October 2009 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
G.R. No. 169554 - Nieva M. Manebo v. SPO1 Roel D. Acosta, et al.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 169554 : October 28, 2009]
NIEVA M. MANEBO, Petitioner, v. SPO1 ROEL D. ACOSTA and NUMERIANO SAPIANDANTE, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision1 dated August 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83300.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On May 4, 2000, at 6:30 p.m. at Barangay San Mariano, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, Bernadette M. Dimatulac, the victim, and Flordeliza V. Bagasan (Bagasan)2 were seated beside each other on a papag watching television inside the church of the Kaibigan Foundation, Inc. Suddenly, a man later identified as SPO1 Roel Acosta (respondent Acosta), with an unidentified male companion, both with short firearms, entered the church premises. Respondent Acosta approached the victim and Bagasan and, at an arm's length distance, respondent Acosta shot the victim several times on the head and body causing her instantaneous death.
Severino Sardia (Sardia), who was standing in front of his house at Barangay San Mariano, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, heard several gunshots and saw two men with short firearms run out of the Kaibigan Foundation, Inc. Chapel. The two men immediately boarded an owner-type jeep without a plate number parked along Maharlika Highway and proceeded to the direction going to San Leonardo town. While the driver of the jeep was in the process of backing up his vehicle, Sardia recognized the driver as Numeriano Sapiandante (respondent Sapiandante), the Barangay Captain of Barangay Tagumpay, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija.
A complaint for murder was filed by Nieva Manebo (Manebo), sister of the victim, against respondents Acosta and Sapiandante before the Special Action Unit (SAU) of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
The findings of the SAU recommending the filing of a murder case against respondents and a certain John Doe was referred to the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor (OCSP), Department of Justice (DOJ), for preliminary investigation.3 Respondents, in turn, filed directly with the DOJ
a counter-charge of perjury, offering false witness and violation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1829 against Manebo, Bagasan, and Sardia.4
Respondents denied the accusations against them. Respondent Acosta claimed that on May 4, 2000, he was on a special assignment in San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, pursuant to a directive issued by Police Chief Inspector Fernando Galang; that there was no reason for him to kill the victim, as he had no grudge against her; that Bagasan's description of him did not fit his physical attributes; that there was a substitution of witness, considering that the person beside the victim when she was shot was identified in the police report as Liza Gragasan and not Flordeliza Bagasan. Respondent Acosta also presented the affidavits of his witnesses corroborating his claim that he was in San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija at the time of the shooting incident.
Respondent Sapiandante denied that he was the driver of the get-away vehicle, as he did not know how to drive nor was he a holder of a driver's license; that Sardia had a grudge against him because of the dismissal of the case filed by the former against him; and that respondent Acosta never testified for him in a case, contrary to Sardia's claim.
On January 22, 2001, State Prosecutor Melvin J. Abad issued a Joint Resolution,5 approved by the Chief State Prosecutor, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the foregoing Joint Resolution be approved and the attached information for murder against respondents SPO1 Roel D. Acosta, Bgy. Captain Numeriano R. Sapiandante, and a certain John Doe be filed before the proper court and that the counter-charge for perjury, offering false witness, and violation for P.D. 1829 against Severino S. Sardia, Flordeliza Bagasan and Nieva M. Manebo be dismissed for lack of merit.6
On the same day, an Information7 for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Cabanatuan City against respondents and a certain John Doe, committed as follows:
That on or about May 4, 2000, at around 6:30 p.m. in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said three (3) accused, two (2) being armed, conspiring, confederating and acting together, and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with malice, intent to kill and treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one BERNADETTE M. DIMATULAC, with accused SPO1 Roel D. Acosta suddenly and unexpectedly firing several shots at her with the use of his firearm and accused John Doe and Numeriano Sapiandante, acting as back-up and driver, respectively, thereby inflicting upon the said BERNADETTE M. DIMATULAC mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Respondents filed their motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution8 dated March 2, 2001.
On March 23, 2001, respondents filed their appeal with the DOJ Secretary.
In the meantime, the herein murder case filed in the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, was transferred to the RTC of Manila, Branch 18, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-196354. Alias warrants of arrest9 for respondents were issued on February 28, 2003.
On June 27, 2003, the DOJ Secretary issued his Resolution10 reversing the appealed resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution is hereby REVERSED. The Chief State Prosecutor is directed to move for the withdrawal of the information filed against respondents and to report the action taken hereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.11
In so ruling, the DOJ said:
Undoubtedly, denial and alibi are inherently weak for they can easily be fabricated and is invariably received with caution. Truly, alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of an accused. Nevertheless, this judicial dictum presupposes the absence of any doubt as to the positive identification of the accused. In other words, the prosecution is not relieved of the required quantum of proof simply because the defense invoked is alibi. Where questionable, alibi assumes strength and significance which is the situation in the present case.
Immediately after receiving a call from a certain Marlon de Guzman regarding the incident, Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Peter Guibong led the investigation of the case and prepared a report. In the course thereof, it was gathered that the victim was shot while watching television in the company of one Liza Gragasan. Still in a state of shock, Gragasan was then not available to provide any information as regards the incident. Nonetheless, PCI Guibong sent a formal letter to Gragasan to provide information on the shooting incident. Gragasan never responded to the invitation.
Comes now, instead, a certain Flordeliza Bagasan who executed an affidavit after more than four (4) months alleging that she was seated beside the victim and witnessed the actual shooting. In turn, Bagasan gave a description of the assailant which, admittedly, does not fit the physical attributes of respondent Acosta. Complainant Manebo could only ascribe the variance to the insinuation that respondent Acosta, short of undergoing plastic surgery, altered his image to avoid being recognized. This is rather too strenuous to be believed.
Under the circumstances, Bagasan's presence at the crime scene when the crime was being committed is highly suspect. Bagasan's delayed testimony coupled with an erroneous description, casts a thick cloud of doubt on her credibility. Such testimony deserves no consideration at all.
The same is true with the testimony of witness Sardia as regards the alleged participation of respondent Sapiandante. Sardia was not among those mentioned in the police report. Surprisingly, his testimony was likewise belatedly executed. Granting that he was already a resident of the barangay where the incident occurred, no reason was given as to why it took him a long period of time to give a statement about the killing. Fear could not have been the reason because as early as June 1998, he filed a complaint for attempted murder against Sapiandante which was later dismissed. As it were, the victim, involved in several criminal incidents, likewise filed a number of cases rooted from the complaint of one Alicia Yambot against Sardia as reported by PCI Guibong. Sardia's testimony may also not be given credence with respect to respondent Acosta since he did not witness the actual shooting of the victim.
All told, the evidence against respondents Acosta and Sapiandante lack the required quantum of proof sufficient to indict them for the offense charged.12
Pursuant to the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw the Information.
Petitioner filed an appeal13 with the Office of the President (OP) which, on January 27, 2004 rendered its Decision14 dismissing the appeal and affirming in toto the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. The OP found the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the DOJ Secretary to be amply supported by substantial evidence.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the OP in an Order15 dated March 5, 2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 43 with the CA.
Meanwhile, the RTC of Manila, Branch 18, issued an Order16 dated June 22, 2004, which resolved to suspend the resolution on the motion to withdraw information filed by the prosecutor, considering that respondents were still at-large and had not been prejudiced by the Petition for Review filed with the CA and also in deference to the appellate court. The RTC likewise ruled for the suspension of the implementation of the warrants of arrest for respondents as moved by the respondents' counsel until after the resolution of the petition filed before the CA.
On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
The CA said that the OP committed no error in affirming the resolution of the DOJ Secretary; that courts will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor a sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against the offender. The CA found that all was not lost for petitioner, since the denial of her petition did not mean an automatic dismissal of the information following the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, as the RTC was mandated to independently evaluate the merits of the case; and it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the DOJ Secretary, since reliance on the latter alone would be an abdication of the RTC's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.
Hence, this petition, which raises the following issues:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Justice committed grave errors in the appreciation of facts and of laws in recommending the dismissal of the complaint based solely on the matters, which are best, determined during a full-blown trial.
Whether or not the Secretary of Justice may disregard the provisions of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which became effective on September 1, 2000, particularly Sections 5 and 6.
Whether or not there is probable cause to charge the respondents for the crime of murder.17
We shall first resolve the second issue, where petitioner claims that the appeal filed by respondents with the Secretary of Justice should have been denied for their failure to comply with Sections 5 and 6 of Department Circular No. 7018 issued by the Department of Justice on September 1, 2000.
Section 5. Contents of the Petition.
x x x
If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, a copy of the motion to defer proceedings filed in court must also accompany the petition.
x x x
Section 6. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. - The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall constitute sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Respondents filed their Petition for Review with the DOJ Secretary on March 23, 2001. On August 20, 2001, they filed with the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, a Motion to Suspend Proceedings19 pending a final determination of the merits of their petition by the DOJ Secretary. On August 27, 2001, respondents filed with the DOJ a document captioned as Compliance20 where they submitted the motion to suspend proceedings filed in the RTC. Notably, the motion to suspend proceedings was only filed with the RTC after respondents had already filed their Petition for Review with the DOJ which explains why the petition was not accompanied by a motion to suspend proceedings. Notably, immediately after the motion to suspend proceeding was filed with the RTC, respondents submitted a copy of such motion with the DOJ. Under the circumstances, we hold that there was substantial compliance with the requirements under Section 5 of Department Circular No.70.
The first and third issues refer to the question of whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the Office of the President, which adopted the finding of the DOJ Secretary that there was no probable cause to indict respondents for murder.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.21 However, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of justice.22 We find that the present case warrants the application of the exception.???�r?bl?�
