or referendum is approved by the required number of votes, Mr. Speaker, it shall become effective 15 days following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette. Effectively then, Mr. Speaker, all the bill seeks to do is to enlarge and recognize the legislative powers of the Filipino people.

Mr. Speaker, I think this Congress, particularly this House, cannot ignore or cannot be insensitive to the call for initiative and referendum. We should have done it in 1987 but that is past. Maybe we should have done it in 1988 but that too had already passed, but it is only February 1989, Mr. Speaker, and we have enough time this year at least to respond to the need of our people to participate directly in the work of legislation.

For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, we urge and implore our colleagues to approve House Bill No. 21505 as incorporated in Committee Report No. 423 of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms.

In closing, Mr. Speaker, I also request that the prepared text of my speech, together with the footnotes since they contain many references to statutory history and foreign jurisdiction, be reproduced as part of the Record for future purposes.
Equally unequivocal on the intent of R.A. 6735 is the sponsorship speech of former Representative Salvador Escudero III, viz:42
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF REP. ESCUDERO

MR. ESCUDERO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues: Events in recent years highlighted the need to heed the clamor of the people for a truly popular democracy. One recalls the impatience of those who actively participated in the parliament of the streets, some of whom are now distinguished Members of this Chamber. A substantial segment of the population feel increasingly that under the system, the people have the form but not the reality or substance of democracy because of the increasingly elitist approach of their chosen Representatives to many questions vitally affecting their lives. There have been complaints, not altogether unfounded, that many candidates easily forge their campaign promises to the people once elected to office. The 1986 Constitutional Commission deemed it wise and proper to provide for a means whereby the people can exercise the reserve power to legislate or propose amendments to the Constitution directly in case their chose Representatives fail to live up to their expectations. That reserve power known as initiative is explicitly recognized in three articles and four sections of the 1987 Constitution, namely: Article VI Section 1; the same article, Section 312; Article X, Section 3; and Article XVII, Section 2. May I request that he explicit provisions of these three articles and four sections be made part of my sponsorship speech, Mr. Speaker.

These constitutional provisions are, however, not self-executory. There is a need for an implementing law that will give meaning and substance to the process of initiative and referendum which are considered valuable adjuncts to representative democracy. It is needless to state that this bill when enacted into law will probably open the door to strong competition of the people, like pressure groups, vested interests, farmers' group, labor groups, urban dwellers, the urban poor and the like, with Congress in the field of legislation.

Such probability, however, pales in significance when we consider that through this bill we can hasten the politization of the Filipino which in turn will aid government in forming an enlightened public opinion, and hopefully produce better and more responsive and acceptable legislations.

Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this would give the parliamentarians of the streets and cause-oriented groups an opportunity to articulate their ideas in a truly democratic forum, thus, the competition which they will offer to Congress will hopefully be a healthy one. Anyway, in an atmosphere of competition there are common interests dear to all Filipinos, and the pursuit of each side's competitive goals can still take place in an atmosphere of reason and moderation.

Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, when the distinguished Gentleman from Camarines Sur and this Representation filed our respective versions of the bill in 1987, we were hoping that the bill would be approved early enough so that our people could immediately use the agrarian reform bill as an initial subject matter or as a take-off point.

However, in view of the very heavy agenda of the Committee on Local Government, it took sometime before the committee could act on these. But as they say in Tagalog, huli man daw at magaling ay naihahabol din. The passage of this bill therefore, my dear colleagues, could be one of our finest hours when we can set aside our personal and political consideration for the greater good of our people. I therefore respectfully urge and plead that this bill be immediately approved.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
We cannot dodge the duty to give effect to this intent for the "[c]ourts have the duty to interpret the law as legislated and when possible, to honor the clear meaning of statutes as revealed by its language, purpose and history."43

The tragedy is that while conceding this intent, the six (6) justices, nevertheless, ruled that "x x x R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" for the following reasons: (1) Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution; (2) the Act does not provide for the contents of the petition for initiative on the Constitution; and (3) while the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.

To say the least, these alleged omissions are too weak a reason to throttle the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution through initiative. R.A. 6735 clearly expressed the legislative policy for the people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action. The fact that the legislature may have omitted certain details in implementing the people's initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify the conclusion that, ergo, the law is insufficient. What were omitted were mere details and not fundamental policies which Congress alone can and has determined. Implementing details of a law can be delegated to the COMELEC and can be the subject of its rule-making power. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of initiatives. Its rule-making power has long been recognized by this Court. In ruling R.A. 6735 insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional, the six (6) justices failed to give due recognition to the indefeasible right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution.
IV

The proposed constitutional changes, albeit substantial, are mere amendments and can be undertaken through people's initiative.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, only allow the use of people's initiative to amend and not to revise the Constitution. They theorize that the changes proposed by petitioners are substantial and thus constitute a revision which cannot be done through people's initiative.

In support of the thesis that the Constitution bars the people from proposing substantial amendments amounting to revision, the oppositors-intervenors cite the following deliberations during the Constitutional Commission, viz:44
MR. SUAREZ:
x x x x This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The Committee members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.



x x x x x x x x x x x x


MS. AQUINO.
In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?


MR. SUAREZ.
We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.


MS. AQUINO.
In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?


MR. SUAREZ.
That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
Commissioner (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., espoused the same view:45
MR. DAVIDE.
x x x x We are limiting the right of the people, by initiative, to submit a proposal for amendment only, not for revision, only once every five years x x x x


MR. MAAMBONG.
My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision?"


MR. DAVIDE.
No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
Commissioner (now a distinguished Associate Justice of this Court) Adolfo S. Azcuna also clarified this point46 -
MR. OPLE.
To more closely reflect the intent of Section 2, may I suggest that we add to "Amendments" "OR REVISIONS OF" to read: "Amendments OR REVISION OF this Constitution."


MR. AZCUNA.
I think it was not allowed to revise the Constitution by initiative.


MR. OPLE.
How is that again?


MR. AZCUNA.
It was not our intention to allow a revision of the Constitution by initiative but merely by amendments.


MR. BENGZON.
Only by amendments.


MR. AZCUNA.
I remember that was taken on the floor.


MR. RODRIGO.
Yes, just amendments.
The oppositors-intervenors then point out that by their proposals, petitioners will "change the very system of government from presidential to parliamentary, and the form of the legislature from bicameral to unicameral," among others. They allegedly seek other major revisions like the inclusion of a minimum number of inhabitants per district, a change in the period for a term of a Member of Parliament, the removal of the limits on the number of terms, the election of a Prime Minister who shall exercise the executive power, and so on and so forth.47 In sum, oppositors-intervenors submit that "the proposed changes to the Constitution effect major changes in the political structure and system, the fundamental powers and duties of the branches of the government, the political rights of the people, and the modes by which political rights may be exercised."48 They conclude that they are substantial amendments which cannot be done through people's initiative. In other words, they posit the thesis that only simple but not substantial amendments can be done through people's initiative.

With due respect, I disagree. To start with, the words "simple" and "substantial" are not subject to any accurate quantitative or qualitative test. Obviously, relying on the quantitative test, oppositors-intervenors assert that the amendments will result in some one hundred (100) changes in the Constitution. Using the same test, however, it is also arguable that petitioners seek to change basically only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive Department), together with the complementary provisions for a smooth transition from a presidential bicameral system to a parliamentary unicameral structure. The big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be affected including Articles I (National Territory), II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V (Suffrage), VIII (Judicial Department), IX (Constitutional Commissions), X (Local Government), XI (Accountability of Public Officers), XII (National Economy and Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), XV (The Family), XVI (General Provisions), and even XVII (Amendments or Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe ground if we use simple arithmetic to determine whether the proposed changes are "simple" or "substantial."

Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative test to determine whether the said changes are "simple" or "substantial" as to amount to a revision of the Constitution. The well-regarded political scientist, Garner, says that a good constitution should contain at least three (3) sets of provisions: the constitution of liberty which sets forth the fundamental rights of the people and imposes certain limitations on the powers of the government as a means of securing the enjoyment of these rights; the constitution of government which deals with the framework of government and its powers, laying down certain rules for its administration and defining the electorate; and, the constitution of sovereignty which prescribes the mode or procedure for amending or revising the constitution.49It is plain that the proposed changes will basically affect only the constitution of government. The constitutions of liberty and sovereignty remain unaffected. Indeed, the proposed changes will not change the fundamental nature of our state as "x x x a democratic and republican state."50 It is self-evident that a unicameral-parliamentary form of government will not make our State any less democratic or any less republican in character. Hence, neither will the use of the qualitative test resolve the issue of whether the proposed changes are "simple" or "substantial."

For this reason and more, our Constitutions did not adopt any quantitative or qualitative test to determine whether an "amendment" is "simple" or "substantial." Nor did they provide that "substantial" amendments are beyond the power of the people to propose to change the Constitution. Instead, our Constitutions carried the traditional distinction between "amendment" and "revision," i.e., "amendment" means change, including complex changes while "revision" means complete change, including the adoption of an entirely new covenant. The legal dictionaries express this traditional difference between "amendment" and "revision." Black's Law Dictionary defines "amendment" as "[a] formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specifically, a change made by addition, deletion, or correction."51 Black's also refers to "amendment" as "the process of making such a revision."52Revision, on the other hand, is defined as "[a] reexamination or careful review for correction or improvement."53 In parliamentary law, it is described as "[a] general and thorough rewriting of a governing document, in which the entire document is open to amendment."54 Similarly, Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "amendment" - as "[a] correction or revision of a writing to correct errors or better to state its intended purpose"55 and "amendment of constitution" as "[a] process of proposing, passing, and ratifying amendments to the x x x constitution."56 In contrast, "revision," when applied to a statute (or constitution), "contemplates the re-examination of the same subject matter contained in the statute (or constitution), and the substitution of a new, and what is believed to be, a still more perfect rule."57

One of the most authoritative constitutionalists of his time to whom we owe a lot of intellectual debt, Dean Vicente G. Sinco, of the University of the Philippines College of Law, (later President of the U.P. and delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1971) similarly spelled out the difference between "amendment" and "revision." He opined: "the revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a consideration of the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such change; while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or to be altered in a constitution."58

Our people were guided by this traditional distinction when they effected changes in our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In 1940, the changes to the 1935 Constitution which included the conversion from a unicameral system to a bicameral structure, the shortening of the tenure of the President and Vice-President from a six-year term without reelection to a four-year term with one reelection, and the establishment of the COMELEC, together with the complementary constitutional provisions to effect the changes, were considered amendments only, not a revision.

The replacement of the 1935 Constitution by the 1973 Constitution was, however, considered a revision since the 1973 Constitution was "a completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts."59 Among those adopted under the 1973 Constitution were: the parliamentary system in place of the presidential system, with the leadership in legislation and administration vested with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet; the reversion to a single-chambered lawmaking body instead of the two-chambered, which would be more suitable to a parliamentary system of government; the enfranchisement of the youth beginning eighteen (18) years of age instead of twenty-one (21), and the abolition of literacy, property, and other substantial requirements to widen the basis for the electorate and expand democracy; the strengthening of the judiciary, the civil service system, and the Commission on Elections; the complete nationalization of the ownership and management of mass media; the giving of control to Philippine citizens of all telecommunications; the prohibition against alien individuals to own educational institutions, and the strengthening of the government as a whole to improve the conditions of the masses.60

The 1973 Constitution in turn underwent a series of significant changes in 1976, 1980, 1981, and 1984. The two significant innovations introduced in 1976 were (1) the creation of an interim Batasang Pambansa, in place of the interim National Assembly, and (2) Amendment No. 6 which conferred on the President the power to issue decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, whenever the Batasang Pambansa fails to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, or there is grave emergency or threat or imminence thereof, with such decrees, or letters of instruction to form part of the law of the land. In 1980, the retirement age of seventy (70) for justices and judges was restored. In 1981, the presidential system with parliamentary features was installed. The transfer of private land for use as residence to natural-born citizens who had lost their citizenship was also allowed. Then, in 1984, the membership of the Batasang Pambansa was reapportioned by provinces, cities, or districts in Metro Manila instead of by regions; the Office of the Vice-President was created while the executive committee was abolished; and, urban land reform and social housing programs were strengthened.61These substantial changes were simply considered as mere amendments.

In 1986, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency, and repudiated the 1973 Constitution. She governed under Proclamation No. 3, known as the Freedom Constitution.

In February 1987, the new constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite and superseded the Provisional or Freedom Constitution. Retired Justice Isagani Cruz underscored the outstanding features of the 1987 Constitution which consists of eighteen articles and is excessively long compared to the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, on which it was largely based. Many of the original provisions of the 1935 Constitution, particularly those pertaining to the legislative and executive departments, have been restored because of the revival of the bicameral Congress of the Philippines and the strictly presidential system. The independence of the judiciary has been strengthened, with new provisions for appointment thereto and an increase in its authority, which now covers even political questions formerly beyond its jurisdiction. While many provisions of the 1973 Constitution were retained, like those on the Constitutional Commissions and local governments, still the new 1987 Constitution was deemed as a revision of the 1973 Constitution.

It is now contended that this traditional distinction between amendment and revision was abrogated by the 1987 Constitution. It is urged that Section 1 of Article XVII gives the power to amend or revise to Congress acting as a constituent assembly, and to a Constitutional Convention duly called by Congress for the purpose. Section 2 of the same Article, it is said, limited the people's right to change the Constitution via initiative through simple amendments. In other words, the people cannot propose substantial amendments amounting to revision.

With due respect, I do not agree. As aforestated, the oppositors-intervenors who peddle the above proposition rely on the opinions of some Commissioners expressed in the course of the debate on how to frame the amendment/revision provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is familiar learning, however, that opinions in a constitutional convention, especially if inconclusive of an issue, are of very limited value as explaining doubtful phrases, and are an unsafe guide (to the intent of the people) since the constitution derives its force as a fundamental law, not from the action of the convention but from the powers (of the people) who have ratified and adopted it.62 "Debates in the constitutional convention `are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law.'"63Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of the Constitutional Commissioners can likewise lead to the conclusion that there was no abandonment of the traditional distinction between "amendment" and "revision." For during the debates, some of the commissioners referred to the concurring opinion of former Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,64 that stressed the traditional distinction between amendment and revision, thus:65
MR. SUAREZ:
We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, "amendment." However, the Committee finally agreed to use the terms - "amendment" or "revision" when our attention was called by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result of our research, we came up with the observations made in the famous - or notorious - Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar,66 wherein he made the following distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve a rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.



The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.



So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be employed in the formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.
To further explain "revision," former Justice Antonio, in his concurring opinion, used an analogy - "When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same location, do you have a changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new house? Some of the material contained in the old house may be used again, some of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have altogether another or a new house."67

Hence, it is arguable that when the framers of the 1987 Constitution used the word "revision," they had in mind the "rewriting of the whole Constitution," or the "total overhaul of the Constitution." Anything less is an "amendment" or just "a change of specific provisions only," the intention being "not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times." Under this view, "substantial" amendments are still "amendments" and thus can be proposed by the people via an initiative.

As we cannot be guided with certainty by the inconclusive opinions of the Commissioners on the difference between "simple" and "substantial" amendments or whether "substantial" amendments amounting to revision are covered by people's initiative, it behooves us to follow the cardinal rule in interpreting Constitutions, i.e., construe them to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. The illustrious Cooley explains its rationale well, viz:68
x x x the constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed. These proceedings therefore are less conclusive of the proper construction of the instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussion and deliberations of their representatives. The history of the calling of the convention, the causes which led to it, and the discussions and issues before the people at the time of the election of the delegates, will sometimes be quite as instructive and satisfactory as anything to be gathered form the proceedings of the convention.
Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but liberally and on broad general lines, to accomplish the object of its establishment and carry out the great principles of government - not to defeat them.69 One of these great principles is the sovereignty of the people.

Let us now determine the intent of the people when they adopted initiative as a mode to amend the 1987 Constitution. We start with the Declaration of Principles and State Policies which Sinco describes as "the basic political creed of the nation"70 as it "lays down the policies that government is bound to observe."71 Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, similarly provide that "the Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." In a republican state, the power of the sovereign people is exercised and delegated to their representatives. Thus in Metropolitan Transportation Service v. Paredes, this Court held that "a republican state, like the Philippines x x x (is) derived from the will of the people themselves in freely creating a government `of the people, by the people, and for the people' - a representative government through which they have agreed to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of their sovereignty for the common good and general welfare."72

In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the sovereign people delegated to Congress or to a convention, the power to amend or revise our fundamental law. History informs us how this delegated power to amend or revise the Constitution was abused particularly during the Marcos regime. The Constitution was changed several times to satisfy the power requirements of the regime. Indeed, Amendment No. 6 was passed giving unprecedented legislative powers to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. A conspiracy of circumstances from above and below, however, brought down the Marcos regime through an extra constitutional revolution, albeit a peaceful one by the people. A main reason for the people's revolution was the failure of the representatives of the people to effectuate timely changes in the Constitution either by acting as a constituent assembly or by calling a constitutional convention. When the representatives of the people defaulted in using this last peaceful process of constitutional change, the sovereign people themselves took matters in their own hands. They revolted and replaced the 1973 Constitution with the 1987 Constitution.

It is significant to note that the people modified the ideology of the 1987 Constitution as it stressed the power of the people to act directly in their capacity as sovereign people. Correspondingly, the power of the legislators to act as representatives of the people in the matter of amending or revising the Constitution was diminished for the spring cannot rise above its source. To reflect this significant shift, Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution was reworded. It now reads: "the Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explained the addition of the word "democratic," in our first Declaration of Principles, viz:
MR. NOLLEDO.
I am putting the word "democratic" because of the provisions that we are now adopting which are covering consultations with the people. For example, we have provisions on recall, initiative, the right of the people even to participate in lawmaking and other instances that recognize the validity of interference by the people through people's organizations x x x x73


MR. OPLE.
x x x x The Committee added the word "democratic" to "republican," and, therefore, the first sentence states: "The Philippines is a republican and democratic state x x x x



May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word "democratic" to "republican"? The constitutional framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were content with "republican." Was this done merely for the sake of emphasis?


MR. NOLLEDO.
x x x x "democratic" was added because of the need to emphasize people power and the many provisions in the Constitution that we have approved related to recall, people's organizations, initiative and the like, which recognize the participation of the people in policy-making in certain circumstances x x x x


MR. OPLE.
I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and I think it does meet a need x x x x


MR. NOLLEDO.
According to Commissioner Rosario Braid, "democracy" here is understood as participatory democracy. 74 (emphasis supplied)
The following exchange between Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Adolfo S. Azcuna is of the same import:75
MR. SARMIENTO.
When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring to representative democracy?


MR. AZCUNA.
That is right.


MR. SARMIENTO.
So, why do we not retain the old formulation under the 1973 and 1935 Constitutions which used the words "republican state" because "republican state" would refer to a democratic state where people choose their representatives?


MR. AZCUNA.
We wanted to emphasize the participation of the people in government.


MR. SARMIENTO.
But even in the concept "republican state," we are stressing the participation of the people x x x x So the word "republican" will suffice to cover popular representation.


MR. AZCUNA.
Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee felt that in view of the introduction of the aspects of direct democracy such as initiative, referendum or recall, it was necessary to emphasize the democratic portion of republicanism, of representative democracy as well. So, we want to add the word "democratic" to emphasize that in this new Constitution there are instances where the people would act directly, and not through their representatives. (emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the stress on direct democracy, the systems of initiative, referendum, and recall were enthroned as polestars in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Commissioner Blas F. Ople who introduced the provision on people's initiative said:76
MR. OPLE.
x x x x I think this is just the correct time in history when we should introduce an innovative mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution, vesting in the people and their organizations the right to formulate and propose their own amendments and revisions of the Constitution in a manner that will be binding upon the government. It is not that I believe this kind of direct action by the people for amending a constitution will be needed frequently in the future, but it is good to know that the ultimate reserves of sovereign power still rest upon the people and that in the exercise of that power, they can propose amendments or revision to the Constitution. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez also explained the people's initiative as a safety valve, as a peaceful way for the people to change their Constitution, by citing our experiences under the Marcos government, viz:77
MR. SUAREZ.
We agree to the difficulty in implementing this particular provision, but we are providing a channel for the expression of the sovereign will of the people through this initiative system.


MR. BENGZON.
Is Section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), not sufficient channel for expression of the will of the people, particularly in the amendment or revision of the Constitution?


MR. SUAREZ.
Under normal circumstances, yes. But we know what happened during the 20 years under the Marcos administration. So, if the National Assembly, in a manner of speaking, is operating under the thumb of the Prime Minister or the President as the case may be, and the required number of votes could not be obtained, we would have to provide for a safety valve in order that the people could ventilate in a very peaceful way their desire for amendment to the Constitution.



It is very possible that although the people may be pressuring the National Assembly to constitute itself as a constituent assembly or to call a constitutional convention, the members thereof would not heed the people's desire and clamor. So this is a third avenue that we are providing for the implementation of what is now popularly known as people's power. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong opined that the people's initiative could avert a revolution, viz:78
MR. MAAMBONG.
x x x x the amending process of the Constitution could actually avert a revolution by providing a safety valve in bringing about changes in the Constitution through pacific means. This, in effect, operationalizes what political law authors call the "prescription of sovereignty." (emphasis supplied)
The end result is Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution which expressed the right of the sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action or through initiative. To that extent, the delegated power of Congress to amend or revise the Constitution has to be adjusted downward. Thus, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution has to be reminted and now provides: "The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum."

Prescinding from these baseline premises, the argument that the people through initiative cannot propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty on its head. At the very least, the submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people. It also denigrates the sovereign people who they claim can only be trusted with the power to propose "simple" but not "substantial" amendments to the Constitution. According to Sinco, the concept of sovereignty should be strictly understood in its legal meaning as it was originally developed in law.79 Legal sovereignty, he explained, is "the possession of unlimited power to make laws. Its possessor is the legal sovereign. It implies the absence of any other party endowed with legally superior powers and privileges. It is not subject to law 'for it is the author and source of law.' Legal sovereignty is thus the equivalent of legal omnipotence."80

To be sure, sovereignty or popular sovereignty, emphasizes the supremacy of the people's will over the state which they themselves have created. The state is created by and subject to the will of the people, who are the source of all political power. Rightly, we have ruled that "the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern."81

James Wilson, regarded by many as the most brilliant, scholarly, and visionary lawyer in the United States in the 1780s, laid down the first principles of popular sovereignty during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention of the 1787 Constitution of the United States:82
There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which there is no appeal, and which, for that reason, may be termed supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable.

x x x x Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with sufficient accuracy our political systems, would answer that, in our governments, the supreme power was vested in the constitutions x x x x This opinion approaches a step nearer to the truth, but does not reach it. The truth is, that in our governments, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions. Indeed the superiority, in this last instance, is much greater; for the people possess over our constitution, control in act, as well as right. (emphasis supplied)
I wish to reiterate that in a democratic and republican state, only the people is sovereign - - - not the elected President, not the elected Congress, not this unelected Court. Indeed, the sovereignty of the people which is indivisible cannot be reposed in any organ of government. Only its exercise may be delegated to any of them. In our case, the people delegated to Congress the exercise of the sovereign power to amend or revise the Constitution. If Congress, as delegate, can exercise this power to amend or revise the Constitution, can it be argued that the sovereign people who delegated the power has no power to substantially amend the Constitution by direct action? If the sovereign people do not have this power to make substantial amendments to the Constitution, what did it delegate to Congress? How can the people lack this fraction of a power to substantially amend the Constitution when by their sovereignty, all power emanates from them? It will take some mumbo jumbo to argue that the whole is lesser than its part. Let Sinco clinch the point:83
But although possession may not be delegated, the exercise of sovereignty often is. It is delegated to the organs and agents of the state which constitute its government, for it is only through this instrumentality that the state ordinarily functions. However ample and complete this delegation may be, it is nevertheless subject to withdrawal at any time by the state. On this point Willoughby says:
Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to themselves a right to control of so slight and so negative a character as to make its exercise a rare and improbable occurrence; yet so long as such right of control is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon a grant and continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as possessing only administrative autonomy and not political independence.
At the very least, the power to propose substantial amendments to the Constitution is shared with the people. We should accord the most benign treatment to the sovereign power of the people to propose substantial amendments to the Constitution especially when the proposed amendments will adversely affect the interest of some members of Congress. A contrary approach will suborn the public weal to private interest and worse, will enable Congress (the delegate) to frustrate the power of the people to determine their destiny (the principal).

All told, the teaching of the ages is that constitutional clauses acknowledging the right of the people to exercise initiative and referendum are liberally and generously construed in favor of the people.84 Initiative and referendum powers must be broadly construed to maintain maximum power in the people.85 We followed this orientation in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections.86 There is not an iota of reason to depart from it.

V

The issues at bar are not political questions.

Petitioners submit that "[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six million registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for Initiative, is a purely political question which is beyond even the very long arm of this Honorable Court's power of judicial review. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution should be amended is a matter which the people and the people alone must resolve in their sovereign capacity."87 They argue that "[t]he power to propose amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right to propose amendments under the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit of a `political question.'"88

The petitioners cannot be sustained. This issue has long been interred by Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, viz:89
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious cycle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves - of course - who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
In the instant case, the Constitution sets in black and white the requirements for the exercise of the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The amendments must be proposed by the people "upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter."90 Compliance with these requirements is clearly a justiciable and not a political question. Be that as it may, how the issue will be resolved by the people is addressed to them and to them alone.
VI

Whether the Petition for Initiative filed before the COMELEC complied with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution and R.A. 6735 involves contentious issues of fact which should first be resolved by the COMELEC.
Oppositors-intervenors impugn the Petition for Initiative as it allegedly lacks the required number of signatures under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Said provision requires that the petition for initiative be supported by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein. Oppositors-intervenors contend that no proper verification of signatures was done in several legislative districts. They assert that mere verification of the names listed on the signature sheets without verifying the signatures reduces the signatures submitted for their respective legislative districts to mere scribbles on a piece of paper.

Oppositor-intervenor ONEVOICE, Inc., submitted to this Court a certification dated August 23, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, Election Officer IV, Third District and OIC, First and Second District, Davao City, stating that his office has not verified the signatures submitted by the proponents of the people's initiative. The certification reads:
This is to CERTIFY that this office (First, Second and Third District, Davao City) HAS NOT VERIFIED the signatures of registered voters as per documents submitted in this office by the proponents of the People's Initiative. Consequently, NO ELECTION DOCUMENTS AND/OR ORDER ISSUED BY HIGHER SUPERIORS used as basis for such verification of signatures.91
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., among others, further clarified that although Atty. Casquejo and Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Acting Election Officer IV, First District, Davao City, later issued certifications stating that the Office of the City Election Officer has examined the list of individuals appearing in the signature sheets,92 the certifications reveal that the office had verified only the names of the signatories, but not their signatures. Oppositors-intervenors submit that not only the names of the signatories should be verified, but also their signatures to ensure the identities of the persons affixing their signatures on the signature sheets.

Oppositor-intervenor Luwalhati Antonino also alleged that petitioners failed to obtain the signatures of at least three per cent (3%) of the total number of registered voters in the First Legislative District of South Cotabato. For the First District of South Cotabato, petitioners submitted 3,182 signatures for General Santos City, 2,186 signatures for Tupi, 3,308 signatures for Tampakan and 10,301 signatures for Polomolok, or 18,977 signatures out of 359,488 registered voters of said district. Antonino, however, submitted to this Court a copy of the certification by Glory D. Rubio, Election Officer III, Polomolok, dated May 8, 2006, showing that the signatures from Polomolok were not verified because the Book of Voters for the whole municipality was in the custody of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Polomolok, South Cotabato.93 Excluding the signatures from Polomolok from the total number of signatures from the First District of South Cotabato would yield only a total of 8,676 signatures which falls short of the three per cent (3%) requirement for the district.

Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino likewise submitted to this Court a certification issued by Atty. Stalin A. Baguio, City Election Officer IV, Cagayan de Oro City, stating that the list of names appearing on the signature sheets corresponds to the names of registered voters in the city, thereby implying that they have not actually verified the signatures.94

The argument against the sufficiency of the signatures is further bolstered by Alternative Law Groups, Inc., which submitted copies of similarly worded certifications from the election officers from Zamboanga del Sur95 and from Compostela Valley.96 Alternative Law Groups, Inc., further assails the regularity of the verification process as it alleged that verification in some areas were conducted by Barangay officials and not by COMELEC election officers. It filed with this Court copies of certifications from Sulu and Sultan Kudarat showing that the verification was conducted by local officials instead of COMELEC personnel.97

Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that the verification conducted by the election officers sufficiently complied with the requirements of the Constitution and the law on initiative.

Contravening the allegations of oppositors-intervenors on the lack of verification in Davao City and in Polomolok, South Cotabato, petitioner Aumentado claimed that the same election officers cited by the oppositors-intervenors also issued certifications showing that they have verified the signatures submitted by the proponents of the people's initiative. He presented copies of the certifications issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo for the Second and Third Legislative Districts of Davao City stating that he verified the signatures of the proponents of the people's initiative. His certification for the Second District states:
This is to CERTIFY that this Office has examined the list of individuals as appearing in the Signature Sheets of the Registered Voters of District II, Davao City, submitted on April 7, 2006 by MR. NONATO BOLOS, Punong Barangay, Centro, Davao City for verification which consists of THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662) signatures.

Anent thereto, it appears that of the THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662) individuals, only TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT (22,668) individuals were found to be REGISTERED VOTERS, in the Computerized List of Voters of SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, DAVAO CITY.98
It was also shown that Atty. Casquejo had issued a clarificatory certification regarding the verification process conducted in Davao City. It reads:
Regarding the verification of the signatures of registered voters, this Office has previously issued two (2) separate certifications for the 2nd and 3rd Districts of Davao City on April 20, 2006 and April 26, 2006, respectively, specifically relating to the voters who supported the people's initiative. It was stated therein that the names submitted, comprising 22,668 individual voters in the 2nd District and 18,469 individual voters in the 3rd District, were found [to] be registered voters of the respective districts mentioned as verified by this Office based on the Computerized List of Voters.

It must be clarified that the August 23, 2006 Certification was issued in error and by mistake for the reason that the signature verification has not been fully completed as of that date.

I hereby CERTIFY that this Office has examined the signatures of the voters as appearing in the signature sheets and has compared these with the signatures appearing in the book of voters and computerized list of voters x x x 99
Petitioner Aumentado also submitted a copy of the certification dated May 8, 2006 issued by Polomolok Election Officer Glory D. Rubio to support their claim that said officer had conducted a verification of signatures in said area. The certification states:
This is to certify further, that the total 68,359 registered voters of this municipality, as of the May 10, 2004 elections, 10,804 names with signatures were submitted for verification and out of which 10,301 were found to be legitimate voters as per official list of registered voters, which is equivalent to 15.07% of the total number of registered voters of this Municipality.100
In addition to the lack of proper verification of the signatures in numerous legislative districts, allegations of fraud and irregularities in the collection of signatures in Makati City were cited by Senator Pimentel, among others, to wit:
(1) No notice was given to the public, for the benefit of those who may be concerned, by the Makati COMELEC Office that signature sheets have already been submitted to it for "verification." The camp of Mayor Binay was able to witness the "verification process" only because of their pro-active stance;

(2) In District 1, the proponents of charter change submitted 43,405 signatures for verification. 36,219 alleged voters' signatures (83% of the number of signatures submitted) were rejected outright. 7,186 signatures allegedly "passed" COMELEC's initial scrutiny. However, upon examination of the signature sheets by Atty. Mar-len Abigail Binay, the said 7,186 signatures could not be accounted for. Atty. Binay manually counted 2,793 signatures marked with the word "OK" and 3,443 signatures marked with a check, giving only 6,236 "apparently verified signatures." Before the COMELEC officer issued the Certification, Atty. Binay already submitted to the said office not less than 55 letters of "signature withdrawal," but no action was ever taken thereon;

(3) In District 2, 29,411 signatures were submitted for verification. 23,521 alleged voters' signatures (80% of those submitted) were rejected outright. Of the 5,890 signatures which allegedly passed the COMELEC's initial scrutiny, some more will surely fail upon closer examination;

(4) In the absence of clear, transparent, and uniform rules the COMELEC personnel did not know how to treat the objections and other observations coming from the camp of Mayor Binay. The oppositors too did not know where to go for their remedy when the COMELEC personnel merely "listened" to their objections and other observations. As mentioned earlier, the COMELEC personnel did not even know what to do with the many "letters of signature withdrawal" submitted to it;

(5) Signatures of people long dead, in prison, abroad, and other forgeries appear on the Sigaw ng Bayan Signature Sheets. There is even a 15-year old alleged signatory;

(6) There are Signature Sheets obviously signed by one person;

(7) A Calara M. Roberto and a Roberto M. Calara both allegedly signed the Signature Sheets.101
Also, there are allegations that many of the signatories did not understand what they have signed as they were merely misled into signing the signature sheets. Opposed to these allegations are rulings that a person who affixes his signature on a document raises the presumption that the person so signing has knowledge of what the document contains. Courts have recognized that there is great value in the stability of records, so to speak, that no one should commit herself or himself to something in writing unless she or he is fully aware and cognizant of the effect it may have upon her on him.102 In the same vein, we have held that a person is presumed to have knowledge of the contents of a document he has signed.103 But as this Court is not a trier of facts, it cannot resolve the issue.

In sum, the issue of whether the petitioners have complied with the constitutional requirement that the petition for initiative be signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. Its resolution will require presentation of evidence and their calibration by the COMELEC according to its rules. During the oral argument on this case, the COMELEC, through Director Alioden Dalaig of its Law Department, admitted that it has not examined the documents submitted by the petitioners in support of the petition for initiative, as well as the documents filed by the oppositors to buttress their claim that the required number of signatures has not been met. The exchanges during the oral argument likewise clearly show the need for further clarification and presentation of evidence to prove certain material facts.104

The only basis used by the COMELEC to dismiss the petition for initiative was this Court's ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that R.A. 6735 was insufficient. It has yet to rule on the sufficiency of the form and substance of the petition. I respectfully submit that this issue should be properly litigated before the COMELEC where both parties will be given full opportunity to prove their allegations.

For the same reasons, the sufficiency of the Petition for Initiative and its compliance with the requirements of R.A. 6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the COMELEC at the first instance, as it is the body that is mandated by the Constitution to administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.105
VII

COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition.
In denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition, COMELEC relied on this Court's ruling in Santiago permanently enjoining it from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

Again, I respectfully submit that COMELEC's reliance on Santiago constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Santiago case did not establish the firm doctrine that R.A. 6735 is not a sufficient law to implement the constitutional provision allowing people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To recapitulate, the records show that in the original decision, eight (8) justices106 voted that R.A. 6735 was not a sufficient law; five (5) justices107 voted that said law was sufficient; and one (1) justice108 abstained from voting on the issue holding that unless and until a proper initiatory pleading is filed, the said issue is not ripe for adjudication.109

Within the reglementary period, the respondents filed their motion for reconsideration. On June 10, 1997, the Court denied the motion. Only thirteen (13) justices resolved the motion for Justice Torres inhibited himself.110Of the original majority of eight (8) justices, only six (6) reiterated their ruling that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. Justice Hermosisima, originally part of the majority of eight (8) justices, changed his vote and joined the minority of five (5) justices. He opined without any equivocation that R.A. 6735 was a sufficient law, thus:
It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected cluster; another to think under fire - to think for action upon which great interests depend." So said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and so I am guided as I reconsider my concurrence to the holding of the majority that "R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation" and now to interpose my dissent thereto.

x x x

WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the Delfin petition.

I vote, however, to declare R.A. No. 6735 as adequately providing the legal basis for the exercise by the people of their right to amend the Constitution through initiative proceedings and to uphold the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 insofar as it does not sanction the filing of the initiatory petition for initiative proceedings to amend the Constitution without the required names and/or signatures of at least 12% of all the registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Vitug remained steadfast in refusing to rule on the sufficiency of R.A. 6735. In fine, the final vote on whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient law was 6-6 with one (1) justice inhibiting himself and another justice refusing to rule on the ground that the issue was not ripe for adjudication.

It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who voted that R.A. 6735 is an insufficient law failed to establish a doctrine that could serve as a precedent. Under any alchemy of law, a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value. The opinion of the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco is instructive, viz:
As it stands, of the thirteen justices who took part in the deliberations on the issue of whether the motion for reconsideration of the March 19, 1997 decision should be granted or not, only the following justices sided with Mr. Justice Davide, namely: Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan. Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Panganiban and the undersigned voted to grant the motion; while Justice Vitug "maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication." In other words, only five, out of the other twelve justices, joined Mr. Justice Davide's June 10, 1997 ponencia finding R.A. No. 6735 unconstitutional for its failure to pass the so called "completeness and sufficiency standards" tests. The "concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations" which Article VII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution requires to declare a law unconstitutional was, beyond dispute, not complied with. And even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the "majority" was initially reached in the March 19, 1997 ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for reconsideration. It was only on June 10, 1997 that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735 was settled with finality, sans the constitutionally required "majority." The Court's declaration, therefore, is manifestly grafted with infirmity and wanting in force necessitating, in my view, the reexamination of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 127325. It behooves the Court "not to tarry any longer" nor waste this opportunity accorded by this new petition (G.R. No. 129754) to relieve the Court's pronouncement from constitutional infirmity.
The jurisprudence that an equally divided Court can never set a precedent is well-settled. Thus, in the United States, an affirmance in the Federal Supreme Court upon equal division of opinion is not an authority for the determination of other cases, either in that Court or in the inferior federal courts. In Neil v. Biggers,111 which was a habeas corpus state proceeding by a state prisoner, the U.S. Supreme Court held that its equally divided affirmance of petitioner's state court conviction was not an "actual adjudication" barring subsequent consideration by the district court on habeas corpus. In discussing the non-binding effect of an equal division ruling, the Court reviewed the history of cases explicating the disposition "affirmed by an equally divided Court:"
In this light, we review our cases explicating the disposition "affirmed by an equally divided Court." On what was apparently the first occasion of an equal division, The Antelope, 10 Wheat, 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825), the Court simply affirmed on the point of division without much discussion. Id., at 126-127. Faced with a similar division during the next Term, the Court again affirmed, Chief Justice Marshall explaining that "the principles of law which have been argued, cannot be settled; but the judgment is affirmed, the court being divided in opinion upon it." Etting v. Bank of United States, 11 Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L. Ed. 419 (1826). As was later elaborated in such cases, it is the appellant or petitioner who asks the Court to overturn a lower court's decree. "If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for no order can be made. The judgment of the court below, therefore, stands in full force. It is indeed, the settled practice in such case to enter a judgment of affirmance; but this is only the most convenient mode of expressing the fact that the cause is finally disposed of in conformity with the action of the court below, and that that court can proceed to enforce its judgment. The legal effect would be the same if the appeal, or writ of error, were dismissed." Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107, 112, 19 L. Ed. 154 (1869). Nor is an affirmance by an equally divided Court entitled to precedential weight. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264, 80 S. Ct. 1463, 1464, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1708 (1960).xxx"
This doctrine established in Neil has not been overturned and has been cited with approval in a number of subsequent cases,112 and has been applied in various state jurisdictions.

In the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Erin G., a Minor Child,113 wherein a putative father sought to set aside a decree granting petition for adoption of an Indian child on grounds of noncompliance with the requirements of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that its decision in In re Adoption of T.N.F. (T.N.F.),114which lacked majority opinion supporting holding that an action such as the putative father's would be governed by the state's one-year statute of limitations, was not entitled to stare decisis effect. In T.N.F., a majority of the justices sitting did not agree on a common rationale, as two of four participating justices agreed that the state's one-year statute of limitations applied, one justice concurred in the result only, and one justice dissented. There was no "narrower" reasoning agreed upon by all three affirming justices. The concurring justice expressed no opinion on the statute of limitations issue, and in agreeing with the result, he reasoned that ICWA did not give the plaintiff standing to sue.115 The two-justice plurality, though agreeing that the state's one-year statute of limitations applied, specifically disagreed with the concurring justice on the standing issue.116 Because a majority of the participating justices in T.N.F. did not agree on any one ground for affirmance, it was not accorded stare decisis effect by the state Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise ruled that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to plurality decisions in which no majority of the justices participating agree to the reasoning and as such are not authoritative interpretations binding on the Supreme Court.117

In State ex rel. Landis v. Williams,118 the Supreme Court of Florida, in an equally divided opinion on the matter,119 held that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933 must be allowed to stand, dismissing a quo warranto suit without prejudice. The Court held:
In a cause of original jurisdiction in this court a statute cannot be declared unconstitutional nor its enforcement nor operation judicially interfered with, except by the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court sitting in the cause wherein the constitutionality of the statute is brought in question or judicial relief sought against its enforcement. Section 4 of Article 5, state Constitution.

Therefore in this case the concurrence of a majority of the members of this court in holding unconstitutional said chapter 15938, supra, not having been had, it follows that the statute in controversy must be allowed to stand and accordingly be permitted to be enforced as a presumptively valid act of the Legislature, and that this proceeding in quo warranto must be dismissed without prejudice. Spencer v. Hunt (Fla.) 147 So. 282. This decision is not to be regarded as a judicial precedent on the question of constitutional law involved concerning the constitutionality vel non of chapter 15938. State ex rel. Hampton v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224, 37 So. 51.

Quo warranto proceeding dismissed without prejudice by equal division of the court on question of constitutionality of statute involved.
In U.S. v. Pink,120 the Court held that the affirmance by the U.S. Supreme Court by an equally divided vote of a decision of the New York Court of Appeals that property of a New York branch of a Russian insurance company was outside the scope of the Russian Soviet government's decrees terminating existence of insurance companies in Russia and seizing their assets, while conclusive and binding upon the parties as respects the controversy in that action, did not constitute an authoritative "precedent."

In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,121 the U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit, in holding that printed lyrics which had the same meter as plaintiffs' lyrics, but which were in form a parody of the latter, did not constitute infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights, ruled that the prior case of Benny v. Loew's, Inc.,122 which was affirmed by an equally divided court, was not binding upon it, viz:
Under the precedents of this court, and, as seems justified by reason as well as by authority, an affirmance by an equally divided court is as between the parties, a conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in this or in inferior courts.123
In Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,124 the Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed the appeal as it was unable to reach a decision because two judges recused themselves and the remaining members of the Court were so divided, it was impossible to secure the concurrence of four judges as is constitutionally required. The Court followed the procedure employed by the U.S. Supreme Court when the Justices of that Court are equally divided, i.e. affirm the judgment of the court that was before it for review. The affirmance is a conclusive determination and adjudication as between the parties to the immediate case, it is not authority for the determination of other cases, either in the Supreme Court or in any other court. It is not "entitled to precedential weight." The legal effect of such an affirmance is the same as if the appeal was dismissed.125

The same rule is settled in the English Courts. Under English precedents,126 an affirmance by an equally divided Court is, as between the parties, a conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in that or in inferior courts.

After a tour of these cases, we can safely conclude that the prevailing doctrine is that, the affirmance by an equally divided court merely disposes of the present controversy as between the parties and settles no issue of law; the affirmance leaves unsettled the principle of law presented by the case and is not entitled to precedential weight or value. In other words, the decision only has res judicata and not stare decisis effect. It is not conclusive and binding upon other parties as respects the controversies in other actions.

Let us now examine the patent differences between the petition at bar and the Delfin Petition in the Santiago case which will prevent the Santiago ruling from binding the present petitioners. To start with, the parties are different. More importantly, the Delfin Petition did not contain the signatures of the required number of registered voters under the Constitution: the requirement that twelve per cent (12%) of all the registered voters in the country wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein was not complied with. For this reason, we ruled unanimously that it was not the initiatory petition which the COMELEC could properly take cognizance of. In contrast, the present petition appears to be accompanied by the signatures of the required number of registered voters. Thus, while the Delfin Petition prayed that an Order be issued fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, the Lambino and Aumentado petition, prayed for the calling of a plebiscite to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition. COMELEC cannot close its eyes to these material differences.

Plainly, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition on the basis of its mistaken notion that Santiago established the doctrine that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. As aforestressed, that ruling of six (6) justices who do not represent the majority lacks precedential status and is non-binding on the present petitioners.

The Court's dismissal of the PIRMA petition is of no moment. Suffice it to say that we dismissed the PIRMA petition on the principle of res judicata. This was stressed by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., viz:
The following are my reasons as to why this petition must be summarily dismissed:

First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that the former is substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of the roles played by the principal parties and inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable, parties in the present petition. But plainly, the same issues and reliefs are raised and prayed for in both cases.

The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM, MODERNIZATION, AND ACTION (PIRMA) and spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is self-described as "a non-stock, non-profit organization duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403, Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its "officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made respondents as founding members of PIRMA which, as alleged in the body of the petition therein, "proposes to undertake the signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were sued in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.

The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at the hearing of the Delfin petition in the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted that said movement was "[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for brevity." In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the PEDROSAS did not deny that they were founding members of PIRMA, and by their arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that they had joined Delfin or his cause.

No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well as the others joining them, from the operation of the principle of res judicata, which needs no further elaboration. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo adds:
The essential requisites of res judicataare: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.127

Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold that all the elements of res judicata are present. For sure, our Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC, which was promulgated on 19 March 1997, and the motions for reconsideration thereof denied with finality on 10 June 1997, is undoubtedly final. The said Decision was rendered by this Court which had jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition under Rule 65. Our judgment therein was on the merits, i.e., rendered only after considering the evidence presented by the parties as well as their arguments in support of their respective claims and defenses. And, as between Santiago v. COMELEC case and COMELEC Special Matter No. 97-001 subject of the present petition, there is identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.

Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC are not identical to the parties in the instant case as some of the petitioners in the latter case were not parties to the former case. However, a perusal of the records reveals that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC included the COMELEC, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of PIRMA, as well as Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra, another founding member of PIRMA, representing PIRMA, as respondents. In the instant case, Atty. Delfin was never removed, and the spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa were joined by several others who were made parties to the petition. In other words, what petitioners did was to make it appear that the PIRMA Petition was filed by an entirely separate and distinct group by removing some of the parties involved in Santiago v. COMELEC and adding new parties. But as we said in Geralde v. Sabido128 -
A party may not evade the application of the rule of res judicata by simply including additional parties in the subsequent case or by not including as parties in the later case persons who were parties in the previous suit. The joining of new parties does not remove the case from the operation of the rule on res judicata if the party against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the first action; otherwise, the parties might renew the litigation by simply joining new parties.
The fact that some persons or entities joined as parties in the PIRMA petition but were not parties in Santiago v. COMELEC does not affect the operation of the prior judgment against those parties to the PIRMA Petition who were likewise parties in Santiago v. COMELEC, as they are bound by such prior judgment.
Needless to state, the dismissal of the PIRMA petition which was based on res judicata binds only PIRMA but not the petitioners.

VIII

Finally, let the people speak.

"It is a Constitution we are expounding" solemnly intoned the great Chief Justice John Marshall of the United States in the 1819 case of M'cCulloch v. Maryland.129 Our Constitution is not a mere collection of slogans. Every syllable of our Constitution is suffused with significance and requires our full fealty. Indeed, the rule of law will wither if we allow the commands of our Constitution to underrule us.

The first principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is the sovereignty of the people. We ought to be concerned with this first principle, i.e., the inherent right of the sovereign people to decide whether to amend the Constitution. Stripped of its abstractions, democracy is all about who has the sovereign right to make decisions for the people and our Constitution clearly and categorically says it is no other than the people themselves from whom all government authority emanates. This right of the people to make decisions is the essence of sovereignty, and it cannot receive any minimalist interpretation from this Court. If there is any principle in the Constitution that cannot be diluted and is non-negotiable, it is this sovereign right of the people to decide.

This Court should always be in lockstep with the people in the exercise of their sovereignty. Let them who will diminish or destroy the sovereign right of the people to decide be warned. Let not their sovereignty be diminished by those who belittle their brains to comprehend changes in the Constitution as if the people themselves are not the source and author of our Constitution. Let not their sovereignty be destroyed by the masters of manipulation who misrepresent themselves as the spokesmen of the people.

Be it remembered that a petition for people's initiative that complies with the requirement that it "must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein" is but the first step in a long journey towards the amendment of the Constitution. Lest it be missed, the case at bar involves but a proposal to amend the Constitution. The proposal will still be debated by the people and at this time, there is yet no fail-safe method of telling what will be the result of the debate. There will still be a last step to the process of amendment which is the ratification of the proposal by a majority of the people in a plebiscite called for the purpose. Only when the proposal is approved by a majority of the people in the plebiscite will it become an amendment to the Constitution. All the way, we cannot tie the tongues of the people. It is the people who decide for the people are not an obscure footnote in our Constitution.

The people's voice is sovereign in a democracy. Let us hear them. Let us heed them. Let us not only sing paens to the people's sovereignty. Yes, it is neither too soon nor too late to let the people speak.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the resolution of the Commission on Elections dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures thereon and to REMAND the petition at bar to the Commission on Elections for further proceedings.

Endnotes:


1M'cCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).

2 Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.

3 270 SCRA 106, March 19, 1997.

4Id. at 153.

5Id. at 157.

6 Justice Teodoro R. Padilla did not take part in the deliberation as he was related to a co-petitioner and co-counsel of petitioners.

7 Justice Davide (ponente), Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, and Kapunan.

8 Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.

9People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.

10 Amended Petition for Initiative, pp. 4-7.

11 G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.

12 Petition, pp. 12-14.

13 Advisory issued by Court, dated September 22, 2006.

14 Exhibit "B," Memorandum of Petitioner Lambino.

15 Barnhart, Principled Pragmatic Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 80 Notre Dame Law Rev., 1911-1912, (May 2005).

16Ibid.

17Id. at 1913.

18 Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 53 Utah Law Rev. 53, 67 (2002).

19Id. at 68.

20Id. at 69.

21Id. at 67.

22Id. at 69.

23 Consovoy, supra note 18, at 57.

24Id. at 58.

25Id. at 64.

26Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 405-06 (1932) (Justice Brandeis, dissenting).

27Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-492 (Justice Frankfurter, concurring).

28Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89 (1987) (Justice Stevens, dissenting).

29 Barnhart, supra note 15, at 1922.

30Id. at 1921.

31 Filippatos, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 11 Boston College Third World Law Journal, 335, 343 (Summer 1991).

32 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

33 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

34 G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004, 445 SCRA 1.

35 G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377.

36 Barnhart, supra note 15, at 1915.

37 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).

38 Section 5(b).

39Ibid.

40Santiago v. Commission on Elections, supra note 11, at 145.

41 85 RECORD OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 140-142 (February 14, 1989).

42 85 RECORD OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 142-143 (February 14, 1989).

43Zeringue v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 467 So. 2d 1358.

44 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 386, 392 (July 9, 1986).

45Id. at 400, 402-403.

46 V RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 806 (October 10, 1986).

47 Opposition-in-Intervention filed by ONEVOICE, p. 39.

48 Opposition-in-Intervention filed by Alternative Law Groups, Inc., p. 30.

49 Introduction to Political Science, pp. 397-398.

50 Section 1, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.

51 Eighth Edition, p. 89 (2004).

52Ibid.

53Id. at 1346.

54Ibid.

55 Third Edition, p. 67 (1969).

56Id. at 68.

57Id. at 1115.

58 Vicente G. Sinco, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 2nd ed., p. 46.

59 Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, No. L-361432, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 367-368.

60 J. M. Aruego, THE NEW PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION EXPLAINED, iii-iv (1973).

61 E. Quisumbing-Fernando, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, pp. 422-425 (1984).

62 N. Gonzales, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 30 (1969 ed.).

63Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317, 337 quoting Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Alt. 220 (1886).

64 L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 367.

65 I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 373 (July 8, 1986).

66 The opinion was actually made by Justice Felix Antonio.

67Javellana v. Executive Secretary, supra note 64, citing Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 37 S.E.2d 322, 327 (1946).

68 T. M. Cooley, I A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 143-144 (8th ed. 1927).

69 H.C. Black, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW S. 47, p. 67 (2nd ed. 1897).

70 V. Sinco, supra note 58.

71Ibid.

72 No. L-1232, 79 Phil. 819, 826 (1948).

73 IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 735 (September 17, 1986).

74Id. at 752.

75Id. at 769.

76Id. at 767-769.

77Id. at 377.

78Id. at 395.

79 Sinco, supra note 58, at 22.

80Id. at 20-21.

81Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 727.

82 G. Wood, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 530.

83 Sinco, supra note 58, at 29.

84State v. Moore, 103 Ark 48, 145 SW 199 (1912); Whittemore v. Seydel, 74 Cal App 2d 109 (1946).

85Town of Whitehall v. Preece, 1998 MT 53 (1998).

86 G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996, 262 SCRA 492, 516-517, citing 42 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 653.

87 Memorandum for petitioner Aumentado, pp. 151-152.

88Id. at 153-154.

89 L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333, 360-361.

90 Section 2, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution.

91 Annex "3," Opposition-In-Intervention of Oppositors-Intervenors ONEVOICE, INC., et al.

92 Certification dated April 21, 2006 issued by Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Annex "B," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.; Certification dated April 20, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, Annex "C," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.; Certification dated April 26, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Cascuejo, Annex "D," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.

93 Annex "1," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Antonino.

94 Annex "10-A," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al.

95 Annexes 1-29, Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Alternative Law Groups, Inc.

96 Annexes 30-31, Id.

97 Annexes 44-64, Id.

98 Consolidated Reply of Petitioner Aumentado, p. 54.

99 Exhibit "E," Memorandum of Petitioner Lambino.

100 Annex "A," Consolidated Response of Petitioner Aumentado.

101 Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Pimentel, et al., pp. 12-13.

102Helvey v. Wiseman, 199 F. Supp. 200, 8 A.F.T.2d 5576 (1961).

103BNO Leasing Corp. v. Hollins & Hollins, Inc., 448 So.2d 1329 (1984).

104

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

How many copies of the petition, that you mention(ed), did you print?


ATTY. LAMBINO:

We printed 100 thousand of this petition last February and we distributed to the different organizations that were volunteering to support us.


ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

So, you are sure that you personally can say to us that 100 thousand of these were printed?


ATTY. LAMBINO:

It could be more than that, Your Honor.



x x x x x x x x x x x x


ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

But you asked your friends or your associates to re-print, if they can(?)


ATTY. LAMBINO:

Yes, Your Honor.


ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

Okay, so you got 6.3 Million signatures, but you only printed 100 thousand. So you're saying, how many did your friends print of the petition?


ATTY. LAMBINO:

I can no longer give a specific answer to that, Your Honor. I relied only to the assurances of the people who are volunteering that they are going to reproduce the signature sheets as well as the draft petition that we have given them, Your Honor.



x x x x x x x x x x x x


ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

Did you also show this amended petition to the people?


ATTY. LAMBINO:

Your Honor, the amended petition reflects the copy of the original petition that we circulated, because in the original petition that we filed before the COMELEC, we omitted a certain paragraph that is, Section 4 paragraph 3 which were part of the original petition that we circulated and so we have to correct that oversight because that is what we have circulated to the people and we have to correct that...


ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

But you just stated now that what you circulated was the petition of August 25, now you are changing your mind, you're saying what you circulated was the petition of August 30, is that correct?


ATTY. LAMBINO:

In effect, yes, Your Honor.


ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

So, you circulated the petition of August 30, but what you filed in the COMELEC on August 25 was a different petition, that's why you have to amend it?


ATTY. LAMBINO:

We have to amend it, because there was an oversight, Your Honor, that we have omitted one very important paragraph in Section 4 of our proposition.



x x x x x x x x x x x x


ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

Okay, let's be clear. What did you circulate when you gathered the signatures, the August 25 which you said you circulated or the August 30?


ATTY. LAMBINO:

Both the August 25 petition that included all the provisions, Your Honor, and as amended on August 30. Because we have to include the one that we have inadvertently omitted in the August 25 petition, Your Honor.



x x x x x x x x x x x x


ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

And (you cannot tell that) you can only say for certain that you printed 100 thousand copies?


ATTY. LAMBINO:

That was the original printed matter that we have circulated by the month of February, Your Honor, until some parts of March, Your Honor.


ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

That is all you can assure us?


ATTY. LAMBINO:

That is all I can assure you, Your Honor, except that I have asked some friends, like for example (like) Mr. Liberato Laos to help me print out some more of this petition... (TSN, September 26, 2006, pp. 7-17)

105 Section 2 (1), Article IX - C, 1987 Constitution.

106 Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres.

107 Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco and Artemio V. Panganiban.

108 Justice Jose C. Vitug.

109 Only fourteen (14) justices participated in the deliberations as Justice Teodoro R. Padilla took no part on account of his relationship with the lawyer of one of the parties.

110 Citing conscience as ground.

111 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972).

112Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1730 n. 7, 95 L. Ed. 2d (1987); France v. Nelson, 292 Ark. 219, 729 S.W. 2d 161 (1987).

113 40 P. 3d 886 (2006).

114 781 P. 2d 973 (Alaska, 1989).

115Id. at 982-84 (Compton, J., concurring).

116Id. at 975-78.

117Negri v. Slotkin, 244 N.W. 2d 98 (1976).

118 112 Fla. 734, 151 So. 284 (1933).

119 Penned by Justice Whitfield, and concurred in by Chief Justice Davis and Justice Terrell; Justices Ellis, Brown and Buford are of the opinion that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933, is a special or local law not duly advertised before its passage, as required by sections 20 and 21 of article 3 of the state Constitution, and therefore invalid. This evenly divided vote resulted in the affirmance of the validity of the statute but did not constitute a binding precedent on the Court.

120 62 S. Ct. 552 (1942).

121 329 F. 2d 541 (1964).

122 239 F. 2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).

123 Citing Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 30 S. Ct. 621 (1910).

124 331 N.E. 2d 65 (1975).

125Neil v. Biggers, supra note 108.

126Catherwood v. Caslon, 13 Mees. & W. 261; Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H. L. Cas. 274.

127Maglalang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85692, July 31, 1989, 175 SCRA 808, 811, 812; Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, G.R. No. 96921, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 118.

128 No. L-35440, August 19, 1982, 115 SCRA 839, citing Anticamara v. Ong, No. L-29689, April 14, 1978, 82 SCRA 337.

129 Supra note 1.



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October-2006 Jurisprudence                 

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - AZCUNA, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

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  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : CONCURRING OPINION - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

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  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : DISSENTING OPINION - PUNO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

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  • G.R. No. 165757 - GALAXIE STEEL WORKERS UNION (GSWU-NAFLU-KMU), ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 165793 - ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 166281 - JESUS ANGELES, ET AL. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 166901 - ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. v. HON. HELEN BAUTISTA-RICAFORT, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 166401 and G.R. NOS. 158660-67 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO BON

  • G.R. No. 167003 - PANFILO A. ABAIGAR v. JESUS A. ABAIGAR

  • G.R. No. 167071 - RUDY S. AMPELOQUIO, SR. v. ROMEO NAPIZA

  • G.R. No. 167084 - MONINA PUCAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 167146 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATION, INC.

  • G.R. No. 167213 - DARREL CORDERO, ET AL. v. F.S. MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 167502 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PABLO CUDAL

  • G.R. No. 167892 - ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC. v. ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES UNION

  • G.R. No. 167866 - PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED, ET AL. v. PEPE B. PAGDANGANAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 168362 - FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY - DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION (FEU-NRMF), ET AL. v. FEU-NRMF EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS (FEU-NRMFEA-AFW), ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 168773 - ELIZA ABUAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 168943 - IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169328 - JULIAN A. ALZAGA, ET AL. v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169098 - MANUEL BAVIERA v. ROLANDO B. ZOLETA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169430 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY BIDOC y ROQUE

  • G.R. No. 169432 and Formerly G.R. No. 145508 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO TAAN @ "Bebot" CORONA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169652 - ASIAN INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, INC. (AIMS) v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169898 - SPOUSES ANITA AND HONORIO AGUIRRE v. HEIRS OF LUCAS VILLANUEVA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 170453 and G.R. NO. 170518 - NESTOR A. BERNARDINO, ET AL. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 171392 - RUPERTO SULDAO v. CIMECH SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION, INC., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 170473 and Formerly G.R. No. 146283 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNIE TEODORO y CAPARAS

  • G.R. No. 171821 - DANILO "DAN" FERNANDEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 171449 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE D. LARA @ JOSE KALBO

  • G.R. No. 172062 - LORENZO MA. D.G. AGUILAR v. BURGER MACHINE HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 172116 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGER VILLANUEVA

  • G.R. NO. 172401 - CARLOS G. AZUL v. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK

  • G.R. No. 172175 - SPS. EXPEDITO ZEPEDA AND ALICE D. ZEPEDA v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 173253 - DR. RENATO S. MU EZ v. PABLITO L. JOMO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 174340, G.R. NO. 174318 and G.R. NO. 174177 - CAMILO L. SABIO v. RICHARD GORDON, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - AZCUNA, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : DISSENTING OPINION - CHICO-NAZARIO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION - CALLEJO, SR., J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : DISSENTING OPINION - CORONA, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION - PANGANIBAN, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - QUISUMBING, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : CONCURRING OPINION - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - TINGA, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - VELASCO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : SEPARATE OPINION - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 : DISSENTING OPINION - PUNO, J. - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

  • A.C. No. 6678 - JOCELYN A. SAQUING v. ATTY. NOEL A. MORA

  • A.C. No. 6973 - ROBERT FRANCIS F. MARONILLA, ET AL. v. ATTYS. EFREN N. JORDA, ET AL.

  • A.M. No. 06-4-220-RTC - Re: report on the judicial audit conducted in the Regional Trial Court

  • A.M. No. P-01-1523 - Carmelita Chiong v. Sherwin Baloloy

  • A.M. No. P-05-2063 - Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Angelina Casareno-Rillorta, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), SusanLiggayu, Clerk III, and Virginia A. Manuel, Court Stenographer, Branch 21, all of the Regional Trial Court, Santia

  • A.M. No. P-05-2099 - Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2154-P - BRIMEL BAUTISTA v. CLERK OF COURT ABELARDO B. ORQUE, JR.

  • A.M. No. P-06-2261 - ELPIDIO SY v. EDGAR ESPONILLA, ET AL.

  • A.M. No. P-06-2262 - ANGELO C. GUERRERO v. ANTONIO O. MENDOZA

  • A.M. No. RTJ-03-1809 and Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1643-RTJ - BUSILAC BUILDERS, INC., ET AL. v. JUDGE CHARLES A. AGUILAR

  • A.M. No. RTJ-06-1997 - ATTY. JESUS R. DE VEGA v. JUDGE FATIMA G. ASDALA

  • A.M. No. RTJ-06-2024 - TIRSO P. MARIANO v. JUDGE ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 128766 - DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC. v. DOMINADOR JOSE y NAGANO, ET AL.

  • G.R. NOS. 117622-23 - FRANCISCO MOTORS CORP. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 129165 - SPOUSES RODRIGO COLOSO, ET AL. v. HON. SECRETARY ERNESTO V. GARILAO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 129318 - DIRECTOR CELSO PASCUAL v. HON. ORLANDO D. BELTRAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 132955 - ORLANDO VILLANUEVA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 136415 - VIRGILIO P. CEZAR v. HON. HELEN RICAFORT-BAUTISTA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 138463 - HEIRS OF CIPRIANO REYES, ET AL. v. JOSE CALUMPANG, ET AL.

  • G.R. NOS. 138701-02 - SPOUSES ROQUE YU, SR., ET AL. v. BASILIO G. MAGNO CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 140138 - SPS. ANGEL L. SADANG, ET AL. v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 140288 - ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE., LTD. v. GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC.

  • G.R. No. 142601 - NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 141528 - OSCAR P. MALLION v. EDITHA ALCANTARA

  • G.R. No. 143562 - CATALINA L. SANTOS, ET AL. v. PARAÑAQUE KINGS ENTERPRISES, INC.

  • G.R. No. 146313 - FLORENCIO ORENDAIN v. BF HOMES, INC.

  • G.R. No. 146848 - GMA NETWORK, INC., ET AL. v. JESUS G. BUSTOS, M.D., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 147640 and G.R. NO. 147762 - JOWETT K. GOLANGCO v. ATTY. JONE B. FUNG

  • G.R. No. 148261 - NENUCA A. VELEZ v. SHANGRI-LA'S EDSA PLAZA HOTEL, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 149429 - HADJI MAHMUD L. JAMMANG, ET AL. v. TAKAHASHI TRADING CO., LTD., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 149468 - MARIE IOLE NACUA-JAO v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 149723 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD

  • G.R. No. 150135 - SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA, ET AL. v. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 150642 - BENJAMIN G. NAVALTA v. MARCELO S. MULI

  • G.R. No. 151322 - MARIO L. COPUYOC v. ERLINDA DE SOLA

  • G.R. No. 150756 - EDUARDO LEYSON, ET AL. v. PEDRO LAWA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 152921 - RUBEN S. SIA v. ERLINDA M. VILLANUEVA

  • G.R. No. 153144 - VMC RURAL ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE, INC. v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 153206 - ONG ENG KIAM v. LUCITA G. ONG

  • G.R. No. 154284 - BIBIANA FARMS & MILLS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. NOS. 153760-61 - titlexxx

  • G.R. No. 154532 - PETRON CORPORATION, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156304 - ANACLETO R. MENESES, ET AL. v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156536 - JOSEPH CUA v. GLORIA A. VARGAS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156761 - LADY LYDIA CORNISTA-DOMINGO, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156956 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEL MONTE MOTORS, INC.

  • G.R. No. 156965 - FROILAN DE GUZMAN, ET AL. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 156132 - CITIBANK, N.A. (FORMERLY FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK) v. MODESTA R. SABENIANO

  • G.R. No. 157972 - HRS. OF SPS. LUCIANO, ET AL. v. HON. JESUS V. QUITAIN, ET AL.

  • G.R. NOS. 158190-91 & G.R. NOS. 158276 and 158283- NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 158290 - ILARION M. HENARES, JR., ET AL. v. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 158840 - PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. SPS. CESAR VILLAR, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 158620 - DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL. v. MARIANO SALDIVAR, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159268 - BALAGTAS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159098 - SPS. HENRY and ROSARIO UY v. HON. JUDGE ARSENIO P. ADRIANO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159593 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 159659 - RUBEN S. SIA, ET AL. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159862 - HERMONIAS L. LIGANZA v. RBL SHIPYARD CORPORATION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 159810 - ESTATE OF EDWARD MILLER GRIMM v. ESTATE OF CHARLES PARSONS AND PATRICK C. PARSONS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 160061 - ENGINEER LEONARDO C. LEYALEY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 160195 - CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. FLORELIO U. MANZANO

  • G.R. No. 160528 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

  • G.R. No. 160832 - THE HEIRS OF EMILIO SANTIOQUE v. THE HEIRS OF EMILIO CALMA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 160895 - JOSE R. MARTINEZ v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 162342 - JAIME H. BALLAO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 162442 - MANUEL REFUERZO, ET AL. v. HEIRS OF THE LATE FRANCISCO REFUERZO, SR.

  • G.R. No. 162775 - INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION (IBC) v. NOEMI B. AMARILLA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 162839 - INNODATA PHILIPPINES, INC. v. JOCELYN L. QUEJADA-LOPEZ, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 163915 - ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COMFAC CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 164049 - NS TRANSPORT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NSTEA), ET AL. v. NS TRANSPORT SERVICES, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 164375 - RODOLFO PAREDES, ET AL. v. ERNESTO VERANO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 164605 - CATERPILLAR, INC. v. MANOLO P. SAMSON

  • G.R. No. 165027 - PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 165757 - GALAXIE STEEL WORKERS UNION (GSWU-NAFLU-KMU), ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 165793 - ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 166281 - JESUS ANGELES, ET AL. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 166901 - ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. v. HON. HELEN BAUTISTA-RICAFORT, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 166401 and G.R. NOS. 158660-67 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO BON

  • G.R. No. 167003 - PANFILO A. ABAIGAR v. JESUS A. ABAIGAR

  • G.R. No. 167071 - RUDY S. AMPELOQUIO, SR. v. ROMEO NAPIZA

  • G.R. No. 167084 - MONINA PUCAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 167146 - COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATION, INC.

  • G.R. No. 167213 - DARREL CORDERO, ET AL. v. F.S. MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 167502 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PABLO CUDAL

  • G.R. No. 167892 - ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC. v. ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES UNION

  • G.R. No. 167866 - PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED, ET AL. v. PEPE B. PAGDANGANAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 168362 - FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY - DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION (FEU-NRMF), ET AL. v. FEU-NRMF EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS (FEU-NRMFEA-AFW), ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 168773 - ELIZA ABUAN v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 168943 - IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169328 - JULIAN A. ALZAGA, ET AL. v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169098 - MANUEL BAVIERA v. ROLANDO B. ZOLETA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169430 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY BIDOC y ROQUE

  • G.R. No. 169432 and Formerly G.R. No. 145508 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO TAAN @ "Bebot" CORONA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169652 - ASIAN INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, INC. (AIMS) v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 169898 - SPOUSES ANITA AND HONORIO AGUIRRE v. HEIRS OF LUCAS VILLANUEVA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 170453 and G.R. NO. 170518 - NESTOR A. BERNARDINO, ET AL. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

  • G.R. No. 171392 - RUPERTO SULDAO v. CIMECH SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION, INC., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 170473 and Formerly G.R. No. 146283 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNIE TEODORO y CAPARAS

  • G.R. No. 171821 - DANILO "DAN" FERNANDEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 171449 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE D. LARA @ JOSE KALBO

  • G.R. No. 172062 - LORENZO MA. D.G. AGUILAR v. BURGER MACHINE HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 172116 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGER VILLANUEVA

  • G.R. NO. 172401 - CARLOS G. AZUL v. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK

  • G.R. No. 172175 - SPS. EXPEDITO ZEPEDA AND ALICE D. ZEPEDA v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

  • G.R. No. 173253 - DR. RENATO S. MU EZ v. PABLITO L. JOMO, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 174340, G.R. NO. 174318 and G.R. NO. 174177 - CAMILO L. SABIO v. RICHARD GORDON, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. 174153 and G.R. NO. 174299 - RAUL L. LAMBINO, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS